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ABSTRACT 
The governance of information technology (IT) service provision entails all those 
elements of the structure and process of contracting and organisation that are 
necessary in order to deliver effective and efficient IT services within today's 
organisations. This thesis develops a framework integrating those elements of 
governance with a view to explaining actual governance structures and to guiding 
relevant decisions in practice. 
Until the late 1980s, the principal concerns with respect to the organisation of IT 
activities revolved around the issues of centralisation versus decentralisation and 
end-user computing versus specialist control. Whilst contracts for various systems 
and services have always been a significant part of the IT department's activity, the 
issue of structuring such contracts took a prominent position on the management 
agenda in the beginning of 1990s with the proliferation of large contracts of the 
`total outsourcing' kind. IT outsourcing rekindled interest in and reshaped the 
agenda of the organisation of IT provision. The debate on IT outsourcing provided 
the motivation and the starting point of this thesis. 
Thus, chapter 1 reviews this debate and, following on the opinion of others, recasts 
the question of `whether to outsource or not' as `how to set up the governance (i. e. 
the structure and process of contracting and organisation) of IT service provision'. 
In order to shed some light on the elements of governance, chapter 2 turns on a 
range of economic theories of the firm. These theories are critically reviewed and 
some preliminary suggestions as to how they might inform the governance of IT are 
put forth. The chapter concludes by setting the theoretical foundations for the rest 
of the thesis. The notion of a governance continuum between the ideal pure market 
and the ideal pure hierarchy is introduced. Actual governance structures, it is 
argued, can be placed on this continuum as individual instances. 
Before advancing onto more substantive work, chapter 3 pauses to reflect on the 
epistemological basis of this research project. The main principles of the 
epistemological position adopted here are taken from the philosophical arguments 
vii 
of transcendental realism. The implications of this epistemological position for the 
empirical methods and the theoretical claims made in this thesis are also examined. 
Chapter 4 documents an intensive case study at British Petroleum Plc. The purpose 
of this case study was to draw lessons from practice and to assess the relevance of 
the theories of chapter 2. This case study was an interactive learning process 
through which the researcher sought access to management practice in order to 
assess economic theories, while the managers at BP sought a broader understanding 
of IT outsourcing. The outcome of this interaction was the S-CAGE framework 
which coupled theoretical insights with practical relevance. 
The S-CAGE (Service Clustering And Governance Establishment) framework is 
described in detail in chapter 5. It is put forth as both an explanatory and a 
normative account of the governance of IT service provision. It is based on the 
notion of governance continuum, it introduces the idea of grouping services into 
clusters and it provides a classification of the elements of governance that should be 
customised to the characteristics of each cluster of services. 
Chapter 6 presents two further case studies aimed at evaluating the usefulness of S- 
CAGE in understanding and explaining alternative outsourcing practices. ICI and 
Anglian Water have been visited for this purpose. On the basis of these cases, the 
concluding chapter summarises the strengths and limitations of the proposed 
framework. An attempt is also made to set forth some preliminary theoretical ideas 
extending the notions of clustering and governance continuum. The thesis 
concludes with a final short illustration of the use of the S-CAGE framework. 
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From `Outsourcing Versus 
Insourcing' To The Governance 
Of Information Technology 
CHAPTER ONE Services 
1. Introduction 
Information technology outsourcing is a contentious issue in both the academic and 
practitioner communities. It appears to have strong followers as well as fierce 
opponents as it has demonstrated both successes and failures. This thesis aspires to 
delve deeper into the management phenomenon and to observe the trends without 
being carried away by the outsourcing bandwagon. The aim is to make a 
contribution both to our understanding as well as to the improvement of the 
management practice of outsourcing 
On 28 November 1996 Computer Weekly presented news of two completely 
opposite approaches to IS organisation. David Jones, then managing director of the 
information systems division of Scottish Power, is quoted saying that 
"you can make tactical use of outsourcing, say for sunset systems, but the 
IT strategy must remain internal, as should systems that are competitive 
... I can offer [our internal customers] BMW services at a 
Ford Escort 
price. "(yowler 1996) 
The second news article is about Ford's £27 million contract with software house 
Logica. Ford UK, having outsourced various parts of their IT activity, assigned the 
management of their entire IT supply chain toLogica. Moreover, Ford hopes in the 
long run to appoint a single company to manage its IT supplyworld-wide (Black 
1996). It seems that it is not only the technical capability that Ford does not want to 
maintain in-house but the management and coordination of suppliers as well. 
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Both companies are large and highly successful in their respective markets. Yet 
each follows a completely different approach with respect to the use of external 
vendors for IT services. Moreover, as Valor et al (1993) found, companies 
outsourcing their IT services display greater diversity of opinion among senior 
managers with regards to outsourcing, as compared to companies running 
traditional IT departments. How can one make sense of such contradictory opinions 
and practices in a dynamic technological and market environment? 
Examples of diverse approaches and practices when companies decide to contract 
out some parts of their IT abound (e. g. Griese 1993, Altinkemer et al 1994, 
Pinnington and Woolcock 1994, Sobol and Apte 1995). In 1996 ICI announced, a 
five year contract with Origin, worth £75 million. It was believed to be the largest 
such contract in the chemicals industry up to then. The deal was considered 
beneficial for both parties, as ICI managed to downsize without resorting to 
redundancies and Origin used this contract and the skills acquired as a springboard 
to expand its business in the UK. 
When Gloucester County Council in England decided to switch from one facilities 
management supplier to another, it faced strong resistance from the incumbent 
supplier's employees (former council staff) whose jobs were threatened. Both the 
Council and the new supplier hoped that staff would also transfer to the new 
supplier. They, however, decided to remain with the same employer who, in turn, 
tried to find jobs for them within the group and denied access to staff by the new 
supplier who wanted to make job offers to them. The existing staff has company- 
specific knowledge of the systems and operations and is invaluable both to the 
1 "Staff are winners as ICI goes Dutch for FM deal", Computer Weekly, February 8,1996. 
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council and to the new supplier. This is an interesting case of the costs of switching 
IT service provider2. 
Rolls-Royce entered into a £300m IT outsourcing contract with EDS. According to 
the contract, EDS and its consultancy division, AT Kearney, make their own 
investment in new IT for Rolls-Royce in the expectation that it will lead to efficiency 
savings at the customer site, resulting in job cuts. If it succeeds, EDS will receive a 
share of the savings. If it fails, it will have to write off its investment costs3 (Ulset 
1996). 
Other examples include RAC which separated mainframe operations and support 
from software development for the mainframe and assigned each service to a 
different supplier4. The insurance company Sun Alliance transferred 140 staff to 
IBM as part of another outsourcing deals. The contract of DuPont with CSC and 
Andersen consulting is considered the largest in the world, worth £2.6 billion and 
involving more than 4000 IT staffs. 
Meanwhile, it seems that some companies make a call for tenders for the sole 
purpose of benchmarking their internal operations and getting ideas for improving 
them, without any serious intention of hiring a vendor. As a consequence, IT 
suppliers have become wary of such attempts because of the time and effort 
required to write proposals. 
2 Collins T (1996), 'Staff rebel against FM supplier change', Computer Weekly, Thursday 5 December, 
p. 1. 
3 Collins T. (1997), "EDS secures £300m Rolls-Royce power group outsourcing deal", Computer 
Weekly, Thursday 9 January, p. 2. 
4 Collins T (1997), 'Two FM suppliers to get share of RAC business', Computer Weekly, Thursday 16 
January, p. 6. 
5 "IBM clinches Sun Alliance outsourcing deal", Computer Weekly, February 29 1996. 
6 Collins T (1997), 'DuPont gives FM suppliers equal share of $4bn deal', Computer Weekly, Thursday 
2 January, p. 2. 
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The public sector is also a very large user of IT outsourcing contracts, at least in the 
UK (Srowger, 1993; Currie, 1996). As part of the Competing For Quality (CFQ) 
initiative the UK public sector has outsourced a large part of its IT services, 10% of 
which is said to have been awarded to EDS7. Major government departments such 
as the Inland Revenue and the Department of Social Security have outsourced the 
whole of their IT operations to EDS. In September 1996 the press published 
information about the UK government's plans to outsource some or all IT services 
of the Ministry of Defence intelligence services, despite the sensitivity and 
confidentiality of the systems and datas. 
Outsourcing is not new nor is it limited to IT. It is being widely adopted in various 
business domains such as project management, accounting, manufacturing, 
logistics and distribution (Szymankiewicz 1993, Ward and Chapman 1994, 
Rothery and Robertson 1995). In the area of information technology, timesharing 
bureaux were common in the 1960s and 1970s and facilities management became 
common later on (Grover et al 1994). Software development has perhaps been the 
most widespread case of subcontracting for IT by all types and sizes of companies 
(Rands 1992). There are significant analogies between outsourcing various 
business activities and IT but differences are also substantial. Willcocks and Lacity 
(1995) and Alpar and Saharia (1995) have attempted a comparison. Among the 
differences they quote, three are highlighted. First, the elusive nature of 
information as a fundamental part of information systems. Second, the rapidly 
changing nature of information technologies and their characteristics. Third, the 
ubiquitous penetration of IT into all areas of business, making it difficult to draw a 
clear boundary around it. In general, inasmuch as outsourcing car parts is different 
to outsourcing catering services, IT outsourcing presents its own idiosyncrasies. 
Consequently, this thesis focuses on outsourcing IT services and the peculiarities 
Computer Weekly, 16 May 1996, p. 1. 
8 Computer Weekly, 5 September 1996, pp. 1,29. 
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involved, while many of the discussions and propositions are expected to be more 
widely applicable. 
The IT outsourcing market is still growing at an increasing rate, particularly after 
the well known case of Kodak (Loh and Venkatraman 1992a). According to 
International Data Corporation in 1991, the IT outsourcing market was expanding 
at a rate of 20% per annum and it was expected to reach E1013 million by 19959. 
In 1992 The Yankee Group estimated that total revenues for all types of 
outsourcing totalled $33 billion and was expected to reach $49 billion in 199410. 
The US IT outsourcing market was estimated at $22.8 billion in 1988, $29 billion 
in 1990 and was expected to reach $49.5 billion by 1994". 
Hurst and Hanessian (1995) report that external providers command a substantial 
share of total spending on applications: 19% world-wide and 30% in the US, 
excluding PC applications. In 1995 the US market for IT outsourcing was the 
biggest, estimated to exceed $18.2 billion (Patane and Jurison, 1994). According to 
INPUT12, the total IT outsourcing market in Europe was estimated at $4600 million 
in 1994 and at $5750 million in 1995. It is projected to reach $14300 million by 
the turn of the century. The 1995 figure comprises of applications operations 
(47%), platform operations (21%), desktop services (11%), network management 
(11%), business operations (5%) and applications management (5%). 
Despite the well publicised successes, IT outsourcing has not been a pleasant 
experience for all the companies that have tried it. Lacity et al (1995) report that of 
14 decisions to outsource the bulk of IT, senior managers declared 3 failures, 9 
others seemed to be at risk of failing and only 2 decisions, involving data centres (a 
9 "The impact of facilities management on the IT market", International Data Corporation, London, 
1991. 
10 Network World, February 1992, pp. 1,31-36. 
11 ComputerWorld, 25 June 1990, pp. 122. 
12 Information Systems Outsourcing Market Europe 1995-2000, INPUT, London, 1995. 
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fairly standard service), were successful. Of the 15 decisions to keep most IT 
services in-house, 5 failed to produce the anticipated cost reductions or service 
improvements. The other 10 were successful from the senior management 
perspective but users felt that service levels had deteriorated. 
As a response to the problems of total insourcing and total outsourcing, 
organisations now seem to be taking a middle road. In 1996 Dataquest published 
evidence showing that while the total number of IT outsourcing contracts continues 
to rise, the average value of contracts started to decrease in 1995. This indicates 
that total outsourcing contracts are proving less popular and companies are 
tending to favour more selective `out-tasking'. This appears to be a more successful 
approach as suggested by the study by Lacity et al (1995). Of the 32 selective 
outsourcing decisions they studied, 20 met top management's objectives and 3 were 
complete failures. At the time of the study it was too soon to determine the 
outcomes of the remaining 9 decisions. 
It becomes apparent that over time the practice of outsourcing has been continually 
changing. Sporadic contracts for software development and facilities management, 
gave way to total outsourcing `mega-deals'; strategies ranged from selective 'out- 
tasking' to subcontracting the management of the whole IT supply chain. One way 
of capturing this moving target is to recast the research question in a more relevant 
way. It appears that the question as to whether companies should outsource their IT 
or not is too limiting and fails to give rise to adequate explanations of observed 
practices. The purpose of this chapter is to trace the progress made so far by 
academic IS research in studying the outsourcing phenomenon and generate some 
insight as to how should the research question be formed. 
The following section attempts to consolidate the various proposed definitions of 
outsourcing in a critical manner. Section 3 reviews the drivers for outsourcing and 
the expectations companies have from it while also examining the actual benefits 
achieved or risks faced. Next, a number of decision making frameworks are 
6 
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reviewed in an attempt to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of each with a 
view to demonstrating the evolving understanding of IT outsourcing within the IS 
community. Subsequently, the approaches taken and the advances made, in terms 
of applying mainstream economic theories to IT outsourcing, are examined. Section 
6 looks at the prevailing theories on the structure and governance of the IT 
function and draws implications for our understanding of outsourcing. The chapter 
concludes by recapitulating the main theoretical advances so far and by setting the 
target of this thesis. 
2. Towards a definition of outsourcing 
A range of new `buzzwords' have been introduced with the expansion of contracts 
for IT services. When 80% or more of an organisation's IT budget is outsourced, it 
tends to be called total outsourcing (Willcocks and Fitzgerald 1994a). However, 
outsourcing, insourcing, rightsourcing, smartsourcing (Willcocks and Fitzgerald 
1994c), transitional outsourcing (Winder 1994) and out-tasking are some of these 
newly introduced terms, used to describe a variety of forms of IT contracting. They 
tend to be over-used and abused resulting in the loss of any specific meaning they 
might have had. These terms are employed on the basis of a generic, common sense 
understanding and in the absence of more exact terminology they are also used in 
research contexts where more precision is normally required. 
In the broader business context, the Director General of the International 
Federation of Purchasing and Materials Management defines outsourcing as 
'finding new suppliers and new ways to secure the delivery of raw materials, goods, 
components and services [It means that you] use the knowledge, experience and 
creativity of new suppliers which you did not use previouslf (Rothery and 
Robertson 1995, p. 4). 
Besides such practitioner conceptions of outsourcing, academic researchers have 
attempted to provide more accurate definitions. However, even these attempts are 
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often constrained by the purposes of the research project from which they emanate. 
For example, some definitions limit the types of IT services they encompass. 
In some instances, definitions of outsourcing are limited to particular activities or 
services. Rosenberg and Macaulay (1993) distinguish between physical (e. g. data 
centres, desktops, networks) and logical (payroll, billing, cash management) 
outsourcing, thus emphasising a technical and a functional perspective. Consulting, 
after sale services, and leased lines are excluded by Cheon et al (1995) and Grover 
et al (1996) who adopt a very broad definition of IS outsourcing as turning over 
part of all IS functions to an external provider. 
Another narrow definition is given by Lacity and Hirschheim (1994). They focus 
on moving IT activities from in-house to external provision, thus excluding the use 
of contractors for new systems or services. In a similar effort, driven by a given 
research project, Heinzl (1993) distinguishes `internal IS outsourcing' as the 
assignment of IS service provision to a subsidiary (a spun-off IS department or an 
acquired IT company, closely controlled through "capital and personal ties') from 
`external outsourcing' (i. e. long-term service contracts to `independent' suppliers). 
A much more focused approach is followed by Alpar and Saharia (1995) who 
define IS outsourcing as an intermediate to long-term arrangement between an 
outsourcing firm and one or more independent vendors who are contracted to 
provide the firm repeatedly with various information systems services throughout 
the life of the contract. Resource transfer is not part of their definition which 
implicitly also excludes project-based contracts in favour of time-based 
agreements. 
Often, a general description of the main apparent elements of an outsourcing deal 
is given in the definition. For example, Loh and Venkatraman (1992b) define 
outsourcing as the significant contribution by external vendors in the physical 
and/or human resources associated with the entire or specific components of the IT 
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infrastructure in the user organisation. Similarly, for Clark et al (1995) 
outsourcing is the delegation by contractual arrangement, of all or any part of the 
technical resources, the human resources and the management responsibilities 
associated with providing IT services to an external vendor. Kern and Willcocks 
(1996) define IS outsourcing as a decision taken by an organisation to contract out 
or sell the organisation's IT assets, people and/or activities to a third party vendor 
who in return provides the services, for a certain time period and monetary fee. 
The above definitions tend to describe the relevant decisions or actions taken by 
companies in a general way and do not specify what distinguishes outsourcing 
from other forms of contractual agreements between IT suppliers and client 
organisations. Moreover, no systematic comparative studies have been found in the 
literature examining the differences between what is currently understood by 
outsourcing and other, more traditional (before the term outsourcing became 
common), forms of IT contracting. 
Nevertheless, some important contributions have been made by the introduction of 
the notions of management, control and ownership in definitions of outsourcing. 
According to one such definition, outsourcing is "the commissioning of third party 
management of IT assets, people and/or activities to required result. This can and 
often does involve a degree of transfer of assets and staff to the third party 
organisation" (Willcocks and Fitzgerald 1994a, 1993a; Fitzgerald and Willcocks 
1994a). Within the same logic, Feeny et al (1993) distinguish insourcing as the 
contracts according to which the market provides resources to be deployed under 
the buyer's management and control. In a similar but more formal way, Loh and 
Venkatraman (1992a) define outsourcing as the transfer of property or decision 
rights in varying degrees over the IT infrastructure by a user organisation to an 
external organisation such as a technology vendor or a systems integrator. 
One common thread is readily apparent among the definitions reviewed above. IT 
outsourcing is a contract for the provision of IT services between two firms, namely 
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the user or client and the supplier or vendor. This immediately excludes at least one 
important contracting mode, that of fixed term (non-employment) contracts 
between a firm and an individual programmer, technician or consultant. This 
broad definition of outsourcing which is more formally specified by Loh and 
Venkatraman (1992a), seems to coincide with the common sense understanding of 
the term which tends not to exclude any forms of subcontracting, although the 
`purest' and ultimate form of outsourcing seems to be total outsourcing. 
Within this broad spectrum of contracting practices, certain defining parameters 
prevail. These are the notions of management, control, ownership, decision rights, 
contract characteristics, duration and number of services involved. These elements 
will be examined in later parts of the thesis. In the absence of a precise definition of 
outsourcing, the term is being used in this thesis in a generic manner unless 
otherwise specified. Whenever needed, reference is made to large `total' 
outsourcing contracts, as defined above, or to other specific forms of contracting. 
3. Drivers, expectations, benefits and risks 
The study of the benefits and costs of outsourcing has attracted a lot of attention 
from IS academics. It is often observed that purported benefits of outsourcing in 
initially attractive deals turn out to become risks or symptoms of failure (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1993a). The typical example is that of heralded cost reductions. Some 
companies fail to see cost reductions and they often experience cost increases. 
Another example is the claim for flexibility. Apart from the issue of technical 
flexibility discussed previously, commercial flexibility is also at risk as outsourcing 
decisions, particularly large ones involving all IT operations, are difficult and costly 
to reverse or even to switch to alternative suppliers (Willcocks and Fitzgerald, 
1994c). 
In such a relationship where both parties are tied to each other, the client is subject 
to supplier opportunism which is usually manifested in subtle ways rather than in 
terms of major contract breaches. Since IT contracts are inherently incomplete, 
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vendors are particularly keen to designate a particular user demand as work that is 
out-of-the-scope of the contract that has to be charged separately. This is a source 
of increased costs and subsequent friction in the buyer-supplier relationship. A 
typical example of the conditions that emerge in large outsourcing arrangements is 
described in the following quotation by the Director of Business Services of the 
Inland Revenue in the UK, two years into the contract (Macintyre, 1996): 
"... in general things are going well... on the days when it gets a 
bit rough, and it does get a bit rough, we have to constantly 
remind ourselves that we are heading towards the samegoals " 
Some commentators in the field suggest that outsourcing does not solve any 
problems or troubles that a company may face with the management of IT. On the 
contrary, it is likely to exacerbate any such problems because a supplier has little or 
no incentive to improve a problematic condition as long as it is profitable for them. 
Typically, some sort of baseline measurement is employed to determine service level 
requirements. A contract specifying service levels set on the basis of a problematic 
operation, only ensures that the operation remains problematic. Yet, many 
companies appear to resort to outsourcing as a means of correcting their existing IT 
operations, or getting rid of the problems they face. Moreover, client organisations 
sometimes lack the necessary expertise to manage such contracts and fall prey to 
the vendor's experience with a number of clients. The importance of management 
involvement is highlighted by the research of Saarinen and Saaksjarvi (1993). 
Nonetheless, from a survey of Fortune 500 companies, Loh and Vankatraman 
(1995) found that IT outsourcing is, overall, being successfully exploited in the 
sense that it is associated with improved firm performance, despite the large 
number of threats and risk that have been identified (Peak and Windson 1993, 
Peak 1994, Earl 1996). 
Following the research by Gupta and Gupta (1992), Ketler and Walstrom (1993), 
Clark and Zmud (1993), Lacity et al (1994,1995), Venkatraman and Loh (1994), 
Khosrowpour (1994), Fitzgerald (1994), Clark et al (1995) and Grover et al 
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(1996), the drivers of, or expected benefits from outsourcing can be consolidated 
under four categories: financial and economic, business (including strategy and 
organisation), technological and political. In the following sections, these are 
considered in turn. 
3.1. Financial and economic eectatlons 
The financial costs and benefits of IT outsourcing are widely contested (McLellan et 
al, 1995). Perhaps the most commonly quoted reason for outsourcing is cost 
reduction. These cost reductions are said to be based on economies of scale and 
scope that specialised suppliers can achieve. The existence of such economies is, 
however, questionable. There are relatively few studies estimating scale economies 
(e. g. Barron 1992, West 1994) and they are limited to the performance of 
mainframes (e. g. Mendelson 1987, Minoli 1995) and to software development and 
maintenance (e. g. Banker and Kemerer 1989, Banker and Slaughter, 1994). 
However, mainframe operation and software development are only parts of a 
multitude of IT services being contracted out. Moreover, from those studies, it 
appears that mainframes display constant or diminishing returns to scale and that 
the efficient size of mainframe capacity in MIPS is fairly low and easily attainable 
even by medium-sized companies. On the other hand, there seem to be substantial 
economies of scale in software development and maintenance, primarily due to 
learning effects and the use of formal tools and techniques. 
Large corporations can often achieve a large scale on their own. They can thus 
provide the services they need as efficiently as the market. Telecommunications and 
wide area networks have been such cases before the deregulation of the respective 
markets. Large companies had their own, proprietary telecommunications 
infrastructure as prices were set too high by state-owned monopolies. Nonetheless, 
such multinationals were the ones that first initiated large outsourcing contracts, 
when the telecommunications markets started becoming competitive. Recent 
developments in telecommunications technologies also spurred further growth in 
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the market. In this respect, empirical evidence seems to support Adam Smith's 
proposition that the division of labour is limited by the size of the market (Stigler 
1968), while showing that the presence of scale economies on its own is not a 
sufficient determinant of outsourcing. 
Apart from scale economies, resource utilisation appears to be a fairly plausible 
reason for outsourcing, particularly for those IT services which are characterised 
by significant demand variations over time. For example, demand for mainframe 
access and processing power may be higher during the end of the financial quarter 
or year but significantly lower the rest of the time. Similarly, systems development 
skills are required in large numbers only for the duration of the project. By 
outsourcing a poorly utilised resource companies can limit their cost to the amount 
of the resource they actually use. This tactic presupposes that the supplier can 
balance the resource demands from its various customers. If not, cost reductions 
cannot be achieved. Thomson Holidays decided to outsource mainframe operations 
(but not the development and maintenance of the respective software) partly 
because they make little use of mainframe capacity during slack periods of the year 
but need considerable capacity to cope with surges in demand for holidays13. 
According to the same news article, IBM (one of the vendors invited to tender) 
found that Thomson's busy periods coincide with slumps in mainframe demand 
from other customers. 
It appears that some of the expected cost reductions are not based on hard evidence 
but rather on the promises of suppliers who bid aggressively for IT service 
contracts, in anticipation of a long term contract which would subsequently bring 
them in superior negotiating position (Whang 1995), The supply of hardware and 
software has become a low-margin business for vendors (IDS and WBS 1994). 
Bundling the provision of hardware, software and support services, which have 
13 Collins, T (1997), "Thomson plans a holiday from running mainframes", Computer Weekly, 13 
February 1997, p. 4. 
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varying profit margins, into large outsourcing contracts appears to be a more 
profitable strategy for them as it allows them to offer a competitive overall price 
while ensuring acceptable profit. Amongst the services currently offered by 
outsourcers, some (e. g. desktop support) are considered more lucrative than others 
(e. g. data centres). The marketing strategies of suppliers may therefore play a 
significant role in the decision of potential clients to outsource. 
The anticipated cost reductions from outsourcing IT rarely materialise. Either 
because the vendor's original bid was unrealistic or because suppliers do not enjoy 
inherent cost advantages, client organisations have faced less than expected savings 
or even cost increases (Lacity and Willcocks 1995, Willcocks and Lacity 1995). 
Failed expectations are not the only sources of increased costs. Incomplete contract 
specification is another reason. Quite often companies find themselves charged 
separately for work not specified in the original contract. For these additional, 
incremental costs, suppliers take the opportunity to charge relatively high mark- 
ups (Willcocks and Fitzgerald 1994c). 
A purely financial reason for outsourcing is that companies typically receive a 
substantial amount of cash in return for selling their IT assets to the supplier. This 
has several positive side-effects on their accounting books (Clark and Zmud 1993, 
Grover et al 1996). First, the net cash infusion can be used to finance other, 
perhaps problematic, areas of the business. Second, the company reduces its capital 
asset base. Third, a large number of employees are eliminated from the payroll as 
they are usually transferred to the supplier. 
Other financial benefits reportedly expected from outsourcing include the 
conversion from fixed to variable costs, greater predictability of IT expenses and 
better accountability and control over costs. Sometimes, these expectations also fail 
to materialise. Although capital costs are reduced, costs rarely become truly 
variable as contracts typically specify fixed fees. Expenses are also not entirely 
predictable, mainly due to additional work, not specified in the contract (Willcocks 
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and Fitzgerald, 1994c). The formality of accountability and control as opposed to 
informal and ad hoc procedures in traditional IT departments is, however, a more 
universally admitted benefit of outsourcing. 
3.2. Slrateg/c and organisational benefits and risks 
Outsourcing is considered to have the potential to provide a basis for organisational 
alignment, mainly in terms of incentives and in terms of business and IT strategy 
formulation (Kambil and Turner, 1993). The concentration on core business 
activities has been a major theme in management since the late 1980s. In the 
context of this line of thought, proponents of outsourcing have argued that (non- 
IT) companies are not in the business of building and maintaining systems and 
should therefore buy-in all related services without having to maintain the in- 
house capability. There are two fundamental problems with this argument. First, it 
assumes that there is a market for those services. While some question the maturity 
of this market, it appears that such a market exists today (at least for some IT 
services), though it may have not existed ten years ago. Moreover, many managers 
and academics alike, recognise that for certain services, specific to a company, a 
market may still not exist. Second, it may be the case that at least some parts of IT 
services are so closely intertwined with other business activities that it is difficult to 
separate them. 
A similar point is made by those who argue that it is not the technology as such that 
creates competitive advantage, it is the information and the way it is used that 
makes the difference (e. g. Hopper 1990, Vowler, 1996b). The information within 
an information system would possibly embody company-specific knowledge and 
expertise which can lead to comparative advantage. It is not clear however, that 
this information can always be separated from the physical systems that handle it 
and the supporting services. An argument could be made that the software and 
hardware used may also embody some intelligence and expertise or that, at least, 
they create some of the desirable attributes of information (such as speed, accuracy 
etc. ). Having said that, an increasing number of organisations are effectively 
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separating the business benefit from the technology. For example, Lufthansa is 
procuring most of its IT services from its IT subsidiary which has been spun-off. 
They are now trying to market Sysnet Netsched, their proprietary network 
management system to their competitors, while explicitly acknowledging that 
network management is the most essential core operation of any airline company 14 - 
A few years ago, American Airlines was making a similar statement regarding the 
handling of `core' or `strategic' information systems when it outsourced and opened 
to its competitors the famous SABRE system, making it their largest source of 
revenue (Hopper, 1990). 
Outsourcing is also employed as a means of facilitating the transition from one 
technological architecture to another. The typical example is that of outsourcing 
mainframe operations while developing a client-server infrastructure (Minoli 
1995). Such transitions may be of a major and strategic nature or of a more tactical 
character. 
Expected improvements in the productivity of the IT group appears to be an 
important reason for outsourcing. The applications and maintenance backlog has 
been a major problem for many organisations, particularly during the 1970s and 
1980s (Nolan 1979). Outsourcing is typically expected to help improve 
productivity by reallocating the effort and attention of the IT department and by 
relying on the alleged productivity of professional service teams and companies. 
The initiation of an outsourcing exercise on this basis by management is likely to 
induce a competitive bid from the internal IT group, wishing to prove its own 
efficiency (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993b). Indeed, the threat of outsourcing can, at 
least in theory, be an effective incentive for the in-house group (Wang and Barron 
1995, Lacity et al 1996). 
14 "Refuelling Lufthansa", Information Strategy, Vol. 2, No. 3, April 1997, pp. 39-41. 
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Another organisational reason for initiating outsourcing exercises is the market 
testing of internal IT operations. Some companies issue invitations to tender without 
a clear intention to outsource. Instead, they seek to assess their internal operations 
as well as to collect possible innovative ideas from vendor bids. In response, 
suppliers often refuse to bid or withdraw their proposals, as mentioned on page 3. 
3.3. Technical and Technological reasons for outsourcing 
Acquiring access to technical expertise and to leading edge technologies is claimed 
to be a good reason for outsourcing. Assuming that vendors can keep pace with 
technological developments and that they maintain highly skilled employees, client 
organisations can benefit from handing their IT systems and services over to them. 
This argument is partly true, especially with emerging technologies. 
Reducing technological risk and improving flexibility and service levels are oft- 
quoted reasons for outsourcing (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993b). According to this 
argument, vendors enjoy inherent technological flexibility and technical 
superiority so that a client can be better protected from technological obsolescence 
or poor service performance (Duncan, 1995). The truth appears to be that vendors 
can be as locked-into a given set of technologies and standards as any client 
organisation. Switching to alternative technologies is a costly and risky activity. 
Moreover, large and complex outsourcing contracts rarely provide the flexibility to 
make such transitions. Companies may become locked into the supplier's 
technology and then observe that other companies adopt alternative, lower cost and 
higher quality systems. 
The management of diverse resources is a more plausible reason for outsourcing. 
Information technologies keep expanding so that organisations have to manage an 
increasing variety of technologies, standards and systems. New generations of 
technologies do not always replace earlier generations but often complement them. 
This seems to be the case with mainframes, personal computers and network 
computers, for example. The task of managing the increasing variety of human and 
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physical resources needed to handle an increasing number of technologies becomes 
overwhelming. Outsourcing some or all IT services is a means of containing the 
expansion in management and technical human resources. 
3.4. Polltlcal antecedents to outsourcing 
Outsourcing is often initiated as a result of internal political manoeuvring between 
managerial ranks. The IT department often finds itself in the middle of conflicting 
demands from users and general management. Users constantly request more 
systems and services of a higher quality and technological standard, more 
promptly. General management is putting pressure for cost reduction as the IT 
budget keeps increasing while any benefits cannot always be assigned specific 
monetary values or improvements in business performance. The IT department is in 
the middle of these conflicting demands and, as a result, is perceived by both user 
and senior management as a troublesome function that they do not understand 
(Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993b) 
General or financial managers call in outsourcers in order to control costs and/or 
to get rid of the problem. CEOs can be tempted by outsourcers promising 
substantial cost reductions and cash transfers in return for taking over IT 
operations. They may also be tempted by the hyperbole in the trade press and the 
`bandwagon' (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a) effect created by early, highly 
publicised outsourcing deals (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992a). 
In this context of conflicting demands, IT directors or managers also have various 
incentives for initiating outsourcing. Proving their efficiency and effectiveness is 
one reason. Justifying further resource demands is another (the opinion of an 
external consultant may be perceived as more credible expert advice). Raising their 
profile and status within the organisation is a third. 
Lacity (1992) has extensively studied the political interactions affecting IT 
outsourcing decisions and has argued that they often bear a heavier weight on the 
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final decision as compared to 'rational' economic criteria. An outsourcing decision 
which is solely a result of political manoeuvring is likely to fail to yield acceptable 
service levels and costs. It is an important decision with substantial risks and as 
such requires significant management attention and skill. 
4. The evolving conceptualisation of IT outsourcing 
A large amount of research effort in the IS field has been devoted to the study of the 
management decision to outsource IT services. Various theoretical propositions and 
empirical accounts have been submitted, addressing the decision making process, 
the criteria employed, and/or the types of outsourcing arrangements available. It 
has become evident that the organisational processes leading up to outsourcing 
decisions are very complex, involving a number of stakeholders with different 
agendas, trying to find a balance between costs, performance, flexibility and long 
term viability (Macey 1993, Willcocks et al 1995,1996). 
Several early accounts of IT outsourcing have emphasised the partnership 
dimension in such deals. In recognition of the complexity, uncertainty and 
idiosyncrasy of the provision of IT services, management consultants, the trade 
press and academics have discussed the need for mutual trust, a collaborative 
culture and other similar qualities assigned to a fairly broad notion of partnership 
(Willcocks and Choi 1995, Klepper 1995). Partnership has also been associated 
with strategic alliances, which, in turn, also received substantial attention (e. g. 
McFarlan and Nolan 1995, Willcocks 1994). It has become clear, however, that a 
partnership attitude, although valuable, is not a substitute for a good contract 
(Panday 1995). Moreover, it can be argued that what is described as partnership in 
businesses, refers, at least to some extent, to institutional structures such as joint 
decision making and arbitration, which are typical of relational contracts'5. 
15 More on the governance structures of relational contract in section 5 and chapter 2. 
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Often, a bipolar distinction is made, between internal IT provision and outsourcing. 
Once these are recognised as the only two options available, the question becomes 
one of how to select between the two. Responses to this question range from 
relatively simple checklists, such as the questions that Benko (1992) and Jones 
(1994) ask, to more elaborate frameworks. For example, Grover and Teng (1993) 
propose a two-level analysis framework which considers characteristics of the 
systems (such as maturity, significance and existing capability) on one level and the 
impacts (costs and benefits) of the decision on the other. From a slightly different 
viewpoint, Cronk and Sharp (1995) argue that whether a system (or service) 
should be outsourced or not depends on whether it is a unit of competitive 
advantage, a value added or an essential support system. These approaches 
emphasise those characteristics of the system or service that make it more or less 
important for the organisation. 
More technically `hard' approaches have also been developed. Clark and Zmud 
(1993) tested a large causal model of the outsourcing decision structure, taking 
into account about 55 variables. Putrus (1994) and Alpar and Saharia (1995) have 
recommended the use of the Analytic Hierarchy Process as a means of resolving the 
various trade-offs between using internal and external groups for IT provision. 
While the above studies assume the existence of only two possibilities (internal or 
external organisation of IT provision) many researchers in the field, have 
recognised the existence of a variety of possible outsourcing arrangements which 
widen the options available to an organisation and can make a difference to the 
success of IT provision. A descriptive framework for classifying IT outsourcing 
possibilities has been proposed by De Loof (1995). It characterises alternative 
options for organising the provision of IT according to elements of the IS function, 
the provider, the relationship between supplier and client and the allocation of 
ownership and control over IS components (systems and services). 
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Several classifications claim to be more than descriptive and attempt to prescribe 
forms of contracting on the basis of some selected criteria. Such a classification of 
IT outsourcing arrangements has been proposed by Ang (1993). Specifically, six 
types of providers or modes of organisation are proposed, namely, in-house, parent 
company, other company in same industry, service bureau, joint venture and 
facilities management. The determinants of this classification are the spatial 
location of the service, the legal ownership of assets, the legal status of human 
resources and the behavioural control (managerial discretion) exercised by the 
client. The focus here is not on system characteristics, but on organisational and 
contractual issues. Apte and Mason (1993) further emphasise the geographical 
dispersion of IT service provision in large corporations, coining the term 
`disaggregation'. Outsourcing often involves relocating services such as data 
centres and help desks, perhaps on a global scale, but this is not necessarily the 
most significant parameter in the outsourcing decisions. 
Fitzgerald and Willcocks (1994b) combine the uncertainty involved in an 
outsourcing deal with the degree of contractual definition to recommend effective 
contract structures. In particular they recommend a fixed fee, tightly specified 
contract under low uncertainty, or a loosely defined, risk/reward sharing contract 
under high uncertainty. 
At a general level, Nam et al (1995) take into account the strategic impact of IS and 
the degree of substitution of supplier for in-house services to propose a two- 
dimensional grid of types of outsourcing relationships, namely, support, reliance, 
alignment and alliance. In a more detailed approach, Willcocks and Fitzgerald 
(1993b) and Willcocks et al (1994) use business uncertainty and system 
interconnectedness, clients' experience with technology and service specificity, as 
criteria guiding the selection of an appropriate approach to the organisation of IT 
provision. Both approaches emphasise that the characteristics of the system, the 
capability of client and supplier and the conditions of the commercial environment 
co-determine the outsourcing decision. 
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One problem often encountered in such exercises, is the diversity of systems and 
services managed by organisations. Producing a contingency framework covering 
all these systems and services is, therefore, problematic. As a result, some studies 
focus on narrower sets of services. Concentrating on applications development, 
Buck-Lew (1992) distinguishes among three modes of organising its provision, 
namely, pure and hybrid outsourcing and in-house development. For the same 
types of services, Saarinen and Vepsalainen (1994) propose a framework according 
to which applications of different levels of uncertainty and specificity are matched 
to three procurement options, namely, off the shelf software purchases, contracting 
out and in-house development. Similarly, Saaksjarvi (1993) matches four IS 
development roles (design, implementation, operations and support) to four 
sourcing alternatives (centralised, decentralised, partnership and service market) 
depending on three business management criteria (flexibility, innovativeness and 
efficiency) and three IS management criteria (joint planning, resource allocation 
and performance evaluation). Interestingly, livari and Ervasti (1993) found that 
systems development is more effective when carried out in-house, depending on 
the complexity of systems. 
In a similar effort, Klepper (1993) draws on Williamson's (1985) contingency 
framework for classifying vertical governance structures, to derive implications in 
the context of organising IT systems and services. Klepper notes that the framework 
as such provides unambiguous recommendations only for two, rather extreme 
cases, namely that a classical contract is appropriate when both uncertainty and 
asset specificity are low and that a relational contract is needed when uncertainty, 
frequency and specificity are high. For intermediate positions, Klepper suggests that 
that decision should depend on individual cases. Most instances, however, would 
be expected to lie in the middle ground between the two unambiguous extremes. 
Moreover, the categories of contract supplied in Williamson's framework may be 
too broad to form the basis of usable recommendations. In particular, relational 
contracts comprise a very broad category. 
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Loh (1994) proposes a more elaborate model of IT governance incorporating 
transaction costs, bargaining costs, agency costs, influence costs, production costs, 
decision information costs and management costs. Equivalent work by Aubert et al 
(1994) includes asset specificity, measurement problems and origin of the most 
important investment (business or technical skills). 
Essentially, all these studies attempt to find a balance between comprehensiveness 
with a very large number of determinant variables (e. g. Clark and Zmud 1993) 
and easy conceptualisation and implementation of the decision making framework. 
Moreover, they try to classify the organisational and contractual possibilities 
available to a limited menu of options. It appears that this quest remains 
incomplete, since both the determinants and the options available, seem to be too 
complicated to be captured in a simple, formalistic framework. 
On a different research direction, Loh and Venkatraman (1995) discuss the move 
from a dichotomous insourcing versus outsourcing decision problem to the concept 
of `rightsourcing'. Following Henderson (1990) they recommend a portfolio 
approach to IT supply relationships where emphasis should be placed on 'co- 
sourcing'. Their notions of rightsourcing and co-sourcing refer to a loosely defined 
strategy of engaging in cooperative supply relationships with various suppliers and 
under different contracting modes, depending on the characteristics of the systems 
and services being outsourced. In particular, they have ranked a number of IT 
services according to the degree of internalisation of physical and human resources 
by the provider, the degree of specificity of the business domain and the extent to 
which a contract is project or period based (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992b). 
The theoretical understanding of the IT outsourcing phenomenon appears to have 
evolved with developments in the marketplace (Wassenar and Thiadens, 1993). 
While the outsourcing market continues to grow, both in value and in number of 
deals, it appears that the average size of each deal decreases (Takac, 1994). 
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Venkatraman and Loh (1994) argue that over time, IT provision arrangements are 
converging to an equilibrium in the region between `total' insourcing and `total' 
outsourcing which have prevailed in the recent past. They characterise this position 
as `relationship portfolio' where IT competence is shared between the client 
organisation and a number of suppliers. Despite its abstract form that provides little 
guidance to researchers and practitioners, this framework succinctly summarises 
the departure from the bipolar dilemma between total insourcing and total 
outsourcing. 
The notion of selective outsourcing as described by Lacity et al (1995) is also based 
on the premise that `total' solutions -where the majority of IT services is provided 
by a single provider, whether it is the internal IT department or an external 
supplier- are not efficacious and that small parts of all IT activity should be 
awarded on multiple providers. The fundamental contribution of the notion of 
selective outsourcing to our understanding of the possibilities available for the 
organisation of IT provision remains significant, despite the unrealistic claim that 
each service can be awarded to more than one supplier and the limited extent to 
which IT services can be split into very small pieces. 
Ang (1994) took these ideas one step further and studied the degree of managerial 
control by the client and the supplier for seven IS activities under six different 
modes of contracting. This analysis clearly shows the difference that both the 
nature of the service as well and the contractual mode make on the allocation of 
decision and control rights for IT. The message coming out of such studies is that 
different IT services pose varying requirements for the organisation of their supply 
while different contractual arrangements afford varying capabilities in terms of 
control and decision rights. This argument is wholly consistent with the basic 
premise of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) which is more fully 
reviewed in chapter 2. 
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These developments raise a whole new set of issues regarding the organisation and 
management of the remaining IT function within the client company. Loh and 
Venkatraman (1995) argue that the IT function should not be seen as the 
`glasshouse' any more but as the `clearing house' for IT services. This will involve a 
substantial shift from technical skills to contract management and relationship 
building skills. From a case study analysis of 30 residual IT functions, Willcocks 
and Fitzgerald (1994d) have identified seven major roles or tasks retained or 
bought in the firm after outsourcing, namely, IT strategy, business development, 
systems integration, informed buyer, contract intermediary, contract monitoring 
and exploitation of contract relations. 
In addition to academics, consultants also share similar views for the reshaped IT 
function after outsourcing. Aylott (1995) envisages a tripartite relationship 
between the IT function, the users and the supplier where each pair is involved in a 
different kind of exchange. However, in practice such relationships are more 
complex as more than one suppliers are typically involved, interacting with 
multiple IT units and user groups in large client organisations. In its guidelines for 
successful outsourcing, KPMG16 classifies the tasks of the client organisation's IT 
group into management issues (related to planning, negotiations and contract 
management), human resource issues (related to in-house, previously in-house and 
the supplier's staff), service/business issues (related to service level agreements and 
service delivery) and communication/ understanding issues (related to 
management coordination with the supplier). 
Acquiring, developing and maintaining the skills required by the IT function in an 
environment where the majority of services have been outsourced, is a difficult 
management task in itself. Inasmuch as staff transfer from the client to the vendor 
serves the transfer of client-specific knowledge, the transfer of selected staff from 
the vendor to the client, serves a similar purpose, mainly in terms of contract 
16 "Best practice guidelines for outsourcing", KPMG IMPACT Programme, London: HMSO, 1995. 
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management skills (Willcocks and Fitzgerald, 1994c). It is not uncommon for 
vendor account managers to be employed by the client, as a result of the knowledge 
and experience they acquire over the course of the contract. 
5. Economics in IT outsourcing research 
The issues surrounding the IT outsourcing phenomenon naturally impinge on the 
question of `make or buy' which has long been a central theme of several strands of 
economics. Among the first to point out the relevance of economic theory in IS 
research, were Kriebel and Moore (1981). They emphasised the vast amount of 
published work in economics faced by IS researchers and the problem of capturing 
and transferring this knowledge into the field of information systems. Bakos and 
Kemerer (1992) re-addressed this association between information systems and 
economics and highlighted outsourcing in their economics-in-IS research agenda. 
Many IS researchers have drawn on theoretical insights, methods and techniques 
found in economics as a basis of their own work on IT outsourcing. 
Much of the groundwork required for economic analyses in IS research has been 
reviewed by West (1994). He discusses the effect of various sources of production 
costs (such as labour specialisation, employment of capital, public goods etc. ) on 
seven functional components of information systems (such as hardware, software, 
telecommunications etc. ). Moreover he points out that decisions regarding the costs 
of one component will affect the costs of other components and consequently the 
costs of the whole system, thus highlighting the economic inter-dependency of IT 
services. 
In the context of IT outsourcing, West (1994) argues that it is characterised by high 
transaction costs and that it is only rational if it provides production cost savings 
which at least offset the increase in transaction costs. This proposition appears to be 
partial in that it does not explicitly take account of the importance of contract 
structure in shaping the realised transaction costs. It also appears to be based on a 
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questionable hidden assumption that production and transaction costs are 
substitutes. It can be argued that either production or transaction costs may render 
certain governance options altogether infeasible or at least highly inefficient, 
although the increase in one can be exceeded by the savings in the other. 
Indeed, if transaction and production costs were substitutable, the same argument 
could be used for both insourcing and outsourcing: if the transaction cost savings 
of internal organisation exceed production costs then insourcing would be 
preferable. Lacity and Hirschheim (1995) have examined such cases where 
insourcing was chosen as the preferred option. However, internal organisation is 
known to have various inherent disadvantages as compared to market transactions, 
mainly incentive slack (Williamson 1995) and influence costs (Milgrom and 
Roberts 1992). 
Transaction cost economics has been a popular reference theory among IS 
researchers studying IT outsourcing, presumably because it directly addresses 
issues of vertical integration and make-or-buy decisions. In this theory, asset 
specificity features as the main criterion. Alpar and Saharia (1995) quote Reeve 
(1990) in arguing that highly specific IT activities can be broken down into sub- 
functions, each of which can potentially have lower specificity. Of course, they 
admit, the coordination across sub-functions may in itself be characterised by high 
specificity and therefore may have to remain part of the in-house operations or it 
may not allow the separation of sub-functions. Indeed, management coordination 
turns out to be an important determinant of IT governance, as shown in subsequent 
chapters. 
Software development may be considered such a sub-function. Following a similar 
line of argumentation and drawing on contract theory, Ang and Beath (1993) 
discuss in depth the relational characteristics of software development contracts. In 
particular they focus on hierarchical elements, typical of internal organisation, that 
are found in such contracts. Their analysis constitutes further testimony to the fact 
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that the important question is not so much whether to outsource or not but how to 
set up the respective governance structure, whether within the organisational 
hierarchy or across the firm's boundary. This has also been the fundamental 
conclusion of the study by Aubert et al (1996). 
Often, transaction cost economics is criticised for a number of shortcomings. As a 
response, researchers may choose to couple insights from this theory with 
contributions from another in order either to compare the respective 
interpretations of IT outsourcing or to present a more balanced account. For 
example, Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b) demonstrate how the same evidence can 
be understood differently from a transaction cost perspective and from a political 
theory viewpoint. Political antecedents of outsourcing have been reviewed in 
section 3.4 above. In contrast, Jurison(1995) combined transaction cost principles 
with financial risk theory in an attempt to provide a more complete model of cost 
and risk differentials between the internal and external organisation of IT services. 
Cheon et al (1995) reviewed resource based theory, resource dependence theory, 
transaction cost economics and agency cost theory and synthesised them into a 
contingency model addressing IT outsourcing. From a slightly different angle, Teng 
et al (1995) explore the strategy-theoretic factors associated with IT outsourcing 
decisions by employing resource based theory, resource dependence theory and 
strategic orientation theories. 
One of the most extensive critiques of the use of transaction cost theory in the 
context of IT outsourcing has been raised by Lacity and Willcocks (1995). They 
report `anomalies', countering typical transaction cost theoretic predictions. They 
attempt to explain these anomalies by challenging some explicit or implicit 
assumptions of transaction cost economics, which seem to be profoundly violated 
in the case of IT services. Three of these violated assumptions are particulaFly worth 
mentioning. First, Lacity and Willcocks (1995) argue that for decision makers in 
the 61 outsourcing cases they studied, economic efficiency was not, on the whole, 
the primary criterion for their outsourcing decisions. Second, they found that 
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information is not always used to make rational decisions. Third, the transaction is 
not found to be an appropriate unit of analysis. This criticism is important but still 
open to debate, at least until a better theoretical alternative is brought forward. 
Economic efficiency may not be the only driver of the outsourcing decision, as also 
discussed in previous sections. It is, however, reasonable to expect that whatever 
the primary driver, the costs and benefits must be part of the decision since 
economically inefficient operations are not viable in the longer run. The rationality 
of human decision making has also been widely debated (e. g. Simon et al 1992, 
Lawson 1997). That said, the position that human decision makers are generally 
irrational is even more open to criticism and requires elaborate qualification. The 
complication can be overcome (at least temporarily) by postulating that decision 
makers are in principle boundedly rational but try to maximise a set of subjective 
gains within a very broad agenda of economic, political, sentimental and other 
criteria. Thus, several apparently irrational decisions and actions can be attributed 
to subjective valuations of non-obvious alternatives. These valuations can still be 
internally (or subjectively) rational. 
Lacity and Willcocks (1995) contend that the transaction is not the appropriate 
level of analysis, because it may be used to refer to different levels of aggregation in 
different cases. For example, some organisations outsource the whole IT function in 
one transaction whereas others outsource individual services selectively. The 
argument adopted in this thesis and developed in the next chapter is that whatever 
the level of aggregation in an IT supply transaction, it should be studied as an `open 
box' with emphasis on the characteristics of its constituent parts and of the 
governance structure. Thus, the transaction as a unit of analysis is not a minimal 
datum but a rich environment for study. 
From the realm of economics, several researchers have drawn on more mainstream 
modelling approaches, namely principal-agent and game theoretic models or, more 
generally, `mechanism design'. The contracts for software development have been 
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studied more extensively. For example, Whang (1992) develops a game theoretic 
model of software contracting and suggests optimal incentive contracts, taking into 
consideration the existence of multiple stages in the process and the fact that costs 
and benefits are privately revealed to the developer and the user respectively, 
gradually over time. A damage clause is incorporated to allow for premature 
contract termination. 
Some interesting results have been found by Richmond et al (1992) who have 
developed an incomplete contracting model to analyse information asymmetry, 
profit sharing rules and specific investments in software development outsourcing. 
Their main finding is that the net benefits to users from outsourcing are neither 
uniformly negative nor positive. Whether outsourcing is preferable to internal 
development or not depends on a number of issues. First, outsourcing can result in 
a higher value to the users since it provides incentives for specific investments 
which can lead to future cost reductions. Moreover, if the true cost and value of the 
project is common knowledge (between users and developers) then the incentives 
afforded by outsourcing are even stronger. However, when the costs and benefits 
are privately known to developers and users respectively, then each party has an 
incentive to misrepresent this information, and as a result users and developers 
may fail to reach certain otherwise beneficial development agreements. Internal 
development dominates outsourcing when either the developer's incentive to 
misrepresent privately known cost information is very strong and/or when there is 
a specific investment to be made by the users and it is comparatively more 
significant than any specific investments needed by the development group. If 
outsourcing is adopted, however, users should be prepared to give up some of the 
savings or benefits from the project, otherwise the developer's incentives will be 
detrimentally impaired. 
These findings summarise some fundamental trade-offs involved in deciding 
between internal and external organisation of IT activities. Richmond and Seidman 
(1993) have also introduced the role of competition between suppliers for 
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undertaking sequential stages of the development process, in the study of these 
trade-offs. Although competition reduces prices, it also diffuses the incentive for 
value adding investments. Besides, an incumbent supplier in such cases acquires an 
advantageous position over rivals, both from its own as well as from the user's 
perspective. . 
Similar results are derived when competition is combined with `learning by doing' 
and `code reusability' effects (Whang 1995). In the presence of market 
competition, cost reductions due to these effects are not passed on to customers as 
each developer tries to underbid the other in order to win the first projects and 
build experience and reusable code for future projects. In so doing they are willing 
to accept smaller profits or even incur losses (low balling) in the beginning. 
Therefore, while development cost decreases over time, profit margin increases and 
price does not necessarily decrease. Users can reduce the prices quoted by potential 
suppliers by giving out more information about the project, thus reducing the 
supplier's cost uncertainty. Having said all that, it does not necessarily follow that 
eliminating competition should reduce the price paid for development. 
Services other than software development have not been widely addressed in this 
stream of the literature, with few exceptions. The study by Wang and Barron 
(1995) is based on principal-agent models. They focus on `processing power' 
services (e. g. data centres, mainframe capacity) where assets are non-specific, 
measurement is not a big problem, the market is competitive and queuing delays 
are pertinent. According to Williamson (1995), in the absence of transaction costs 
production should be allocated to the most efficient producer. Wang and Barron's 
(1995a) modelling and results are consistent with this principle. Their main 
finding is that central management should consider organising the IS department 
as a profit centre while exposing it to the threat of external competition in order to 
generate efficiency incentives and to simplify the outsourcing decision. Whenever 
the internal department doesn't break even in face of external competition, (some 
of) its activities should be outsourced. However, the same authors have shown that 
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a cost centre is superior to a profit centre in that it maximises the total value of the 
IT resource, despite the incentive slack (Wang and Barron 1995b). In practice, 
organisations do not appear to go through such an exercise before outsourcing 
their data centres. Even if it can be shown that internal departments cannot 
compete on price, this corroborates the finding that economic efficiency is not the 
only or necessarily the most important determinant of outsourcing. Moreover, 
assuming that transaction costs are entirely absent, is an exaggeration. There are 
specific investments associated with data centre operations, mainly in human 
assets, as the Gloucester County Council case shows (see page 2). The 
interdependence between data centre operations and other services such as 
network support, create further problems of coordination and management. 
Further insights are generated by the study of Van Alstyne et al (1995) who have 
applied the theory of incomplete contracts on a number of issues related to 
database management. Their results are easily generalisable to other IT services. 
Two main principles are examined. First, if an organisation (more generally, agent) 
is indispensable to the functioning of a service, it should also own the respective 
assets, since ownership provides better incentives. Second, complementary services 
should be controlled together (see also Thong et al, 1994). There is a clear conflict 
in cases when there are more than one indispensable agents for the same asset or 
activity and when assets/activities are complementary and there are more than one 
indispensable agents. In such cases (which are expected to be fairly common in 
practice) there is no distribution of ownership (control) that induces first best 
investment. Moreover, there is no a priori precedence of complementarity or 
indispensability or vice versa. The second best balance is case specific and should 
give precedence to the principle that weighs most heavily in improving 
performance incentives while minimising the compromise on others. 
The preceding discussion in this and previous sections reviews a number of criteria 
and trade-offs impinging on the outsourcing decision. Each of these theories has 
clear limitations but also highlights important aspects of the problem. The 
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arguments developed in this thesis draw on the lessons learned from the strengths 
and weaknesses of the theories reviewed above. 
6. The governance of the IT function and outsourcing 
Since the 1970s, the emphasis of debate on IT management has been on the 
question of centralisation versus decentralisation of IT resources and decision 
making. With the proliferation of end-user computing in the 1980s, another 
question surfaced, whether IT should be in the hands of specialists or users. These 
organisational designs for IT evolved as part of the data processing and MIS eras 
that marked that period (Earl 1989, Ward 1995). While there are efficiency and 
other reasons for centralising the provision of IT facilities, business users also 
require involvement in and control over some IT decisions. Still today, the 
relationship between users and IT is often fraught with problems (Ward and 
Peppard 1996). 
With the growing recognition of the strategic importance of IT and the 
proliferation of strategic and competitive information systems (the strategic era) the 
size, the complexity and the budget for IT in large organisations increased 
dramatically. However, the disagreements over the allocation of resources, 
responsibilities and authority for IT did not seem to diminish. Although the 
question of whether to `make or buy' IT services has always been an integral part of 
the structuring of the IT function within organisations, IT outsourcing has hit the 
headlines in the last ten years (1990s). As discussed in section 3 above, several 
senior IT or general managers saw total outsourcing arrangements as an easy way 
out of all these problems. 
Having said that, these massive contracts opened a new range of contracting 
possibilities, which are markedly different from the traditional contracts for 
systems development or for temporary analysts/programmers. Despite the 
questionable managerial motives behind some of these exercises, long term service 
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contracts have their own merits, as discussed in previous sections. Initially the 
question was whether to outsource or to keep IT in house. However, one of the 
lessons we have learned from the debate on centralisation versus decentralisation is 
that polar extremes carry significant risks and that a balanced trade-off is more 
appropriate. By reviewing extant knowledge on the organisation and governance of 
the IT function, this section aims to draw lessons for the outsourcing decision. 
The structure of the IT function ranges from the corporate centralised service, 
through the federal structure, to the completely decentralised (Hodgkinson 1996, 
Earl et al 1996). Admittedly, most large, complex organisations employ some form 
of federal structure, where internal bureaux, run as profit centres, or business 
ventures, run as semi-autonomous subsidiaries, are not uncommon. Research on 
(de)centralisation of IT highlights three aspects of the problem. 
First, prior research has sought to examine what determines the structural 
alternatives adopted by organisations. The broader organisational structure and 
strategy as antecedents of centralised or decentralised IT, have attracted most 
interest and have yielded significant empirical support (Tavakolian 1989, Ahituv et 
al 1989, Allen and Boynton 1991). However, Brown and Magill (1994) and Brown 
(1997) observed that within the same multidivisional firm, the (de) centralisation of 
IT activities may not be uniform across business units. Organisational and strategic 
factors specific to each business unit and to the IT function, were found to be 
significant determinants of variations in organisational design among business 
units of the same firm. The theoretical concept underpinning these research efforts 
is the fit (alignment) between elements of the context (mainly organisational and 
strategic characteristics of the organisation, the business unit and the IT function) 
and the organisational design adopted for IT. 
The second aspect of the (de)centralisation debate revolves around the 
categorisation of IT tasks, activities, decisions or services. This aspect, particularly 
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the significance and implication of the nature of IT activities, tends not to be 
directly addressed and is, therefore, under-researched. Although there is a lack of 
consensus on terminology and classification, most authors (e. g. Zmud et al 1986, 
Tavakolian 1989, Brown and Magill 1984 and 1998), broadly agree on a 
distinction between infrastructure activities (such as networks and 
communications) and user-oriented activities (such as systems development and 
maintenance). At the outset, for obvious reasons of efficiency and control, the 
former are better controlled as a central facility whereas the latter should be the 
responsibility of the users. This approach is usually taken for granted, with few 
variations. Von Simson (1990), who emphasises the distinction between 
responsibility for financial resources and responsibility for human resources, 
presents a different approach. His `centrally decentralised' structure entails central 
control of human resources (recruitment, training, and career advancement) and 
decentralised control of financial resources and project priorities. The question of 
what is an appropriate classification of the things that the IT function does, remains 
unanswered. 
The case study at Baxter Corporation (Main and Short 1989) demonstrates that 
without a closer look at the level of individual decisions, tasks and systems, generic 
classifications may not be sufficient either for research purposes or for decision 
making in practice. In order to avoid possible confounding effects of task-specific 
characteristics, some studies concentrate on one well defined task, such as systems 
development (e. g. Brown and Magill 1998) or data centre operation (e. g. Hufnagel 
and Birnberg 1989). In both studies, task-specific elements (e. g. user involvement 
in systems development and high fixed costs in mainframe operation) are evidently 
important but are excluded from the causal reasoning or models being developed. 
IT functions in large organisations today are involved in a number of processes (e. g. 
strategy, procurement, project management and security) and deploy a broad array 
of technologies (from `legacy' systems to web-based intranets). A more systematic 
understanding of what makes an individual task or system more suitable for 
centralised or decentralised control is needed. 
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Finally, the third aspect of the debate is about what decision making and control 
mechanisms should be put in place to ensure the successful operation of whatever 
organisational design (centralised or decentralised) is adopted. Organisational 
structure is only one element of the governance of IT. Unless appropriate 
management processes complement it, the anticipated benefits may not be achieved 
and important strategic issues may be disregarded. Steering committees, functional 
and IT planning groups and chargeback procedures are some of the mechanisms 
commonly introduced (Earl 1989, Ward 1995). Moreover, as Brown and Magill 
(1998) found in their research, the determinants of organisational design for IT 
may be in conflict. In such cases they suggest that IT tasks and decisions may have 
to be further subdivided and the allocation of decision making may have to be 
further customised. Some of the complex intricacies involved in setting up such 
mechanisms are exposed in Taylor and Tucker's (1989) case study on centralising 
IT procurement decisions in a multidivisional bank. The study shows the range of 
issues (incentive, financial, political and others) that need to be addressed 
simultaneously and the variety of arrangements that can be introduced. Similarly, 
the case study by Hufnagel and Birnberg (1989) on chargeback for a centralised 
data centre, implicitly demonstrates that organisational design and management 
processes (all the elements of governance) need to be decided jointly since, to a 
certain extent, they determine each other. 
This brief note on the issues of centralisation versus decentralisation and user 
versus specialist control serves to highlight that the questions we faced with the 
proliferation of large outsourcing contracts were not totally alien to previous 
knowledge and experience. The decision whether to centralise or decentralise IT 
resources can, to some extent, be paralleled with the decision whether to outsource 
or not. 
Early work by Zmud (1984) put into perspective the organisational design of IT 
services. He noted the increasing complexity of the technological and market 
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environment and stressed that `managing information resources within such an 
environment is considerably more difficult than the environments of the 1960s and 
1970s, where an intimidating, relatively inflexible, butgenerally stable, technology 
base resulted in the centralised information systems authority maintaining a virtual 
monopoly as a provider of information service'. 
Since the early 1980s, this environment has become even more complex and 
unstable but Zmud's (1984) recommendation for organisation design is still valid, 
involving, `... relationships between tasks and work groups such that work 
behaviours i-vlll be consistent with the performance criteria characterising that 
particular task environment'. It is quite remarkable that, despite the age of this 
statement and its implicit focus on issues of centralisation versus decentralisation, it 
is still valid in the context of modern outsourcing. Namely, work groups, whether 
internal or external, need to be assigned to tasks (or services) by taking into 
account the particular characteristics of the latter and of the broader organisational 
structure and strategy. 
The arguments developed by La Belle and Nyce (1987) also emphasise that 
dilemmas between polar extremes are false: "the issue is ill served, we believe, by 
the label `centralization vs decentralization'. The game isn't tennis, its a balancing 
act. 1.. J The question is how to judge what to centralize and decentralize" 
(emphasis in original). The authors go on to analyse why and how different IT 
activities and services should be centralised/decentralised to a greater or lesser 
extent, according to their characteristics. This argument is equivalent to the notion 
of selective outsourcing (Lacity et al 1995). In tandem with others (e. g. Von Simson 
1990), Earl et al (1996) note the continuous changes in the configuration of the IT 
function, consisting of minor reallocations of IT activities or adjustments in 
organisational structures and management processes. This discussion paints a 
picture similar to the notion of a portfolio of IT sourcing relationships 
(Venkatraman and Loh 1994) where the allocation of IT services to internal or 
external groups varies from one service to another and evolves over time. 
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Similarly valid for outsourcing is the framework by Feeny et al (1994) for assigning 
responsibilities for IT activities to users or specialists. Inasmuch as mature and low 
level (e. g. delivery and support) services should be the responsibility of specialists, 
they can also be outsourced. In contrast, less mature and higher level activities (e. g. 
strategy) should be the responsibility of senior user and IT management and should 
probably be kept in house. 
In managing their IT resources, organisations have traditionally been separating 
and allocating IT activities to central divisions or to decentralised units, under the 
control of users or IT specialists, to be delivered by internal or external teams 
(Ward 1995, Cross et al 1997, Clark et al 1997). In other words, it has been a 
question of balancing the allocation of IT resources along three dimensions of 
organisational design. The proliferation of novel outsourcing practices in recent 
years has spawned renewed interest in the external dimension. Following the 
lessons learned in the study of (de)centralisation, there are three aspects of the 
external dimension that need consideration. First, the fact that the bipolar dilemma 
between the two extremes (insourcing vs. outsourcing) is false and that we need to 
examine the range of possibilities in the middle ground. Second and related to the 
first, the need to systematise the management processes, the decision making 
procedures and the other elements comprising the external governance of IT. 
Third, the need to explore those characteristics of IT systems and activities that 
render them more suitable for internal or external provision. 
Extant literature has covered substantial ground, to varying degree in each of the 
three aspects. In these terms, the aim of this thesis is twofold: to analyse each of the 
three aspects in more detail and to synthesise the findings in one coherent and 
manageable framework. 
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7. Conclusions 
A common thread permeating this chapter is that the way outsourcing relationships 
are established and structured is the fundamental determinant of success or failure. 
Whether to outsource or not is one question but a more important one is how to do 
it (e. g. Willcocks and Fitzgerald, 1993a). Kumar and Willcocks (1996) 
demonstrate examples of IT outsourcing attempts that went into trouble because of 
badly specified or non-functional contracts. Richmond et al (1992) have adopted 
the same position and, more specifically, argue that "one has to determine the 
characteristics unique to each function in the information systems organisation and 
develop models that highlight these unique characteristics'. Once it is recognised 
that IT services vary both within and across organisations, different contractual and 
organisational structures ought to be devised to match their individual 
characteristics. 
Moreover, Grover et al (1996) recognise that common classifications of IS 
outsourcing functional components (i. e. functional breakdown of IT activities) have 
limited granularity and that a closer and more detailed look at the characteristics of 
IT systems and services is warranted. This is similar to the principle of Van Alstyne 
et al (1995) that interdependent services should be identified and organised 
together. In the same line of thought, Lacity et al (1996) have argued that 
companies ought to be selective in deciding which systems or services to outsource 
and which to retain in-house. Following Loh and Venkatraman (1992b), Grover et 
al (1996) point out the need to take into account the degree of outsourcing as a 
continuous measure. 
These propositions form the starting point of the theoretical development in this 
thesis. The main issues of concern is not so much whether to outsource or not but 
how to structure the organisation of IT supply. In this context, two dimensions have 
been established in the IS literature as being of prime significance. First, the degree 
of outsourcing as a continuous measure, determined by an array of criteria and 
trade-offs and second, the characteristics of individual systems and services and of 
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their interdependencies at a microanalytic level. Each of these dimensions has been 
considered in the literature in various useful but often limited and fragmented 
ways. 
This thesis aims to bring together the parameters co-determining these two 
dimensions, under an integrative conceptual framework that could provide some 
more comprehensive guidance to the structuring of the governance of IT provision. 
Each of these two dimensions on its own gives a partial (and therefore incomplete) 
picture of the outsourcing decision. Focusing on selective outsourcing emphasises 
the distinct characteristics of systems and services but reduces the governance 
options to two unitary alternatives, namely outsourcing and insourcing. Focusing 
on the continuous array of governance possibilities addresses the structural details 
of contract and organisation but undermines the possibility of separate sourcing 
approaches for different services. Therefore, the two dimensions must be 
considered jointly. These basic ideas are fully articulated and developed in chapter 
5. Chapter 2 sets the theoretical scene on which they are based. 
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1. Introduction 
By reviewing the relevant literature in the information systems field in the previous 
chapter, the main directions followed by this thesis in pursuing further research on 
IT outsourcing have been identified. The aim of this chapter is to review a range of 
theories in economics that can support theoretical development in these directions. 
The emergence and proliferation of broad and long term contracts for IT systems 
and services caught IS academics and managers almost by surprise. However, such 
contracts have been very common, virtually since the dawn of the industrial 
revolution and much more so during the course of the twentieth century. Natural 
monopolies, as in the energy and transport industries, provide typical examples of 
long term, often exclusive, contracts. In many sectors of the economy, variousso 
called non-standard contracting practices, such as reciprocal trading, exclusive 
territories and resale price maintenance have been common. 
Despite the abundance of such transactions and their obvious importance for 
economic activity, economists have paid relatively little attention to them. 
Traditional microeconomic theory treats firms as unitary transformers of inputs 
into outputs, analytically represented by the production function, without 
questioning how this is achieved. Vertical integration is often assessed for its 
informational properties (e. g. Riordan 1990). In a contractual relationship, 
supplier and customer have private information on the cost of production and the 
value of the product respectively. Under such conditions, if specialised investment 
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is required, profitable trade may not be realised as each party tries to manipulate 
his private information to maximise his information rent. The buyer will have to 
make do with standard products offered in the competitive market and thus forego 
the benefits of specialisation. Vertical integration has an efficiency justification 
inasmuch as it eliminates information asymmetry. 
Following Adam Smith's legacy, competitive, decentralised markets have been 
considered as the main form of exchange. Any deviations have been either 
classified as undesirable monopolistic attempts or attributed to externalities and 
market failures. The boundaries of firms have been considered to depend on 
technological inseparabilities and scale and scope economies, derived from the 
production function. Within this theoretical mindset, Stigler (1968) extended 
Smith's conjecture that the specialisation of labour is limited by the extent of the 
market, to firm level and showed that as markets grow firms should become 
smaller and more specialised. 
IT outsourcing as a phenomenon, can be attributed to these conditions. As the IT 
industry has been growing over time, extensive outsourcing should have been 
predictable. Moreover, it is possible that specialised suppliers may be able to 
achieve economies of specialisation, especially with the proliferation of standard 
techniques and technologies. Despite the plausibility of these suggestions, it can be 
convincingly argued that they are not adequate to explain the particular 
contractual and organisational arrangements employed. The purpose of this 
chapter is to review the relevant literature in economics that has grown 
substantially over the past thirty years and which, despite its incomplete state at 
present, can help generate substantial insight to the problem at hand. 
In a landmark article, Coase (1937) questioned the necessity of technological 
conditions for the emergence of firms, arguing that technologically related assets 
can still be owned separately. He suggested that the presence of transaction costs in 
the economic system is the real cause. He postulated an imaginary world free of 
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transaction costs where the allocation of asset ownership and many other legal and 
commercial arrangements taken for granted today would not matter. However, in 
the real world, transaction costs abound. 
They are the costs of running the economic system, much like friction in 
mechanical systems. Transaction costs represent the real resources economic agents 
dissipate to maintain viable and efficient relations of economic exchange. 
Transaction costs include, among others, the costs of writing, monitoring and 
enforcing contracts, of negotiating and of making provisions for uncertainty. In a 
broad sense, transaction costs are found both in markets as well as within firms. 
The coordination, supervision and other activities of management can be thought 
of as activities aimed at negotiating, monitoring and enforcing a different kind of 
contracts within organisations. Ouchi (1980) provides an interesting 
complementary conception of transaction costs as arising from the need for equity 
and reciprocity in economic exchange: "A transaction cost is any activity which is 
engaged in to satisfy each party to an exchange that the value given and received is 
in accord with his or her expectations" (p. 130) . 
Transaction costs do not add any productive value. They are a `necessary evil' that 
rational economic agents are expected to try to minimise. -In answering the 
question why firms exist, Coase suggested that for certain activities, the transaction 
costs of firm organisation are lower than the transaction costs of market exchange. 
On the other hand, Demsetz (1997) argues that the emergence of firms is fully 
explained in the traditional theory on account of the benefits of specialisation. 
Hierarchical structures of direction and control are necessary in order to deploy 
specialised knowledge efficiently (also see section 6, paragraphs 6-5 below). Even 
so, transaction cost arguments are needed to explain the structure and boundaries 
of firms, as well as the various governance structures under which market 
transactions take place. Transaction cost thinking sheds new light on various 
economic phenomena, including vertical integration and long term contracting. 
43 
Chapter Two: On the Economics of the Organisation of Production and Exchange 
Coase's (1937) ideas had an incubation period of nearly half a century before 
spawning a wealth of literature on the study of transaction costs as determinants of 
economic organisation. The study of team organisation by Cyert and March (1963) 
was pioneering in this respect. Blois (1972) studied `close relationships' between 
firms involving exclusive or nearly exclusive trade and coined the term vertical 
quasi-integration. Goldberg (1976) was among the first to criticise the prevailing 
microeconomic and contracting approaches to economic exchange which were 
based on unlimited rationality and zero transaction costs. 
One of the first analytical breakthroughs in dimensionalising transaction costs was 
made by Klein et al (1978). They define the notion of appropriable specialised quasi 
rents as the source of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour. The quasi rent value 
of an asset is "the excess of its value over its salvage value, that Is, its value in its 
next best use to another user. The potentially appropriable specialised portion of 
the quasi rent is that portion, if any, in excess of its value to the second highest 
valuing user" (p. 298, emphasis in original). 
When specialised assets are committed and such appropriable quasi rents created, a 
dependence arises where one party has an incentive (equal to the appropriable 
quasi rent) to take advantage of the other. For example, an IT supplier who trains a 
number of employees on a nearly unique information system of a particular client 
will have to sacrifice part of this investment in training if, for some reason, this 
contract is terminated too early and these employees have to be redeployed to 
another client where these skills will be only partly valuable. Once the investment 
is made, the client is in a position to seek further pecuniary or non-pecuniary gains 
commensurate to that portion of the training investment being at risk. 
It is this that creates the problem of hold-up. The size of the hold up potential 
depends on three conditions: the presence (and size) of specific capital (i. e. 
appropriable quasi-rents), contract specification costs (i. e. the incentive for 
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contract violation) and contract enforcement costs (i. e. the ease of contract 
violation) (Klein 1980). 
There are two kinds of governance responses to this problem, namely, vertical 
integration and long term contracts. First, the cost of devising sufficient explicit 
contracts is commensurate to the size of the appropriable quasi-rents. In addition, 
explicit contracts are plagued by rigidities, despite formal mechanisms to reinstate 
flexibility, such as price adjustment mechanisms (Crocker and Masten 1991). The 
rigidity of long term contracts defines a self-enforcing range, within which 
contingencies can be dealt with by the contract in an efficient or nearly efficient 
manner. A sufficiently large change in the environment (e. g. in demand, in the 
technology or in the market structure) forces the contract out of its self-enforcing 
range. The parties will have to renegotiate an appropriate response to the changed 
conditions. This creates further possibilities for hold up (Klein 1993). Second, the 
costs of vertical integration, however, are independent of the size of appropriable 
quasi rents. Therefore it is expected that over a certain (though varying) threshold 
level of specific investment and appropriable quasi rents, vertical integration will 
be the more efficient alternative. The promise of long term exchange operates as a 
future bond or insurance premium which has to be greater than the short term 
gains from opportunistic defection. Such a condition may not always be achievable 
by long term contracting. Internal organisation does not suffer from the same 
problem. 
In general, this literature has (broadly) advanced the argument that, as asset 
specificity increases, economic activity is organised under more intricate 
governance structures (e. g. long term contracts) of which vertical integration is the 
`final frontier'. However, recently Coase (1990) took exception with this 
proposition, arguing that increased levels of asset specificity do not necessarily 
explain vertical integration. By referring to the oft-quoted case of the acquisition of 
Fisher Body by General Motors in 1926 as evidence of the explanatory power of 
asset specificity, he juxtaposed the case of another GM supplier, AO Smith which 
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was the main supplier of frames to General Motors for many decades through a 
long term contract. Despite the highly specific investments required in tooling, 
production processes and human capital, the two companies never integrated and 
managed to trade efficiently over a long period of time and across a long distance. 
Two main questions arise from this critique. First, why does the cost of organising 
particular activities differ among firms. Second, if internal organisation is so 
efficient in mitigating opportunistic hazards, why isn't the whole economy better 
organised as a single large firm. Economic theory has not given a definite answer to 
the first question. A simple response is to attribute such differences to situational 
contingencies. It can tentatively be argued though that given the same technologies 
and skills, the differential costs of organising economic activity can be ascribed to 
all the detailed elements comprising the notion of governance. Economists have 
produced numerous models of different aspects of the organisation of exchange. 
Each of these models can offer a partial answer to the question. 
The second question can be restated as `what is responsible for the limitations to 
firm size? ' or, in comparative terms, `why can't a large firm do everything that a 
collection of small firms can do and more? '. The response is twofold. First, there are 
a number of economic activities for which transaction costs are relatively limited so 
that market organisation can serve them more efficiently in comparison to the 
hierarchy. Second, the size of firms is limited by the perils of bureaucratisation 
(Futterman 1995). Despite this paramount significance of bureaucratic failures, it 
has received relatively little attention. Influence costs (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), 
incentive slack and the impossibility of selective intervention (see section 3.3 
below) are postulated as sources of bureaucratic costs. 
This brief sample of transaction cost thinking demonstrates the intricate 
complexities arising from the analysis of transaction costs. The purpose of this 
chapter is to clarify the main tenets of the literature with the aim of setting an 
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economising basis for understanding IT outsourcing arrangements, as opposed to 
political, sociological or other perspectives. 
Williamson (1985) places the intellectual locus of transaction cost economics on 
the efficiency branch of the study of economic organisation, in sharp contrast to 
the monopoly arguments that pervade the traditional microeconomic literature 
(Figure 2.1). Moreover, transaction cost economics is distinguished from the 
incentive branch of the efficiency approach in that the latter emphasises 
precontractual alignment of divergent goals using incentives, while the former 
focuses on postcontractual structures and processes for adaptation. The incentive 
branch can be further split into the property rights literature and the agency theory 
literature. Transaction cost economics also forks into the measurement and 
governance strands. Despite the differences between these four strands of the 
literature, they have a lot in common and, on the whole, they usefully inform each 
other. 
The structure of this chapter broadly follows this classification of the literature. 
First, though, a brief note on the legal and institutional context of economic 
exchange provides a useful point of reference. Then, transaction cost economics, 
agency theory and the theory of property rights are discussed in turn. Two 
important and recurring themes are then presented, namely, the role of knowledge 
and information and the effects of culture and reputation. The concluding section 
provides a critique of the literature and sets certain further assumptions and 
propositions used in subsequent chapters. 
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Measurement Governance Agency Property 
Rights 
Figure 2.1 
A Classification of the Literature on Economic Organisation 
Amended from Williamson (1985: 24). 
2. Institutional environment: the transaction and the firm 
It is widely accepted that the law has important ramifications for economics and 
vice versa (Goldberg 1989). Much more so in the study of transactions, where 
notions such as contract, court enforcement, litigation and arbitration are, among 
others, the objects of study. In a general sense, the law is one part of the 
institutional environment and enables economic activity to take place by delimiting 
the possible actions of economic agents and enforcing equity where it is not 
privately achieved. The institutional environment entails numerous formal and 
informal organisations, ranging from the state and trade organisations to the 
enforcement of property rights (e. g. through patents) and the power of reputation. 
An explanation of the institutional environment (see North 1990) is out of the 
scope of this brief note. Instead, a clarification of the main legal positions on 
exchange and transactions and on the concept of the firm will prove useful in 
understanding the theories subsequently reviewed. 
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2.1. Relational exchange 
Exchange is a direct result of specialisation. If individuals were entirely self 
sufficient there would be no need for exchange. The ubiquity of exchange can, 
therefore, be thought of as a result both of the efficiency and wealth benefits of 
specialisation as well as of the introduction of money. In addition, trade has 
desirable wealth effects in its own right. It has to be recognised though, that 
humans depend on each other not only for materialistic wealth maximising 
purposes, but also for broader social and psychological `satisfaction'. Consequently, 
economic exchange has to be seen as embedded in a web of social relations, despite 
the fact that these are not directly studied by economic analysis. 
Classical contract law and neoclassical microeconomics typically treat transactions 
as discrete exchanges, isolated from any historical, social or psychological context. 
Discrete exchange is defined as "relativelvfree of relations beyond those created by 
a common language, a system of order [.. J, a monetary system, and, for discrete 
exchanges not accomplished simultaneously, a legal system enforcing promises" 
(Macneil 1985: 485, emphasis in original). Examples include purchasing petrol on 
the motorway or music CDs by mail order. 
Contracts are interpreted as promises of the parties involved, to be fulfilled into the 
future. Such contracts are supposed to presentiatel all future possibilities and 
provide appropriate responses in advance. This contracting paradigm relies on the 
efficacy of courts to enforce promises or award remedies and damages according to 
some rules of justice. 
However, contracts are necessarily incomplete. Presentiating all future possibilities 
(contingent claims contracting) is ultimately impossible. Essentially, there is not one 
point in time when the parties to a contract make a definite and final agreement. 
1 Presentiation is the term used to denote that contracts in a way map future events and actions onto 
the present by means of an agreement of promises. 
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Instead, it is an incremental process of renegotiation and adaptation over time. 
Actual contracts very often allow many decisions to be made during the course of 
the relationship rather than in advance. Litigation is costly and not always 
efficacious as the courts have limited knowledge of the context of the exchange and 
many claims the parties make cannot be directly verified, not to mention delays and 
possible miscarriages of justice. As a result, private ordering is often more efficient 
and the threat of litigation is employed to delineate threat positions in bilateral 
bargaining. Llewellyn (1931) succinctly summarises: "a contract almost never 
accurately indicates real working relations, but... affords a rough indication around 
which such relations vary, an occasional guide in cases of doubt, and a norm of 
ultimate appeal when the relations cease in fact to world' (p. 737, quoted in 
Williamson 1996: 10). 
Moreover, the historical and social context as well as the identity of the parties play 
a significant role in determining the content and execution of contracts. Cultural 
and reputation effects within specific industries, ethnic communities or 
geographical regions testify to this. In addition, the parties to a contract (whether 
long term or repeated spot transactions) develop reciprocal social and 
psychological links beyond the letter of the agreement during the course of the 
exchange relationship. Macaulay (1989) quotes research sowing that managers 
tend to disregard contractual technicalities and prefer to rely on `gentlemen's 
agreements'. Lowry's (1976) comment on the social conditioning of economic 
exchange is apposite: "[.. J the bargaining transaction [assuming it leads to actual 
trade/ is essentially divisive and zero sum, and [... J it must occur in a contained 
zone structured by a relational system. On the other hand, the relational structure 
necessary to an organised economy cannot be derived from an aggregation of 
bargains, but must be understood as a social contract developed in a setting of 
widely accepted social values and goals. " (p. 18) 
Moreover, Macneil (1985) strongly argues that wealth maximisation is not the 
only goal that people pursue through their economic transactions, particularly 
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within relational transactions. On non-pecuniary satisfaction in economic 
exchange, Williamson (1975: 38-39) notes that "recognition that alternative modes 
of economic organisation give rise to differing exchange relations, and that the 
relations themselves are valued, requires that organisational effectiveness be 
viewed more broadly than the usual efficiency calculus would dictate ... efficiency 
and a sense of well-being (which includes, but transcends, equity) are intrinsically 
(nonseparably) joined... individuals [may] forego material gains for nonpecuniary 
satisfactions'. Whitford (1985) suggests that identity (in the sense that humans, as 
social entities, construct their identities partly through the relations they form) and 
participation are two other goals pursued by individuals, independently of any 
wealth effects of their transactions. 
This is the meaning of relational contracting. It is a broad (in many respects 
sociological) notion of exchange as primarily human relation in which individuals 
seek to satisfy a number of goals through an incremental process of mutual 
adaptation to changes of all kinds. The law makes appropriate provisions in support 
of relational contracting. Macneil (1978,1985) argues that all contracts are 
ultimately relational to a greater or lesser extent. Even the most discrete exchanges 
are also embedded within a broader relation, such as the market that enables their 
performance. The extent to which an exchange is discrete or relational is a matter 
of degree along a continuum, rather than kind. 
2.2. The firm as a discrete alternative to the market 
Arguably, the distinction between the firm and the market is more a matter of 
degree than kind. It is a matter of the degree of discretion, authority, continuity of 
association, incentive intensity and so on. These properties clearly vary from spot 
markets, through intermediate governance structures, to long term contracts and 
internal organisation. The discrete differences often ascribed to internal 
organisation in terms of its transaction cost economising capacity in a general 
sense, can be disputed (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). Direction and authority exists 
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within firms as well as it exists in markets. Firms can direct the actions of their 
employees and can fire them, as they can direct the performance of their suppliers 
and terminate their supply relationship. Information asymmetries are also not 
relieved with integration, as employees can still withhold, distort or not produce 
information. Commercial contracts can also enforce audits, as firms can use fiat to 
obtain information. Similar arguments can be articulated with respect to incentives 
and adaptation. This has lead many to argue that the firm is no more than a legal 
fiction. It is a nexus of explicit and implicit contracts (Aoki et al 1990) and the 
difference between the firm and the market lies on the particulars of each contract. 
The agency theoretic position of Jensen and Meckling (19 76: 311) in this respect 
has been a point of reference for many arguments: "it makes little or no sense to try 
to distinguish those things that are 'inside' the firm and those that are `outside' of it. 
There is in a very real sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i. e. 
contracts) between the legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of... inputs and the 
consumers of output'. This has been the position adopted in many economic 
theories, for two apparent reasons. First, it is a convenient analytical concept. 
Second, any discrete differences between market transactions and the firm certainly 
do not derive endogenously from the assumptions and analysis within the relevant 
theories. Even when Williamson (1996) insists on the structural discreteness 
between markets and hierarchies, it is an assertion (or assumption) rather than a 
result of transaction cost theory. 
Masten (1993) argues that this position is probably correct until one brings into 
consideration the legal regimes governing market transactions and the firme. As it 
turns out, the law provides substantially different mechanisms to the firm and the 
market, thus rendering them discrete alternatives indeed. The law provides much 
broader power to the authority of employers than the performance that might be 
2 The work of Masten (1993) and Clark (1985) reviewed here makes reference to American 
legislation. Although labour laws may differ in other jurisdictions, the main principles reviewed in 
this section are expected to be similar, at least among the western capitalist societies. 
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stipulated in the employment contract. Clark (1985) locates the legal differences 
between the firm and the market in four legal attributes of the fiduciary 
relationship within the firm. First, the affirmative duties to disclose. Second, open- 
ended duties to act. Third, closed-in rights to positional advantages. Fourth, moral 
rhetoric. These are briefly explained below. 
An employee is expected by labour laws to obey all reasonable rules and orders of 
the employer, to yield loyalty, respect and faithfulness and to disclose all relevant 
information. In return, the employer is held liable for any harm the employee 
causes to third parties in the course of their employment. This creates the need for 
closer monitoring but also an incentive for the employee to follow the employer's 
orders without much consideration of the consequences. In a commercial contract 
the contractor is only expected to abide by the performance stipulated in the 
contract and has complete control over all non-contracted aspects of his behaviour. 
Moreover, the law affords the employer greater powers to enforce the cooperative 
behaviour of the employee. The employee can be held liable and the employer can 
recover damages for failure to perform the duties accruing from the law and the 
employment contract, though not necessarily explicitly stipulated in it. In addition, 
members of the firm are explicitly forbidden to use any privileged information 
(positional advantage) to their private benefit (e. g. insider trading). Of course, this 
creates an incentive for the employee not to seek additional valuable information 
thus increasing the importance of monitoring. Finally, termination is the ultimate 
threat for both commercial and employment contracts. The differences mainly lie 
in what constitutes breach of contract in each case. An employer can take various 
disciplinary actions or dismiss an employee on the basis of disloyalty, dishonesty 
and insubordination, among other `offences' which are irrelevant in the context of 
commercial contracting. 
While labour laws may differ between jurisdictions, in general the employment 
relation is granted a greater capacity of authority, flexibility and information 
advantages as compared to commercial contracts. Of course, many such aspects of 
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internal organisation can be replicated by contractual agreement. However, writing 
a contract that would fully replicate internal organisation would be extremely 
costly and therefore impractical. Moreover, the more complex a commercial 
contract the less flexible it is by definition. The legal essence of the firm, therefore, 
constitutes a governance structure combining the above mentioned advantages at a 
very low cost while achieving substantial adaptive flexibility. In addition, the legal 
constitution of the firm also shows where the incentive deficiencies commonly 
ascribed to the firm lie. The firm is therefore a discrete structural alternative to the 
market by reference to the legal regimes that govern each institution. For many 
analytical purposes, however, it is still possible to conceive a continuum from the 
spot market to the hierarchy, while recognising that the switch from long term 
contracting to internal organisation makes a substantial difference in kind and not 
only in degree, despite the many structural similarities between the two. 
3. Transaction cost economics 
The origins of transaction cost theory can be traced back to Coase (1937) while 
substantial theoretical advances have been made by Williamson (e. g. 1975,1985, 
1996). Transaction cost economics emphasises the institutions of governance 
which refer to alternative forms of organising economic activities. These are 
contrasted to the institutional environment which refers to the broader legal, 
political and customary `rules of the game' in a historical context (e. g. North 
1990). The institutional environment is exogenous to the study of the institutions of 
governance and is considered as a set of shift parameters affecting the feasibility, 
efficacy and relative costs (efficiency) of alternative governance mechanisms. 
Transaction cost economics has been applied to a number of issues, including non- 
standard contracting practices that are normally assessed for their anticompetitive 
effects, the employment relation, corporate finance and governance and public 
policy. However, it is typically considered in connection with the question of `make 
or buy'. 
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The main argument is that transactions, which differ in their attributes, are (or 
should be) aligned to governance structures, which differ in their incentive and 
adaptive capacities, in a discriminating and transaction cost economising way. 
Moreover, it is recognised that all governance structures are ultimately imperfect. 
Consequently, the selection and assignment of governance structures is made on a 
comparative rather than an absolute basis (Williamson 1996). 
The following brief exposition of transaction cost economics starts with the basic 
behavioural assumptions of the theory and their implications. Then the dimensions 
of transactions and governance structures are outlined. Finally, the process of 
alignment is sketched. 
3.1. Behavioural assumptions 
The theory of transaction cost economics is based on two fundamental behavioural 
assumptions about human nature, namely, bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Economic actors are "intendedly rational but only limitedly sd' (Simon 19 61) . Both 
the intentional character of human rationality and its limited nature are crucial 
assumptions in this theory. All the theories of the firm reviewed in this chapter rely 
on at least a minimum amount of rationality to justify the efficiency perspective. 
The necessary incompleteness of contracting (which creates all the contractual 
hazards that transaction cost economics is interested in) is a direct result of 
limitations to rationality (combined, of course, with environmental uncertainty and 
measurement problems). Once it is recognised that all feasible contracts are 
necessarily incomplete, those mechanisms of governance that can deal with ex post 
manifestations of this incompleteness (such as the condition of small numbers, 
bilateral dependence or hold up) are of primary importance. These mechanisms 
(including contingent claims, renegotiations or litigation) bear various costs which 
have to be judged against their efficacy. That rationality is bounded does not mean 
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that it is myopic. On the contrary, individuals have to be farsighted to acknowledge 
contract incompleteness and to anticipate future hazards, despite the fact that they 
cannot determine them in advance. 
Economic agents are also characterised by opportunism, defined as self interest 
seeking with guile. Opportunism gives rise to various well known agency problems 
such as adverse selection and moral hazard (see section 4). Both these problems 
appear under conditions of hidden and/or asymmetric information. If economic 
agents were not acting opportunistically they would normally share all available 
information to maximise total net gains. Because of opportunism, they prefer to 
appropriate any surplus not accounted for by extant agreements and thus 
strategically manipulate (withhold, distort or selectively disclose) their private 
information. This behavioural attitude is so strong that agents often withhold their 
private information not realising that sharing it might increase their individual 
gains (prisoner's dilemma). The fundamental implication of opportunism and its 
manifestations for economic organisation relates to the typical notion of contract as 
promise. Opportunistic agents cannot be assumed to reliably fulfil their promise. 
Various costly ex ante and ex post measures (such as incentives, monitoring or 
court ordering) are needed to counter this possibility. 
Williamson (1975) argues that information impactedness is a derivative condition 
of bounded rationality and opportunism. Pre- and postcontractual information 
impactedness are distinguished and the role of first mover advantages with respect 
to this condition is recognised. Information impactedness arises either from 
asymmetrically available information between two parties, coupled with high costs 
of achieving information parity and the opportunistic behaviour of the parties, or 
from identically informed parties who, however, make opportunistic 
representations that the true state of affairs is something different to what they both 
know, coupled with the high costs of apprising an arbiter of the true information. 
Information impactedness is a particularly acute problem under `small number' 
conditions where the absence of a competitive process allows opportunistic 
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behaviour (otherwise, competitive bidding and benchmarking serve both as 
revelation mechanisms and as deterrents of opportunism, despite the added 
problems of under-bidding). When information is incomplete ex ante and the 
parties cannot devise sufficient rules of conduct, ex post haggling results as each 
party dissipates resources to take advantage of opportunities to increase their 
private gains. 
In this respect, the purpose of economic organisation, according to transaction cost 
economics, is to economise on bounded rationality and to safeguard against 
opportunism. It is also worth mentioning that transaction cost economics, as 
advanced by Williamson, typically ignores the risk attitudes of contracting parties 
and implicitly assumes risk neutrality. In order to effect an alignment of 
transactions and governance structures, given these assumptions, the dimensions of 
transactions and governance structures need to be operationalised. This is dealt 
with in the following two sections. 
3.2. DImenslonallsing transactlons 
Transactions can be described along three main dimensions, namely, frequency, 
uncertainty and asset specificity. 
Recurrent or long term transactions, as opposed to one-off exchanges provide 
fertile ground for most of the phenomena of economic organisation. Incomplete 
contracting, opportunism and reputation effects are some of the main conditions 
that become more relevant in recurrent or long term transactions. One-off 
exchanges approximate more closely the notion of discreteness while recurrent or 
long term transactions provide more ground for the development of complex 
relations (see section 2.1). 
Uncertainty is of three types, namely, primary, secondary and behavioural 
(Williamson 1985: 56-60). Primary uncertainty is of a state-contingent type and 
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derives from natural or social events out of the control of the decision maker. 
Secondary uncertainty is a result of bounded rationality and refers to distorted 
communication, limited access to information and measurement problems which 
are a result of limitations to the cognitive skills of individuals. When such problems 
are a result of strategic manoeuvring (e. g. non-disclosure, disguise or distortion of 
information), they are due to opportunism and the resultant uncertainty is called 
behavioural. 
Asset specificity refers to the extent to which an asset cannot be redeployed to 
alternative uses, except at a significant cost or sacrifice of productive value. It is 
related to the notion of sunk costs but whereas in neoclassical economic analysis 
sunk costs have no role to play after they are committed, asset specificity takes a 
central position in transaction cost analysis. The degree of asset specificity is 
commensurate to the appropriable quasi-rents it creates. There are four main kinds 
of asset specificity, namely, physical asset specificity (usually involving specialised 
equipment or materials), human asset specificity (including tacit knowledge and 
learning by doing), site specificity (spatial proximity normally due to technological 
constraints) and dedicated investments (large investments in general purpose assets 
made for the benefit of a particular trading partner in anticipation of high volume 
future exchange). In addition, brand name capital and temporal specificity have 
recently been added as further types of asset specificity (Williamson 1996: 59-60). 
Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) introduce the notion of business process asset 
specificity as deriving from the combination of human asset specificity and 
procedural specificity, the latter referring to the degree to which a firm's 
workflows and processes are customised in line with the requirements of the 
exchange partner. 
A profound implication of asset specificity is what Williamson calls the 
`Fundamental Transformation'. While competitive bidding is typically efficacious at 
the outset, once a contract is entered into by the initial winning supplier and the 
customer, competitive parity at contract renewal is questionable. If the exchange 
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relationship does not involve any specific assets of any kind, all potential suppliers, 
including the incumbent, remain at a par (assuming that the cost of bidding and 
supplier selection is negligible). Otherwise, the incumbent contractor has an 
advantage over other potential suppliers, commensurate to the unredeployable 
value of the specific assets involved (appropriable quasi-rents). This is the `small 
numbers' condition that arises postcontractually. 
By definition, the presence of asset specificity implies that, were the contract to be 
terminated, economic value would have to be sacrificed. It is therefore in the 
interest of both parties to renew their contract (or to avoid termination due to 
conflict). For rational decision makers therefore, it is a question of balancing the 
costs and potential benefits of switching. This line of thought is particularly 
pertinent to the outsourcing of IT services where a variety of practices is being 
observed, from companies trying to sustain their relations with incumbent 
suppliers despite the conflicts, to other organisations painfully switching suppliers, 
or others going as far as re-establishing their internal capability all over again. 
3.3. Dimensionallsing governance structures 
The main purpose of economic organisation according to this theory is to align 
transactions and governance structures in a discriminating, transaction cost 
economising way. To achieve this, we need an operational means of characterising 
transactions and governance structures. While frequency, uncertainty and asset 
specificity are the dimensions characterising transactions, three main attribute 
categories dimensionalise governance alternatives (Williamson 1991). 
Williamson identifies three discrete governance structures, namely markets, 
hierarchies and hybrids, although most comparisons are typically made between 
the first two extremes. The three attribute categories of these governance structures 
are (i) instruments, including incentive intensity and administrative controls, (ii) 
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adaptive capability, including autonomous and cooperative adaptation, and (iii) 
contract law regimes, including classical, neoclassical and forbearance doctrines. 
Incentive intensity is highest in markets and lowest in hierarchies, despite the fact 
that the latter also have access to additional incentive instruments, such as 
performance payments, profit sharing and career rewards. Administrative controls 
are the fundamental instrument of hierarchies, exemplified by authority and fiat. 
The threat of termination and possible reputation effects are the only such 
instruments in market transactions. The power of authority in hierarchies is 
constrained by its limited capacity to monitor and process all the necessary 
information. In markets, whatever contingency is not adequately dealt with by the 
price mechanism, is resolved in the courts of law. Alternatively, the parties involved 
switch to another governance structure (hybrid or hierarchy) where more 
administrative flexibility is available (examples of such recourse include take-overs 
and more generally vertical and lateral integration). 
According to Williamson, adaptation is the central problem of economic 
organisation. There are two kinds of adaptation. First, autonomous, where markets 
have an advantage and second, cooperative, where hierarchies have the advantage. 
Intermediate (hybrid) contractual forms replicate some degree of cooperative 
adaptation within what is essentially a market transaction. 
Markets effect adaptation via the autonomous decisions and actions of economic 
agents reacting to the information conveyed by prices. Any signs of cooperation are 
either condemned as anticompetitive (collusion) or justified on grounds of market 
failure, externalities and/or transaction costs. In contrast, hierarchies adapt to 
changing circumstances by cooperation, or the "conscious, deliberate and 
purposeful efforts to craft adaptive internal coordinating mechanisms" 
(Williamson 1996: 103). In pure hierarchies, autonomous adaptation is not, in 
principle, available as an option, although divisionalisation, transfer pricing or 
other attempts to decentralise control are efforts to replicate some autonomous 
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adaptation of the type available in markets. That adaptations in hierarchies are 
called cooperative does not necessarily imply the presence of congenial relations 
and congruous motives. Opportunism survives within hierarchies as it does in 
markets, despite the provisions made by the law (see below and section 2.2). As a 
result, the adaptations actually implemented are not necessarily efficient, as 
members of the organisation pursue their individual subgoals. Inasmuch as 
authority in hierarchies does not only intervene to supplement incentive and 
adaptive inadequacies, truly selective intervention is impossible. 
Markets are governed under classical contract law regimes. Classical contract law 
attempts to facilitate exchange by emphasising discreteness: "sharp in by clear 
agreement, sharp out by clear performance'' (Macneil 19 74: 738) and presentiation 
(fully pre-specifying all relevant future contingencies and responses pertaining to a 
given transaction). The exchange agreements (explicit or implicit) and the 
legislation describe all possible actions available to economic actors. Any disputes 
are resolved by the courts according to the relevant agreements and laws. 
Contingent claims contracting is the respective concept in economics. In a 
departure from his earlier analyses, Williamson has replaced relational contracting 
(1985) for the forbearance doctrine (1991) as the legal regime governing the 
operation of internal organisation. In sharp contrast to classical contract law, the 
forbearance doctrine allows maximum flexibility to the firm to regulate all its 
internal affairs by its own mechanisms, without even the possibility of bringing a 
disagreement to the courts. Exceptions to forbearance refer to issues creating 
externalities, usually relating to employee rights, health and safety and the natural 
environment. 
Hybrid governance structures possess all elements of the three attribute categories 
available to markets and hierarchies, but to a more limited extent. The parties to a 
hybrid exchange relationship maintain their ownership autonomy, thus high- 
powered market incentives may still be effected, albeit to a restricted degree. Hybrid 
contracts afford substantial administrative controls (for information disclosure, 
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joint decision making, renegotiation, dispute resolution etc. ), in recognition of the 
problems arising due to contract incompleteness, reciprocal dependence and asset 
specificity. Inasmuch as parties to a hybrid governance structure maintain their 
autonomy while instituting joint administrative controls, they sustain both 
autonomous as well as cooperative adaptation. Neoclassical contracting is the legal 
regime governing hybrid contracts. Faced with the impossibility of complete ex ante 
contingent claims contracting, neoclassical contract law reinforces exchange 
agreements with administrative mechanisms allowing ex post resolution of 
contingencies. 
3.4. AlIgning transactions with governance structures 
Williamson (1996: 92) argues that the principle according to which transactions 
are assigned governance structures in a discriminating way is that of 
remediableness, whereby first-best outcomes are infeasible due to the ultimate 
incompleteness of all feasible contracts. Consequently, the least costly alternative is 
selected on a comparative basis. 
Moreover, Williamson (1996) emphasises discrete structural analysis of 
governance structures (as opposed to continuous variations in governance 
attributes) on three grounds. First, it is argued, the three generic forms (market, 
hybrid and hierarchy) employ different means and are not extensions of each 
other. Second, each of them relies on a different contract law regime. Third, 
Williamson focuses on first order economising as opposed to marginal analysis 
which is concerned with second order refinements (e. g. in incentive intensity or 
information acquisition). 
Williamson (1985) and Riordan and Williamson (1985) have attempted a 
formalisation of the bipolar choice between market and hierarchy, taking into 
account the degree of asset specificity and firm output. The production and 
transaction cost differentials between internal organisation and market 
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procurement are studied under various amounts of asset specificity and firm 
output. For relatively small amounts of output and limited asset specificity, market 
procurement has an advantage in terms of production costs (arising from scale and 
scope economies achieved by specialised suppliers). This advantage diminishes as 
output grows and the firm can replicate similar production economies. In terms of 
transaction costs, the market has an advantage for low levels of asset specificity and 
the hierarchy has an advantage for higher levels of asset specificity. 
For a given amount of output, there will be a threshold level of specificity for which 
the hierarchy replaces the market as the least cost alternative. Williamson (1996) 
argues that contracts in the region of that threshold are expected to be ambiguous 
and unstable: "mixed governance, in which some firms will be observed to buy, 
others to make and all express `dissatisfaction' with their procurement solution are 
apt to arise' (p. 69). One cannot avoid pondering whether this is what we 
currently observe with IT outsourcing. 
The presence of economies of scale and scope favour market organisation over a 
wider range of asset specificity values than would be observed, if production cost 
economies were absent. Having said that, Teece (1980) argues that the mere 
presence of scope economies (Panzar and Willig 1981) is not a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for lateral integration, unless the relevant assets are also co- 
specialised. 
Another ambiguity arises when, within a range of limited output, the marginal 
production cost disadvantage of internal organisation and the marginal transaction 
cost disadvantage of market procurement operate in opposite directions. At a 
sufficiently high level of output, internal organisation can replicate all production 
cost economies available in the market, thus the governance choice rests on the 
governance cost differential between the two alternatives, for a given level of asset 
specificity. 
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This treatment, although instructive and consistent with the analytical standards of 
the neoclassical tradition, is limited in two main respects. First, it deals with two 
polar extremes, vertical integration and market contracting, without considering 
the particular structure of any of the two which determines the extent of 
governance costs and of the respective differentials. This is a result of the insistence 
on first order economising and on discrete alternatives. Second, it examines only 
one transaction at a time, whereas contracting takes place in a broader institutional 
nexus (Aoki et al 1990) of possibly related exchange relationships. 
Another similar exercise in developing the analytics of the alignment of governance 
structures with transactions is presented by Williamson (1991). This includes three 
governance forms (market, hybrid and hierarchy) and ignores production costs. 
The transaction cost curves of the three generic governance alternatives are 
expressed as an increasing function of asset specificity. Due to the adaptability 
differences discussed earlier, the three curves differ in their slopes and origins. The 
market turns out to be the least cost option for low asset specificity but its cost 
increases rapidly with specificity. Hybrid forms are the least cost alternative over a 
medium range of asset specificity. The governance cost curve for the hierarchy has 
the highest origin and the smallest slope and turns out to be the least cost structure 
for high levels of asset specificity. An efficient (or governance possibility) frontier of 
governance structures is thus created, whereupon actual governance structures 
(e. g. franchising) can be placed. 
The threshold values of asset specificity for which a transition from markets to 
hybrids and from hybrids to hierarchies takes place are affected by the institutional 
environment. Four elements of the institutional environment are examined by 
Williamson (1991) in this respect, namely, property rights, contract law, 
reputation effects and uncertainty. Weak enforcement of property rights (e. g. an 
ineffective patent system) would shift all governance costs upwards, particularly as 
asset specificity increases. Other things being equal, hierarchy would be expected 
to be the least cost option for a broader range of asset specificity. Changes in the 
64 
Chapter Two: On the Economics of the Organisation of Production and Exchange 
willingness of courts to intervene (i. e. changes in the contract law regimes) would 
also shift the governance cost curves of the respective governance structures, thus 
altering their relative efficiency. An environment where reputation effects are 
effectively communicated and play an important role, reduces the costs of hybrid 
governance and render it feasible over a broader range of asset specificity. 
Increased uncertainty reduces the efficacy of hybrid forms of governance while 
hierarchies can rely on fiat and markets on autonomous adaptation to respond to 
contingencies. 
To further demonstrate the role of asset specificity as the main dimension of 
transactions and the main determinant of governance, Williamson has proposed a 
simple contracting schema with three main contracting possibilities. First, 
transactions that are efficiently supported by general purpose assets do not need 
protective governance structures. Discrete market contracting suffices and 
competition obtains. Second, transactions that involve significant transaction- 
specific investments typically involve some sort of bilateral dependence. Such 
transactions can be supported by contractual safeguards to protect against 
postcontractual opportunism and to provide incentives for the (presumably more 
productive) specific investment. Third, transactions involving specific assets but for 
which no contractual safeguards are provided will lead to a higher price. For 
example, to induce a supplier to make a transaction-specific investment, the buyer 
will have to pay for that part of the investment that the supplier cannot salvage 
outside the particular relation. Moreover, such a transaction is expected to be 
contractually unstable as the pricing-out of specificity may not mitigate other 
contractual hazards arising from opportunism, uncertainty and measurement 
problems. Such transactions are expected to revert to either a position where the 
specific investment is forgone in favour of the general purpose assets or to a 
position with appropriate governance safeguards. Such safeguards provide credible 
commitments to the exchange relationship, so that the appropriation of the specific 
investment is guaranteed and opportunistic dangers avoided. 
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The provision of credible commitments is analogous to an exchange of hostages 
(Williamson 1986). One possibility when cost-reducing specific investments are 
needed, is for the buyer to make the investment and retain ownership, while 
contracting with the supplier for the supply of goods using these specific assets. The 
feasibility of this option, however, is limited to physical and mobile assets, and 
creates further incentive distortions (dampened performance and possible abuse of 
the assets). 
Another alternative is for the buyer to promise (post a hostage of appropriate value) 
to compensate the supplier for the unrecoverable cost of the specific investment, 
should the exchange come to an end, while otherwise pay the marginal cost price. 
This option is still subject to supplier opportunism. The supplier may induce breach 
of contract in order to appropriate the hostage. For this reason it is suggested that 
buyers post hostages which are of the appropriate value to them (thus ensuring 
credibility of commitment) but are of no value to the supplier (thus mitigating the 
risk of contrived cancellation). 
Further problems arise when the buyer cannot verify the extent and value of 
specific investments claimed to have been made by the supplier. For this reasons 
contracts often provide for the engagement of third party arbiters and/or give the 
buyer audit rights over the supplier's activity. Such audit rights appear to be typical 
in IT outsourcing contracts. 
Another source of governance hazard arises due to the necessary incompleteness of 
contracts and the opportunity of the parties to haggle over contingencies that arise, 
especially where the allocative implications are not straightforward. Specialised 
contractual arrangements allow hybrid forms of governance to control such 
hazards. Third party arbitration and reciprocal exposure (perhaps through 
reciprocal trading) are two of the possibilities. Other possibilities include joint 
decision making mechanisms and procedures of private appeal (escalation 
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processes). The promise of long term exchange on the part of the buyer is also a 
form of hostage. 
This discussion is particularly pertinent to IT outsourcing which typically involves a 
substantial amount of specificity of almost all kinds. One example is proprietary 
software. This constitutes physical asset specificity, which also extends to human 
asset specificity, since specialised skills are needed to develop and maintain it. 
Another example is desktop support which requires investment in local operations 
(site specificity). Vendor staff working exclusively on a particular client's project or 
service, constitute a dedicated investment, to the extent that the vendor cannot 
employ them efficiently, were the particular contract to be terminated. The case of 
Gloucester County Council (chapter 1, section 1) is illustrative of the hold-up 
potential accruing to both dedicated investments and human asset specificity 
associated with data centre operations. Long-term agreements are one commitment 
mechanism typically employed to safeguard specific investments. 
4, Agency costs 
The literature on agency costs is divided into two parts (Jensen 1983). First, 
mathematical principal-agent theory (e. g. Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985) emphasises 
ex ante alignment of incentives, usually assuming unlimited rationality, costless 
and complete contracting and perfect commitment. Positive agency theory (e. g. 
Jensen and Meck ling 1976) studies both ex ante alignment and ex post adaptation 
and adopts the main tenets of transaction cost theory, namely that contracting is 
costly and incomplete. Therefore, organisational form is of prime importance for 
this branch of the theory while for mathematical principal agent theory, 
organisation form does not matter as virtually any outcome is achievable through 
an efficient (no matter how complex) contract. 
Both theories view the firnt as a nexus of internal and external contracts or as a 
network of overlapping or nested principal agent relationships between owners, 
managers, employees, suppliers and customers. Mathematical principal agent 
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theory structures these contracts through mechanism design whereas positive 
agency theory defines the nature of the firm as an equilibrium state of this nexus of 
contracts. 
The contract is the object of study and the individual the unit of analysis in both 
strands of the theory. The presence of specific investments (appropriable quasi- 
rents) as a cause of cx past hold-up (opportunism) potentials is also a central 
theme. However, mathematical principal agent theory can almost always perfectly 
resolve hold-up potentials contractually (Rogerson 1992) by relying on the absence 
of externalities (one individual's decisions and actions do not affect others), risk 
neutrality, costless contracting (contracts can be arbitrarily complex) and perfect 
commitment (individuals cannot renege or renegotiate, even if this is ex prost 
efficient). 
Information asymmetry is recognised as another source of opportunistic behaviour 
which manifests itself in two ways. Precontractual information asymmetry creates 
the problem of adverse selection. For example, a buyer has limited information on a 
potential supplier's capacity to deliver high quality and/or low cost. The supplier 
can consequently take advantage of the buyer's ignorance. Postcontractually, 
information asymmetry leads to moral hazard. For example, the contractor may 
shirk or exaggerate his costs or any adverse conditions, if the buyer cannot monitor 
these variables sufficiently. Moreover, if such information is not independently 
verifiable, the buyer may renege on the contract and refuse to make payments by 
understating the contractor's performance (moral hazard from the part of the 
principal). 
Positive agency theory is positioned much closer to transaction cost analysis 
(Williamson 1996: 171-179) because they share the same behavioural 
assumptions (although agency theory admits bounded rationality only implicitly by 
recognising contract incompleteness) and they both appreciate the importance of 
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transaction costs in the broadest sense of the term. The following sections outline 
the main tenets of each branch of the theory. 
4.1. Mathematic d princ/pal-agent Theory 
The basic setting (Sappington 1991) involves a principal contracting with an agent 
for a particular job. The principal makes an offer which includes a payment 
schedule conditional on the performance of the agent. The payment is equal to the 
principal's valuation of the agent's performance minus a fixed franchise fee. The 
agent accepts the contract if his expected gains exceed his opportunity cost. The 
principal motivates the agent by making him the residual claimant of any 
performance that he might achieve above the fixed franchise fee. The agent's 
performance can be deterministic or probabilistic, depending on his effort and a 
random parameter representing the environmental conditions that may arise. 
The typical principal-agent setting assumes complete and symmetric information, 
complete contracts, risk neutral agent, perfect commitment from both principal 
and agent and costless measurement and verification of information. While 
transaction costs are typically ignored in this branch of the literature, differential 
risk attitudes often play a significant role. 
If the agent is risk averse and the principal risk neutral, the latter will choose to 
bear some of the risk himself, thus offering a compensation based more on realised 
costs rather than the agent's performance. The agent thus ceases to be the sole 
residual claimant, which dampens his incentives. Moreover, this insurance 
provided by the principal can be a cause of moral hazard. The same result obtains 
when the principal has to respect the agent's limited liability (limited commitment) 
and has to compensate his effort even under adverse environmental conditions. The 
certainty with which effort leads to performance in a particular task environment 
determines risk. By opting for input (effort) monitoring (and input-based 
69 
Chapter Two: On the Economics of the Organisation of Production and Exchange 
compensation), the principal internalises these risks and vice versa (Anderson and 
Oliver 1987). 
More generally, if the principal is the residual claimant of gain and risk, lie will 
prefer to monitor inputs. Characteristic examples include vertical integration and 
cost plus contracting. If the agent is the residual claimant, the principal will prefer 
to measure output performance (e. g. fixed price or performance contingent 
contracts). The argument can be reversed so that if input monitoring is more 
efficacious (or less costly) the principal will prefer to acquire the residual claims 
and if output measurement is more efficacious (or less costly) the principal will 
choose to assign residual claims to the agent. These results derive from the dual 
sources of rent available to agents, namely, manipulating input costs and quantity 
(Khalil and Lawarree 1995). Effort (input) monitoring can generally be used in 
addition to, performance (output) measurement, even if either information is 
imperfect, as long as the total information is more useful. The feasibility of all these 
options is ultimately constrained by the risk attitudes of each party, which are 
typically set as assumptions in principal-agent models. 
Team organisation poses additional problems for input monitoring and output 
measurement, depending on the degree of separability (the extent to which output 
information discriminates between different input owners) and programmability 
(the availability of knowledge on the transformation of inputs to output). To relieve 
this problem, two or more competing agents can be employed as reciprocal 
monitors, as long as each agent's effort and performance is independent of the 
other's. Agent collusion then becomes a problem which can, in turn, be mitigated if 
each agent is regarded for truthfully squealing on the other. Collusion between 
principals and agents can also occur in multi-tiered or nested agency relationships, 
such as those found in hierarchies, for example between managers, supervisors and 
workers (Tirolc 1986). 
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Depending on risk preferences, simple tournaments can provide powerful 
incentives. The principal does not have to measure cardinal performance but offers 
winner-take-all' or `loser-bear-all' contracts where only ordinal performance 
needs to be assessed. \Vlicn a small amount of effort is only required, `loser-bear- 
all' contracts that penalise non-performance are more efficacious. Such 
tournaments are also effective deterrents of opportunism (reneging) on the part of 
the principal, assuming that ascertaining a winner is less costly and more verifiable 
than assessing the cardinal performance of each agent. 
Under symmetric information, greater environmental uncertainty is expected to 
lead to a greater fixed and a smaller incentive proportion in compensation, and 
vice versa. When the principal has private information about environmental 
uncertainty and the effort level required by the agent does not vary with 
(uncertain) changes in the environment, the principal will choose to offer a 
contract with a higher incentive proportion as a signalling device to communicate 
the degree of uncertainty to the agent (Umanath et al 1996). If the agent's effort 
level is expected to vary with states of the environment, then the incentive effect is 
expected to dominate (over the signalling effect) and compensation will follow the 
rule under symmetric information. If the agent has private information, the 
principal can induce truth revelation by offering a menu of Alternative reward 
schemes, more or less incentive intensive. The agent will have to select the payment 
structure that maximises his gains given his private information and thus he will 
not be able to expropriate any information rents by misrepresenting his private 
information. If risk preferences and the availability of information about them are 
taken into account, matters get more complicated and the above mechanisms may, 
under risk aversion, be rendered ineffective altogether. 
Contracts for software development are typically of the cost-plus kind (time and 
materials), in recognition of the uncertainties involved in the process. Large 
outsourcing contracts often have a mixed payment schedule where a (relatively 
smaller) proportion of total compensation is tied to performance targets. 
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Interdependent tasks have further incentive implications. When the costs of two 
tasks are negatively correlated, better incentives are provided if they are both 
assigned to the same agent and vice versa. For example, if higher development cost 
(effort) leads to lower maintenance cost, a countervailing consideration (Riordan 
and Sappington 19S7) is introduced to the agent who is assigned both. Reporting 
high development costs implies a claim that maintenance will be carried out at low 
cost. Alternatively, an agent undertaking only development has an incentive to 
exaggerate his cost and so does the agent separately undertaking maintenance. 
However, if, for example, high costs of requirements specification leads to high cost 
of development (positive cost correlation), there is no countervailing incentive and 
the agent can exaggerate both costs (or, alternatively, shirk at both tasks). The 
principal is therefore Letter off assigning the two tasks to separate agents. 
In long teen contracts, if future gains are not heavily discounted, the principal can 
offer adequate incentives while protecting the agent from uncontrollable risk by 
making payment contingent on average performance over time meeting some 
specified target. This assumes that the technologies and the environment are fairly 
stable over the averaging time window. Averaging offers some protection to the 
agent against unpredictable contingencies impairing his performance. 
The threat of termination in long term contracts has powerful incentive 
consequences (Sen 1996). Termination clauses are instituted for three main reasons 
of efficiency. First, if the incumbent contractor is somehow assessed as inferior to 
alternatives, termination provisions allow the principal to switch. Second, in the 
presence of moral hazard (i. e. when the agent's effort is not perfectly monitored) 
the threat of immediate termination upon detection of defection can induce agents 
to align their actions with the interests of the principal. Finally, termination clauses 
can be used to deter the agent from misrepresenting his private information (e. g. 
costs). Such a termination clause should specify that, other things being equal, the 
agent should be fired if he reports a high level of costs. The efficacy of this 
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mechanism depends on the extent of intertemporal cost correlation, or, 
alternatively, the degree of uncertainty. Negative or no cost correlation (high 
uncertainty) reduces the efficacy of this kind of termination clause. 
In other words, this applies when, for example, the agent performs a repeated task 
and has private information about his costs. If the task environment is stable, the 
agent should be fired when he reports unprecedented high cost. This rule is 
weakened when the task environment is known to be uncertain and/or when the 
agent's private information can be monitored or verified. 
4.2. PosftPe Agency IY 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principals) engage another person (the agent) to 
perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent. Both parties to the relationship are assumed to be 
self-interested utility maximisers. This means that the agent will often make 
decisions and take actions that diverge from the interests of the principal. The 
reduction of welfare experienced by the principal due to this divergence is the 
source of agency costs. To limit this cost, the principal will offer incentives aiming 
at realigning the interests of the agent with those of the principal. Moreover, the 
principal will incur monitoring costs aiming at limiting the incongruent activities 
of the agent and informing the amount of compensation (including possible 
penalties) that should be awarded. The agent will also often expend resources 
(bonding costs) to offer guarantees that he will be acting in the interest of the 
principal. However, both monitoring and bonding efforts are imperfect so that the 
remaining divergence will still create a loss of welfare. The sum of the principal's 
monitoring costs, the agent's bonding costs and the residual loss, defines agency 
costs. 
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Fositivc agency theor y has been extensively applied to corporate governance but 
las broader implications. A recurrent theme is that of the separation of ownership 
from control (Fama and Jensen 1983). Ownership is defined as residual risk 
bearing or alternatively, residual claim on net gains. Moreover, four stages of the 
decision making process are distinguished, namely, initiation, ratification, 
implementation and monitoring of decisions. Initiation and implementation 
combined refer to decision management, while the combination of ratification and 
monitoring refers to decision control. 
The benefits of specialisation in decision making and risk bearing and the need to 
control the agency costs arising from the separation of ownership from decision 
making determine the concentration or separation of residual risk bearing, decision 
management and decision control. The benefits to specialisation in decision making 
are defined by the task environment and by the amount of specific (non- 
transferable) information available to individual agents. Accordingly, Fama and 
Jensen (1983) formulate two fundamental hypotheses. 
Furt, separation of residual risk bearing from decision making leads to decision 
systems that separate decision management from decision control. This is necessary 
in order to control agency costs. Second, combination of decision management and 
decision control in a few agents leads to residual claims that are largely restricted to 
these agents. This leads to efficiency losses in risk bearing. The second arrangement 
is likely to be found in cases when specific information is limited to these few 
agents. In complex organisations where specific knowledge is diffused to many 
individuals, residual risk bearing is expected to be separated from decision making. 
To counter the agency problems created as a result, decision management is 
separated from decision control. Incentive mechanisms provide important support 
in linking the interests of owners, decision managers and decision controllers. In 
certain circumstances, usually when there are few residual claimants, decision 
control %%rill be assigned to them. However, when residual claimants are many and 
diffuse (and cannot exercise effective control collectively), separation and diffusion 
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of decision management and control helps mitigate the power of individual agents 
to expropriate the interests of residual claimants. Formal decision hierarchies is the 
organisational structure that often obtains. This discussion applies directly to the 
relations between shareholders (risk bearers), the board of directors (decision 
controllers) and executive directors (decision managers). 
Based on Fama and Jensen's account alone, the common practice in IT outsourcing 
contracts where the contractor (who is responsible for decision management) is 
also asked to monitor and report performance (decision control), appears as an 
anomaly. To the extent that the contract specifies a cost-plus reward scheme, the 
client is also the residual claimant (the contractor is the residual claimant to an 
extent equal to the proportion of performance contingent rewards in his 
compensation). This apparent anomaly can be justified on three factors. First, the 
client organisation (principal) is also the recipient of the service and as such can 
costlessly collect performance information and exercise control. The quality of the 
information and the cost of its collection are compromised by the fact the this 
information is diffused across the users of the organisation and is not directly 
observable by the individuals managing the contract. Moreover, some performance 
information is more rarely observed (e. g. security breaches). Nonetheless, even this 
imperfect signal can, for many services, provide a sufficient deterrent to the 
supplier's interest in misrepresenting performance information, as long as 
appropriate penalties are attached to unacceptable performance. Second, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that reputation effects can be quite powerful, particularly for 
large, high profile contracts. Third, there may be substantial benefits from 
specialisation to monitoring achieved by the contractor (reduction of measurement 
cost). The rights to audit and/or benchmark, often reserved by clients, also serve in 
part as additional monitoring instruments. Additionally, the client organisation 
often retains a portion of decision management by reserving the right to approve 
certain decisions made by the supplier. There is no doubt, however, that all these 
means are imperfect, hence some degree of opportunistic expropriation does 
remain (residual loss) as this theory predicts. 
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A further incentive problem arises when performance targets are regularly reset 
according to past performance. Ex post efficiency dictates that principals should not 
commit to previously agreed performance targets if newer information from the 
execution of the contract can be used to revise incentives. Such lack of commitment 
gives rise to the ratchet effect (Litwack 1993). An agent anticipating this behaviour 
will underperform in order to avoid the imposition of more stringent incentives in 
the future. To avoid this adverse incentive effect, the principal should offer 
assurances that as long as the technology, the task environment and the agent(s) 
are the same, incentive targets will not change, even if the originally agreed targets 
prove to be too high or too low. Alternatively, introducing some randomness in the 
task environment (e. g. by job rotation or new technology) can mitigate the ratchet 
effect while efficient adjustments can take place. 
According to the notion of the firm as a nexus of contracts, agency problems are 
also pervasive within hierarchies. Holmstrom (1989) succinctly demonstrates how 
the promotion system which is the traditional incentive mechanism of internal 
organisation may misallocate specialised human resources. The structural nature of 
hierarchy creates further distortions arising from the strategic manipulation of 
private information (McAfee and McMillan 1995). This cost increases cumulatively 
as the distance in hierarchical levels from the employees who `own' local 
information to those who use it for decision making widens. This result justifies in 
part flatter hierarchies, allocation of decision authority to line employees 
(empowerment) and subcontracting. 
Influence costs are the resources dissipated in organisations by the efforts of 
individuals to take advantage of their private information in order to influence 
those with decision making authority to their own benefit (Milgrom and Roberts 
1990,1992). Two conditions are necessary to render influence costs likely. First, 
there must be a group of decisions that determine how the costs and benefits are 
allocated within an organisation. Second, the parties affected must have open 
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channels of communication to the decision makers during the time period when 
decisions are being made. The trade-off that arises is between minimising influence 
costs while maximising the communication of useful information for decision 
making. In other words, the goal is to structure the decision making process in such 
a way as to limit opportunities for rent seeking while still acquiring the necessary 
information to make a well informed decision. The total size of influence costs is 
commensurate to the amount of rents available for redistribution. The propensity of 
an individual or organisational unit to engage in influence activities depends on 
their ability to expropriate information rents. Decentralisation and disaggregation 
of decision making and information generation is one means of limiting influence 
activities by allocating decision authority to the owners of relevant information. 
5. Incomplete contracting and property rights 
In the absence of transaction costs, economic activity can be organised efficiently 
both in markets and in hierarchies without the allocation of ownership making any 
difference. Any rights that naturally accrue to asset ownership can be costlessly 
reassigned as dictated by efficiency, through contracting. However, transaction 
costs abound in reality, making complete contracting impossible. Uncertainty, 
measurement problems and bounded rationality are responsible for contract 
incompleteness. 
That contracts are incomplete means that many actions over the assets involved in a 
transaction cannot be contracted in advance. These residual rights of control that 
are not allocated by contract or by law define ownership (Grossman and Hart 
1986, Hart 1993). Contract incompleteness also implies that some part of the profit 
stream generated by the use of an asset cannot be contracted in advance. 
Ownership determines the ex post bargaining power of the parties to a transaction 
over the division of these rents. Moreover, the presence of transaction specific 
investments creates potential ex post hold ups. Inasmuch as ownership, defined as 
residual rights of control, affects ex post bargaining and hold ups, efficient 
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allocation of ownership should minimise ex post bargaining costs and help mitigate 
ex post hold up potentials. As a result, the allocation of ownership affects the 
parties' ex ante incentives to invest in specific assets. 
Residual rights of control are sharply distinguished from residual claims over 
future profit streams which feature prominently in agency theory. In general, 
residual rights and residual claims do not have to be allocated to the same party. 
For example, an employee or contractor who works on a profit sharing incentive 
scheme is to an extent the residual claimant but not necessarily the owner of the 
relevant assets. There are at least three reasons, however, why the two should go 
together. First, the separation of residual rights and residual claims intensifies 
problems of opportunism. Second, residual claims tend to strengthen incentives for 
short term profit, possibly at the expense of the asset's long term value, while the 
incentives accruing to ownership redress this balance. Third, separation may not be 
feasible altogether if contracting for the allocation of profit streams is imperfect. 
The owner of residual rights of control ultimately controls residual claims as well 
(Hart 1995). 
Hart and Moore (1990) advance the implications of this theory for vertical 
integration. Some of the main results are summarised here, assuming that there are 
two economic agents, a buyer A and a supplier B, initially each owning asset a and 
asset b respectively. If agent A's investment in a transaction is more important than 
agent B's, agent A should acquire B, otherwise they should remain independent. 
Agents A and B should remain independent when agent B is indispensable to asset 
b, when asset b is idiosyncratic to agent B and/or when assets a and b are 
economically independent. Agents A and B should integrate when agent A is 
indispensable to'asset b, when asset b is idiosyncratic to agent A, when assets a and 
b are complementary and/or when agent B is dispensable (in the sense that he can 
be readily replaced without any loss of value). Clearly these results are stylised and 
rather limited, as multiple assets, multiple agents and a combination of the above 
conditions are the more general case, also likely to be more common in practice. 
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The theory extends to such cases, specifying various control structures including, 
for example, shared ownership. 
According to this theory, when an investment specific to the buyer needs to be 
made then ownership should remain with the buyer. Specifically, Hart (1993: 152) 
argues that an asset which is indispensable to a buyer, who, in turn, can transfer it 
to contracts with alternative suppliers while it is of less value to the supplier outside 
the particular contract, should remain under the ownership of the buyer. Supplier 
ownership of this asset would lock-in the buyer and give the supplier the 
opportunity to hold him up. In this sense we would expect that clients maintain 
ownership of IT assets in IT outsourcing deals. The observed practice of transferring 
all assets to the supplier is either a clear contradiction to this theory or requires 
more elaborate examination of the facts that might justify it. 
There are three ways to reconcile this apparent anomaly. First, if the performance 
required from the supplier by the contract involves taking actions that cannot be 
explicitly specified in the contract (e. g. innovation, process improvement or 
replacement of equipment), then performing such actions requires possession of 
the residual rights to control the assets, or otherwise every such action would have 
to be negotiated separately. Such negotiations can become overwhelmingly costly. 
Therefore, inasmuch as all the activity of the supplier cannot be contracted ex ante, 
transfer of ownership (as residual rights of control) provides incentives for such 
activities to take place. Second, asset ownership creates incentives for the supplier 
to make further client-specific investments of his own. Third, IT outsourcing 
contracts typically transfer asset ownership to the supplier but specify their return 
to the buyer, after appropriate payments are made, at contract termination. The 
only apparent obstacle to virtually costless contracting of asset ownership 
restitution is the calculation of their remaining value. The supplier is in a position 
to bargain over the remaining value of assets and can also manipulate his own 
accounting methods. In response, standard accounting techniques and third party 
auditing can be specified in the contract. 
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This theory works for physical assets of various kinds, including `hard' assets such 
as machinery and production plants, as well as `soft' assets such as patents, client 
lists, existing contracts or brand name. In the absence of slavery, residual rights of 
control over human assets are held by each individual and are not transferable. 
Nonetheless, the importance of human assets is paramount. The theory assumes 
that individuals acquire or invest in skills and specialised knowledge specific to a 
given physical asset. This is how the conditions of indispensability and idiosyncrasy 
mentioned above accrue. 
However, the theory also insists that the firm cannot exist without any physical 
assets at all. It makes an even stronger claim, that "control over non-human assets 
leads to control over human assets" (Hart 1995: 58). That a given physical asset is 
idiosyncratic to an agent means that the agent needs this asset in order to be 
productive. If this agent is a contractor and the exchange relation breaks down, the 
agent takes the asset with him. However, if this agent is an employee, termination 
of the employment relation would deprive the agent from the asset he needs in 
order to be productive. In this case he is likely to be more loyal to the employer. 
This is how the property rights theory of the firm explains the greater power of 
authority and fiat often ascribed to internal organisation. 
The incomplete contracting theory of the firm works at the level of the individual 
owner-manager. However, the diffusion of ownership among many shareholders 
and the percolation of control rights down a hierarchy are still amenable to 
analysis. Moreover, it is assumed that individuals have adequate finances to 
purchase the assets as efficiency dictates. In reality, of course, various investors, 
bankers or shareholders may be involved and thus the efficient allocation of 
ownership and control rights becomes a more complicated matter. Several 
developments have been made in this respect but are out of the scope of our interest 
in this chapter. 
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The discussion on residual claims and on diffused ownership (among shareholders 
and investors) and control (among managers) indicates that ownership is not a 
binary variable but it can take intermediate values (Hart 1995). This is an 
underdeveloped area of the theory, possibly due to the problem of studying residual 
control rights directly, since, by definition, they cannot be specified. 
6. Measurement costs and the firm as knowledge repository 
As Barzel (1982) points out, measurement costs are pervasive in economic activity. 
They arise from private information and its opportunistic manipulation, from 
hidden physical attributes of commodities, from team organisation and from 
specialised non-transferrable expertise, to name but a few. Their presence explains 
the emergence of organisational arrangements as diverse as warranties, product 
bundling and block booking, professional associations or share contracts. 
Based on the measurement problems of team organisation, Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) advance the informational properties of internal organisation to one of the 
more influential discussions on the nature of the firm. Team organisation is defined 
as the joint production by two or more inputs where the joint output is greater than 
the sum of the outputs if each input was used in separate production. The main 
problem identified is that of measuring (and subsequently controlling) the 
marginal productivities of each input. Due to the systemic nature of team 
organisation, measurement is costly and imperfect and thus each team member has 
an incentive to shirk and free-ride on the rest of the team. 
Market competition cannot by itself alleviate this problem. A competitive market of 
team member `replacements' would be operative only if productivity and shirking 
information was costlessly available. Instead, firm organisation institutes a monitor 
whose main task is to observe the behaviour of team members, rather than their 
output, and use this information to ascertain their productivity. Making the 
monitor the residual claimant of the net gains of total team production provides 
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adequate incentive for him to perform efficiently. Overall, the monitor is also given 
responsibility to be the central party contracting with each member (more 
generally, for each input), to alter team membership and to sell all his rights and 
responsibilities. This, according to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), defines firm 
ownership (or the employer) of the classical capitalist firm. 
The informational and systemic view of the firm is further analysed by Aoki (1990) 
who argues that an important feature of internal organisation is information 
(knowledge) that is generated, maintained and used collectively by organisational 
members and is not individually portable by them (as opposed to specialised skills). 
Such information creates information rents, which, due to their participatory 
nature, are non-contractible. Such information rents only accrue to the collective 
activity within the particular organisational framework and both the collective 
nature and the organisational framework are indispensable to their generation. 
Inasmuch as such conditions cannot be replicated by contractual agreement, when 
participatory information rents are important parameters of performance (or 
elements of final net gains), internal organisation is the preferred governance 
structure, ceteris paribus 
This argument is extended by Demsetz (1993) who follows Adam Smith's original 
ideas and the refinements offered by Stigler (1968), that knowledge accrues to 
specialisation and specialisation can, in turn, take place either within or across 
firms. The organisational arrangements within firms, particularly the process of 
directing, serve to economise on the generation, accumulation and use of 
specialised knowledge. 
Specialised knowledge can be put to work without loss of its value, first by directing 
the activity of non-experts to produce and second, by selling products (or services) 
which encapsulate this knowledge and require less information to use than to 
produce. Hierarchical structures of direction economise on the costs of acquiring 
and maintaining specialised knowledge, as fewer people need to specialise in an 
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area of expertise (or, alternatively, a greater amount of knowledge can be handled 
by the same number of people). The transfer of an intermediate product relieves the 
downstream purchaser from the need to acquire and use the same knowledge as 
the upstream producer. The need to economise on the specialised knowledge 
required for production and to achieve the production economies accruing to this 
specialised knowledge, determines firm size. The limits of the firm are reached 
when the breadth of knowledge required to direct a range of operations exceeds the 
capacity of the firm, assuming there are knowledge economies to scale up to a 
certain volume of knowledge and diseconomies thereafter. In other words, the 
division of knowledge between the direction of employees and the direction of 
buyers of the good determines the boundaries of the firm. 
The transaction cost implications of organisational knowledge, particularly under 
conditions of change, uncertainty and/or innovation (Wieland 1993), create 
second order effects for the determination of firm boundaries. For example, the 
downstream purchaser of an intermediate product may be able to create innovative 
knowledge regarding the design or construction of the intermediate good. 
However, he may have inadequate incentives to do so if non-contractibility that 
accrues to the collective nature of the innovation prevents him from securing 
property rights (Lundgren 1990). Backward integration may thus obtain. 
Although the informational properties of team organisation and the creation of 
participatory information rents have been examined in the analytical economic 
tradition, the notion of the firm as knowledge repository has not received as much 
analytical treatment. Winter (1993) reaffirms the systemic nature of the firm by 
postulating that knowledge and the associated human asset specificity are to be 
found in the collectiveness of firm members and in organisational structures and 
processes which are more than the sum of individuals. However, there remains a 
need to unpack this notion into an account of the exact structures and processes by 
which this knowledge is generated and preserved while individual members of the 
firm come and go. 
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This part of the literature may find fertile grounds for empirical work in the 
organisation of IT systems and services. It can be hypothesised (see also chapter 1) 
that the growth of the number of different systems, standards and technologies 
makes it difficult for a firm to acquire and maintain all the relevant expertise, 
particularly when faced with frequent innovations in the IT industry. 
7. Culture, reputation and trust 
The firm-specific common stock of knowledge is often defined as corporate culture 
(Cremer 1990). Besides any anthropological and psychological facets of culture, for 
economists it has efficiency advantages as it helps economise on bounded 
rationality and to a certain extent it conditions the incentives of organisational 
members (Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995). 
Kreps (1990) defines corporate culture as a principle or a set of principles that 
guide the decisions and actions of the members of the organisation when 
unforeseen contingencies occur. As such, culture is primarily a remedy for contract 
incompleteness. It instils an idea as to how the organisation as a whole and each 
member individually should react to circumstances as they arise. Therefore, culture 
is also a coordination device,. inasmuch as complete centralisation of decision 
making and comprehensive communication of directions are ultimately infeasible. 
A set of shared tacit principles (culture) relieve the need for comprehensive 
communication and coordination, thus facilitating the exercise of hierarchical 
authority. 
Culture is also a control and screening device. Members of the organisation can be 
monitored for their adherence to the principle(s). Non-members can be screened as 
to their `compatibility' with the organisation's culture, should they become 
candidates for membership or other long term association. 
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Although culture evolves over time to accommodate the kinds of contingencies the 
organisation tends to encounter, it is (or it has to be) relatively more persistent than 
individual organisational members and individual decisions or plans. For culture to 
be operative it has to be common knowledge in a recursive sense. Each member of 
the organisation is aware of it and is also aware that all other members are aware 
both of the culture and of the truth of this statement. Therefore, it has to be 
communicated and `taught', especially to new members, through the continuous 
and consistent application of its principles. This means that the principles of culture 
will have to be applied even when, ex post, they are not the most efficient reaction 
to a given contingency. This is necessary in order to reinforce and communicate it, 
both to insiders and to outsiders. Moreover, the particular circumstances that 
rationalise a deviation from the principles of culture may not be common 
knowledge to all relevant parties, so that the deviation may be interpreted as the 
demise of culture and thus dampen their incentives to attend to it. In turn, this 
observation points to the fact that culture is largely indivisible, in the sense that the 
principles that comprise it are strongly interrelated. 
Finally, Kreps argues that culture has implications for firm size and scope. The 
argument is similar to that for organisational knowledge in the previous section. 
Culture is specialised in the sense that it has evolved to encounter the kinds of 
contingencies typically faced by the given organisation. As the size and scope of the 
firm increase, so does the range of different types of contingencies that culture will 
have to deal with. This can be achieved in two ways. Either more specialised 
principles are added or the same core principles are applied to the broader set of 
contingencies. In the first case more ambiguity is introduced as to which principle 
should apply and in the second, responses are more inappropriate, more often. 
Therefore, there is a limit to the size and scope of the enterprise that a coherent and 
consistent culture can sustain. 
The implication of the above discussion for inter-firm transactions, is that the 
parties' cultures will have to be common knowledge (in the strict, recursive sense). 
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In addition, there will have to be some kind of compatibility in the sense that 
contingencies should be dealt with in non-conflicting ways. Otherwise it would be 
difficult to reach agreement as each party would rightly insist in maintaining their 
own principles, as discussed above. Culture defines a significant part of a firm's 
identity. 
It is often argued that corporate culture is an extension of the reputation 
mechanisms that pervade economic activity (Williamson 1996: 156-157). 
Reputation effects also rely on the condition that the rewards and penalties of 
honouring or taking advantage of trust respectively, are common knowledge. 
However, the principle underlying reputation is a generic notion of trust (see 
further below) rather than a specialised set of historically determined principles. 
Still though, reputation effects serve to counter opportunism in the absence of 
complete contracting. 
In a one-off exchange, one party may decide to trust another and expose itself in 
anticipation of jointly beneficial trade. The second party is often better off betraying 
the other's trust and appropriating any benefits, if future exchange is not 
anticipated or not valued (discounted). In the context of repeated transactions, 
however, both parties are better off honouring each other's trust in anticipation of 
further future trade and knowing that abusive behaviour is penalised at least by 
loss of repeat trade. This argument can be extended to a broad setting with many 
buyers and sellers where each party essentially inherits the reputation of their 
predecessors. 
Such reputation effects are pervasive but are also limited in a number of respects. A 
given outcome (payoff) from a transaction may be probabilistic and if one party 
cannot directly observe the other's behaviour it will be uncertain as to whether a 
bad outcome is due to the other party's defection or to unfortunate circumstances. 
The efficacy of reputation mechanisms is therefore limited by noisy and indirect 
observations. 
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Incomplete contracting implies that in some contingencies it will not be clear what 
constitutes abusive or cooperative behaviour since appropriate responses are 
indeterminate ex ante and haggling is likely to result. Reputation information is 
also often imperfectly communicated and, moreover, it is imperfectly understood. 
Further distortions are introduced if goods and services and, consequently, 
anticipated performance, change frequently over time or when agents in a 
competitive environment manipulate reputation signals strategically. The 
effectiveness of reputation mechanisms relies on the enforcement of penalties to 
those parties that defect. In many cases, penalties for defection are not enforced and 
the effectiveness of the mechanism is degraded. Often the costs of termination (if 
this is the penalty) are higher than those of a temporary defection. As long as the 
relationship is not terminated, both parties have an incentive to transmit positive 
reputation signals to the market in order to maintain their relationship, even in the 
presence of serious conflicts. In addition, a given party may plead for mercy 
claiming that it should not be held responsible for the bad reputation of its 
predecessors and achieve forgiveness. Alternatively, a certain party may ignore 
information of bad reputation, if it considers itself to be `smarter' and thus more 
able to achieve the cooperation of others. Complexity may introduce further 
problems. 
Despite these detrimental side-effects, trust and reputation are necessary to 
economic exchange. Trust accrues to personal relationships (not necessarily of an 
economic kind), to the institutional environment (e. g. the state, the legal system, the 
local or ethnic community) and to the transactions of economic agents. To the 
economist, trust is based on calculativeness while humanitarian or religious 
conceptions of trust cannot be accommodated. Even in personal trust, where 
altruism admittedly prevails, there has to be a (low) threshold of calculativeness in 
the sense that a rational individual is not expected to endure too many betrayals of 
his trust (Williamson 1993). 
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In this context, trust can be defined as a subset of risk, as the subjective probability 
with which an agent assesses that another agent will perform a task that is 
beneficial or at least non-detrimental to him. Reputation informs the calculation of 
that probability (trust). According to this conception of trust, governance 
safeguards (such as hostages - see section 3.4) are properly interpreted as 
manifestations of trust (since they increase the probability of a net gain), despite the 
more intuitive approach according to which in the presence of trust such 
safeguards are redundant. 
Calculativeness is therefore the pervasive basis for such trust. It is the result of 
opportunism combined with bounded rationality. Admittedly though, 
calculativeness can be carried to extremes and has to be suppressed. Effectively, this 
is a calculative limitation of calculativeness, a second order calculativeness, in itself 
(Williamson 1993). 
The literature on IT outsourcing, particularly early commercial publications, 
emphasised the importance of concepts such as trust and partnership in total 
outsourcing agreements. This hyperbole over trust has, in many instances, lead to 
an interpretation of trust as substitute to a good contract. The discussion in this 
section helps to put matters into perspective. Trust and convivial corporate cultures 
between client and vendor are valuable on account of the necessary incompleteness 
of such contracts. Both qualities, however, are (or should be) calculated and must 
lead to appropriate contractual safeguards aimed at limiting the potential scope of 
future opportunism (from either party). 
8. Conclusions 
Hierarchical organisational forms are ubiquitous in modern, market economies. 
Simon (1991) uses the hypothetical analogy of a Martian who, upon approaching 
earth, colours the organisation of economic activity on a map of the developed 
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economies. The Martian would find the largest areas of the map covered by 
hierarchical organisation with fewer areas covered by market transactions. The 
emergence of firms, however, is not foreign to the neoclassical economic theory 
(Demsetz 1997). Firms emerge as a result of economies of specialisation. Demsetz 
further argues that a reduction in transaction costs does not lead to the replacement 
of hierarchies by markets, instead, it increases both the number of firms (of a 
smaller average size) and the number of market transactions in the economy. 
However, it is widely agreed that neoclassical economics has relatively little to say 
about the boundaries and structure of firms and contracts. The theories briefly 
reviewed in this chapter address these issues head on. 
Among these theories, alternative postulates have been put forth, regarding the 
motivation of firms in expanding their activities vertically and laterally and the 
factors that might limit the ability of firms to grow in these directions. Further, 
studies of some of the internal phenomena of hierarchical organisation have also 
been examined. All these theories provide efficiency explanations of observed 
structures, while monopoly explanations have been set aside. 
Three further omissions of this review ought to be admitted at this point, namely 
the evolutionary theory of economic change (Nelson and Winter 1982), the 
resource-based view of the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the X-inefficiency 
theory of the firm (Leibenstein 1975). The first introduces in a systematic manner 
the importance of history in economic organisation, as opposed to a comparatively 
static solution to the problem of organising. It has been bypassed precisely because 
the aim of this research is, in part, to suggest a normative framework that 
management can employ in answering the question of how to organise the 
provision of IT services. However, by no means does this aim lessen the significance 
of the evolutionary antecedents of the IT outsourcing phenomenon as it emerged in 
the late 1980s, a study of which remains pertinent. 
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The resource-based view of the firm is related to the evolutionary theory and 
emphasises the competencies and capabilities that organisations develop through 
learning. Moreover, the resource dependence between an organisation and its 
social and economic environment is an important theme in this theory. The 
discussion on knowledge and culture in the previous two sections is more closely 
related to this perspective. Otherwise, economic theories such as transaction cost 
economics are often presented as competing (Pfeffer 1997: 192-193) perspectives. 
However, it is conceivable that transaction cost economics, agency, resource based 
and evolutionary theories can usefully complement each other. In particular, both 
empirical research and abstract theories on governance structures often 
incorporate constructs and arguments from more than one of the above 
perspectives (e. g. Anderson and Oliver 1987, Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1988, 
Alston and Gillespie 1989, Donaldson 1990, Lieberman 1991, Mahoney 1992, 
Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995, Roberts and Greenwood 1997, Hodgson 1998 and 
Nordhaug 1998). Moreover, Williamson envisages the convergence of all these 
theories into a unified theory of organisation, or what he calls `the incipient science 
of organisation' (1990). The fact that it is not clear exactly how all these theories 
might be unified, should not inhibit us from taking advantage of the benefits of 
combining insights from them. This thesis addresses the structure of IT outsourcing 
contracts by drawing on all the theories reviewed in the present chapter. 
The theory of X-inefficiency takes an even more microanalytic perspective as 
compared to, for example, transaction cost theory. It redresses several standard 
assumptions (e. g. utility maximisation) of more mainstream theories and provides 
an analytical framework for the study of the behaviour of economic agents as 
individuals with rich personality traits. However, this theory has remained at the 
margin of intellectual development in the economics of organisation. 
Tentative evidence (particularly in conjunction with that provided in chapter 1) 
shows that the theories reviewed in this chapter are pertinent to the study of the 
organisation of IT services. Clearly, all these theories are far from complete. Each of 
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them, taken individually, illuminates many important aspects of the phenomena 
under study. Furthermore, they appear to offer complementary explanations in 
several respects, despite the marked differences that distinguish them. 
A growing literature of empirical work, has found supporting evidence, 
particularly for transaction cost and agency theory (e. g. Lafontaine 1992, Joskow 
1993, Lyons 1994, Zaheer and Venkatraman 1995, Masten 1996). In addition, the 
apparent complementarity between these two approaches has prompted several 
conceptual and/or empirical studies that combine them (e. g. Ouchi 1980, 
Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1988, Mahoney 1992, Zenger and Hesterly 1997). It is 
becoming clear that such a combined approach, despite the complexity and other 
difficulties it entails, is a profitable research direction. Such empirical work, 
however, faces significant difficulties. Most of the concepts advanced by the above 
theories, such as asset specificity, uncertainty and residual rights are not always 
directly observable or measurable in the same way as prices and quantities. Faced 
with such difficulties, empirical work is based either on case studies or on 
econometric analyses using various imperfect approximations (see for example 
Rindfleisch and Heide 1997). 
The approach followed in this thesis departs from the mainstream methodology of 
economics. Some fundamental theoretical assumptions are discussed in the 
following section. Methodological issues and goals are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
8.1. The theoretical basis of this thesis 
The analysis in subsequent chapters is based on the fundamental arguments of 
transaction cost economics, as put forward by Williamson, supplemented by 
insights from agency theory, property rights, knowledge and reputation effects. 
These diverse elements are brought together by attempting a critique and 
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reinterpretation of the basic transaction cost arguments which, in turn, makes the 
necessary space for these other theoretical contributions. 
Transaction cost theory has been presented in the literature in a fairly 
comprehensive manner, including fundamental assumptions and arguments as 
well as operationalisations and applications, into a tightly knit system of ideas. For 
this reason it provides a convenient basis on which to lay the principles of a 
combined theory of organisation. The other theories examined have been presented 
in numerous, relatively more narrow accounts, although they often go to greater 
analytical depths and, of course, they do not lack broad applicability. The greater 
analytical depth is precisely the feature that can complement the basic principles of 
transaction cost thinking. 
Transaction cost theory claims to be microanalytic in that it focuses on the 
transaction as the main unit of analysis. In turn, transactions take place "when a 
good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface" 
(Williamson 1996: 58). The study of transactions should therefore focus on 
individual products or services. Having said that, the questions of how aggregate an 
individual good or service is and where technologically separable interfaces are 
placed, are open to interpretation. An obvious example is that `IT'service' is usually 
not a unitary service but includes a variety of diverse sub-systems and sub-services. 
The composition of this bundle is crucial as different sub-services may be 
characterised by varying degrees of asset specificity, measurement costs and inter- 
relationships with other systems and services. Given a sufficiently broad population 
of systems and services that a company may employ, the specification of such 
bundles is non-trivial. 
Transactions are also often identified with contracts, if there are any. However, the 
correspondence between goods or services and contracts is not necessarily one to 
one. A single contract may include several goods or services. Similarly the 
correspondence between contracts and suppliers is not one to one. A buyer may 
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purchase a range of goods from a single supplier, under one or more contracts. 
This is one reason why a relevant microanalytic strategy ought to focus on a finer 
level of detail, examining the composition of the goods or services being 
exchanged. By aggregating diverse components and assigning a generic value of 
`mixed asset specificity' the discriminating power of the theory is compromised and 
other important dimensions (such as incentives, measurement issues and technical 
interdependence) are overlooked. 
Further, Williamson contends that transaction cost economics is concerned with 
discrete structural alternatives, namely markets, hybrids and hierarchies, and goes 
to great lengths showing that they represent discrete differences in kind rather than 
continuous variations in the degree of certain parameters. This argument is backed 
with an emphasis on "first order economising (getting the basic alignments right) 
rather than second order refinements (adjusting the margins! ' (Williamson 1996). 
A discussion of the latter is deferred until certain reasons why discrete structural 
alternatives are not sufficient, are first explained. 
It is difficult to generate a normative theory of organisation, which is also going to 
be useful to the practitioner, with just the three alternatives proposed by 
Williamson. It is not adequately clear what action a manager should take if he is 
advised that a certain transaction must be organised under a hybrid governance 
structure. 
Williamson (1996: 90) quotes a conversation he had with Ian Macneil in the late 
1970s, speculating on the frequency distribution of markets, hybrids and 
hierarchies. Macneil suggested a bell-shaped distribution with most governance 
structures being of the hybrid kind, whereas Williamson posited a bimodal 
distribution, with most transactions split between markets and hierarchies, arguing 
that transactions in the middle range are inherently unstable. 
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In another instance, however, Williamson (1985: 385) argues otherwise: "... it is 
sometimes argued that models of polar extremes are wholly adequate. But the 
relevant test, presumably, is whether middle-range phenomena can better be 
understood and refutable implications derived by studying these matters directly. 
As matters stand at present, contracts in the middle range are notoriously 
intractable. But if that is where the main contracting action resides, more attention 
to mixed transactions is arguably warranted'. 
Although the frequency distribution of governance structures remains an 
interesting question for empirical investigation, it can be argued that aggregating 
all `middle range phenomena' under the `hybrid' label is inadequate. 
At a conceptual level of analysis, it is argued that pure markets and hierarchies are 
ideal types that never occur in practice. Even the purest of (actual) spot markets, 
such as foreign exchange markets, are closely controlled and regulated. To give 
another example, occasional purchases from a greengrocer's are also conditioned 
by reputation effects and the problems of measuring quality. More generally, once 
incomplete contracting is accepted as a universal condition of the actual world, 
pure markets are ultimately impossible. 
Pure hierarchies are also an ideal extreme, expected to be rare in practice, on three 
accounts. First, hierarchies can encapsulate internal markets for goods and services 
(e. g. profit centres and transfer prices). These structures are akin to usual markets, 
despite the fact that they eschew the enforcement powers of courts. Second, and in 
relation to internal markets, is the capacity of hierarchies to accommodate 
autonomous adaptation (Williamson 1996: 110). The same transaction cost 
arguments explaining the multidivisional form (M-form) and other alternative 
structures of internal organisation suggest that hierarchies are not pure from 
elements typical of market structures (Williamson 1985: 279). Finally, inasmuch as 
exit (resignation) is an option, the reach of fiat is limited. 
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Zenger and Hesterly (1997) have convincingly demonstrated the dilution of market 
structures with hierarchical elements and the diffusion of market characteristics 
within hierarchies. Once it is thus established that pure markets and hierarchies 
are fictional ideal types, it follows that the frequency distribution of governance 
structures cannot be bimodal in the sense described by Williamson above. Having 
said that, establishing that pure markets and hierarchies are fictional ideal types, 
does not rule them out as good instruments for exposition, discourse and 
comparison. Moreover, having found elements of hierarchy within markets and 
elements of market within hierarchies does not mean that they are similar 
structures, with a small distance between them. On the contrary, hybrid 
governance structures are a very broad category occupying the space between 
markets and hierarchies. 
Coase's (1993) argument that a high degree of asset specificity is not a sufficient 
condition for vertical integration, can be reversed and interpreted that vertical 
integration is not the only response to rising transaction costs. There is a 
multiplicity of governance mechanisms available to economic agents and a variety 
of circumstances encountered in practice, suggesting the existence of many 
variations of actual governance structures. Contracting practices in the middle 
range are contingent upon the actual circumstances which render certain 
governance responses more efficacious than others. Reputation effects, hostages of 
various kinds, ownership allocation, explicit incentives and integration are some of 
the governance alternatives which may prevail, individually or in combination, 
under different circumstances. In a pragmatic sense, each actual governance 
structure is unique. Much theoretical power is foregone by grouping together an 
array of different governance structures under the label `hybrids'. 
The attribute categories (incentives, administrative controls, adaptive capacity and 
legal regime) proposed by Williamson (1991) as dimensions of governance 
structures, can be further elaborated to* a much finer detail by incorporating 
insights produced by other relevant theories (e. g. agency and property rights) on 
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incentives, authority, bargaining and information, to name but a few. This line of 
thought can be pushed as far as arguing that the dimensions of governance are as 
many as the clauses of the most complex contract. Our only means of creating 
order and generality out of this complexity are the various available theories, such 
as those reviewed above. 
Another reason why the transaction cost framework needs to be supplemented by 
more detailed constructs arises from a criticism often raised against transaction cost 
theory, namely that it is tautological. "One could always invent a specification of 
transaction costs that could rationalise almost anything. By rationalising everything 
we might really be explaining nothing" (joskow 1993: 118). This is expected to 
happen when the notions we ascribe to our theoretical constructs are too broad and 
inclusive. For example, using the notion of transaction costs without discriminating 
between management, measurement, communication, bargaining and other costs, 
is one source of tautological accounts. Transaction cost theory highlights the 
significance of asset specificity, but this is not the only relevant dimension nor a 
sufficient explanatory condition. Goldberg (1989: 21-23) makes a similar criticism 
by highlighting the difference between transaction costs as the costs of the activities 
involved in transacting (e. g. negotiation) and transaction costs as the comparative 
efficiency of alternative governance forms. Although it can be argued that these 
two kinds of costs are not independent, the point remains that a closer examination 
of the nature and components of transaction costs is needed. 
As different governance structures possess elements of markets and hierarchies in 
varying proportions, some are bound to be more akin to the ideal market, and some 
closer to the ideal hierarchy. All these arguments so far can be conceptualised with 
a continuum of governance structures as in Figure 2.2. The continuum is populated 
with generic categories of governance structures (e. g. joint ventures or 
franchising), which are considered to occupy narrower or broader ranges on the 
governance continuum between the two ideal extremes, the spot market and the 
pure hierarchy. That the pure spot market and hierarchy are fictional is explained 
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on page 94 above. In the diagram, internal organisation has been separated from 
the pure hierarchy in order to emphasise the fictional character of the latter and to 
show that internal organisation can be structured in a number of different ways, 
employing more or fewer elements of markets. 
Actual governance structures as found in practice can be classified under a generic 
category but are expected to be fairly unique when the details of their composition 
are brought into consideration. Hence, they are expected to occupy discrete 
positions on the continuum, within the range of their category. For example, a 
given IT outsourcing contract may be classified under long-term procurement but 
when we examine its exact incentive structure, its adaptive mechanisms and its 
other elements of governance in detail, it is likely to be quite unique. 
The governance continuum is derived from the theoretical arguments elaborated in 
the present section. Clearly, some of the debates in the IS literature that were 
reviewed in the previous chapter were also pertinent in shaping this concept. 
Fundamentally though, the governance continuum is a theoretical proposition 
drawn from a critical reappraisal of the economic theories reviewed in previous 
sections, especially transaction cost economics. 
Comparative institutional assessment, in the sense advocated by Williamson, is 
applicable among governance categories. For example, time and materials 
contracting is relatively closer to spot market transactions as compared to inside 
contracting (Buttrick 1952), which is closer to the hierarchy. Comparative 
assessment is also applicable within the range of each category (i. e. between actual, 
unique, contracts), thus allowing us to populate these generic ranges on the 
governance continuum with observed governance structures. 
Figure 2.3 demonstrates how the governance continuum might be interpreted in 
the context of IT contracts. Again, the governance categories listed are indicative 
and do not represent a one-to-one correspondence with the governance categories 
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listed in Figure 2.2. The internal IT department is not equivalent to a pure 
hierarchy to the extent that it may be decentralised, devolving decision and 
responsibility to end users and employing a chargeback procedure (see chapter 1, 
section 6). Contrary to some widely held beliefs, particularly in the IT literature, 
long term procurement of the kind employed in total outsourcing deals is very 
similar to internal organisation. In other words, internal organisation and such 
contracts employ very similar governance mechanisms (Ang and Beath 1993). 
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Figure 2.2 
The Governance Continuum with indicative categories of governance 
Between the two ideal types of the pure spot market and the pure hierarchy lies a broad range of 
categories of governance structures. These possess elements of both markets and hierarchies in 
varying degrees. They are placed closer to the spot market or the pure hierarchy according to a 
comparative assessment of these characteristics. Each category occupies a range on the 
governance continuum. Actual governance structures (contracts) are unique and can be discretely 
positioned under a category on the continuum. 
Broadly, individual programming contractors (Figure 2.3) correspond to `inside 
contracting' (Figure 2.2) and systems development contracts (Figure 2.3)are 
typically of the time and materials or the requirements contracting kind. Off-the- 
shelf software purchases are not pure spot market transactions because they are 
accompanied by warranties and possible maintenance agreements, which extend 
the exchange relation beyond the 'atomic' transaction. 
Following the critique of transaction cost economics in the previous paragraphs, 
alternative governance structures are conceptualised as varying in the degree of 
certain attributes, rather than being different in kind. The attributes on which they 
vary are derived from the theories reviewed in earlier sections. These attributes 
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include, for example, asset specificity, incentive intensity, adaptive capacity, 
measurement costs, ownership allocation and reputation effects. Clearly, a more 
coherent classification of these attributes (or elements or mechanisms of 
governance)is needed. This is one of the contributions of the thesis, presented in 
chapter 5, section 4. 
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Figure 2.3 
The Governance Continuum with indicative IT contracts 
The microanalytic approach to economic organisation takes on two more 
dimensions, in addition to the above mentioned need to unpack the bundle of goods 
and services in a transaction and to consider their characteristics. First, the general 
governance alternatives (markets, hierarchies and hybrids) must be unpacked to 
reveal the many different governance possibilities. Second, the all-inclusive notion 
of transaction costs must also be unpacked to discriminate among several detailed 
elements of governance. 
According to transaction cost theory, the purpose of economic organisation is to 
assign "transactions (which differ in their attributes) to governance structures (the 
adaptive capacities and associated costs of which also differ) in a discriminating 
way' (Williamson 1985: 18). The way this alignment is achieved in the context of 
the microanalytic strategy defined here, is by examining the characteristics of the 
goods or services being exchanged and customising the necessary elements of 
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governance. This is a bottom-up approach, as opposed to selecting from a `menu' of 
alternative governance categories such as those listed in Figure 2.3 
The governance continuum provides the platform on which the modified 
microanalytic strategy proposed here, the principle of comparative institutional 
assessment and the alignment of governance to transactions, advocated by 
transaction cost theory, make space for important contributions from agency 
theory, property rights, measurement issues, information and knowledge 
considerations and reputation effects. 
Clearly, the role of the legal regime governing different types of governance 
structures, has been suppressed. Including it would have required a detailed 
account of its effects on efficient organisation, thus further complicating the task. 
However, inasmuch as the theories adopted embody elements of the law, the latter 
is not completely ignored. Moreover, by exogenising the legal regime it has been 
possible to alleviate (at least temporarily) the discrete character of internal 
organisation. It is the legal doctrine of forbearance that renders internal 
organisation discretely different to other governance structures (see section 2.2). 
Although certain governance mechanisms prevailing within hierarchies are unique 
(e. g. promotion as incentive and influence costs), analytical equivalents can be 
found in intermediate contracting structures. Therefore, the notion of a continuum 
from the pure spot market to the pure hierarchy can be sustained. 
The first chapter concluded by identifying the fundamental research question as 
how to structure the efficient governance of the provision of IT systems and 
services. This chapter sets the theoretical basis for tackling this question in the rest 
of the thesis. The breadth and complexity of all the theories adopted is one of the 
problems addressed in chapter 5, by proposing an organising framework of the 
various ideas reviewed here. Meanwhile, chapter 3 explains the epistemological 
link between the IT outsourcing phenomenon, the theories of economic 
organisation and the framework delivered in chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER THREE Provision 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research approach adopted in this 
thesis by developing a meta-theoretical account of what is being attempted. This 
will also provide a basis for assessing what is being achieved. It is not simply a 
review of the advantages and disadvantages of the research methods employed. 
Rather, it is an effort to surface epistemological and methodological considerations 
that are often bypassed as implicit assumptions. 
Arguably, every research project is able to make its theoretical claims only on 
account of a specification of epistemological and methodological considerations, 
even if unconsciously, implicitly or otherwise. On occasion, the nature and extent 
(and ultimately the value) of theoretical contributions may be self evident by virtue 
of the extent to which they appear realistic in explaining the phenomena they 
study. However, theoretical success is rarely so obvious mainly because research 
and theory development are conditioned by the social context in which they take 
place and, in turn, they shape the social objects of study. Some criteriaexternal to 
the theory concerned are, therefore, needed. However, what follows is not a 
complete review of alternative philosophies of science. This would be far beyond 
the scope and purpose of such a chapter within a thesis on the governance of 
information technology. 
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This thesis aspires to follow the principles of the philosophy of science typically 
recognised under the heading of transcendental realism. In the absence of an 
unequivocal unified philosophy of science, the adoption of a particular 
philosophical position is necessarily subject to all those personal and social 
conditions that frame human thought and action. The appeal of transcendental 
realism, which led to its adoption in this project, rests mainly on its adherence to an 
independent reality and its integrative accommodation of human subjectivity, 
interpretation and agency alongside this reality. Moreover, realism makes no a 
priori judgements for or against particular methods of research; their contribution 
to a research project depends on the context and process of their use. 
Given this philosophical position, the purpose of this chapter can be more 
specifically redefined as aiming to assess the nature of this project and the 
challenges it confronts, including the empirical methods it employs, if it is to 
conform with this philosophical principle. 
The rest of the chapter starts with an exploration of methodological and 
philosophical discussions common in recent IS literature, with a view to showing 
the importance of making ontological and epistemological assumptions explicit 
when contemplating alternative research methods. A brief outline of the 
transcendental realist ontology follows. Next, the nature and aims of the project 
presented in this thesis are restated in the context of this philosophy. Mainstream 
economics has been criticised for its insistence on positivist research. The main 
tenets of this critique and the possibility of incorporating extant economic theories 
in a realist theory is the subject of section 5. Section 6 examines the methodological 
implications of realism for this research project and explains the exact methods 
employed. The concluding section reasserts the role and significance of this chapter 
in the flow of the thesis. 
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2. Epistemological and methodological concerns in IS research 
In the area of information systems research, lengthy discussions have risen as to the 
methods, methodologies and approaches that are appropriate for the questions 
encountered by IS researchers (e. g. Fitzgerald et al 1985, Cash and Lawrence 1989, 
Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, Galliers 1992, Mingers and Stowell 1997). One 
distinction commonly made is between quantitative and qualitative research 
approaches (Kaplan and Duchon 1988, Galliers 1991, Myers 1997). Literally, the 
distinction is between using quantitative measures and using qualitative 
observations. Logically, this distinction is extended to differentiate between the 
methods of data collection, analysis and inference that are appropriate to each kind 
of empirical evidence. The debate often revolves around two apparent deficiencies 
of the quantitative approaches (e. g. Klein and Lyytinen 1985, Pervan and Klass 
1992). First, quantitative approaches are criticised for over-simplifying the 
complex, emergent inter-relationships between the objects of our study 
(information systems, people, organisations etc. ) and reducing them to linear, 
sequential associations of cause and effect. Second, by starting with preconceived 
hypotheses, it is argued, quantitative approaches ignore the context in individual 
circumstances and supplant it with some sort of `scientific objectivity'. 
In contrast, qualitative approaches present the researcher with the opportunity to 
reveal the complexity and appreciate the context of the social setting being studied. 
The assumption here is that elements of the context, most notably the subjective 
and inter-subjective meanings ascribed by the members of a given social situation 
to the objects of study, cannot be easily measured and that complex relationships 
are not easily represented (and analysed) in mathematical form. Therefore, 
quantitative approaches are not adequate to cope and qualitative approaches are 
called for. 
Moreover, if research is to inform the practice of developing and managing 
information systems, it needs to be able to take into account the complexity of the 
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`real world' within its context. Inasmuch as qualitative research is better at 
contextualising the research process and outcomes, it is argued, it emphasises 
relevance, whereas quantitative approaches, which favour experimental controls 
and mathematical sophistication, emphasise scientific rigour. The debate often 
turns to a dichotomy between relevance and rigour (e. g. Galliers 1995). However, 
as discussed further on, there are good reasons why the two are not mutually 
exclusive. 
One suggestion hidden in the above argument is that some settings of interest to 
research (or some aspects of a setting) lend themselves to quantitative or qualitative 
approaches, to a greater or lesser extent. For example, with enough perseverance 
we might be able to measure certain attitudes or meanings, as it actually has been 
the case. In addition, when we seek generalisable patterns of association 
quantitative methods are more appropriate whereas when we are interested in deep 
contextual understanding qualitative methods are better suited. Consequently, it 
has been argued that certain research problems are better approached 
quantitatively and others qualitatively. 
A second suggestion hidden in the above argument is that qualitative and 
quantitative approaches are better suited to different stages of the research process. 
If qualitative approaches are good for revealing complex structures and context- 
specific definitions (meanings), then they are more appropriate to the early, 
exploratory stages of research. These structures and definitions can inform 
quantitative methods (as the basis for formulating hypotheses), which, in turn, 
appear to be better at establishing the existence of causal relations with a high 
degree of external validity. Therefore, quantitative methods, it is argued, are more 
suitable for theory development and testing. Theories thus developed can also be 
subsequently evaluated using a qualitative approach. The rationale is that such an 
in-depth study is a good means for re-examining the reliability and validity of 
formal theories, mainly for purposes of falsification (Yin 1989). 
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The argument crudely sketched here underpins the taxonomy of research 
approaches proposed by Galliers (1991). He concentrates on research approaches 
as generic `ways ofgoing about one's research' (p. 329) and proposes 14 categories 
including, for example, field experiments, surveys, case studies and action research. 
In a way similar to the points made above, Galliers (1991) argues that researchers 
should choose suitable research approaches according to the object of study (e. g. 
individual, organisations or society) and the stage of their research process (e. g. 
theory building, testing or extension). 
Following the same line of thought, the case is made for using a pluralism of 
methods and approaches in combination, within the same research project (Kaplan 
and Duchon 1988, Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, Galliers 1995, Silverman 1998). 
The main advantage is that sources of evidence can be triangulated and that more 
light can be shed on and, hence, more insights can be gained from the same 
evidence. 
The debate on research approaches is often confined to substantive matters 
pertaining to the objects and theories of our research (e. g. whether they lend 
themselves to measurement or whether subjective meanings are deemed significant 
for the purposes of a given research question). However, inevitably such 
discussions rely on explicit or implicit assumptions regarding the locus and 
structure of reality and the nature of scientific knowledge. These issues are dealt 
with at a higher level of abstraction, namely at the levels of ontology and 
epistemology respectively. A variety of arguments and propositions have been 
advocated by different philosophies of (social) science. It is worth touching upon 
some key issues and relating them to the philosophical position underpinning this 
thesis. 
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A philosophical dichotomy often encountered in the IS literature is between 
(logical) positivism and interpretivisml. The distinction is sometimes wrongly 
equated with the use of different methods, quantitative and qualitative respectively. 
It just happens that positivism tends to favour quantitative research methods 
whereas interpretivism tends to favour qualitative methods. However, this 
correspondence is circumstantial and not necessary. Indeed, qualitative methods 
and evidence are easily accommodated within a positivist research programme. In 
principle, research methods and techniques are independent of epistemologies and 
ontologies (Myers 1997). For example, case study research can be positivist (Yin 
1989) or interpretive (Walsham 1993) and so can action research (Clark 1972, 
Elden and Chisholm 1993). Moreover, in principle nothing precludes quantitative 
techniques from being constructively employed within an interpretive research 
programme. 
The difference between these two philosophical positions lies in their different 
conceptions of reality and of scientific (as opposed to lay) knowledge. For 
positivism, real is whatever can be observed and recorded in an independent 
(objective) way. The purpose of science is to establish causal links between 
observations. Simply put, a description of such causal relationships is theory. Since 
reality is identified with observed experience, causal relationships are to be found 
in constant conjunctions of observations. In broad terms, this is the foundation of 
statistical significance. For example, if we can observe enough workers whose 
productivity has improved after computerisation (and assuming we adhere to 
sampling and other statistical requirements), then we can deduce that 
computerisation is a cause of improved worker productivity. 
Interpretivism as ontology posits that in the social realm, reality is not objective but 
it is embedded in the subjective meanings that human agents ascribe to objects of 
1 Each of these two terms is used to refer to a family of similar variants of a philosophical direction 
(and a variety of related terms) but a discussion of such refinements is out of the scope of this thesis. 
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their environment. Individual predespositions and inter-subjective meanings 
constantly perpetuate and change each other. Interpretive research confronts social 
settings in their own terms and aims to develop theoretical explanations 
(interpretations) based on the definitions and meanings held by the members of the 
social setting itself. Interpretivism as epistemology posits that our knowledge of 
reality is a social construction. Therefore, objective and value-free evidence and 
theory are not attainable. As a consequence, weak constructivism, a strand of 
interpretivism, posits that the beliefs and meanings of the participants being studied 
can be accessed and documented in their original, pure form. In this sense 
interpretivism can complement positivist research by informing hypothesis 
formulation and interpretation of results. Strong constructivism, another strand of 
interpretivism, argues that in designing and carrying out social research, the 
researcher essentially reconstructs the reality being studied by interjecting his or 
her own predispositions. This version of interpretivism is incommensurable with 
positivism. 
For the sake of compliance with recent discussions in the IS literature, it is worth 
reporting a philosophical position that is gaining increasing acceptance by IS 
researchers, namely critical theory (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991). Critical theory 
adopts some fundamental tenets of interpretivism but makes significant further 
claims. Ontologically, social reality is systemic in the sense that objects exist and are 
meaningful only within a broader web of inter-relationships with other objects. 
Moreover, these social systems are historically constituted and defined in a 
continuous change process from the past, via the present and into the future. 
Change is triggered by contradictions and conflicts inherent within social systems. 
Emphasis is placed on how things are and importantly, on how things can be 
(potentiality). At any moment in time, human agents are entrenched in systems of 
beliefs, which, in conjunction with the material conditions of social reality, 
constrain their understanding of their historical reality and impede their further 
historical development and attainment of their potentiality. Epistemologically, the 
purpose of science is to make human agents conscious of these limitations, of 
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existing contradictions and of the potential directions of change. Thus theories 
adhering to this philosophy are emancipatory. In this sense, the claim of 
interpretivism that science must reveal the subjective beliefs of human agents 
within their social context is not enough; science must transcend those entrenched 
beliefs and at least enable human agents to decide upon and take action to 
transform their social reality (if not prescribe action on behalf of human agents). 
This brief exposition of three oft-quoted philosophies of social science serves to 
emphasise the need to refer to a meta-theory when selecting research methods, 
developing theoretical arguments and evaluating research results. When 
alternative research approaches are debated within the bounds of a research 
question or theoretical perspective and without reference to any external criteria, 
any approach can be justified on its own terms. In practice, the choice of a research 
approach is likely to be influenced more by the dominant paradigm within the 
research community working on this subject area than by any inherent merits of 
either approach (Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991, Walsham 1995). To any 
suggestion of a proponent of qualitative methods that the latter are better at 
capturing elements of context and subjective beliefs, the proponent of quantitative 
methods can counter-argue that with enough perseverance sophisticated 
measurement instruments can be developed. To any suggestion of a proponent of 
quantitative methods that modern techniques of data analysis can manipulate 
complex inter-relationships and replicate experimental controls, the proponent of 
qualitative methods can always counter-argue that social relations are even more 
complex. 
Moreover, as mentioned previously, the same methods can be successfully 
employed under different epistemological positions. Case studies can be carried out 
in different ways in a positivist as well as in an interpretivist research programme 
(Benbasat et al 1987, Yin 1989, Cavaye 1996, Myers 1997). Similarly, participant 
observation can be employed to record observed practices in a detached manner for 
the purposes of (qualitative) hypothesis testing (Silverman 1998) or they can be 
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employed in a more engaged manner to reveal and debate hidden assumptions, 
meanings and beliefs (Pettigrew 1985). Experiments and quantitative techniques of 
data analysis can also serve the purposes of an interpretive or critical research 
programme, even if they are not sufficient on their own. 
How can relevance and rigour be assessed, without a conception of the structure of 
social reality that we want to explain in a relevant way and without a conception of 
what constitutes valid and rigorous knowledge? Statistical techniques define 
specific tests of validity, which cannot be literally replicated in qualitative methods. 
However, theoretical validity can be argued by other means, notably by reference to 
an ontological and epistemological position (Lyytinen 1987, Tsoukas 1989, 
Numagami 1998). An argumentative or a grounded interpretive theory can be as 
rigorous as a mathematical theory but the criteria for achieving and assessing 
rigour must be external to the theory concerned, stemming from an epistemological 
position. 
Whether such philosophical assumptions are explicitly articulated or not, any 
research design or any argument about a research design (approaches, methods, 
techniques) is bound to rely on hidden philosophical assumptions (and this is an 
interpretive statement in itself). Therefore, the upshot of this section is that it is 
useful and desirable that a researcher makes his or her ontological and 
epistemological assumptions explicit. These assumptions guide the design of 
research, the choice of methods, the development of theory and the evaluation of 
the whole project by peers, clients and other third parties. This brief review of the 
main philosophical and methodological arguments within the IS literature also 
serves as the backdrop for the philosophical and methodological position adopted 
in this thesis and explained in subsequent sections. 
One does not have to be an expert in all the philosophies of science and their often 
esoteric nuances in order to articulate the meta-theoretical assumptions permeating 
his or her own research project. Admittedly, opening such a philosophical 
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discussion sometimes amounts to opening Pandora's box. There are many different 
theoretical positions and even more refinements and variations within each school 
of thought. Understanding all the arguments and counter-arguments and adopting 
an informed opinion is a job for experts. It is possible, however, for any researcher 
in any field of social enquiry to educate him or herself in the basic ontological and 
epistemological questions, in order to be able to make explicit his or her 
assumptions when devising a research design. 
Another problem is which side to take in the philosophical debates. There does not 
seem to be a further meta-level of theory from which to draw criteria for selection. 
Although some philosophies of science present themselves in an exclusionary way, 
it is possible to argue that none of them holds the absolute truth. In the absence of 
external criteria (except the rules of logic) and of an ultimate truth (except, 
perhaps, faith), adoption of one or another philosophical position turns either to a 
utilitarian criterion (whether a given philosophy serves our purposes and hidden 
agendas) or to the researcher's cognitive and intellectual predispositions (which, in 
turn, may be socially and historically constituted) or both. The realist philosophy of 
science, which is adopted in this thesis and briefly presented in the next section, 
adheres to an independent reality and accommodates subjectivity, interpretation 
and human agency in an integrative way, alongside this reality. 
3. The main tenets and implications of transcendental realism 
A complete account of the realist philosophy of science is beyond the aims of this 
chapter.. Instead, a brief outline of this perspective is provided here, based mainly 
on the works of Bhaskar (1978,1979), Outhwaite (1983,1987), some of the 
contributions of Chalmers (1982) and its implications for economics elaborated by 
Lawson (1997). By setting the scene in a concise manner, subsequent sections can 
highlight issues of more direct relevance to this research. 
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The realist philosophy of science turns its attention to ontology by asking what 
should the world be like if scientific enquiry and knowledge are to be possible. 
Implications are consequently drawn for epistemology which concerns itself with 
the nature of scientific knowledge and its explanatory capacity. Methodology refers 
to the practical means of acquiring or developing such knowledge. As it turns out, 
the realist philosophy informs the capabilities and limitations of different 
methodological approaches but does not prescribe a specific programme. 
For the realist philosophy, the world comprises three domains, namely the real, the 
actual and the empirical (Table 3.1) . In brief, we acquire experiences from the 
empirical domain. These experiences are subjective representations of events that 
occur in the actual domain. Actual events are, in turn, contingent products of the 
interaction of objects of the real domain. The three domains are irreducible to one 
another. 
Real Domain Actual Domain Empirical Domain 
Objects  
Events  
Experiences  
Table 3.1 
The three domains of the world according to transcendental realism 
The checkmarks () indicate the domain of reality in which objects, events and experiences reside. 
Amended from Tsoukas (1989). 
The real domain is populated by objects with inherent structures and causal 
powers. Different objects in the real domain may be related internally or externally. 
Two objects are internally or necessarily related when the existence of each 
depends on the existence of the other (e. g. employer and employee or information 
system and user). Two objects that are not internally related can, potentially, be 
externally or contingently related when they happen to interact (e. g. a married 
couple and a court of justice or an information system and a hacker). 
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When the causal powers of objects are triggered the respective mechanisms are set 
into operation which, in turn, generate some effects. These mechanisms are not 
necessarily in constant operation. In fact, they may exist but never actually be 
triggered in operation to produce actual events. Therefore the real and the actual 
domains are separate. Moreover, a mechanism may be in operation but not 
necessarily be observable. Therefore, the empirical domain is also separate from the 
other two. Gravity is the typical example here: it is a mechanism constantly in 
operation but we do not constantly observe its effects, namely objects falling to the 
ground. Another example, related to the subject of this thesis, is the power of 
contractual clauses and the legal system to enforce promises and/or damages. This 
is a mechanism that is constantly there but it is rarely triggered since contracting 
parties usually prefer alternative (less costly) means for resolving their disputes 
(Macaulay 1989). 
The events that are actually (i. e. in the actual domain) produced are contingent on 
a variety of (typically unpredictable) conditions that may emerge in the interaction 
of objects and of their causal powers. The events produced are not necessary 
consequences of the mere existence of real objects, but contingent results of their 
interaction. In other words, the actual domain is an open system where real objects 
interact and events are produced. 
The ontological separation between the real and the actual domains can be 
illustrated with an example from meteorology. Specialists have a fairly complete 
knowledge of the structure and causal powers of `objects' in the atmosphere and 
can provide detailed and precise explanations of the phenomena that occur. 
However, weather forecasts are notoriously inaccurate. This is not because the 
knowledge of the real causal mechanisms is incomplete (since ex post explanations 
are feasible and fairly complete) but because the actual weather conditions that 
emerge take place in an open system and as such they are inherently dynamic and 
unpredictable. 
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The empirical domain is the world of perceptions and experiences of human 
agents, including scientists and lay people alike. Events occur independently of 
their identification. Some events may not be experienced at all and the perceptions 
that different individuals hold of those events that they perceive are conditioned by 
a variety of factors including their senses, their instruments (such as microscopes 
or questionnaires), their subjective preconceptions and their social environment. 
For example, wars can be attributed to some sort of inherent tendency of groups of 
people to pursue or protect their collective interests using military force. In a 
simplistic way, this would be a mechanism in the real domain. A particular war is a 
result of various historical contingencies occurring in the actual domain. The same 
war is experienced (in the empirical domain) by different participants and 
observers (e. g. winners, losers and mediators) in many different ways. 
The term `transcendental' that features in the name of this philosophy refers 
precisely to the fact that the objective reality advocated resides beyond our 
experience of it and beyond its manifestation in actual events. In other words, 
reality transcends both our knowledge and experience of it as well as the events 
produced by it. For example, electricity exists in nature even when no electrical 
phenomena (events in the actual domain) take place (such as a lightning or an 
electric lamp being lit) and it has always existed even before we understood it as 
such (knowledge and experience in the empirical domain). As a social example, 
most would agree that the information revolution is a historical change comparable 
in magnitude to the industrial revolution (Angell 1998, Castells 1996). Though we 
are all living through this change, we are not constantly aware of it nor do we 
understand it fully (knowledge of the real mechanisms). Moreover, this revolution 
is manifested in a number of technological, economic, political and social ways 
(events in the actual domain) but not all of us experience all these events and not in 
the same manner (observations in the empirical domain). 
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Once it is recognised that the objects of science belong to an objective reality, 
independent of our experience and knowledge of it, the purpose of scientific theory 
is to postulate an account of the structures, causal powers and mechanisms that can 
produce the phenomena under investigation. Scientific enquiry, therefore, needs to 
transcend both the empirical and the actual domain in order to reach their 
intransient generative mechanisms. This is not to say that experiences and events 
are not real and do not merit investigation. On the contrary, the explanation of a 
particular event or experience will also require an understanding of the 
contingencies that lead to the particular state of affairs and the parameters that 
condition our perception of it. As indicated in Table 3.1, contingent events and 
experiences are part of reality. However, scientific enquiry is not exhausted at these 
two transient levels, without an adequate theory of the intransient mechanisms that 
produce them. For example, it is not sufficient to record the behaviour of erupting 
volcanoes. Both the event of eruption and our observations of it are contingent 
(circumstantial). The causes lie in the structure of the earth, which we do not 
observe directly. Similarly, the seasonality of consumer demand for turkeys in some 
countries is not sufficiently explained by the coincidence of certain holidays. Such 
an account would collapse once the holidays are maintained while the respective 
traditions are not upheld (or vice versa). The historical antecedents, the meanings 
and the social structures reproducing these traditions need to be explained in their 
own right. 
A further property of the real domain is stratification. Objects can be conceived as 
made up of component parts and as being themselves components of larger 
structures. In each case, the whole has emergent structure and causal powers and 
is irreducible to the sum of its parts. For instance, a firm comprises a set of human 
and physical resources but it is much more than their sum. Similarly, water is used 
to extinguish fire although both oxygen and hydrogen are highly flammable. 
Scientific enquiry is therefore never ending. Once an acceptable (perhaps 
temporarily) theory of some mechanisms has been attained, the component and 
containing objects will have to be further explored. For example, the power of 
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water to extinguish fire may be an acceptable first theory. Further research 
uncovers how oxygen and hydrogen combine to such an effect. 
One reason why we need to accept the existence of the intransient real domain is 
that it renders scientific enquiry possible. If reality was exhausted with contingent 
events or experiences then unique phenomena would remain unintelligible. 
Therefore, the objects of reality need to be enduring or at least enduring enough for 
their scientific discovery to be possible. It follows, that scientific knowledge is 
transient, at least relative to its objects of study. 
To place the realist perspective in context, it is useful to contrast it with some other 
extant approaches (see also the discussion in section 2). The positivist tradition 
identifies laws and necessity with empirical regularities. In terms of the realist 
framework, it collapses the real and the actual domain on to the empirical by 
recognising regular contingent coincidences as real. Positivism relies on deductive 
reasoning. For example, to explain a temporary increase in the demand for turkeys, 
the positivist needs a set of initial conditions (that it is the period before Christmas) 
and a covering law (that demand for turkeys is higher before Christmas). The 
conventionalist strand of positivism accepts a reality independent of our knowledge 
of it but posits that explanation can be based on purpose-built and provisional 
assumptions. The critique of theory is, therefore, suppressed. In a similar vein, for 
pragmatism all that exists is ad-hoc theories. Some strands of interpretivism 
identify as real only the meanings that individuals ascribe to experience. It is clear 
that all these approaches collapse ontology to experience and entail the risk of 
extreme relativism, that `anything goes'. Kant's transcendental idealism finds 
necessity in the theories of science, only in this case these theories are intransient. 
This approach disregards the social construction and conditioning of science and 
hence its fallibility and transience. Critical theory comes closer to transcendental 
realism. It emphasises the objective reality of the material conditions of society but 
realism makes even stronger ontological claims. The importance placed on social 
critique is shared by both theories. 
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Even in this short exposition, the validity of realism for the natural sciences appears 
quite intuitive. As it happens, the development of realism by Bhaskar started with 
an assessment of experimental practices in the natural sciences. In order to adopt 
realism in the social realm, several issues need to be contemplated, mainly reflexive 
and intentional human agency and human choice. 
In the social realm, transcendental realism can be challenged by an apparently 
simple question: how is it possible for real social structures to exist independently 
of their manifestations and of our experience of them, if human agents create, 
reproduce and change them? This question raises the classic paradox between 
social structure and human action (Poole and Van de Ven 1989). If social 
structures did not exist in their own right and were reducible to human agency, 
then the human agency would not be possible, at least not as we know it. However, 
social systems, rules, relations, traditions and the like precede any individual and 
condition his or her actions. If, in turn, human agency was to be denied and 
identified with social structures, then there would be no space for human choice, 
i. e. the capacity of individuals to act otherwise. It follows that human agents and 
social structures are internally related in the sense defined previously. Neither is 
identifiable with the other, yet each is necessary for the other's existence. If we 
accept that human agents can take purposeful and intentional action, can reflect 
and act upon their knowledge (whether scientific or lay) and can choose their 
actions, then social structures are susceptible to change and reproduction as a 
result. In other words, human agents are active members of the real domain and 
have the capacity to reproduce and/or transform it. 
It can be shown that despite these differences between the natural and the social 
world, transcendental realism can still be sustained in the latter. Intentional choice 
and action presuppose some form of knowledge which, in turn, presupposes the 
objects of knowledge are enduring enough to facilitate their coming to be known. 
Also, in reverse, the development of a social scientific theory will affect the 
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decisions, choices and actions of those individuals who get to know it. They will 
adjust their behaviours thus changing and/or reproducing the social structures. A 
new theory might then be needed to explain the changed structures and 
behaviours. This relative intransience of social objects over sufficient time-space 
windows sustains and is sustainable under transcendental realism. Moreover, the 
realist ontology sustains those crucial elements of the social world, namely 
intentional human choice and agency. In contrast, the positivist strands deny the 
possibility of choice since human actions have to follow the empirically deducted 
`laws' of necessity (Lawson 1997). 
Predictive power has traditionally been held as the acid test of any scientific theory. 
Given the realist ontology, it can be shown that prediction is ultimately impossible, 
not essential and, in the social sciences, undesirable. Given the contingent nature of 
the actual and the empirical domains, successful prediction is possible only in the 
closed system conditions of experiments. Experimental conditions are, however, 
very rare in the social world, despite the effort made in this direction by modern 
techniques of data analysis. Such techniques attempt to replicate conditions of 
closure by incorporating more variables of the phenomenon of interest and by 
endogenising as many situational variables as possible. Ultimately, however, 
conditions of experimental closure are almost impossible to achieve in the social 
realm. In addition, forecasts in the social realm can be self-fulfilling or self- 
negating by virtue of the reflexive nature of human agency to react to such 
knowledge (Numagami 1998). 
Prediction and forecasting are, also, not essential for policy formulation and 
implementation. All that is required, indeed, is an understanding of the real 
underlying mechanism according to which society acts, reacts and changes within 
given time-space frames. Actual events are always contingent and unpredictable. 
Finally, prediction in the social realm is undesirable because it leads to the 
possibility of engineering and controlling human activity. The latter, in turn, leaves 
no space for human freedom and choice. 
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At the level of methodology, realism has practically no firm directions to give. 
Substantive theories are developed in an incremental way and are assessed in 
comparative terms. In particular, for each phenomenon of interest, a theoretical 
account will have to be compatible with the realist ontology and postulate real 
causal mechanisms as well as possible contingent factors that explain the 
occurrence of the specific empirical events being studied. This account will have to 
start from the (lay) interpretations that human agents ascribe to the structures and 
phenomena of interest within the context of their everyday activity. These 
subjective interpretations constitute part of the reality of the phenomenon but do 
not exhaust the causal mechanisms that produce it. Additionally, each postulated 
theoretical account will have to make reference to other extant theories of 
relevance. 
Scientific knowledge is thus socially conditioned. The explanatory power of a 
theory will have to be assessed according to its capacity to provide sufficient 
explanations of the phenomena of interest. Theories are also always provisional, in 
that they are often compared and criticised against competing or complementary 
explanations. Complementary explanations may refer to related phenomena or to 
further levels of (the stratified) reality. Given the stratified structure of reality, 
multiple alternative theories can be sustained unless, of course, a better theory 
explicitly rejects earlier explanations. Different aspects or different levels of 
abstraction of reality can be explained by different theories, each of which can be 
possibly judged as adequate in its own right. The discussion of paradox in social 
theories by Poole and Van de Ven (1989) succinctly demonstrates this possibility. 
For example, Newton's theory is still valid although it has been superseded by 
Einstein's theory. And the latter can stand alongside quantum mechanics although, 
at present, they are incommensurable. While theories are transient, i. e. subject to 
revision or adaptation, consistency with the realist ontology and adherence to the 
principle of critique ensures that science is not reduced to extreme relativism. 
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4. The project undertaken in this thesis 
This thesis is motivated by the widespread occurrence of large outsourcing 
agreements for the provision of information technology services since the late 
1980s. A substantial amount of research that ensued has indicated various causes, 
reasons, and factors of success or failure of such practices (chapter 1). As 
elaborated in the ends of chapters 1 and 2, this thesis focuses on the governance 
structure of such arrangements. 
In particular, the governance structure of the provision of IT services is postulated 
as a general mechanism determining, to a non-trivial extent, the organisational and 
contractual forms we observe and their success or failure. Clearly, the causal 
powers of the governance structure are not the only determinants of the respective 
practices that are actually implemented and of their antecedents and consequences. 
Other research has elaborated on the role of intra-firm politics, strategy and the 
bandwagon effect. This thesis abstracts from such other parameters to study 
governance structures in more detail. Empirical findings presented in chapters 4 
and 6 help re-position the abstraction into its broader context and locate its 
significance. 
In order to illuminate the operation of governance structure as a generative 
mechanism, this thesis draws heavily on extant economic theory. The task is 
synthetic, in that it attempts to bring together various contributions from a wide 
range of relevant, albeit in many respects different, theories (chapter 2). The goal is 
to produce a theoretical account that is both valid theory and a useful guide for 
decision making in practice. 
The resultant framework (chapter 5) is presented as primarily a normative guide 
for decision makers, although it consists of positive theories of governance. It 
consolidates a coherent account of what a governance structure is, what it consists 
of and how it operates. It postulates in an organised manner a number of partial 
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mechanisms that in conjunction give shape to the governance of IT service 
provision. Not all of these mechanisms are expected to be necessarily operative or 
of the same significance in every actual instance. They are however potentially 
operative and from a normative point of view they should be taken into account 
whenever relevant. 
While the framework is presented as normative, it is also (necessarily) an 
explanatory theory. The majority of its substantive content is already available, 
albeit dispersed, in the economics literature. Its original explanatory contribution 
lies in the synthesis and repositioning of extant theory (see end of chapter 2) and in 
its specific formulation to address the peculiarities of IT governance2. Moreover, the 
production of a theory directly usable in practice has been one of its original 
objectives. 
Briefly, the realist objective has been pursued by repositioning the positive 
economic theories of governance as generative mechanisms having the capacity to 
produce the postulated outcomes. The latter are, therefore, potentialities rather 
than predictions. The normative objective has been pursued by studying the 
structures and practices pertaining to IT outsourcing in situ. 
As also explained in section 6.2, despite the normative form of the proposed 
framework, a contingency structure has been intentionally avoided. Since, 
according to realism, actual events and situation-specific contingencies are varied 
and unpredictable, a contingency structure, (apart from futile) would be too 
constraining and less informative in practice. By explaining some mechanisms of 
governance that are potentially at work, the proposed framework is intended to 
promote criticism, appraisal and debate among practitioners regarding the best 
course of action, rather than to offer pre-fabricated solutions which do not relate to 
2 The specificity of the framework to IT versus its general applicability to other business activities is 
discussed, among other issues, in chapters 1 and 7. 
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the actual context. This is consistent with the principle of social critique and the 
argument against prediction that realism advocates (and, to a significant extent, 
critical theory shares). Numagami (1998) succinctly demonstrates the point: 
"Given that human beings have reflective capacity, the realistic goal for 
management researchers is not to teach scientifically naive practitioners law-like 
regularities confirmed by a scientifically rigorous method, but to encourage 
reflective dialogue among researchers and practitioners to generate more reasoned 
discourse on today's key management issues. " (p. 4). 
To demonstrate the significance of the framework's theoretical contribution and 
practical applicability, two issues warrant further discussion. First, economic 
theory, including the strands reviewed in chapter 2 and subsequently employed, 
have been criticised as typical cases of misconceived positivist research. Their 
incorporation into the realist ontological position adopted here requires important 
qualifications. Second, the empirical methods employed determine to a significant 
extent the success of the project, both in terms of achieving its realist objectives and 
in terms of ensuring its practical (normative) relevance. The instrumental role of 
the case studies therefore requires further elaboration. These two issues are 
addressed in turn, in the following sections. 
5. Incorporating economics into a realist theory 
Economics, as a discipline, has been widely criticised for its failure to produce 
realistic theories, to inform policy making and to predict economic development 
(see for example, Blaug 1980). Much of the economics literature consists of formal 
models of high technical sophistication which achieve little more than elegant 
exercises in mathematics with more internal consistency than practical relevance 
(Jensen 1983). Empirical work has, at large, failed to falsify any theory 
unambiguously, as the positivist tradition of the mainstream dictates. It also appears 
that any theory (and often contradicting theories) can find confirmatory evidence 
in an appropriately manipulated set of data. The practice of empirical economics 
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seems to have distanced itself from the principle of falsification in favour of 
confirmatory exercises which are more easily attainable (Lawson, 1997). 
Part of the blame is ascribed to the overly simplistic and typically fictitious 
assumptions imposed on theoretical models. Such assumptions include the 
omnisciently rational nature of economic agents, the profit maximising purpose of 
firms or the utility maximising behaviour of consumers. In response, several 
departures from the orthodox economic programme have taken on the task of 
correcting the failures of the mainstream by relaxing or otherwise adjusting these 
assumptions. Transaction cost economics is one such example. As it turns out, 
however, these alternatives still face significant problems in empirical research. No 
matter what claims can be made regarding the superiority of their assumptions, 
they often lack the technical sophistication of the mainstream but share its 
empirical failure. Despite a growing amount of empirical studies in these areas, 
they face additional problems in formulating empirical tests comparable to the 
established mainstream practices mainly due to the difficulty of measuring key 
concepts (such as asset specificity or bounded rationality). 
Another response has been to pursue even more sophisticated mathematical 
techniques in theoretical modelling and data analysis methods for empirical work, 
with a view to improving the explanatory power of the economist's tools. While 
tools and techniques are being improved and developed, successes in substantive 
theory have not ensued. The academic community in economics appears to be 
caught in a vicious circle of more technical sophistication, arbitrary assumptions 
and theoretical propositions of little relevance to the actualities of the economy. 
Transcendental realism can help shed new light on this criticism (Lawson 1997). 
From a realist perspective, the problems of mainstream economics are due to its 
(sometimes implicit) insistence on a positivist research programme and a deductive 
mode of reasoning. In econometrics, this is clearly the case. Scientific laws are 
sought in constant conjunctions of events. The explanation of economic 
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phenomena is subsequently deductive, given a set of initial and boundary 
conditions and the relevant empirical laws. Therefore, from the realist point of 
view, the relative failure of econometrics and its apparent capacity to find 
corroborative evidence for different, often opposing, theories, is no surprise, since 
empirical regularities (in the empirical domain) are coincidental rather than 
necessary (as are the structures of the real domain). The improvements sought by 
econometricians are in the direction of measuring more aspects of the phenomenon 
of interest and by endogenising more situational variables that are seen to impinge 
on that phenomenon. Such efforts attempt (often unconsciously) to secure 
conditions of experimental closed systems, akin to the experiments conducted in 
some natural sciences. In the realist terminology, these attempts seek to establish 
conditions of closure that minimise the contingent interrelationships of the actual 
and empirical domains in order to reveal the direct effects of the real mechanisms 
in operation. However, the openness and complexity of actual economic systems 
are pervasive. 
Theoretical modelling in economics is also based on the same positivist-deductivist 
conception of science. Axioms and assumptions are used as empirical actualities in 
the place of empirical laws. Often, they are selected and configured so as to suit the 
tractability of the mathematical calculus, which is used to deliver various solution 
concepts. These solution concepts are also postulated as assumed features of 
actuality. Mathematical sophistication is sought to accommodate more realistic 
assumptions. Whether such models are empirically tested or not, it is implicitly 
held that an appropriate research design could be formulated for an empirical test 
aiming to confirm or falsify the results of the model on the basis of the existence or 
absence of corroborating empirical regularities. However, given the typically 
superficial nature of the assumptions held and the open and contingent nature of 
actual economic systems, it is not surprising that empirical support for formal 
models is scarce. 
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The theories reviewed in chapter 2, including transaction cost economics, are not 
exempt from this criticism. Although, as their proponents claim, they constitute a 
departure from orthodox economics, the difference is limited to the substantive 
assumptions and propositions. The underlying conception of science remains 
positivist. The question then begged is whether and how such theories can be 
incorporated in a realist theory that this thesis aspires to develop. 
That economics is based on a misconceived ontology does not necessarily mean that 
all the economic theory thus developed over nearly two centuries has to be 
discarded. Transcendental realism as a philosophical position cannot decide on 
substantive matters (i. e. which one is a good theory and which is not). Also it does 
not, at the outset, rule out any empirical methods. It does, however, have 
implications for assessing the nature of theoretical claims. Moreover, nothing 
precludes that a positivist research programme cannot by chance, by insight or 
otherwise produce valid theoretical explanations. However, realism requires that 
such explanations be postulated as potentialities rather than actualities. 
For example, it cannot be denied that economic agents possess some kind of 
rationality. The manifestation of rationality in practice, though, is conditioned by a 
number of parameters pertaining to the decision-making context and the 
individuals' personality. To study human rationality experimentally would require 
controlling all aspects of one's personality and all situational conditions. While this 
is ultimately impossible in practice, it is possible to develop explanatory accounts of 
observed phenomena that separate the real mechanisms of rationality from the 
contingencies that lead to decisions and actions and from the factors that affect the 
observer's perception of ensuing events. Therefore, the observation of apparently 
irrational actions does not by itself falsify the assumption that human agents are 
rational. An examination of the context and of the individuals' private preferences 
may reveal that what appears rational to an observer with different preferences 
and social conditioning is actually perfectly rational for the individuals being 
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studied (see a related criticism against transaction cost economics raised by Lacity 
and Willcocks 1995). 
This is the way in which the theories of chapter 2 are employed in subsequent 
chapters. These theories are conceived as possible mechanisms that come into 
operation in observed governance structures, although their relative importance 
and manifestation will vary across different circumstances. Moreover, they are not 
considered to constitute a complete account of all mechanisms that can determine 
actual governance structures. However, they do cast a broad net over several 
different possible mechanisms. 
Awareness of these mechanisms and of their potential effects provides the basis for 
a constructive dialogue among researchers and/or practitioners on a course of 
action that is appropriate to the specific context of the situation. For example, the 
theory postulates various incentive effects of asset ownership, of reward structure 
and of performance target setting over time. The extent to which these mechanisms 
are efficacious, significant or even relevant in any particular contracting case will 
vary from case to case and, therefore, different contractual and organisational 
arrangements will be made. This is the way economic theories are used in this 
thesis and incorporated in the proposed framework in chapter 5. 
The theoretical basis for this thesis laid out in the very last section of chapter 2 
certainly conforms with this principle. There it is argued that the idealised, 
fictitious concepts of markets, hierarchies and hybrids are unrealistic and a 
continuum of actual governance structures is proposed instead. Each of the latter, it 
is argued, is determined contingently by a range of possible mechanisms, such as 
incentive schemes, adaptive capacities and reputation effects. The realist basis of the 
argument is strengthened with the insistence on unpacking, first the characteristics 
of the systems and services provided, second the many different governance 
possibilities and third the mechanisms determining actual governance structures. 
In short, the view of the organisation of IT provision taken here is an abstraction 
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that emphasises governance structure in terms of certain mechanisms informed by 
extant theory. This abstraction constitutes in itself a synthesis of various more 
partial and higher level abstractions, that can as a whole be re-synthesised with 
other factors (such as intra-firm politics and the bandwagon effect) that have been 
temporarily neglected in this thesis. 
The normative presentation of the proposed framework in chapter 5 is also made 
on the basis of potentiality. There are no concrete `cookbook' instructions. Instead, 
the various mechanisms included are potentially relevant factors in setting up the 
governance of IT provision in a particular situation. The assessment of the actual 
relevance of each mechanism and of its interplay with other mechanisms and 
contingencies are necessarily left to the decision maker. The empirical work 
presented in chapters 4 and 6 provides some insights as to the appropriate 
placement and scope of the postulated governance mechanisms within the wider 
context of intra-firm operations, inter-firm exchanges and IT provision and use. 
The following section turns on the empirical work carried out. 
6. Empirical methods 
As mentioned above (section 4), the aim of this thesis is to provide a theoretical 
account of the governance structure of the provision of IT services, which is based 
on the realist philosophy of science and which has a normative character with a 
view to aiding decision makers in practice. The realist and normative aims have 
been pursued with intensive case studies. One long-term case at British Petroleum, 
akin to participatory action research, has lead to the development of the proposed 
framework. Two shorter case studies (at ICI and Anglian Water) have been 
employed in retrospect to assess the proposed framework in alternative contexts, to 
examine its relevance and explanatory power and to reposition it within a broader 
web of governance determinants. The realist and action perspectives are considered 
in turn in the following sections. 
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6.1. Realism 
Given the realist ontology summarised in Table 3.1, Sayer (1992) has proposed a 
classification of four types of research, which is reproduced in Figure 3.1. Abstract 
research deals with the structures and mechanisms of objects in the real domain 
with little or no formal empirical grounding. This would be the case with 
theoretical modelling in economics. Intensive research starts from a narrow slice of 
observations in the empirical domain and attempts an in-depth study in order to 
postulate real objects and generative mechanisms. Some case studies, action 
research, ethnographic or anthropological studies provide examples of methods in 
this category. Extensive research tends not to involve abstraction into the real 
domain and searches for regularities within large collections of empirical 
observations. Surveys and the corresponding data analysis methods are the typical 
examples of this type. Synthesis is a type of research that attempts to explain major 
parts of whole systems by combining extensive analysis of both empirical 
observations and of postulated abstract structures and mechanisms. Clearly, this 
type of research confronts practical difficulties and requires substantial resources. 
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Figure 3.1 
Types of Research from a Realist Philosophical Perspective 
Amended from Sayer (1992) 
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Intensive and synthetic research are the most valid types from the perspective of the 
realist ontology and epistemology (Tsoukas 1989). Given that causality and 
necessity are not to be found in event regularities, the latter are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for theoretical explanation. Moreover, the ability to generalise can 
only be based on accounts of intransient real objects rather than on empirical 
coincidences. On the other hand, purely abstract research lacks the necessary 
empirical grounding which is the only source of validation. 
The present research project has both an intensive and a synthetic dimension. 
Synthesis has been pursued at the purely abstract level by combining a broad range 
of theoretical propositions from the economics literature. Empirical grounding has 
been sought intensively through the study of IT outsourcing practices in the three 
companies. 
The case study method is very versatile and can be employed in many different 
ways, including a multitude of data collection techniques (Eisenhardt 1989, Cavaye 
199G). In information systems research it has been used extensively to serve 
positivist, interpretivist and critical research programmes (Myers 1997). The main 
advantage of case studies is that they allow researchers to study the people, the 
social structures and the phenomena they are interested in, in their natural setting 
(Benbasat et al 1987, Silverman 1998) and to explore qualitative nuances of the 
context and of the subjective understandings of the participants. Researchers are 
advised to enter a case without prior conceptions of the boundaries of their 
investigation or the constructs they need to study. These emerge and are constantly 
adjusted as the case study unfolds (Pettigrew 1985, Benbasat et al 1987). 
As such, it is argued that case studies are best suited to the exploratory stages of a 
research process, serving to clarify the research problem and to inform the 
formulation of hypothesis, which subsequently feed typical extensive positivist 
testing. However, it has also been argued that case studies can be used for purposes 
of hypothesis testing (Yin 1989, Benbasat et al 1987), despite their weaknesses, 
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such as lack of experimental controls and small number of observations making 
generalisation problematic from a statistical point of view (Galliers 1991). In this 
positivist view of the method, single case designs are considered suitable for 
exploratory or disconfirmatory purposes or for exceptional (unique) cases, while 
multiple case design is considered suitable for theory testing (Yin 1989). 
The realist philosophy rejects some of the positivist requirements for case-based 
research design. In particular, the number of sites is not considered to impinge on 
the generalisability of the theory (Tsoukas 1989) and the criteria for validity and 
reliability are reconsidered (Numagami 1998). Moreover, once we "recognise the 
relative and multifaceted nature of truth amongst those in the research procesF 
(Pettigrew 1985, p. 57), it becomes clear that the objective formality of the 
positivist process of theory development and testing is not the only way to conduct 
case studies. However, this is not and should not be an excuse for lack of 
systematicity and rigour (Eisenhardt 1991). 
Two different kinds of case studies have been carried out for this thesis. First, a 
single case study at BP aimed at investigating IT outsourcing practices through the 
lens of economic theories of the firm. In particular, the case served both 
exploratory as well as explanatory purposes and lead to the proposed framework. 
Second, two shorter case studies served the assessment of this framework in 
alternative contexts. 
The diverse practices and opinions within the BP group have provided the stage for 
understanding the phenomenon of IT outsourcing beyond the secondary accounts 
of the literature and for deriving the proposed framework. Since all research is 
theory-laden, economic theories of contract and governance have been consciously 
adopted in this project, mainly due to their intuitive appeal in questions of `make or 
buy' and to their prior use in IT outsourcing research (see chapter 1). In tandem 
with the principles of the realist epistemology (section 3 above), the purpose is not 
to confirm or falsify the theories but to investigate their relevance and to reframe 
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their applicability in an organised framework, accepting that they offer valid and 
useful, even if partial and incomplete, explanations of governance structures and 
contractual practices. The relevance and applicability of the various economic 
theories have been assessed over a period of nine months in an interactive, 
participative manner with managers at BP. In the process, practical experiences 
and opinions were exchanged with theoretical insights. The former were used to 
inform the selection and interpretation of relevant theoretical propositions. The 
latter were debated with BP management in an effort to understand their relative 
importance and applicability. The framework of chapter 5 emerged as a result. The 
practices and opinions observed at BP are documented in chapter 4. 
After further refinement, the proposed framework guided data collection in two 
shorter case studies at ICI and Anglian Water. The aim there was to assess the 
adequacy of the framework in describing, understanding and explaining the 
observed practices in two contexts different to the original BP environment in 
which it was conceived. In doing so, some explanatory limits were also highlighted. 
Those parameters that were found to impinge on the observed practices but were 
not taken into account by the framework helped to identify its relative position 
within a broader web of causal powers in the organisational and economic context. 
The proposed framework and the theories it relies on are not considered as 
competing against alternative explanations such as political, evolutionary or 
resource dependence theories, as they are sometimes portrayed (Lacity and 
Hirschheim 1993b and Pfeffer 1997 [p. 1921). Following a realist epistemological 
perspective, it can be argued that these theories are complementary, highlighting 
different aspects of the same phenomenon or explaining it at different levels of 
abstraction. The two cases and the respective results are the subject of chapter 6. 
The utilisation of the three case studies is consistent with the realist ontology and 
epistemology. Of course, like every social theory the proposed framework is limited 
to the time-space window in which it emerged, namely large private companies in 
the UK today. As such it is a tentatively valid theory, subject to further refinement 
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and evaluation in alternative empirical contexts. A further note on the validity and 
reliability of the proposed framework is made in chapter 7. 
6.2. Action 
Within most management disciplines and in information systems in particular, the 
practical usefulness of theoretical contributions features prominently in debates 
among members of the academic community. Discussions on rigour versus 
relevance are one manifestation of such concerns. The editorial policy of MIS 
Quarterly gives almost exclusive priority to research articles that offer direct 
practical insight, alongside their theoretical and methodological rigour. In a similar 
vein, the research project presented here aims at delivering a theoretical account 
that can be of immediate use to managers deliberating the governance of IT 
provision in their organisations. For this reason the proposed framework is 
presented in normative terms. The case study at BP has been pivotal in 
incorporating such an element of action within the theoretical framework. 
A notion of a theory aspiring to be both a valid explanatory account as well as an 
instrument for guiding decision making in practice, points to the method of action 
research. The term was coined by Kurt Lewin in the 1940s in the field of social 
psychology (Kemmis 1988). Over the last fifty years, it has been widely employed 
in community development, education and organisational psychology. It has also 
found fertile ground, but not widespread use, in operational research (e. g. Hindle et 
al 1995) and information systems, typically in research on systems development 
(Checkland 1991, Wood-Harper 1985, Sandberg 1985, Baskerville and Wood- 
Harper 1996, Lau 1997). 
In its original conception (Rapoport 1970, Clark 1972, Kemmis 1988), action 
research aims at contributing both to the solution of practical problems of people in 
a particular problematic situation and to the advancement of social science equally, 
by joint collaboration between researchers and practitioners. Action research 
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entails a spiral process of planning an intervention, implementing it, monitoring it 
and reflecting on the whole process. 
However, the practice of action research has not sustained a consistent definition, a 
concrete method or a particular epistemological foundation (Kemmis and 
McTaggart 1988). Today there appear to be several variations on the original 
theme without a well defined mainstream (Elden and Chisholm 1993). One 
fundamental strain pertains to the relative emphasis that should be placed on 
action (i. e. solving practical problems) or on research (i. e. general scientific 
knowledge). Confronted with these ambiguities, action science (Argyris et al 1985) 
distances itself from action research by making specific and strong claims on its 
definition, although the central aim is identified with Lewin's original ideas. 
Given the ambiguity surrounding action research, it is too easy for any research 
project containing a practical perspective to label itself as such. To be sure, the 
project contained in this thesis has a strong element of action but one which is 
markedly different from both action science and the widely held notion of action 
research. 
The case at BP was an action research project because it responded to an immediate 
need of management to improve their understanding of IT outsourcing, faced with 
the problems and uncertainty that ensued after the large deals they had arranged at 
the time. A framework to help the management at BP Oil understand and assess 
their IT outsourcing options was their expectation from the very beginning and 
throughout the process. The process was participative and interactive, with BP's 
experiences contrasted to theoretical insights until a common understanding was 
reached. BP management adopted a considerable amount of theoretical 
terminology, while their experiences and opinions were crucial in shaping the final 
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framework. In the end, the latter was adopted by BP and featured in their internal 
discussions and documentation3. 
As such, the project carried out at BP (which corresponds to the derivation of the 
proposed framework) is an action research project. The practical problem was to 
improve understanding and the project succeeded in doing so. However, the 
framework has not been tested in a full scale reorganisation of the provision of IT. 
BP had recently concluded their outsourcing agreements and no major changes 
were planned or intended. This is a potential source of limitations to the 
actionability of the framework4. For this reason and in order to avoid confusion 
given the ill-defined notion of action research, the term is avoided in favour of the 
more general notion of case study. The subsequent case studies at ICI and Anglian 
Water were not concerned with actionability, although the framework was 
presented to and briefly discussed with management. 
An important difference between this project and a typical action research exercise 
concerns its epistemological grounds. In particular, action research and action 
science alike, take a pragmatist stance. As briefly mentioned in section 3 above, 
pragmatism entails the choice or development of a theory that suits the actual 
circumstances encountered, rather than conforming to any firm ontological claims. 
As Argyris et al (1985) successfully point out, this has an obvious advantage in that 
practising managers, being non-scientists and having limited capacity to perform 
lengthy analyses when rapid decisions and actions need to be taken, require brief 
and concise knowledge that is immediately applicable. Such knowledge, according 
to the deductivist argument of Argyris et al (1985), cannot be but of the contingent 
3 For example, OHP transparencies used at internal presentations in BP used the language and 
displayed various aspects of the S-CAGE framework. In one transparency asking why did BP's 
outsourcing arrangements not go well in certain respects, the first bullet-point answered "because 
we didn't follow Nikos' framework". 
4 This does not constitute a limitation to its explanatory power. The latter is discussed in the 
previous section. 
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form "if action x is taken, consequences y will result". Pragmatism serves this 
purpose by quickly reducing a potentially complex theory to few such statements 
according to what is perceived as relevant and/or important given the 
circumstances and the goals of the practitioners. 
Indeed, management at BP regularly asked for such concrete guidelines, in 
particular of the form "service x is best procured under governance structure y". 
As it has been shown, however, such claims are illegitimate both for philosophical 
(see section 2 above) and for substantive reasons (see last section of chapter 2). BP's 
requests were resisted. The shape of governance is determined on the basis of the 
contingent (and hence unpredictable) conditions arising in each individual case. 
However, the argument of Argyris et al (1985) is still valid and the question 
remains: how can managers with limited information processing capacity 
accommodate a potentially complex theory in an `on-line' manner? As the same 
authors suggest, the managers ought first to be trained to understand and apply the 
theory. The way the framework of chapter 5 is presented as an organised collection 
of potential governance mechanisms facilitates the reduction of the many elements 
it contains to those that are relevant to a given actual context, by a knowledgeable 
manager. This became obvious in interviewing managers for the case studies at ICI 
and Anglian Water. The open ended questionnaire employed (see appendix) served 
as a guide through the elements of the framework. During the interviewing 
processes it became clear that the number and complexity of the issues raised in the 
questionnaire quickly reduce to fewer and more specific questions that become 
relevant once the facts start unfolding, while many alternative possibilities were 
quickly eliminated as less relevant or less important. 
Therefore, the proposed framework maintains its practical usefulness 
(actionability) by virtue of the empirical exercise at BP and of the way it can be 
reduced to fewer relevant recommendations, while not compromising its adherence 
to the epistemological requirements of the realist philosophy of science. 
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7. Conclusions 
The research design explained in this chapter is an effort to synthesise and respond 
to the epistemological and methodological concerns raised in the information 
systems literature (e. g. Fitzgerald et al 1985). The limitations of the typical 
quantitative study that follows the principles of logical positivism is increasingly 
being recognised (e. g. Klein and Lyytinen 1985, Pervan and Klass 1992). A greater 
plurality in the choice of both philosophical assumptions and particular methods is 
also being advocated (e. g. Galliers 1992, Myers 1997). Among the research 
methods, the case study, in its various mutations, has become quite popular 
alongside more `mainstream' quantitative methods (e. g. Cavaye 1996). Among the 
philosophical assumptions, interpretivism and, to a lesser extent, critical theory are 
gaining ground (e. g. Orlikowslä and Baroudi 1991, Walsham 1995). 
This thesis takes on board the above issues and responds both in terms of 
philosophy and in terms of methodology. First, philosophically this thesis makes a 
modest contribution by introducing transcendental realism and outlining the 
latter's implications for theory development and empirical methods. These 
principles govern both the research methods as well as the substantive theoretical 
propositions. Second, methodologically the proposed framework is developed 
through an intensive case study with strong elements of participatory action 
research. Two additional case studies are employed to assess the proposed 
framework in alternative contexts. On substantive matters, in order to avoid re- 
inventing the wheel, economic theories of governance have been employed as a 
basis for theoretical development and for the proposed framework. 
By making a relatively brief reference to philosophical issues in social science, as 
they are viewed through the philosophical lens of transcendental realism, this 
chapter attempts to clarify the nature of the project undertaken, its ends and its 
means. It may appear as a rhetoric for the research approaches followed in this 
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thesis and against other alternatives. It is a rhetoric inasmuch as it makes explicit 
the foundations and assumptions guiding this work, instead of leaving them to the 
reader to infer (Metcalfe 1996). In addition, however, it plays an instrumental role 
in three respects. 
First, this chapter explains the way in which the economic theory of chapter 2 is 
subsequently used in the proposed framework. Given the realist epistemology 
adopted here and the positivist tradition in economics, the economic theories 
employed have to be reconceptualised as potential structures and mechanisms 
which may or may not produce observable effects of various kinds, depending on 
actual circumstances. Second, by addressing all these meta-theoretical issues, this 
chapter sets out the basis on which to judge both the substantive theoretical 
contribution of the thesis and its methodological sufficiency. 
Finally, this chapter is pivotal in the presentation of the thesis. Chapter 1 set the 
motivation for undertaking research on the governance of IT and highlighted the 
main strands of the received knowledge from the extant academic and trade 
literature. The conclusion sketched the direction followed in the rest of the thesis 
for studying the outsourcing phenomenon and the organisation of the provision of 
IT systems and services. Chapter 2 set out to review the relevant parts of the 
economics literature and to elaborate a starting point for further theory 
development. The present chapter establishes the meta-theoretical position and the 
empirical methods for the substantive work that follows in chapters 4,5 and 6, 
starting with the case study at BP. 
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The economic theories of organisation reviewed in chapter 2 are clearly pertinent 
to the governance of information technology service provision but the exact way in 
which they apply and their relative importance are not straightforward. The in- 
depth case study carried out at BP aimed at facilitating the transition from the 
theory of economic organisation and apply it to the question of sourcing IT 
products and services. 
This case study serves to generate awareness of the practical issues specific to the 
provision of IT. More than that, the case study served as a `distillery' of the theories 
in chapter 2. The end product is the S-CAGE framework presented in the next 
chapter. As explained in chapter 3, section 6, the case study had a strong action 
orientation. BP expected specific practical results from the exercise and contributed 
actively to the development and refinement of the framework. In particular, 
theories, meanings and practices were debated, and potentially useful frameworks 
were developed interactively with management at BP. For presentational purposes, 
the practices observed at BP are separated from the framework that was produced 
in the end, although the observation and the development of the framework 
progressed simultaneously. This chapter presents facts and opinions collected at BE 
Chapter 5, in turn, combines the relevant theoretical insights with the practical 
experiences to present the new framework. 
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This chapter documents events, contractual arrangements, processes and opinions 
with a view to understanding how the mechanisms of governance are manifested 
in practice and what consequences they have. The following section describes the 
intensive interaction process carried out at BP, its strengths and weaknesses. Section 
3 sets the scene at BP as it relates to organisation and information technology. 
Section 4 discusses the diversity of opinion across the BP Group with respect to 
outsourcing. The supplier selection and the transition process followed by BP 
Exploration are the subject of sections 5 and 6 respectively. The structure of 
different outsourcing contracts is considered in more detail in section 7. Finally, 
some further issues of concern faced by BP managers are presented in section 6 and 
the chapter is concluded in section 9. 
2. Carrying out the case study 
The case study was carried out at British Petroleum Plc from May 1994 until 
January 1995. The process involved collection of written documentation as well as 
interviews, presentations and discussions with a number of IT managers across the 
organisation. The Global Head of IT of BP Oil at the London headquarters and his 
associates were the main points of interaction. 
Throughout the process, the goal of the meetings was twofold. First, to collect 
qualitative and quantitative information consisting of factual (oral and 
documented) data and the managers' perceptions about IT sourcing problems and 
practices in the different BP businesses. Second, to inform and discuss with BP 
managers concepts and ideas derived from theory and debate their relevance and 
applicability. In this way, the case study became a learning process for both the 
researcher and the participating managers. The former familiarised himself with 
the language and frame of mind of the practitioners and the latter became able to 
access and adopt complex theoretical concepts and jargon. In the beginning there 
was a clear communication gap, due, most likely, to the different language used, 
that of the academic and that of the practitioner. However, over time the parties 
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converged to common grounds of understanding as both sides kept bringing into 
the discussion new information, ideas, concepts, as well as challenging feedback. 
This does not mean that a consensus of opinion was reached. On the contrary, 
participants maintained quite diverse and strong views. However, it took a while to 
bridge the gap between the researcher's academic language and terminology and 
the practitioners' own use of outsourcing terminology, which had been developed 
through their specific experience in BP. 
Most interactions with management at BP started as interviews but evolved into 
collaborative exchanges of ideas. As mentioned below, interview guides (open- 
ended questionnaires) were prepared for each occasion. The chosen theoretical 
background (chapter 2) informed all interview guides, discussion papers and 
debates. In particular, many interview questions were directly related to specific 
theoretical propositions. In other instances, theoretical propositions were explained 
in simple terms to practitioners and were then debated in order to assess the extend 
of their practical relevance. In doing so, two methodological aims were pursued. 
First, this approach provided a link between the abstract mechanisms postulated by 
theory and their actual manifestations. This relates to the stratified view of reality, 
advocated by the realist philosophy of science (see chapter 3, section 6.1) . Second, 
this process of feeding theoretical concepts to practitioners and debating them 
educated the latter who, in turn, were able to reflect further on their experience. 
This served the action research objectives of the case study (see chapter 3, section 
6.2). More specifically, the interaction with participant unfolded as follows. The 
information collected and the ideas generated at each meeting provided the basis 
for revising and targeting the interview guides for subsequent meetings. Meticulous 
notes were taken during meetings and many issues were revisited with the same or 
other participants in other meetings. After each meeting, all information (notes and 
documents) was analysed, interpreted and drafted in the form of interim discussion 
papers, which were shared and debated with participants in the next meeting. In 
this way, the whole process was interactive and augmented the knowledge and 
understanding of both the managers and the researcher. The former reflected on 
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their practices and revised their beliefs through a new perspective. The latter was 
able to pinpoint the practical relevance and manifestation of abstract theoretical 
propositions. The aim was to generate a unifying framework that would provide a 
common ground for understanding and bridging the diverse opinions and 
preferences held by each participant. Clearly, the final framework does not explain 
absolutely everything. Its limitations are discussed in chapters 5,6 and 7. 
Nonetheless, it is the product of an intensive, evolutionary and collaborative 
process of consolidating theoretical propositions, subjective opinions and 
organisational and contractual practices. 
During the process, the researcher had the initiative for analysing the data, 
proposing alternative frameworks and seeking criticism and feedback. The hosts at 
BP Oil demonstrated commitment in drawing support for the study from all 
quarters of the organisation. Below, the process of carrying out the case study is 
described in chronological order. Thus, it becomes evident how the aims of 
actionability and realism (chapter 3, section 6) were achieved. 
May 1994 
The case study started with a visit to BP's corporate headquarters in the City of 
London. The main event of the day was a presentation to seven senior and middle 
IT managers from Oil (the Global Head of IT and two advisors), Exploration (two 
senior IT managers) and the Corporate Centre (two desktop services managers), 
followed by person-to-person fact finding discussions'. The presentation was based 
on a paper titled `the impact of information technology on buyer-supplier 
relationships', distributed to the participants. The paper outlined the main tenets of 
transaction cost economics and agency theory and discussed their applicability to IT 
outsourcing. To exemplify the points being made, the three-dimensional 
contingency framework proposed by Mahoney (1992) formed the basis of 
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discussion. The terms `governance', `specificity', 'programmability' and 
`separability' attracted much interest, despite their abstract, academic, nature. The 
ensuing debate revolved around understanding the framework and associating it 
with the experience of BP. Moreover, the potential direction and outcome of the 
research and a clarification of the expectations of either party were openly agreed. 
In particular, and in accordance with tentative prior communication, it was agreed 
that BP would contribute information, documentation, management time for 
interviews and feedback on the development of the anticipated framework. In 
return, they expected to gain a better understanding of the issues involved in IT 
outsourcing and of the range of possible arrangements2. It was agreed that the final 
deliverable would be a framework classifying various governance alternatives and 
the conditions under which they are applicable. The framework would have to 
have practical usefulness for BPO but its exact form was, at that stage, left open. 
Two points in that agreement highlight the action research aspect of the case study. 
First, BP was expecting a tangible benefit in the form of `education' in new ideas 
and in the form of a managerial framework. Second, BP would contribute not only 
information but also active feedback on the development of the framework. In this 
sense the case study was to be a catalyst for transforming abstract economic 
theories into actionable knowledge. An electronic mail message that was later 
1 As a result of recent reorganisation throughout the BP Group, formal managerial titles were being 
abandoned in favour of ad-hoc specification of responsibilities (see also Cross et al 1997). This is 
why generic terms such as 'advisor' and 'senior manager' are used. 
2 The research was not going to address all the issues involved in IT outsourcing but only those 
afforded by the transaction cost and agency theoretic perspective that had already been adopted by 
the researcher. BP was also receiving other academic insight from within the UK and from abroad. 
BP felt that the research proposal considered at that meeting was making a distinct contribution. The 
recent outsourcing agreements of BP Exploration had spawned a debate within the Group on the 
appropriateness of various sourcing arrangements (see also section 4 below). Therefore, there was a 
desire to reconcile the different opinions under a unifying framework. 
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circulated to enlist managers for meetings and interviews explained: "[.. ] He aims 
to identify appropriate governance structures I .. 
I for various IT services [.. I. For 
our part, we are providing Nikos with our experience of outsourcing and a 
sounding board for his ideas. " 
June 1994 
Meetings were held with the two Oil IT advisors during a single day, both 
individually and jointly. The purpose of the meetings was mainly to collect facts 
about the history and structure of IT sourcing practices in the Group. In addition, 
various issues were debated. 
A discussion paper, prepared before the meeting, was shared with the two 
managers. It included an open-ended interview guide as well as brief summaries of 
issues for debate. The questions asked were related to the various sourcing practices 
in the Group and the recent BPX contracts. Issues for debate included the 
irreversibility of outsourcing decisions, the specificity and complexity of systems, 
the distinction between core strategic versus tactical activities, the choice between 
one (or few) versus many suppliers and the notion of partnership vis-a-vis 
inflexible contracts. 
The purpose of the issue debates was to elicit the opinions of management, the 
actual practices of the company and their relative importance and relevance in the 
context of BP. The questions and issues in the paper were drawn from economic 
theories, from the IT outsourcing literature (which, at the time, was limited but 
growing) and from the discussions during the previous meeting. 
After the meeting, a report was prepared and sent back to them for circulation to 
interested parties in BP. The title of the report was `Information technology 
outsourcing: an economic perspective on the nature of services and efficient 
contracting' and its aim was to educate and to raise awareness within BP of the 
perspective and of the terminology. It was expected that BP managers would be 
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able to associate the theory to their experience by themselves and reflect on its 
relevance during subsequent interviews and meetings. Once more, the paper, based 
on Mahoney's (1992) framework that was presented in the first visit, explained the 
terms and their potential applicability by giving relevant examples. Although the 
report did not contain immediate feedback on the information thus far collected, it 
gave stylised examples, drawn from the BP experience, to clarify the terms. 
August 1994 
After a break, the case study resumed with a meeting with one of the two Oil IT 
advisors. More facts and documentation were collected and plans were made for 
further interviews. The possible shape of the framework was also considered. These 
ideas, alongside other empirical findings and theory-driven arguments were, after 
the meeting, elaborated on a series of slides and a new 16-page document with the 
same title as the one before. Its purpose was to communicate and debate these ideas 
in subsequent meetings. This paper, which since then was continuously being 
revised, was the first draft of the final report3, although very few of the original 
ideas survived to the end. 
It is worth highlighting some of the elements of that paper. It introduced the notion 
of `service fulfilment devices'. These were defined as contractual and organisational 
arrangements aimed at ensuring the achievement of the desired goals in terms of 
service delivery and comprised three categories: measures of performance, 
monitors of conduct and formal incentives. They were associated to the three 
variables of Mahoney's (1992) framework, namely task separability, task 
programmability and asset specificity respectively. The concept of a lifecycle of 
service fulfilment devices, which survived nearly intact to the present thesis, was 
also introduced. 
3 The final report presented the S-CAGE framework and formed the basis for chapter 5. 
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The paper proposed a hierarchical classification of IT services, discussed possible 
forms of service fulfilment devices for IT services at different levels of the hierarchy 
and explored the cost (difficulty) of developing them through the lifecycle. Finally, 
the paper considered the advantages and disadvantages of organising IT services 
under a single unified governance or through a portfolio of governance structures. 
All these ideas were the seeds of the elements of the framework presented in 
chapter 5. 
However, at that time a different argument started taking shape. The argument, 
which was also appealing to BP, was that a particular set of service fulfilment 
devices could be devised for each IT service. The set of service fulfilment devices 
would then dictate acceptable general forms of governance. This blueprint for a 
contingency framework was contemplated for about a month before it was 
abandoned. It was considered to be too complex and too ambitious. It was also 
thought that it was not really necessary to be so prescriptive. 
Later in August, this paper was discussed at length during further meetings with 
the two IS advisors and the Vice President for Operations of BP America who had 
visited London to present their approach to IT sourcing. Several good ideas were 
exchanged that influenced the final framework, including, among others, the 
importance of proper definition of services and the varying degree of management 
involvement in monitoring the contract (and the provider) that is required for 
different services. 
September 1994 
Whereas all previous meetings were held at the corporate headquarters in London, 
on 1St September various meetings took place at the Stockley Park headquarters of 
BP Exploration and at the Hemel Hampstead Headquarters of BP Oil. A revised 
interview guide was prepared for these meetings. Related documentation was 
collected from both sites, including internal policy documents, vendor performance 
reports and parts of contracts. A senior manager responsible for Exploration's 
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global IT infrastructure explained in detail the initiative, the rationale and the 
structure of their recent contracts. At Hemel, the Partner Resource Manager (PRM - 
see section 7.2 below) for Oil Europe explained the `grief point' system 
implemented in the respective contract with SEMA. The part-time PRM for Air BP at 
the same site gave similar information regarding Air's contract. On the same 
building, SEMA rents space for their local operations (desktop support, network 
management and related services). SEMA's Account Consultant (local site manager) 
provided the vendor's perspective. Among others, he stressed the importance of 
additional (out of scope) work for SEMA and he explained their perception of 
value-added contribution to BP. 
Apart from giving factual information, all commentators that day were asked to 
critique the implementation of the contract and the effectiveness of the 
performance measurement systems. Several interesting points emerged regarding, 
among others, the form of supplier and customer opportunism, the qualities 
(precision and completeness or the lack of them4) of performance measures and the 
meaning of `partnership'. 
Later in September, a meeting was held with SEMA's Account Manager responsible 
for BP, at the SEMA headquarters outside Birmingham. A separate interview guide 
was prepared for this occasion and further contract documents were collected from 
SEMA. Among other issues, the discussion emphasised the contract management 
procedures, the degree of customisation of contracts to different clients and services 
and the partnership relation with BP. 
November 1994 onward 
Meanwhile, the paper mentioned above was undergoing major revisions. By the 
end of September, it was still under the same title but it was substantially enhanced 
and extended. The contingency approach contemplated in the previous version 
4 See chapter 5, section 4.1.2. 
145 
Chapter Four: The Problem Facing Practitioners 
had been abandoned (see chapter 3, sections 4 and 6.2 for a more extensive 
discussion), in favour of a classification of the elements of governance. The three- 
layer model (chapter 5, section 4) had started taking shape and formed the largest 
part of the report. In addition, the paper contemplated various arguments 
regarding `total' outsourcing solutions versus narrowly focused contracts. On 7 
November, one of the two BP Oil IT advisers visited Warwick Business School for a 
review of the drafts and an update on relevant developments at BE 
By the end of the year, the governance continuum (chapter 2, section 8.1) and the 
idea of service clustering (chapter 5, section 3) were introduced. Among other 
explanatory notes, the final report included a generic methodology for applying the 
framework in practice. On 15 January 1995 it was presented to and discussed with 
a panel of IT managers from Oil and Exploration at the London headquarters. The 
new title of the paper was `The efficient governance of information technology 
service provision: The S-CAGE framework'. Most of the managers who participated 
in the interviews were present. All participants received the framework with great 
interest. Feedback from the presentation lead to a revised version of the report and 
a supplement titled `A guide to understanding IT service specificity'. Both were 
distributed widely within BP in early February (see chapter 3, section 6.2 for some 
indication of the positive way in which the framework was received in BP). 
In May 1995, Oil's Global Head of IT and a senior member of his team at the 
corporate centres visited Warwick Business School to discuss further developments 
on this project. While the case study was effectively completed, close contact was 
maintained. As the research and the writing of chapters 4 and 5 progressed, the 
report was continuously being updated and refined using further feedback from BP 
Oil. Soon, the title was changed to `To outsource or not to outsource? This is not the 
5 By that time the Oil Systems Group at the London headquarters had been restructured more than 
twice and had undertaken responsibility for the systems of the corporate centre. Of the four advisors 
working at that level in BPO and BPCC when the case study had started a year before, only one had 
remained. 
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question: How to organise the provision of information technology'. The last 
version was produced in January 1997. 
2.1. Strengths and limitations of the approach 
The case study was a transformation process. Inputs were the recent BP experience 
with IT outsourcing and the range of economic theories reviewed in chapter 2. The 
output is the framework presented in chapter 5. BP had entered into large 
outsourcing agreements for a range of different services. This change had a 
significant impact on the IT organisation within all businesses of the Group. BP 
contributed to the case study with diverse practices, opinions and reactions to the 
outsourcing exercise. The theories selected are also characterised by extensive 
diversity. The literature surveyed in chapter 2 spans a broad range of theoretical 
propositions. The transformation process that took place during the case study was 
synthetic in nature. It synthesised the diversity of experiences at BP with the 
diversity of the respective literature to produce a single unifying framework. The 
BP experience served as a catalyst for the relevance, applicability and practical 
manifestation of the abstract theories. In turn, the theories provided the means for 
reconciling the diverse empirical observations onto a common basis for 
understanding them. 
Like every empirical research, this case study has its own strengths and limitations. 
One strength of the case study is its emphasis on practical relevance while 
maintaining strong theoretical grounding in the literature. The researcher and BP 
traded theoretical insight with practical experience in the process of converging to 
a common ground of understanding (the final framework). The collaborative 
interaction with practitioners was a key feature of this process. It has both 
advantages and disadvantages. The main advantage is that it facilitated the aims of 
relevance and actionability. The main disadvantage is that it was susceptible to 
biases emanating from the researcher's theoretical predisposition, from the specific 
experience of BP and from the personal and political inclinations of the 
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participants. In particular, the process emphasised the governance aspects of 
outsourcing at BP and has thus set aside other, possibly important, organisational 
antecedents of the outsourcing decisions and the ensuing events. Furthermore, the 
generality of the findings is compromised by the fact that the source of evidence is 
only one organisation. Additionally, some of the in-house outsourcing terminology 
used by BP managers has been adopted in parts of the S-CAGE framework (chapter 
5). This is not a serious problem, as the essence and validity of the framework is not 
affected. For example, chapter 6 uses the terminology of the companies referred to 
there, without contradicting or causing any other misinterpretation of chapter 5. 
Having said all that, BP demonstrated significant diversity of opinion (among 
individuals) and practices (between different companies in the group). However, 
some of this diversity might be due to conflicting interests and other political 
interactions among individuals in BP. This possibility (see, for example, Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1993) has been left out of the scope of this research. 
As discussed in chapter 3, any research project is theory laden and both researchers 
and practitioners bring their own subjectivity to the research process. Moreover, 
the research process and the research outcome themselves feed back into social 
reality and reconstruct it by influencing the beliefs and actions of social actors. 
Research approaches adhering to the principles of experimentation emphasise the 
need to control all such biases in order to obtain objective observations of cause and 
effect. Interpretivist approaches insist that not only are subjective beliefs part of 
social reality (and, therefore, they should be part of the study) but also that such 
biases ultimately cannot be avoided6. In this case study, no effort was made to 
disable these subjective interjections. On the contrary, both the researcher and BP 
managers agreed openly from the outset to embrace each other's knowledge and 
use it to revise their own understanding and to construct a set of common beliefs. 
6 The various strands of interpretivism are not unanimous on this. See chapter 3, section 2. 
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Therefore, the result is likely to be biased by the specific experience in BP and by 
the chosen theoretical background. This possibility, among other things, is 
examined in chapter 6. As it is also mentioned in other parts of this chapter, it 
should be stressed that BP did not present a unitary case. A diversity of 
organisational and contractual practices was observed in different BP businesses. 
Moreover, opinions varied greatly between individuals. So from a purely 
experimental viewpoint, there has been some degree of randomisation. However, 
richness of context was a more important objective than randomisation. 
The case study has lead to the refinement and extension of extant theory, in the 
form of the governance continuum (chapter 2, section 8.1), the notion of clustering 
and the classification of the elements of governance (chapter 5, Figures 5.2 and 
5.4). To summarise, this case study has not been a test of theory and it has not led 
to the development of major new theory. Notwithstanding, it has been a research 
intervention in BP and it has achieved a synthesis of two diverse realms of 
knowledge, namely the abstract economic theories and BP's experience. 
3. Organisational background 
British Petroleum Plc. is one of the largest petroleum and petrochemicals companies 
in the world. It is organised in three main divisions under the control of the 
Corporate Centre (BPCC) and operates in eleven regions all over the world. 
Exploration (BPX) explores and produces crude oil and natural gas. Oil (BPO) 
refines, markets, supplies and transports oil products. Chemicals (BPC) 
manufactures and markets petrochemicals. Oil is the largest division generating 
nearly 75% of the Group's turnover which was over £36 billion in 1995. When the 
case study began in 1994, of those three businesses, Oil was the largest IT user with 
70% of the expenditure and 80% of the headcount. Total IT expenditure of Oil for 
1994 was $350 million. This represented a 22% reduction since 1989. 
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In 1994, BPO's model of IT procurement included three basic categories. First, in- 
house activities included service and project management, procurement, and 
policy. Second, equipment, software and commodity services were purchased. 
Third, data centres, telex/telephone and 24-hours operations were outsourced. The 
procurement of other services varied among business units and sites according to 
local conditions. For example, telecommunications and bandwidth were either 
purchased from a telecommunications operator and managed by BPO or wholly 
outsourced. Help desks, applications development and support and consultancy 
were either carried out in-house or outsourced. Total internal activities totalled 
about 39% of expenditure, purchased services accounted for 26%, facilities 
management for less than 2%, work contracted out represented 23%, fixed price 
contracts represented 8% and cost-plus contracts less than 2%. The last four 
categories are broadly considered as `outsourcing' by BPO and constituted a total of 
35% of IT expenditure. The bulk of infrastructure activity was either outsourced (in 
the broader sense) or purchased. Business applications were delivered by a roughly 
equal balance between outsourcing, purchasing and in-house work. 
In BP Oil's terminology, `purchasing' refers to equipment as well as to fixed-term 
contract staff. Facilities management is linked to the traditional notion of data 
centre operations. Contracting out refers to individual project-based contracts. 
Their notion of true outsourcing was of a bundle of services contracted out for a 
fixed price schedule, for a given period of time. At the time of the case study, BPX 
had already entered a long term total outsourcing agreement of the `cost plus' kind. 
Some of Oil's IT (less than 2%) was included in this contract. 
Oil's adoption of outsourcing coincided with a technical platform shift from 
mainframes to client-server. Linked to this was a major IT development which 
began in 1990 (before the outsourcing deals), the European Systems Project (ESP). 
This involved the development of integrated information systems for all functional 
areas covering the whole of Europe for Oil's operations. It is a very large project 
being developed at BP sites in the UK, Germany and France. The project was left out 
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of the outsourcing contract. Its development was the responsibility of internal 
groups. Contractors were employed for parts of the system in fixed and short term 
contracts. The organisation of ESP development is readily understood in the context 
of transaction cost economics and of those theories of the firm emphasising the 
organisation of knowledge (chapter 2). ESP required BP-specific knowledge and, 
given its innovative nature, it involved significant uncertainties which BPO could 
not forecast. It was also considered a project capable of bringing significant 
business advantages as it was designed to integrate all European operations. For 
these reasons BPO wanted to have close control over ESP. Since the case study, the 
project became international and was being deployed to sites throughout the world. 
Moreover, once the relevant business knowledge was embodied in the system, BP 
sought to reduce operating costs by contemplating more hands-off (discrete 
market) governance arrangements in collaboration with IT suppliers. Whereas 
specific knowledge and skills dictated a set of highly relational organisational 
structures during development (predominantly internal organisation), the 
structured and impersonal character of this knowledge after it is built into the 
system reduced the costs of organising it and thus gave the opportunity for the 
adoption of more discrete governance structures. 
In 1991 BPX initiated a major outsourcing exercise which was concluded with a 
total outsourcing agreement with three suppliers, namely SEMA, Syncordia and 
SAIC. With each supplier BPX signed a framework agreement where the general 
terms of the relationship were detailed. Rolling call-off contracts were subsequently 
signed by each site or business unit. This exercise was initiated by and for BPX 
globally but in practice call-off contracts were activated mainly in the UK where 
they also included the corporate centre and over time expanded to include services 
for other businesses within the group. 
The outsourcing exercise was part of the `Project 1990' initiated in May 1990 by 
CEO Robert Horton which aimed at introducing major cultural, structural and 
managerial changes throughout the organisation in order to focus on BPs core 
151 
Chapter Four: The Problem Facing Practitioners 
business and revitalise its financial situation. In the process, large numbers of staff 
were made redundant. IT was no exception and the outsourcing deal contributed in 
this direction. Within four years, the 900-strong group that provided all IT services 
internally to the corporate centre was reduced to just 7 in four main stages. The 
roles of the remaining staff are business consultancy, technology consultancy and 
contract management. 
BP have been trying to standardise their systems and services across the Group 
whenever this is desirable and maintain non-standard systems only where they 
create substantial local value added. For example, they have a global and standard 
contract with a major software vendor for all their office productivity tools. Similar 
arrangements are in place for WAN services except for those countries where the 
telecommunications regulation is not convenient or where BP's main supplier does 
not reach. Most business applications, in contrast, are non-standard and different 
approaches to their support and maintenance may be followed by different 
business units. This practice reflects the trade-off between the business value added 
by asset specificity and the respective increase in management and transaction 
costs. 
4. IT procurement philosophies in the BP Group 
The BP Group is a heterogeneous organisation. Each business unit operates in 
different markets and follows a different business mentality. Their approaches 
towards IT procurement also differ. Nevertheless, while they are aware of their 
distinct characters, they also communicate and share experiences and best 
practices. Early in 1994, global representatives from the main BP businesses met to 
discuss their approaches to IT outsourcing, to identify the differences, to draw 
lessons for the future and to find some common ground. This meeting was seen 
more as a learning and sharing exercise rather than an effort to establish one 
uniform approach throughout the Group. Each business unit continues to follow its 
own path, according to its idiosynchracy. 
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The approach of BPX in undertaking the IT outsourcing initiative stemmed from the 
strategic imperative of the company to devolve functions, focus on core operations 
and slim down the organisation. BPO took a different approach. Their starting 
point was the internal efficiency of IT operations and this has been their guiding 
criterion in deciding how to organise IT procurement. The BPX initiative, however, 
acquired a critical mass that put pressure on other parts of the group to follow suit 
and to join the same framework agreements. Chemicals and Air BP (a subsidiary of 
Oil) joined soon after the first contracts of Exploration and the Corporate Centre. 
This difference in approach reflects other differences between the two businesses. 
BPX is characterised by a more aggressive and proactive management attitude 
while in BPO changes are more subtly introduced. BPX is a highly centralised and 
hierarchical organisation as opposed to Oil which has a flat structure akin to 
notions of network organisation. 
Oil has 2 senior IT managers in its global headquarters. Their primary job is to 
facilitate communication and diffusion of best practice across a global network of 
regional IT managers. Each region may follow different technical and managerial 
(including outsourcing) practices. A Global Professional Team (GPT) facilitates 
communication between regional management teams. The GPT only decides upon a 
few global standards, the adoption of which can generate cost savings or other 
advantages as compared to independent decisions and technology choices. 
Perhaps more importantly, the systems of Oil and Exploration are very different. 
BPX has high technology systems and applications which are relatively independent 
and easier to define. Oil's business is much more complex, ranging from refinery 
and warehousing to distribution and retailing. The information systems supporting 
all these activities are both diverse and inter-related. It is not only more difficult to 
write comprehensive contracts, but the implications of any IT procurement decision 
for a given application are more far reaching than the case of BPX where IT 
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services are more distinct. A different approach to evaluating the outsourcing 
decision was therefore warranted. 
BP America's philosophy for IT procurement is that as long as IT cannot be treated 
as a commodity service like electricity, emphasis should be placed on the definition 
of both the services and the set of skills required for managing their provision. 
Services differ in their characteristics so their definitions should also differ. In 
general, according to BP America's Vice President of Operations, IT service 
definitions should emphasise the business aspect of the service rather than the 
technical processes and assets involved. Moreover, the organisation should define 
the set of skills required to manage the delivery of services to customers, whether 
they are `produced' in-house, contracted out or outsourced. Commodity services 
require from the organisation relatively narrowly defined skills for contract 
management while services unique to the business need a broader range of 
technical, business and legal skills. For example, a few people are needed to look 
after a telecommunications contract and the supplier's performance. With 
applications however, staff from the client organisation are needed to oversee the 
developer's effort and product more closely. The opinion of this senior business 
manager reflects an understanding of the repercussions of asset specificity and of 
the issues pertaining to input an output measurement. Of course, the terminology 
adopted in practice differs from that used in the theoretical arguments reviewed in 
chapter 2. 
One of the underlying principles that guided BPX towards outsourcing was their 
decision that the IT group within the company should focus on business rather 
than technical solutions. They consequently wanted to separate information 
management from technology management. The practicalities of contracting 
(described later in the chapter) made them realise that the ability to separate 
business service from technology management varies among different services. 
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According to a senior manager, BP Exploration had three further reasons for 
pursuing outsourcing. First, they ascertained that the existing IT organisation could 
not improve its performance any further, at a time when the challenge within the 
company for continuous improvement was imperative. The outsourcing option 
promised to break through this performance barrier. From a fat hierarchy of 1400 
people including many technical staff, they achieved a transition to a slimmer 
organisation of 160 people, of which very few (about 10) are technical consultants 
and most are IT professionals working with the business on their use of IT. The new 
structure resembles an inverted pyramid as shown Figure 4.1. 
Managerial level 
Technical level 
Outsourced IT 
Figure 4.1 
BP Exploration's organisational transition to outsourcing 
From an internal hierarchy of 1400 people with fewer managers than technologists to a slimmer 
structure of 160 people with more managers than technologists. 
The second reason for considering outsourcing was the desire to align the cost 
structure of IT with that of the rest of the business. BP Exploration's business is 
characterised by a large proportion of variable costs. Cost flexibility is consequently 
very important and outsourcing was seen as a way to increase the variable 
proportion of IT costs. 
Third, the general business environment put pressure on BPX to reduce their total 
costs and outsourcing was seen as a cost cutting instrument. Another reason quoted 
by BPX was the problem of effort duplication and the difficulty of coordinating the 
large number of suppliers under the previous regime. After outsourcing they 
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interact with three major suppliers which may in turn use a number of 
subcontractors in a transparent way for BPX. 
The BPO approach was incremental. The process of outsourcing IT systems and 
services at the Hemel Hampstead headquarters (outside London) started with a 
competitive bid to assist them with the transition from mainframe to client server. It 
was a `closed book' competitive process and the contract was awarded to SEMA. 
According to the SEMA account manager, BP had relatively few expectations. This 
relationship however gradually evolved to a broader `partnership' (in his own 
words) by including more services in the contract and implementing an open-book 
policy. The BPX approach was significantly different. BPX had higher expectations 
from the beginning, requiring both a `partnership' and a radical 40% cost cut. 
Outsourcing is considered by Oil to be one approach to IT procurement which in 
itself comprises a range of styles of external provision from purchasing through to 
contracting out using either fixed-price or risk-sharing contracts. Having realised 
there is a range of options for organising the provision of IT services, they have no 
a priori bias towards total outsourcing or towards a single supplier, despite the 
bandwagon effect created with the Exploration's initiative. The latter's attitude 
derives from their top level vision for IT which places emphasis on the `demand 
side', i. e. the business value of IT, rather than the `supply side', i. e. the process of 
delivering systems and services. For BPX there is virtually no alternative other than 
outsourcing. In addition, Oil seems to have a preference for fixed-price contracts 
while Exploration for cost-plus/risk-sharing contracts. Oil tend to select their 
procurement mode on a service-by-service basis and opt for outsourcing when it 
can deliver benefits beyond their own reach. Exploration's primary driver for 
outsourcing is to refocus their (residual) IT organisation. Over time and after 
various debates within the Group, most BP managers appear to have agreed that by 
following a piecemeal approach to sourcing IT services they gain experience that 
proves invaluable when they decide to consolidate their separate contracts into one 
large outsourcing deal. Table 4.1 below summarises the two opposite IT 
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procurement philosophies of BPO and BPX as described in BP documents and 
explained by BP managers. These two philosophies seem to mark the two extremes 
of the range of opinion within the Group. 
Table 4.1 
Outsourcing criteria, reasons and expectations for BPO and BPX 
POi 
Economies of scale can be realised 
beyond BP's reach. 
Costs can be made variable. This is 
considered particularly relevant to 
declining legacy systems. 
Mature, low-risk, well understood 
services are better suited to outsourcing. 
After compacting and improving a 
service internally to the point that no 
further improvement can be achieved 
in-house. 
Where external skills can be accessed 
cost-effectively. 
Functions that BPO do not want to 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
BP Exploration 
" Refocusing the residual IT organisation. 
" Leveraging relationships to access new 
technologies and expertise. 
" Accelerating the pace of technology 
delivery and installation. 
" Improved cost focus by avoiding 
infrastructure investment. 
" Reduced and variable costs. 
manage. 
5. BPX supplier selection 
BP Exploration's approach to outsourcing and the supplier selection process they 
followed are described in a Harvard Business Review article by John Cross (1995), 
BPX general manager of IT. The process started in 1991 and was thoroughly 
prepared. Initially they mailed requests for information to 100 vendors including 
their incumbent suppliers and three internal management buyout bidders. Of these, 
65 responded and an initial screening by a team of 20 BPX managers from various 
departments reduced the list to 16. At that time (June 1992) the Corporate Centre 
had also decided to downsize their operations and joined the BPX initiative. Each of 
the 16 candidates was visited by BP staff with a comprehensive list of more than 12 
evaluation criteria. The list of 16 suppliers was reduced to 6. Instead of inviting 
them to tender, BPX and BPCC decided to host a `BP IT Partnering Workshop'. BP 
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presented detailed requirements for each service, excluding performance (service 
level) targets. They did however state their cost targets. These were ambitious 
enough so that candidate suppliers were deterred from underbidding 
opportunistically. The suppliers were then asked to negotiate among themselves 
and to make coherent proposals as to how they would cooperate in order to provide 
a seamless service for the whole set of IT services required by BP. Five proposals 
were submitted. The proposal finally accepted involved two site providers (SEMA 
and SAIC) and a WAN supplier (Syncordia). 
BPX wanted the three vendors to form an alliance and enter in contractual 
agreement with BP as a single party/entity. This would allow BP first to have a 
single interface both for negotiations and for service management and second to 
ask for seamless service provision across services and business units. This scheme 
would have significant operational advantages for BP as opposed to an 
arrangement in which they would have to manage three suppliers and the inter- 
relationships among them. The then European Economic Community (European 
Union now) intervened and the courts did not allow this arrangement to 
materialise on the grounds of protecting competition. 
SEMA has taken over data centre operations across the UK and moved them to their 
own sites, as well as providing IT services for the BPCC and BPX's London-based 
headquarters. SAIC (Science Applications International Corporation) manages IT 
services at BPX's European headquarters in Aberdeen and all the applications. It is 
noteworthy that most BPX applications are specialised, high technology systems for 
the study of geological data, drilling sites and so on. Syncordia provides WAN 
services covering the UK and most BPX overseas sites. 
SAIC and SEMA are responsible for local site services such as desktops, applications 
and LANs. Syncordia (BT's subsidiary) has undertaken wide area network services 
including telephones, video-conferencing and data communications. The main sites 
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served are the London headquarters hosting the Corporate Centre, BPX's 
headquarters at Stockley Park, Sunbury and Aberdeen. 
6. The transition to outsourcing 
Despite the stringent provisions of the law, BPX bypassed the transfer of 
undertaking (protection of employment) (TUPE) regulations of 1981 by firing and 
paying redundancy fees to staff prior to outsourcing but informally agreed with the 
suppliers that they would give them the option of applying for a job to them. 
Several BP employees were subsequently employed by one of the suppliers. 
Therefore the outsourcing contract did not include any provisions for personnel 
transfer. 
The contract provided for the transfer of some assets, software licences and prior 
contracts. Generally, however, they tried to avoid asset transfer if it involved many 
complications such as licences, leases and many third-party contracts. A senior BPX 
manager felt that any asset purchases by the supplier at the beginning would be 
charged back to the customer at a later stage indirectly via the pricing structure. 
Further, the supplier may prefer to purchase existing assets or retain ownership of 
new ones, in order to improve its bargaining position in future negotiations and at 
contract renewal. In the case of BPX, desktop hardware (mainly PCs and printers) 
was sold to the supplier and leased back. At contract termination this equipment 
reverts to BP after payment of its residual value (which forms part of the stranding 
costs - see section 7). 
Project teams from the suppliers went to BPX sites during call-off contract 
negotiations to collect detailed information about each service. BPX did not have to 
collect and present this information. At this stage the negotiations generated a lot of 
friction and nearly fell through as the suppliers gradually realised the complexity 
of services. 
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Air BP and SEMA agreed on a transitional period during which the two parties 
would collaborate closely in service provision while SEMA acquired and developed 
the business- and systems-specific knowledge required. For this purpose, key IT 
staff were transferred to SEMA. BP's intention was to concentrate on business 
results rather than the process of service delivery as soon as this transitional period 
ended. This practice corroborates the theoretical discussion on the role of 
knowledge in economic organisation that has been elaborated in section 6 of 
chapter 2. 
7. The structure of contracts 
The framework agreement is entered into by BP and each supplier. It covers the 
fundamental principles of the exchange, describes the way business is to be done 
and the way specific goals are to be set. Moreover, it sets policies for intellectual 
property and data protection. An open book policy is established according to 
which BP retains the right to access and audit the supplier's cost information. The 
issues of measurement examined in chapter 2 can inform such observations. The 
framework agreement also specifies how disputes are to be dealt with and makes 
provisions for service level reviews (technical aspect) and renegotiation of 
payments (commercial aspect). Cost targets are reviewed and negotiated annually 
but service level targets rarely. Two categories of costs are defined. Direct costs 
relating to resources used directly for service provision such as hardware, software, 
staff and subcontractors. Indirect costs are management and other overheads. The 
agreement also allows BP to benchmark the suppliers' costs against prices in the 
market. Suppliers are required to hire the best-in-class subcontractors whenever 
subcontracting is required. 
The framework agreement also makes general provisions for contract termination. 
Standards and procedures are specified to ensure uninterrupted service and initial 
support to the succeeding provider. These are relatively few and are not defined in 
extensive detail. Performance expectations are detailed in the call-off contracts. A 
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senior BPX manager feels confident that BP will be able to change supplier 
promptly if needed. In his opinion, if it is possible to switch supplier it is equally 
easy to bring a service or a set of services back in house. Exit provisions include the 
payment of so called `stranding costs' from BP. Stranding costs include the 
amortisation of capital investments and the salaries of staff the employment of 
which the supplier has to maintain. Stranding costs in this case can be seen as a 
measure of the specificity of the supplier's investment. 
The framework agreement also describes an escalation process which is to be 
followed when problems persist or major disputes arise. The process gradually 
involves more senior people from the two organisations who attempt to reach an 
agreement before the problem is referred to the next level of escalation or to 
arbitration or to even more severe legal measures. The following managers from 
the part of SEMA are involved at increasing levels of the escalation process: site 
manager, account manager, area manager, production director and managing 
director. From the part of BP it is the partner resource manager who makes all 
these contacts but in severe cases more senior people within the BP organisation 
may have to exercise their power of authority. The contract stipulates with 
precision the conditions under which each level is invoked. Overall, it has proved 
to be a useful and effective measure, particularly where the performance of third- 
party subcontractors is concerned. When their performance is not up to standard 
and BP managers cannot bring about any correction, SEMA are notified and their 
bargaining power over third parties is such that any problems are promptly 
resolved. When SEMA is about to renew their contract with a third party, BP have 
the right to intervene and make specific requests, within certain limits, but they 
seldom make use of this right. These provisions demonstrate the significant 
relationality of the contract (see section 2.1 in chapter 2). 
Call-off contracts are negotiated separately by each business unit at each site with 
each supplier and may include several services. They are subject to the provisions 
of the framework agreement but may identify particular amendments that suit 
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individual circumstances. Call-off contracts specify the following: charging and 
billing, the service level agreement (SLA), site management organisation, the scope 
of the contract, plans for maintaining and improving quality, the particular grief 
points and incentives applied, confidentiality clauses, transfer of hardware, 
software, licences, documentation and continuing contracts. The case of WAN 
services is an exception as it was treated as one business/one site and was specified 
in one call-off contract with Syncordia. The cost is shared by BP businesses/sites. 
BPX call-off contracts provide for a regularly renegotiated cost payment, plus a 
fixed percentage margin. They also include a formula for yearly cost reduction 
according to changes in market prices, the economies achieved by the supplier and 
other economic parameters. BPX retains the right to benchmark suppliers' services 
and costs against competing vendors in the market. In the event of a discrepancy, 
the supplier has to either match the cost or justify it. Cost-plus contracting of this 
kind provides no incentives (chapter 2, section 4). The benchmarking rights are an 
attempt to remedy this problem by restoring some competition and thus acquiring 
comparative performance information. 
Detailed service level requirements are specified for each service. For example, the 
main services included in BPCC's call-off contract are data centre operations, PC 
and workstation support, help desk, LAN support and applications support. Some 
call-off contracts also specify the amount of effort required for each service in 
terms of person-hours or number of staff. Costs for applications support and 
maintenance are fixed and expressed in terms of full-time employment equivalents 
of person-hours. 
For some infrastructure support services, the continuous improvement of service 
quality is not considered important as long as certain levels of availability, 
reliability and response are met. For more involved services (e. g. business 
applications) quality improvement becomes a major issue. Quantitative service 
targets within the contracted SLAs do not always prove satisfactory in practice 
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because they turn out not to cover all aspects of the service. Key-user satisfaction 
surveys complement discrete targets and are also part of the contract and of the 
incentive payments. The contracts specify no more than `simple questionnaires on 
service quality [to] be distributed to a small number of key users and if their 
responses are considered satisfactory a payment of 1 fo [to] be made to the 
suppller'7. These user satisfaction surveys are administered quarterly and for the 
suppliers to get the full 1% they must achieve satisfactory results throughout the 
year. Air BP managers felt however that user satisfaction surveys were not properly 
addressed in the contract and the feedback collected in practice was inadequate to 
assess service quality. Some managers felt that BP was altogether too hands-off but 
perhaps this might have been a natural reaction to the transition from a very 
hands-on environment to contract management. These issues point to the 
discussion of information, measurement problems and incentive structure in 
chapter 2. 
Prior to negotiating the call-off contract, some BP businesses benchmarked their in- 
house services in order to set service levels and cost targets. The supplier was then 
given the chance to verify BP's benchmarks. Service levels and costs were thereafter 
agreed upon the assumption that services would remain the same. This assumption 
may not hold for certain services over an extended period of time. As for new 
services or for revised service level agreements, joint negotiations on a zero-basis 
with the supplier have been carried out. 
Work not required by the contract(s) or not achievable within the resource levels 
specified is classified as `out of scope'. Examples of out of scope services are user 
requests or system amendment requests (SARs) for applications. Small projects are 
carried out and charged without further negotiations but for major work either a 
separate contract has to be negotiated and entered into or the existing SLAs must be 
renegotiated and changed. This provision allows the suppliers to look forward to 
7Air BP call-off contract with SEMA. 
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additional business while creating an additional and potentially uncontrollable 
source of expenditure for BE The SEMA account manager mentioned that in one 
year they had 66 cases of small projects in addition to the contract and they were 
looking forward to more such work. He estimates that 10% of the work they 
perform is not stipulated in the SLAs but is initiated by the users in the course of 
contract execution. Such is the nature of contract incompleteness (chapter 2). 
Contracts are necessarily incomplete, particularly in IT where technologies and 
business needs change regularly and where user requirements cannot be easily and 
accurately elicited in advance. 
The approach BP wanted to adopt in specifying service level agreements, was to 
focus on business requirements for each service rather than the technical 
characteristics and the way services are provided. In practice however, this was 
rarely possible. Whenever there is a transfer of responsibility of existing operations 
or applications, the contract specifies in detail, the hardware and software used and 
the amount of person hours needed. While the rationale initially was to buy the 
technical expertise of the suppliers and let them decide the best way to provide a 
service, inevitably, existing systems have to be described in the contract. Moreover, 
in order to control costs, in some cases BP determine the human resources required. 
The managers interviewed recognised that specifying the resources to be used in 
the contract involves a trade-off between cost control and shifting responsibility for 
service levels. The trade-offs between contracting for input resources and 
contracting for output are well documented in the theory (chapter 2). 
The process for devising or revising performance metrics and targets involves an 
initial consultative discussion with the users, the partner resource manager (PRM, 
see section 7.2) and the supplier. Then technical staff are called to assess technical 
details. Finally, commercial (incentive and financial) issues are dealt with. It is a 
formal process because if it involves change in the scope of a service, further 
negotiations may have to be entered into and formal documents must be produced 
and signed by the appropriate managers from both parties. 
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7.1. Prlc/ng and Incentives 
A fundamental element of the incentive and monitoring system specified in call-off 
contracts, is the grief point system which varies between the contracts of different 
sites or business units. When suppliers do not meet the performance targets set out 
in service level agreements, BP collect points according to detailed rules taking into 
account the extent of non-performance and the criticality of the service. These 
points are accumulated over rolling periods of time and complex monetary reward 
or penalty rules are subsequently applied. According to BP, the purpose of grief 
points is to maximise flexibility by emphasising that the goal is to get the job done 
rather than penalise the supplier for every single instance of bad performance 
which might well be due to unpredictable factors. Any failure to meet a given 
target could otherwise signal breach of contract which could in turn lead to costly 
disputes and perhaps litigation which would not only damage the relationship but 
finally wreck IT services. This is clearly undesirable and the grief point system is 
instituted in recognition of the uncertainty involved and is designed to allow 
uninterrupted service provision and smooth trade relationships as long as 
performance is within some acceptable tolerance limits. The penalty system is 
comprehensive and forgives isolated exceptions, penalises persistent problems and 
allows BP to terminate the contract unilaterally when performance falls very low. 
Performance indicators for each service include service level metrics and activity 
measures. The former are distinguished by the fact that a given performance target 
is specified for each service level metric. Performance targets can be either absolute 
quantities (e. g. `the European network is allowed to suffer no more than 5 outages 
per month') or percentages (e. g. `50% of help desk calls must be fixed in less than 5 
minutes'). Service level metrics are classified as either critical or non-critical and 
have a different `grief point value'. Service criticality is judged and negotiated on 
the basis of the importance of service in terms of business performance. For 
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example, database availability at the end of each quarter is more critical than 
database availability at other periods of time. 
Activity measures do not convey a performance target but are additionally reported 
on a regular basis in order to collect richer performance information. An example 
of activity measure is a monthly report on the total number of videoconferences 
requested, held or cancelled. This information is used to qualify the two related 
service level metrics, namely, that 98% of conferences must run without problem 
or delay (critical) and that no more than 1 VIP conference to run with a problem or 
delay (non-critical) per month. Demand information provided by the report 
(activity measure) can help infer whether the service levels actually delivered (as 
measured by the two service level metrics) were easily achieved or whether any 
problems were justified. The discussion of information and measurement in section 
6 of chapter 2 is pertinent in this respect. 
Service level metrics and activity measures are measured and reported monthly, 
weekly or daily. Some are only reported by exception (i. e. only when deviations or 
problems occur). Certain metrics are characterised as `mystery shopper'. These are 
monitored occasionally. Such metrics are either easy to achieve and hence rigorous 
monitoring is not necessary (e. g. `provide telephone directory to users on the same 
day of the request') or their measurement is involved and complex and hence 
cannot be frequently carried out (e. g. for help desk services, `contact a sample of 
users to confirm problems are handled satisfactorily'). 
Metrics are recorded on manual logs or by specially written software tools, 
wherever possible. BP and the three suppliers agreed on a limited 'honeymoon' 
period in the beginning of contract execution, during which grief points would be 
calculated but not enforced in order to test all the arrangements and address any 
teething problems. In the early period of the outsourcing relationship some gaps 
were found in the service level agreements. The supplier agreed to incorporate 
additional metrics and by the time the case study was taking place they were 
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considered complete. Over time, certain metric targets have been renegotiated but 
not the metrics themselves. 
It is the supplier who has responsibility for keeping track of metrics and reporting 
them as required by the SLA. Moreover, a weekly copy of the help desk log is 
handed to BP. BP retains the right to audit the validity of the suppliers' reports but 
they seldom make use of it. At the time of the case study they did not have the 
resources or the procedures to carry out comprehensive and regular audits. 
Normally they rely on informal, approximate judgements on the supplier's 
truthfulness. It was felt that any misrepresentation of performance would be 
detected or inferred by the existing managerial structures and would subsequently 
trigger a full audit, if necessary. This example provides an interesting qualification 
to the theoretical arguments on opportunism and misrepresentation of information. 
Concern was also raised over making the structure and content of performance 
reports more efficient and useful for service management. 
The grief point system as applied to the service level agreements with SEMA for 
services delivered to Oil UK and Oil Europe combined, is based on a monthly 
monitoring and reporting cycle. As far as critical metrics are concerned, if all the 
targets are achieved, then a point is awarded to SEMA. If SEMA fail to achieve 
between one and five of the targets, a point is awarded to BP. If SEMA fail to 
achieve more than five of the targets then two points are awarded to BP. For non- 
critical metrics, consecutive failure on the same non-critical metric for 3 months 
will result in a point being awarded to BP and the counter for this metric being 
reset. If SEMA collect three points, the counters for the critical metrics are reset for 
both SEMA and BP. If BP collect three points then 10% of the quarterly 
management fee is paid to BP and the counters are reset for both SEMA and BP. If 
BP are awarded two payments in a rolling twelve-month period, BP can review the 
option to terminate the contract on grounds of breach. If BP elect not to terminate 
the contract then they receive a payment of 10% of the quarterly management fee 
and BP forego the right to review the option of contract termination until two 
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further payments are awarded to BP. These rules are depicted in the flow chart of 
Figure 4.2. 
A number of activities have not been assigned a measured target but have been 
assigned a qualitative expectation. If it becomes apparent that this expectation is 
not being met, then BP and SEMA will agree a way to include these in the grief 
point mechanism. 
The grief point system contains an ambiguity related to the assignment of points to 
BP. If BP has collected 2 points and during the following month all critical targets 
are met then BP's points are reset to zero. However, it is possible that during the 
same month BP is awarded further points due to the supplier's consistent 
underperformance in non-critical metrics. In such cases it is not clear what action 
is taken (financial penalty or reset points). BP managers maintain that since it is 
their responsibility to administer the grief point system, they make judgements on a 
case by case basis and try to address any problems in cooperation with the supplier. 
The overall effects of the grief point system appear to be ambiguous. Its mere 
existence makes users more confident that their expectations will be met. A partner 
resource manager, however, had some reservations regarding its effectiveness. 
Gaps in the specification of metrics and in the operation of the grief point 
mechanism are unavoidable. BP managers felt that the supplier has been able to 
take advantage of such gaps in small and incremental steps, at the expense of the 
quality and cost of service to BE At the time of the case study, BP managers were 
seeking supplementary instruments to guard against such behaviour of the supplier 
and to provide further incentive for innovation and service improvement. It 
appears that opportunism is manifest in taking advantage of gaps in the contract 
(contract incompleteness) rather than in misrepresenting asymmetrically available 
(albeit measurable) information (see chapter 2). 
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The grief point system of the BPO/SEMA call off contract 
An incentive system that does not reward good performance but penalises consistently bad 
performance instead, while protecting against uncontrollable contingencies. 
User surveys are a service level measurement instrument which has not been 
employed in the BPO/SEMA contract but they were planning a way to develop and 
introduce them formally in the contract. 
The incentive system stipulated by the Air BP contract has also been examined. For 
1994 the incentive payments (target) were to be calculated on a subset of selected 
items (including permanent and contract staff, systems maintenance, two 
applications and a data centre) from the total cost target for the contract. Incentive 
percentages and the target were to be renegotiated every year. For 1994, rewards 
were to be up to 2% of the incentive target and penalties up to 1% of the incentive 
target. On top of that there was to be an additional payment of 1% of the incentive 
target if the perception of designated key users (derived by means of a survey) is 
that the service received is acceptable. The supplier's incentive would depend on 
solving all problems even those not directly caused by them or under their own 
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responsibility. This is justified "in the interest of making agreement of any incidents 
easier"8. By foreclosing the allocation of responsibility, this contract, clause 
mitigates potential costs of coordination, haggling and influence activities (see 
chapter 2, mainly section 4). 
The incentive system aggregates the supplier's performance over five major 
services, each of which specifies targets calculated on a number of detailed 
requirements. The five services are: database availability, front end processors, telex 
and fax system, availability of invoices and statements, priority 1 incidents. All 
these services are measured monthly or averaged over monthly periods. For each 
service intervals of performance are specified for awarding -1,0,1 or 2 percent of 
the incentive target to the supplier. The percentages are averaged over quarters and 
then over the year and the incentive payment is settled at the end of the year. As for 
the measurement of user perceptions the contract specifies 8 key users to which a 
simple questionnaire is sent every quarter. If the supplier's service is judged 
satisfactory throughout the year, another 1% of the incentive target is awarded. 
The incentive systems of Air and Oil are very different, despite the fact that they are 
under the same framework agreement with the same supplier. Oil's system 
penalises the supplier in cases of unacceptable performance and does not provide 
any positive rewards. Air's contract, in contrast, emphasises monetary rewards for 
good performance while including a smaller penalty for non-performance. 
Following the theory of chapter 2, this could be explained by the different types of 
services included in Oil's and Air's contracts. The services included in the BPO 
contract are comparatively more standard: invoice management, video- 
conferencing, telex, fax, voice, network operations, network installations, help 
desk, office moves, commissioning, installation and acquisitions, PC support, e-mail 
administration and support. Air's contract is for the operation, maintenance and 
support of business applications which are by definition specific to the 
8 Air BP Limited / SEMA Call-Off Contract, November 1993. 
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organisation. Applications use a total of approximately 16 databases which are also 
included in the contract. 
Another difference between the incentive systems of Air and Oil is their intensity. 
Air's contract awards the supplier between I% and 3% of part of the cost target for 
the year and/or charges the supplier up to 1% of the same cost target, up to three 
times a year. Oil's contract may charge the supplier for up to 10% of the quarterly 
management fee for up to two times in a rolling 12 month period. It is difficult to 
make an exact comparison of the two systems as they are calculated in different 
ways. It appears however that the Oil contract is more strict and punishing while 
Air's is more encouraging. This is perhaps due to the fact that the former contract 
involves standard commodity services which should create fewer uncertainties to 
the supplier, as compared to the more business-specific and complex application 
services in the latter. Service level requirements are more easily specified, 
administered and relied upon in the case of standard and mature services. 
Penalising incentives are thus expected to be fairly efficacious. In contrast, 
business-specific applications are not as well defined and involve significant 
uncertainty. In this case, penalising incentives would not be sustainable and 
rewards are more appropriate. See also chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraph 6. 
The part time Partner Resource Manager of Air BP mentioned that the user survey 
specified in the contract has not worked very well. Nevertheless, this is not 
considered a major problem as long as costs are acceptable and critical services are 
delivered. It was not clear however how they would react if major problems arose. 
An incentive system similar to OEU but even more intense is implemented with BP 
Finance. In particular, SEMA gets six points for not achieving critical targets and 
one point for non-critical targets. They have to pay a penalty when they have 
collected a number of points but they also receive a reward for achieving the 
targets. This incentive pattern can be explained if the systems and services at BP 
Finance are relatively standard (so that severe penalties can be acceptable by the 
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supplier) while highly critical to the performance of the business (so that severe 
penalties are also justified). To the extent that uncertainty is associated with certain 
applications, positive rewards for good performance compensate losses due to `bad 
luck' in other instances. 
In January 1995 BP Oil started to negotiate a new set of quality incentives to be 
introduced in the revised contract between BP and SEMA for the Corporate Centre 
in London. According to their draft plans, part of SEMA's profit margin would be 
contingent upon the fulfilment of five categories of quality criteria. It was proposed 
that each category would bear equal weight and the rating of SEMA's performance 
against these criteria would be at BP's descretion. The five categories of quality 
criteria were first, criteria related to the supplier's responsiveness, i. e. it's ability to 
suggest innovative ideas for service improvement and cost reduction. Second, 
criteria pertaining to the collaboration and information exchange between BP and 
supplier staff in formal and informal structures. Third, criteria related to the usage, 
management and review of service level metrics and targets. Fourth, criteria 
encouraging new services and adaptations to existing ones according to business 
changes. The fifth criterion is user perception of service as derived from `customer 
responsiveness surveys'. These criteria are clearly difficult to measure and verify 
objectively and consistently but BP wanted to introduce them regardless, in 
response to problems faced during the first couple of years in the initial contract. 
For example, innovations in service delivery made by one team or supplier was 
occasionally withheld from others in other sites since they were competing for a 
larger share of BP's business. As a result, the proposed arrangements include 
incentives for increased communication and diffusion of new ideas. In other 
instances the suppliers were sometimes reluctant to introduce changes in the 
services and saw such cases as opportunities for additional business at a high 
premium. The proposed incentives prescribe ways for systematically taking into 
account requirements for change. The problem is, of course, that the proposed 
criteria are rather abstract and difficult to measure and verify objectively. Agreeing 
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on and implementing such provisions could therefore be difficult. This appears to 
be an attempt to address some of the effects of contractual incompleteness by 
instituting a process of subjective assessment. Further details on this attempt have 
not been made available. 
BPX contracts determine a profit margin for the supplier comprising a small fixed 
part (up to 25%) which is a percentage of total costs and a large (75%) variable 
incentive part, geared to the achievement of cost-reducing targets. A senior BPX 
manager acknowledges that suppliers have their own incentives to perform well, 
beyond the formal reward system stipulated in the contract. The reputation and 
credibility suppliers try to build up in the marketplace constitute significant 
performance drivers. BP is a big customer and the potential for more business 
within the group is an incentive to demonstrate good performance (see section 7, 
chapter 2). 
Other BP managers however repeatedly emphasised that while they were generally 
satisfied with the suppliers, they noticed that whenever possible they (suppliers) try 
to take advantage of minor gaps or ambiguous parts of the contract. Taken 
individually, such instances have negligible impact but if compounded they 
constitute a significant benefit to the supplier at the expense of BP. Such a pattern 
of opportunism features prominently in the academic literature (chapter 2). 
7.2. Site organisation 
The organisation of site management is specified in service level agreements. A 
typical site management organisation consists of a Partner Resource Manager 
(PRM), a technical and a business consultant from BP. From the supplier's part 
there is an Applications Support Manager (ASM), an Account Manager (AM), a Site 
Service Delivery Manager (SSDM) and a number of other full- or part-time staff 
for roles such as personnel, legal and contract management, production services, 
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technical services, quality, financial control. The exact organisation on each site 
varies depending on the types of services delivered and the total size of operations. 
The business consultant's role is close to the business and the users. His or her 
responsibilities include understanding business strategy, aligning systems with 
business strategy, helping users to develop their information strategy, monitoring 
the delivery of systems and ensuring the latter add value. The technology 
consultant is placed closer to the supplier and to the partner resource manager. His 
or her role is to contribute to the development of the business unit's technology 
architecture and to the integration of systems and to advise on how best to take 
advantage of emerging technologies. 
The role of the partner resource manager is often filled on a part time basis. This is 
the case, for example, with Air and Oil/Europe. He/she is responsible for day-to- 
day service delivery and for handling the escalation process. His/her 
responsibilities also include verification of supplier's monthly reports and SLA 
amendments in consultation with the customers. 
The performance of the PRM depends on the individual and has repercussions for 
the ongoing relationship between the parties.. One SEMA account manager reported 
a case where their reputation in BP suffered because they had to have many contact 
points with the customers while one PRM was not fulfilling his duties. He believes 
that the role of PRM does not provide adequate incentives to perform well (but he 
didn't define good performance). He also finds BP's supervision of SEMA's 
operations too close while he does not consider it necessary. 
The Applications Support Manager and the Site Service Delivery Manager are 
assigned to different sets of services supplied to a particular site, typically 
applications support and desktop support respectively. Their titles and 
responsibilities may differ from site to site depending on the services being 
provided. In general, their role is to manage day-to-day delivery of some given 
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services. Different services (e. g. applications and mainframe operations) require 
different management processes and skills and are therefore assigned to different 
managers. The account and site managers are the main contact points of the 
supplier organisation for BP. Both interact mainly with the Partner Resource 
Manager. Their primary responsibility is to manage and coordinate SEMA's 
contractual obligations and to negotiate contract amendments and scope changes. 
The account manager is based at SEMA's headquarters while the site manager is 
more hands-on and located on-site. 
The framework agreement specifies the role of the outsourcing review board 
(ORB). This is a joint committee which meets quarterly to discuss dispute 
resolution, persistent problems and changes in the scope of the contracts. The ORB 
is chaired by a senior manager from the BP group and participants include the 
heads of Information Systems of the BP businesses for which the Board convenes, 
the respective account manager and a senior manager from the supplier. This is a 
further element of relationality in BP's contracts (chapter 2, section 2.1). The 
outsourcing review board was not considered to function effectively and fulfil its 
intended goals. It is considered to lack focus, because first, its members are 
frequently replaced and therefore it is difficult to develop and maintain continuity 
in approaches and accord and second, participation has been irregular and 
inconsistent. 
A monthly service review meeting is held to review service level reports on a 
service by service basis, to assess the status of grief points and to action decisions. 
The meeting consists of the site manager, the area manager, the account manager 
and, less often, the production manager of SEMA and is chaired by the partner 
resource manager from BP. The same participants also hold occasional meetings to 
review major or persistent problems and devise measures and policies to avoid 
similar hazards in the future. According to the SEMA account manager, the service 
review meetings work well, in contrast to the outsourcing review board. 
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IT managers at Oil perceive their role as intermediators between suppliers and end 
users. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) are instrumental in this structure. End users 
have business problems and requirements and the systems (IT) group is called to 
deliver business solutions. Their role is to translate these needs into technical 
requirements and request them through service level agreements. Because SLAs are 
necessarily restricted, the IT group also has to monitor the performance of suppliers 
and manage the expectations of the customers. Rationalisation of user requirements 
(what BP call demand management) is seen by IT managers as key part of their 
role, in addition to contract management and performance monitoring. The IT 
group is therefore not a mere `broker' or `clearing house' as suggested in the 
literature (Loh and Venkatraman, 1995) but a proactive entity adding value in the 
process of service provision. 
From the point of view of the customers, services are provided by the IT group who 
in turn have subcontracted them to the three suppliers. A problem that has risen in 
the Hemel Hampstead headquarters, is that there are many groups of customers on 
the same site and therefore different contracts and different service and partner 
resource managers with whom SEMA has to interact. This created a coordination 
problem for SEMA and at the time of the case study they were trying to simplify the 
interface and create a single contact point between the two organisations. 
8. Further issues of concern 
The outsourcing bandwagon 
BP Exploration initially outsourced only infrastructure services and not application 
development and support. Soon however they started writing call-off contracts for 
application services with the same suppliers. The pattern of a bandwagon effect 
appears to emerge. BPX initiated the outsourcing exercise for infrastructure 
services (mainly wide and local area telecommunications, help desks and desktop 
support). Other businesses of the BP Group soon joined in the same framework 
agreement with the same suppliers and negotiated additional call-off contracts and 
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service level agreements. The outsourcing epidemic spread not only across business 
units but also across the range of services. Applications (i. e. business-specific IT 
services) were gradually handed over to the same suppliers. Several plausible 
explanations for this could be postulated. Either BP businesses were happy with the 
level of service and cooperation achieved and were confident to broaden their 
contracts, or the initial leak of expertise started an avalanche in which it became 
increasingly difficult and costly to maintain any in-house IT teams with 
outsourcing becoming a self-justifying option, or the outsourcing trend was part of 
the general restructuring plans orchestrated by the Group's top management as 
part of `Project 1990'. 
Market competition versus transaction costs 
A related issue of concern for BP IS managers was whether it is worth introducing 
competition in their IT procurement schemes by allowing more than one vendor to 
supply the same service, perhaps in different sites or business units, thus creating a 
`stick-and-carrot' incentive for higher quality and lower costs. 
BP recognised that the processes of supplier selection, tenders, negotiation and 
contracting from scratch are very costly. This is one of the reasons why they have 
decided to hold on to the set of three suppliers they initially selected, maintain the 
framework agreement and use call-off contracts whenever they need to purchase a 
product or service, as long as they are reasonably satisfied with the service 
received. In this way the process of supplier selection, a large part of contract 
negotiations (the part corresponding to the framework agreement) and the 
respective transaction costs are avoided. Both applications (business-specific) and 
more commodity services are included in the same contracting approach. 
The maturity both of the IT industry and of BP with given technologies is 
considered significant in the decision to outsource or not and how to structure the 
outsourcing relationship. Moreover, long term contracts are considered necessary 
because the supplier needs a guarantee that he will be doing a fair amount of 
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business to justify the necessary resource commitment. This guarantee of long term 
exchange is also an implicit incentive. But long term contracts raise questions of 
flexibility from BP's point of view. 
While BP consider their relationships with their suppliers to be a partnership, they 
have insisted in making their contracts as comprehensive as possible. They 
acknowledge that the notion of partnership, however elusive, is useful given the 
complexity, uncertainty and the unavoidable incompleteness of contracts involved. 
The impact of the decision of the European Court was significant for what BPX was 
trying to achieve. The initial plan was to enter a single contract with all three 
suppliers and thus delegate to them any problems of coordination amongst them 
while ensuring a single interface for each user site. This ideal would implement the 
BPX vision of focusing on supply management and providing a truly seamless 
service. Now BP has not avoided the burden of managing three separate contracts, 
the coordination between them and any conflicts. 
More obstacles to the totally seamless, end-to-end service vision arose when they 
started writing service level agreements. For many services it was impossible to 
specify only business requirements. Particular systems and technologies also had to 
be stipulated, thus transferring part of the responsibility for choosing the 
technologies to BP. In order to control the costs, staff numbers and skills were also 
specified, thus increasing BP's involvement in the details of service delivery. 
Measured and true service quality 
A widely held belief among BP managers was that service level agreements and 
service targets ought to be reviewed every year in order to take into account aspects 
of services previously neglected and to expand service targets to include more 
elusive requirements such as user satisfaction, value added and user 
documentation. The primary aim during the first year of the contracts was to get 
the services running smoothly. They anticipated however that once this is achieved, 
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further improvements could be sought. The problem they observed was that the 
contractors inevitably stick to the letter of the contract and provide only the 
requirements explicitly specified. However, the quality of complex, business- 
specific services is multifaceted and difficult to define on paper. Consequently the 
real satisfaction with service provision might be different to what formal 
performance metrics show. 
The outsourcing of desktop support at the corporate centre seems to have created 
some discomfort to end users who were not interacting any more with the people 
they knew but with new personnel who might or might not adapt to the culture of 
the office and the idiosyncracies of individual users. Users felt that they lost control 
over such `soft' issues, although the contract gives the right to BP to remove 
particular people from the site when serious problems arise. 
BP managers were also concerned with the fact that user satisfaction and other 
service level measures for a given service may depend on other services. For 
example, user satisfaction with e-mail depends not only on e-mail support but also 
on infrastructure and telecommunications operations. This has implications for the 
allocation of responsibility between contractors. The supplier providing e-mail 
support should not normally be charged any grief points if e-mail fails because of a 
telecommunications problem which is the responsibility of another contractor. 
Identifying and verifying the source of bad performance in a web of interdependent 
services may be troublesome. However, BP's contracts stipulate that the single 
supplier coordinating service provision at any site be held responsible for work 
subcontracted to third parties. For example, because SEMA is responsible for the 
Stockley Park headquarters of BPX they are also responsible for any problems 
occurring at this site due to work performed by SAIC, Syncordia or any other third 
party. The theories of agency reviewed in chapter 2 can recast these concerns in a 
more informed way. In particular, the problem described here is a typical case of 
the problem of team organisation, where performance information does not 
discriminate between team members and the effort each has contributed, and 
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where overall performance is more than the sum of each contributor's effort (see 
chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraph 5 and section 6, paragraph 2). Team organisation 
may lead to phenomena of shirking and free-riding. These theories examine 
various contractual and organisational alternatives to mitigate such problems. 
These alternatives include, among others, internal organisation with direct 
supervision and making team members reciprocal monitors who are motivated 
with rewards for squealing on each other. In the presence of imperfect 
information, imperfect verification and divergent interests, all these mechanisms 
are imperfect and costly haggling (with implications for the cost and quality of 
service) is expected to result. By making one supplier responsible for all work on a 
given site, BP passes all these transaction costs to the supplier concerned. Moreover, 
BP achieves some alignment of that supplier's interests with its own, thus reducing 
the complexity and severity of the problem. 
In terms of user satisfaction the opinion of the SEMA account manager was that in 
the beginning BP Exploration expectations from SEMA were very high (9/ 10) and 
the perception of service delivered lower (5/10). About a year and a half into the 
contract, BP expectations from SEMA were lower than in the beginning (7/ 10) and 
the perception of the service delivered slightly higher than expected (8/10). This 
pattern reflects the increased hype with which outsourcing was introduced in BPX. 
Over time, the trading relationship between the two parties adapted to an 
equilibrium in which users regard SEMA less highly and SEMA in turn manages to 
satisfy users by slightly exceeding their expectations. As long as this equilibrium is 
at an acceptable level, serious conflict should not occur. Of course this is the point 
of view of the account manager of SEMA and BP customers may have other views. 
As far as performance metrics in service level agreements are concerned, the 
concern raised by senior management was that in some instances too many metrics 
dissipate the focus of overall management and coordination. While detailed and 
comprehensive metrics may be required, the capacity of management attention and 
information processing is limited. Therefore some kind of aggregation of metrics is 
180 
Chapter Four: The Problem Facing Practitioners 
considered desirable but none has been devised. Nonetheless, such an aggregation 
is partially fulfilled by the grief point mechanism. Grief points aggregate 
performance successes and shortfalls in order to calculate incentive rewards and 
penalties. An overall picture of service levels is thus generated but conveys no 
background information pertaining to particular services or persistent problems. It 
is believed, however, that the experience and maturity of BP and the suppliers with 
a given service as well as the development of a sustainable partnership, allows the 
introduction of fewer and better targeted metrics, in contrast to services for which 
little is known and therefore more extensive and detailed information needs to be 
collected in order to counter the uncertainty involved. 
In terms of data security and confidentiality, three types of information are 
identified. First, information which can be made freely accessible by the suppliers' 
personnel. Second, confidential information for which every member of staff of the 
supplier signs a confidentiality agreement. Third, business-critical information 
which is secret and is maintained in-house and/or is encrypted. Overall, they do 
not consider data protection to be a problem. 
Scope of the contract 
An account consultant of SEMA raised the issue of work outside the scope of the 
contract. The distinction between work included in the scope of the contract and 
work out of scope is ambiguous and a potential source of friction with BP. When a 
contingent problem or requirement arises, it is not always clear if it should be part 
of the contract and therefore be provided by existing resources within the given 
cost limits or whether it should be considered additional business and paid for 
separately. Services resulting from business changes are, according to the contract, 
separate projects. However, it is not clear what constitutes business change. A 
rough proposal was to incorporate in the contract provisions for additional 
capacity (staff) to cater for small projects outside the strict letter of the contract. 
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Related to this is BP's desire that SEMA adds value to the business through IT. For 
SEMA, added value as well as technological changes would be work additional to 
the existing contract. SEMA would like to help BP standardise their systems across 
business units and across sites. This could lead to significant cost reduction. 
However, customers resist standardisation claiming that their own system has 
specific features that create business value which is otherwise unattainable. 
9. Conclusions 
From the various issues pertaining to IT outsourcing that are discussed in chapter 1, 
the case study emphasises those aspects that are relevant in the context of the 
theories of chapter 2. Although the organisational background and the reasons for 
outsourcing are briefly reviewed, they are not the main focus of the case study. 
Following transaction cost, agency and property rights theories, the case study 
emphasises the elements of governance in BP's contracts. Such elements of 
governance include contractual arrangements that generate incentives, share risks, 
provide adaptations, distribute information and allocate authority. Broadly, these 
theories associate different governance arrangements with the characteristics of the 
service or product being exchanged. 
The extent of specificity, uncertainty and information availability with respect to 
different services were ascertained by discussing and understanding the context of 
service provision for each service or group of services9. The people who can assess 
an elusive concept such as specificity are the people who know the services best 
and not the researcher. During the course of the case study, BP managers were 
9 Although various measurement instruments have been proposed in the literature (see Rindfleisch 
and Heide 1997), they tend to be specific to an industry or product, other than the IT services 
considered here. The development of such instruments would involve a completely different 
research design, which would not be suitable for capturing the breadth of scope and depth of detail 
aimed at in this case study. 
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taught the meaning of concepts such as specificity using examples and metaphors. 
They were then asked to assess (or debate if there were more than one managers 
present) the extent of specificity, uncertainty and information availability for 
different services, in comparative terms. The researcher facilitated the process of 
assessment or debate. Therefore, there was less need to seek detailed information 
for all services included in the contracts in order to conduct an `objective' 
measurement. The evaluation of service characteristics was done subjectively by the 
managers who were responsible for setting up and managing the outsourcing 
relationships. 
Since 1991, the BP Group in the UK has outsourced most of its Information 
Technology services. It is a rich showcase of diverse practices in contracting for IT 
services. Of course, it does not show all possible approaches. It is also not 
considered to be a representation of what companies generally do in practice. 
Finally, it is not an archetype of what should be done in practice. This means that 
the outcome of the case study (chapter 5) cannot be assumed to generalise to all 
kinds of IT services, to all possible governance alternatives or to all organisations. 
However, because of the diversity of BP practices and by virtue of the generality of 
the theories, the framework can be expected to be more generally applicablelo. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates some interesting findings in this respect but, clearly, more 
research is needed. 
The case study examined some perceptions of positive achievements and negative 
outcomes but it was too early to make firm judgements regarding the success or 
otherwise of any of the contracts. Any discussion of success or failure in the 
previous sections, is made with reference to particular governance mechanisms, 
such as the grief point system or end-user surveys. Besides, the purpose of the case 
was not to evaluate outsourcing decisions. 
10 BP managers expected the S-CAGE framework to be applicable to non-IT procurement as well 
and were interested in exploring this possibility. 
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The BP case was used as an instrument to bring economic theory and management 
practices in IT outsourcing closer together. This was a bi-directional process. First, 
the case material highlighted a number of important practical issues and generated 
a further understanding of them, beyond the second-hand knowledge received 
from the literature (chapter 1). In this way it was possible to maintain a wide reach 
on the economics literature (i. e. avoid focusing on one or two narrow streams of 
theory) and to use it effectively by emphasising those parts which were most 
pertinent to the practical issues raised. Second, the relevant theory was used to 
analyse the issues identified in practice and to generate structured 
recommendations. The S-CAGE framework presented in chapter 5 is an organising 
framework hosting this bi-directional process. It was born through this interactive 
case study to provide a common language for addressing a common problem from 
two different perspectives, the practitioner and the theoretical. 
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1. Introduction 
Practice 
The `Service Clustering and Governance Establishment' (S-CAGE) framework 
presented in this chapter is the principal contribution of the thesis. It emerges from 
the managerial insights of chapter 4 acquired through the theoretical lens of 
chapter 2. All the examples quoted in the rest of the chapter are drawn from the 
experience at BP. S-CAGE is oriented to both theory and practice. In particular, it is 
aimed at pulling together a broad range of theoretical contributions, at providing a 
basis for the study of Information Technology governance and at devising practical 
guidelines. 
The proposed S-CAGE framework is a re-synthesis of the theories examined in 
chapter 2 and of the empirical evidence from BP analysed in chapter 4. The 
empirical work at BP was used to bring forth and elaborate the relevance of the 
economic theories of chapter 2. The purpose of this theoretical background is 
threefold. First, to assess the empirical findings at BP using the theory as an external 
criterion and vice versa to assess the relevance of the theory in practice. Second, to 
establish the coherence of the framework on the basis of a single underlying 
thread. Third, to round out the arguments made by highlighting alternatives not 
directly observed at BP. Most of the arguments and claims in subsequent sections 
are illustrated with examples from the BP case. 
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The theoretical basis of the S-CAGE framework is the microanalytic approach 
developed in chapter 2, section 8.1. Specifically, it is founded on transaction cost 
economic arguments supplemented with insights from the theories of (i) agency, 
(ii) property rights, (iii) measurement, information and knowledge and (iv) culture, 
trust and reputation effects. Section 2 below builds up the theory behind the basic 
formulation of the framework. The main lessons learned about the governance of 
IT from a transaction cost perspective are outlined below. 
If service specificity, is higher than some threshold level (which may differ from 
one IT service to another), then external suppliers do not enjoy any advantages in 
terms of production costs over internal organisation. If service specificity is low, if 
the company can attain satisfactory resource utilisation and if the minimum 
efficient size of operations is achievable within the company, then it does not make 
a difference whether IT service(s) are provided internally or externally. The choice 
should depend on other considerations. 
If complete resource utilisation or the minimum efficient size of operations is not 
achievable within the company, then external procurement becomes preferable on 
production cost grounds. If, in contrast, high service specificity is combined with 
extensive uncertainty and if formal measurement and incentives are not 
efficacious, internal provision is advantageous on transaction and agency cost 
grounds. This trade-off requires a comparative assessment of the production and 
transaction costs involved. Governance structures in the middle range between 
pure markets and hierarchies provide various contractual and organisational 
instruments to cope with such conflicting requirements. 
There is one crucial decision parameter that is not dealt with exhaustively in this 
thesis. This is the bureaucratic inefficiency associated with internal service 
1 Service specificity is defined here as the extent to which a given IT service involves transaction- 
specific assets (Williamson 1985). 
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provision. When such costs are significant, internal organisation may not be 
superior in some of the cases described above. 
As far as scope economies are concerned, the mere existence of common resources 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for organising the provision of IT 
services within the firm (Teece 1980), since the same productive economies can be 
replicated by contractual agreement between independent companies. Joint 
production by the same company is preferred from an efficiency perspective when 
the shared resource is specialised. This is a transaction cost argument and will be 
further explored later on. Such conditions do appear in the case of IT services, as 
specialised skills on customer-specific systems and tacit organisational knowledge 
are always in demand. A counterexample is the computer, which is an indivisible 
asset that can run a variety of software simultaneously (therefore it can be shared) 
but in most instances is not specific to any customer. Companies can therefore 
write appropriate contracts to share one another's computer capacity (e. g. 
timesharing or reciprocal backup agreements for disaster recovery). In short, those 
shared resources which are specific are better organised internally (or, at least, 
under the same governance). 
The generally inconclusive considerations about the effect of scale, scope and 
transaction economies on the efficient organisation of IT, in conjunction with the 
diversity of actual contracts, point to the need for a closer and more detailed look at 
the relevant mechanisms. This chapter addresses a wide variety of such 
mechanisms directly, in an organised manner. The rest of the chapter starts with a 
brief overview of the proposed S-CAGE framework (section 2). The objective is to 
provide a concise picture of a number of interrelated issues, which are dealt with in 
more detail in subsequent sections. One section is then devoted to each of the two 
major components of the framework: the clustering of IT services into homogenous 
groups (section 3) and the design of each cluster's efficient governance (section 4). 
The chapter concludes (section 5) with a recapitulation of the rationale, the scope 
and the main elements of S-CAGE. 
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2. Overview of S-CAGE 
The provision of IT services is a compound and complex transaction which 
comprises a multiplicity of different services. For example, wide area network 
(WAN) provision is a commodity service with significant potential economies of 
scale as opposed to desktop support, which requires close contact with end users, 
and knowledge of the specific work environment. Moreover, individual IT services 
also consist of various tasks which need not be homogenous in terms of their 
economic properties and the respective implications for efficient organisation. 
Software development for example requires project management, analysis, 
requirements specification, design, coding, testing, documentation, installation and 
training. These tasks are not necessarily carried out by the same provider, whether 
it is an internal IT department or an external supplier. 
A central argument built into the S-CAGE framework is that IT service provision 
should not be viewed as a unitary exchange. Following the microanalytic research 
strategy defined in chapter 2 (section 8.1) it is necessary to unpack the bundle of 
goods and services exchanged within a single transaction (or contract) in order to 
assess their attributes in detail. For the purposes of this study, the unit of analysis is 
identified with the single IT service. This is the least divisible unit of IT activity. The 
next problem, of course, is at what level of refinement to define IT services. As 
discussed in section 4.1.1, IT services are defined endogenously in the process of 
devising the governance of IT. The basic argument of transaction cost economics, 
reinterpreted in this context, dictates that governance structures be aligned with 
the attributes of each service, assuming that IT services differ in their transaction 
cost characteristics. 
The general question asked is what institutional arrangements maximise the 
efficiency of IT governance, given the characteristics of the technology, the systems, 
the services and the markets. Again, the argument made in chapter 2 (section 8.1) 
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is that the number of actual governance structures is theoretically infinite, ranging 
on a continuum from pure spot markets to pure hierarchies (Figure 2.2). Figure 5.1 
replicates Figure 2.3 and depicts examples of governance structures as commonly 
known in IT, in the place of the generic governance types of Figure 2.2. Again, the 
labels commonly used, such as contracting out or outsourcing, specify ranges of 
possible structures on this continuum rather than unitary instances. 
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Figure 5.1 
The Governance Continuum with indicative IT contracts 
Internal IT departments may organise most IT provision in-house but have always 
had several procurement contracts for software, hardware, maintenance and 
training, to name but a few. Contrary to some widely held beliefs, total outsourcing 
contracts are positioned very close to internal organisation. Such transactions, 
whilst carried out in the market, involve sophisticated organisational 
arrangements, similar to those found in hierarchical firms. Off-the-shelf purchases 
of software and hardware are not pure spot market transactions since they usually 
involve guarantees, training and maintenance contracts. Nevertheless they are 
comparatively simple exchanges. Systems development contracts are usually 
positioned around the middle of the governance continuum. They fall into the 
general category of requirements contracting and involve significant monitoring 
and supervision by the customer. The hire of independent 
technicians/programmers or flexible fixed-term contracts is a case of inside 
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contracting: having someone work on a temporary basis under the internal control 
of the organisation but with a subcontracting rather than an employment contract. 
The underlying argument is for a bottom-up approach to the formation of IT 
governance, starting with the characteristics of IT services and the components of 
governance rather than a top-down choice of governance structure. 
The argument so far places emphasis on the match between the governance 
structure and each individual service. This argument alone sheds light on only one 
part of the problem. Taken at the extreme, each service should be organised 
separately. However, this is not always desirable or feasible because of technical 
interdependence, coordination costs, incentive inter-relationships and other 
inefficiencies. For example Help Desks are services related to many other IT assets 
and services. The same is also true for desktop support and LAN operations. The 
quality of many IT services depends on the quality of others. For example, 
electronic mail, groupware and EDI depend on network operations and support. 
Similarly, systems implementation depends on analysis and design. 
The above examples indicate that the optimisation of governance for each 
individual service is not adequate for the successful and effective' provision of all IT 
services. Specific governance provisions are needed for the co-ordination of service 
interdependencies. Service interdependence can be defined in terms of (i) 
technological indivisibilities and constraints, (ii) the existence of scope economies 
among services, (iii) the costs of managing many different governance structures 
(and possibly different suppliers), (iv) the costs related to the monitoring and 
incentive structures for associated tasks and (v) issues of skills and technical 
expertise. This argument emphasises synergies and coordination and taken to the 
extreme dictates the inclusion of all IT services under a single governance. 
The efficient governance of IT should match the technological, transactional and 
agency characteristics both of individual services and of their interrelationships. 
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This discussion leads to a trade-off between local and global optimisation. Local 
optimisation addresses the specialisation of governance structures to individual 
services by favouring separate governance structures for each service. Global 
optimisation swings towards unifying structures encompassing all services, in order 
to take advantage of synergies and to minimise the cost of coordinating them. 
A simultaneous consideration of local and global optimisation leads to the notion of 
clustering. IT services are grouped into clusters and each cluster of services is 
assigned a different governance structure. The governance structure includes the 
contract plus all those organisational structures and management processes needed 
to execute it effectively and efficiently. Therefore, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between clusters of services and contracts. 
In order to strike a balance between local and global optimisation, IT services 
should be allocated to clusters such that each cluster maximises both the fit 
between services and specialised governance mechanisms as well as the synergy 
between services. As shown in Figure 5.2 below, any number of clusters can be 
adopted, ranging from one cluster for each individual service (the theoretical 
extreme of local optimisation) to one cluster for all services (the theoretical extreme 
of global optimisation). Figure 5.2 also depicts the main benefits of one or the other 
extreme, namely specialisation and synergy respectively. The benefits of 
specialisation of governance mechanisms to the characteristics of services provide 
the rationale for a greater number of smaller clusters of services. Taking advantage 
of technical and organisational synergy requires fewer and larger clusters. Mixed 
strategies of relatively smaller and larger clusters populate the middle range. 
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Figure 5.2 
The Clustering Continuum and the main benefits of each extreme 
The trade-off between taking advantage of synergy among services and capturing the benefits of 
governance structures specialised to individual services leads to service clustering. The clustering 
ratio of the number of clusters C over the number of services S ranges between the two 
theoretical extremes of one cluster including all services (1/S) and each service forming a 
separate cluster (S/S). Synergy and specialisation are the respective benefits. 
The ratio of the number of clusters Cto the number of services Sis a measure of the 
clustering of IT provision and takes a value in the interval (34,1). The smaller the 
clustering ratio the greater the concentration of services to few clusters and the 
greater the clustering ratio the more fragmented is IT service provision into many 
service clusters. The two extreme points are theoretical. C> 1 since, for example, 
companies never make their own hardware. Total fragmentation is clearly 
inefficient besides the fact that services are anyway compound and not unitary. 
Hence C<S and < 1. 
This fundamental trade-off between local and global optimisation in IT governance 
constitutes the rationale behind the proposed `Service Clustering and Governance 
Establishment' (S-CAGE) framework (Figure 5.3) which encompasses both notions 
of the governance continuum and of the clustering continuum. 
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Figure 5.3 
IT Service Clustering and Governance Establishment (S-CAGE) 
IT services are allocated into clusters. Each cluster is assigned one governance structure 
(contract). Governance mechanisms are specialised to the services of each cluster. Each contract 
is entered into with a (possibly different) supplier. 
The set of Information Technology services is split into a number of clusters, each 
of which is assigned a different governance structure (contract) and possibly a 
different supplier. The greater the number of clusters, the closer the match between 
the characteristics of individual services and the associated governance (local 
optimisation) and greater the cost of management and coordination between 
service clusters. The fewer the clusters, the easier management and coordination 
between clusters (global optimisation) but certain individual services may be 
inefficiently organised. 
Clustering is not a new idea. Companies have always been bundling IT services and 
projects in different ways and assigning them to different internal or external 
providers (see chapter 1, section 6). Moreover, the idea of service clustering is 
consistent with early arguments that `you cannot outsource everything' (Huber 
1993) and with the notion of `selective outsourcing' introduced by Lacity and 
Hirschheim (1995) and Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny (1995). The proposed 
clustering and governance establishment scheme, however, is more structured and 
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general, encompassing the whole range of possibilities. It is also substantiated using 
established theoretical arguments from a range of economic theories. 
The S-CAGE framework of Figure 5.3 is a conceptual and not a process model. The 
arrows do not imply a linear time-line along which services are first clustered and 
the governance is then set up. As discussed in the rest of this chapter, the clustering 
strategy depends almost entirely on governance considerations and vice versa. 
Implementing S-CAGE in practice is a different matter altogether. The purpose at 
this stage is to provide an organised and clear set of conceptual distinctions 
encapsulating both theoretical insights and empirical considerations. 
Plainly, the elements of governance for each cluster will also depend on the choice 
of service provider (whether it is an internal department or an external supplier), 
its productive capacities, costs, market reputation and so on, as depicted in Figure 
5.3. However, problems pertaining to bidding processes and provider selection are 
out of the scope of this thesis (see for example Rosenthal et al 1995, Nam et al 
1995). 
3. Service Clustering 
As mentioned earlier, service clustering may result in any pattern on the theoretical 
continuum between a single cluster encapsulating all services and as many clusters 
as IT services (each service being organised independently). To decide on the 
number of clusters and to allocate services into them, a number of criteria need to 
be taken into account. These are drawn from the elements of governance set out in 
section 4. One way of deciding on service clustering is to start by considering all 
services as one cluster and gradually examine reasons for separating different 
services. This approach emphasises the need to economise on the costs of 
coordinating different service contracts and to take into consideration 
complementarities and inter-dependencies among services. The main reasons for 
separating services are listed below. 
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1. Other things being equal, services for which specialist suppliers achieve 
significant economies of scale should be separated and allocated to the most 
efficient providers. This is the traditional microeconomic argument. 
Telecommunications and wide-area networks are typical examples. The selection 
of the three suppliers by BP Exploration reflects such an approach that 
emphasises specialisation. Telecommunications were assigned to Syncordia (a 
telecom operator), specialist applications were assigned to SAIC (which has a 
record of experience in such applications) and commercial applications and 
services (e. g. data centres and help desks) were assigned to SEMA. 
2. Related to the above, if a given service cluster is too diverse for the skills and 
capabilities of any existing providers, it may have to be split to match what is 
available in the market. The same applies even when the main candidate is the 
internal IT department. A company may decide that they cannot sustain skills in 
certain areas. The respective services may have to be separated. Alternatively, 
main contractors are often asked to employ third party subcontractors for 
equipment and services that are not offered by them. For example, BP expects 
SEMA and SAIC to hire `best in class' subcontractors and retains the right to 
intervene in the selection of those third parties. One potential problem with this 
approach is that the client organisation loses control over the costs and 
performance of the third party, since it does not control the respective contract. 
3. If one service is distinguished in terms of the customer-specific investments it 
requires, it may be worth separating it in order to reduce dependence on a single 
provider (in other words, to reduce the amount of appropriable quasi-rents 
available to any single supplier). If more than one services share the same kind 
of asset specificity (e. g. skills), they should be clustered together. This derives 
from the main results of the theory of property rights (see chapter 2, section 5, 
paragraph 4). BP Oil insisted on keeping the European Systems Project under 
internal control during development in order to control and protect the business 
specific knowledge it required. Once it was complete, they outsourced its support 
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by commercialising it in order to achieve cost savings (see chapter 4, section 3, 
paragraph 4). 
4. Services provided continuously or frequently (e. g. network operations and help 
desks) may be separated from those provided only once or rarely (such as new 
systems development) for the same reasons as above. One obvious advantage of 
separating continuous from one-off services is that it induces competition via the 
bidding process. The downside is that the process of bidding is costly for all 
parties and incumbent suppliers usually have an advantage. Otherwise, long 
term and project-based contracts are markedly different and there are 
transaction cost efficiencies to be gained from writing separate contracts. See the 
discussion on frequency as a dimension of transactions in chapter 2, section 3.2, 
paragraph 2. BP did not make such separation on a large scale. Once the call-off 
contracts were in place, the incumbent supplier was preferred for any additional 
or one-off work (see discussions on work out of the scope of the contract in 
chapter 4). In some respects this is the objective of some outsourcing contracts, 
to economise on the transaction costs of selecting suppliers and contracting for 
every task. 
5. If greater effort in one service improves the performance of another, then they 
should be clustered together as the contractor is better motivated by undertaking 
both. In reverse, if the performance of two services is negatively correlated, they 
should be assigned to different providers. An example of the first case is software 
design and coding; design is difficult and time consuming but good design can 
substantially improve the quality and efficiency of coding. An example of the 
second case is requirements specification and development: a provider expecting 
to undertake subsequent development is likely to manipulate requirements so as 
to maximise his future gains from development (e. g. promote his own 
capabilities or products while not necessarily serving the customer) 2. Some BP 
managers raised the concern that SEMA wanted to 'do things their own way', 
2 See mathematical principal-agent theory, chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraph 9. 
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without necessarily taking into account all of BP's interests (see, for example, 
chapter 4, section 8, last paragraph). 
6. If the performance of each of two services cannot be monitored equally well 
then under certain conditions they should be kept in separate clusters, because 
the contractor will place significantly less effort on the service that cannot be as 
well monitored. This is a result that derives from theory and was also observed at 
BP. Partner resource managers suggested that one of the drawbacks of the grief 
point system was that SEMA emphasised the measured targets and ignored 
others. 
Clearly, the above criteria and the benefits of keeping services together may pose 
conflicting requirements for clustering so that a second-best solution is 
unavoidable. The resolution of these trade-offs is case-specific. For example, BP 
Exploration set an a priori aim to cluster all services together in order to achieve 
seamless service provision. On the other hand, BP Oil was more sceptical of this 
approach and proceeded in a more incremental fashion. In effect, most service 
clusters (call-off contracts) were determined on the basis of a common site rather 
than the intrinsic characteristics of services. Chapter 6 discusses some evidence of 
separating services on the basis of their characteristics. 
4. The Governance of Service Clusters 
The governance structure of IT service provision can be conceptualised as 
comprising three interlinked layers, as in Figure 5.4, which is essentially zooming 
into part of Figure 5.3. The three layers have been derived from the case study at BP 
as a conceptual classification of the constituent parts of governance. Specifically, 
contracts and other documents were examined in detail, while various 
management practices pertaining to the structuring and management of the 
contracts were repeatedly discussed. A variety of sections and clauses were 
observed in contracts and a diversity of ways of structuring contractual provisions 
were encountered. In addition to documented material, the rationale behind 
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contractual choices and the management processes through which contracts were 
set up and subsequently managed, were debated with management. The three 
layers shown in Figure 5.4 are a classification scheme of the elements of 
governance (which includes contractual provisions and associated management 
structures and processes) that were observed at BP (see chapter 4, section 2). 
As also mentioned in chapters 3,4 and the beginning of the present chapter, the 
whole process was constantly informed by theory. The theories reviewed in chapter 
2 moderated the process of understanding and classifying empirical evidence, 
hence they influenced the choice and formulation of the three layers. Incidentally, 
as it turned out after the S-CAGE framework was formed, in his seminal article 
Jensen (1983) proposes a three-part taxonomy to characterise organisations, nearly 
identical to the three layers of Figure 5.4. In that article, Jensen reviews agency and 
related theories in an attempt to appraise contemporary theoretical developments 
and suggest further directions in theory development and methodology. Jensen sees 
organisations as complex systems comprising three subsystems: the performance 
measurement and evaluation subsystem, the reward and punishment subsystem 
and the subsystem for partitioning and assigning decision rights among 
participants in the organisation (p. 325). It becomes obvious below that these 
subsystems are nearly identical to the three layers of governance proposed here, 
namely assurance of service delivery, incentives for service level attainment and 
organisation and management of service provision respectively. 
Jensen's scope of enquiry encompasses whole organisations whereas the present 
analysis is confined to the provision of IT services. However, the provision of IT 
services requires a set of organisational structures, management processes and 
contractual provisions (governance structures) which are part of the broader 
organisation and which are amenable to the same theoretical investigation as 
whole organisations. Although the three layers of governance proposed in this 
thesis were derived on the basis of empirical findings at BP, the similarity with 
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Jensen's classification is not surprising since the same theoretical background 
informed both schemas. 
Each layer of governance is subsequently broken down into three parts that form 
the headings of the sections further in this chapter. These subsections were devised 
in the same way as the three main layers (from the contract evidence at BP) and 
serve to classify the elements comprising each layer as well as to clarify their 
exposition. The Assurance of Service Delivery layer entails (i) service specification, 
(ii) service level requirements specification and (iii) service level measurement and 
verification. The Incentives for Service Level Attainment layer involves 
implementing and enforcing service level requirements (i. e. the bottom level) with 
the use of (i) implicit incentive patterns, (ii) contractual reward/penalty devices, 
and (iii) other organisational and contractual safeguards. The Organisation and 
Management of Service Provision layer refers to the overall organisational context 
in which IT service provision is carried out and includes (i) roles and 
responsibilities, (ii) coordination and communication mechanisms and the (iii) 
locus and scope of decision making. 
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Figure 5.4 
The governance of IT service clusters as a layered system. 
This layered concept is a framework for organising and categorising the various elements of IT 
governance. It emphasises both the hierarchical and the enveloping relation between the three 
layers as well as their direct correspondence with the attributes of the services they attend toi. 
The governance design and decision problems at each layer depend to a greater or 
lesser extent on elements of other layers. For example, organisational structures 
(top layer) operate in conjunction with incentive systems (middle layer) which are 
tightly coupled with performance measurement and verification procedures 
(bottom layer). The latter are in turn contingent upon the nature of each system or 
service within the cluster (service specification). The framework of Figure 5.4 is 
conceptual and the positioning of the three layers represents their hierarchical and 
enveloping relation to each other and not a process for devising governance 
structures. Imposing a linear sequence on the various decision problems of each 
layer as described below is not straightforward and would inhibit the concise and 
3 The resemblance of this diagram to a birdcage, or, in this case, a service cage has inspired the 
acronym S-CAGE. To some managers at BP it reminded of a sunrise, arguably a more optimistic 
viewpoint! 
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integrative exposition aimed at in this chapter. This layered exposition serves as an 
organising framework of the relevant parameters that need to be taken into 
account. 
The elements of each layer are derived from the contracts studied at BP (chapter 4). 
The process of derivation was informed by the theories reviewed in chapter 2. 
Table 5.1 below summarises which parts of these theories are drawn into each 
layer. The rows of the table correspond to the three layers of governance (Figure 
5.4). Each governance layer is broken down into three components, further 
refining what each layer entails, as mentioned above. Each component corresponds 
to a subsection in the rest of the chapter. The columns of the table correspond to the 
headings of sections 3 to 7 in chapter 2, i. e. the theories forming the background of 
the S-CAGE framework. The cells in the middle of the table indicate what part of 
each theory informs each (sub-) layer of governance. Grey cells indicate no or 
negligible relation. More refined references to the relevant theories are made as 
each layer and sub-layer is explained in the sections that follow. 
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Table 5.1 
The three layers of governance and the corresponding insights from the theories 
reviewed in chapter 2. 
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4.1. Assurance of service deUvery 
The purpose of this layer is to provide a specification of the boundaries of the 
services and their interdependencies, a characterisation of their economic attributes 
and the necessary performance measures and targets. In particular, the purpose 
here is to understand the nature of services in order to complete the groundwork 
needed for designing governance structures and mechanisms. This is achieved first 
by delineating the nature and scope of each service, second by specifying the 
required performance targets for each service and third by establishing ways of 
measuring and verifying realised performance. 
4.1.1. Service specification 
Proper service specification ensures that customers/users get what they need and 
ask for, achieve the desired level and quality of services, manage service provision 
and get the service provider to commit to specific deliverables. 
IT services are not necessarily standard and uniform across companies, nor even 
across business units within the same company. What is important in any case is to 
specify each service in a manner relevant to user strategies, perceptions and 
requirements. Service specification can include either what must be delivered 
or/and how it must be provided. Defining what a service is to provide entails 
specifying the aims and the scope of serving the respective business functions, 
operations or processes. Apart from the aim and scope of a service, a company may 
wish to specify elements such as particular equipment or software, site-specific 
information and other detailed conditions, which relate more to how the service is 
provided rather than to what it must deliver. For example, network operations can 
be specified as the provision of a certain level of network availability, reliability, 
speed and security (what). Alternatively or simultaneously, it can be specified that a 
given number of people with particular skills will operate the pre-specified 
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equipment in a particular way (how). The distinction is between contracting for 
input or output4. 
There are four factors that must be considered when deciding between the two 
specification strategies. First, the determination of the material conditions of service 
provision (how), to great lengths, increases the control as well as the accountability 
of the client organisation over service delivery. This was explicitly recognised my 
management at BE It may also inhibit adjustments and improvements over time as 
these would require contract renegotiation whereas a contract based on expected 
business services (what) is independent of the technological conditions of providing 
the service, which may change over time (see footnote 7). Second, if a company 
specifies only the aim, scope and success factors of the service (what), it delegates 
all responsibility to the service provider but also gives away more control of the 
service. Third, the risk associated with such decisions is usually borne by the party 
who makes the decision (see footnote 4). Finally, the feasibility and efficacy of 
performance measurement may constrain what can and cannot be specified5. 
4 The basic informational properties of contracting for input and/or output are discussed as early as 
in the third paragraph of chapter 2. An equivalent argument is constructed in terms of the 
uncertainty involved in the provision of given services and the risk attitudes of supplier and 
customer (see chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraphs 3-4). The ability to ascertain whether a bad outcome 
is due to bad luck or little effort (when contracting is based on output performance) affects the 
efficacy of reputation mechanisms (see chapter 2, section 7, paragraph 9). With respect to positive 
agency theory (chapter 2, section 4.2, paragraph 4), contracting for inputs (how) relegates 
responsibility for decision making to the customer and responsibility for implementation to the 
supplier. Conversely, contracting for output (what) relegates responsibility for both decision making 
and implementation to the supplier. 
5 This is the main issue discussed in chapter 2, section 6, paragraph 1. Measurement problems are 
one of the causes of the incompleteness of contracting (chapter 2, section 3.1, paragraph 2, also 
section 5, end of paragraph 1) and a constituent part of secondary uncertainty (chapter 2, section 3.2, 
paragraph 3). The cost or efficacy of monitoring input or measuring output may also determine to 
some extent whether the contract is based on input (how) or output (what) and how risk and 
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BP recognised the desirability of emphasising the business aspect (what) of services 
but found it unavoidable in many instances to specify technical resources (how). 
See, for example, the opinion of BP America's VC of Operations and the initial 
intentions of BPX in chapter 4, section 4, paragraphs 5 and 6. BP America's VC of 
Operations emphasised the need to identify the necessary skills and the amount of 
involvement required (i. e. inputs) for the management of each service, whether it is 
provided internally or it is outsourced. As mentioned later in the same section, the 
top-level vision for IT in BPX emphasised the `demand side' as opposed to the 
`supply side'. 
Nonetheless, they were aware of the implications mentioned above. BP call-off 
contracts variably specify inputs and outputs for each service or system. Input 
specifications include, among others, descriptions of the service (which may 
include specific software and hardware), interfaces with other systems, specific 
responsibilities and level of effort in person-hours for each task or skill-set 
involved. In addition, the charging and billing section of the contract often specifies 
specific budgets for particular activities (an additional measure to control inputs in 
cost-plus contracts). Output specifications include the scope of the service, who the 
users are, business criticality of various components of the service and service level 
targets. The two kinds of specifications are usually not separated in the contract. 
See chapter 4, section 7, paragraphs 4 and 10. 
In identifying individual services, it is also important to take into account their 
inter-dependencies and complementarities6. There are many examples of service 
residual claims are allocated (see chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraph 4 and related comments in 
footnote 4). 
6 Inter-relationships between tasks have repercussions for incentives and therefore for the allocation 
of tasks to agents. This issue is explained in chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraph 9. Inter-relationships 
between IT systems and services may give rise to the condition of asset complementarity, in which 
case residual rights of control for both assets should be allocated to the same party. See chapter 2, 
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inter-dependence, especially between end user applications and infrastructure 
systems. Database availability for example depends on both the availability of the 
server or host as well as on the availability of the network. Help desks are related to 
most other services, e-mail depends on LAN and WAN support and so on. Of 
course, all IT services are ultimately related in some way. However, an 
understanding of all inter-relationships is useful in pinpointing those that matter. 
The contracts at BP did not explicitly address issues of inter-relationships between 
IT systems and services, although wherever applicable the interfaces of a given 
system or application were clearly stated. However, in discussion with managers at 
BP Oil it became evident that this was an issue of concern to them. Specifically, the 
issue of identifying the fault and the party responsible when a problem arose was a 
significant burden to them and a strong argument for total outsourcing. This 
highlights the systemic nature of IT service provision (see footnote 6). 
Time is another parameter of IT service specifications. Services may change over 
time due to at least three influences. First, user requirements and technologies 
change regularly. Second, the evolving conditions of the IT supply industry also 
determine to some extent the shape of IT services. Third, service contracts are being 
evaluated and reviewed. For instance, if poor service quality and high costs prove to 
be due to inappropriate service specification, the latter would then have to be 
revised. Therefore, service specifications need to be reviewed on a regular basis and 
provisions for this may have to be made both in the contract and in terms of 
appropriate organisation and management processes to carry out the reviews (see 
section 5, paragraph 4. Complementary IT systems and services effectively give rise to a situation of 
team organisation where the inputs ('team members') are a combination of different kinds of 
equipment and human skills. The joint output is more than the sum of its parts. Identifying such 
relationships in conjunction with the cost and efficacy of measuring the marginal contribution of 
each input has implications for the feasibility of different forms of organisation. See chapter 2, 
section 6, paragraphs 2 and 3. 
206 
Chapter Five: Service Clustering and Governance Establishment (S-CAGE) 
section 4.3 further below)7. Provisions for changing service specifications over time 
depend on the broader governance context. 
BP management found that moving from legacy mainframe systems to a client- 
server architecture is an important shift although it may not be wholly visible to the 
end-user. This shift also changes the economics of the contract if, for example, the 
outsourcer is responsible only for the servers and not for the desktops (clients). 
Running a data centre generates significant value to the supplier, whereas 
maintaining servers is relatively small business since value is now generated at the 
desktops. This is another case where service interdependence proves critical. 
BP agreed with its suppliers an initial period of testing and fine-tuning 
performance measures, targets and incentive mechanisms before enforcing 
rewards and penalties or additional charges (see chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraph 
5). This can be interpreted as a response to the need for ex post efficient adaptation 
while avoiding adverse incentive effects (see footnote 7). BP contracts also instituted 
formal procedures for handling Service Amendment Requests (SARs) from users. 
Moreover, for each system/service, the contracts prescribe particular change 
7 Contractual provisions create a self-enforcing range wherein contingencies are dealt with 
efficiently and effectively. Contingencies outside the self-enforcing range create opportunities for 
haggling and hold-ups. Additional management processes and decision making authorities need to 
be in place in order to deal with such situations and to revise contractual provisions. See chapter 2, 
section 1, paragraph 13. Adaptability to changing or unexpected circumstances is the main 
advantage of relationality in contracting (chapter 2, section 2.1) and of the legal regime governing 
internal organisation (chapter 2, section 2.2). The need to forego contractual promises when 
unexpected or changing circumstances require so, is the essence of the condition of imperfect 
commitment which permeates all theories reviewed in chapter 2 except mathematical principal 
agent theory (see chapter 2, section 4, paragraphs 1 and 4 and section 4.1, paragraph 2). However, 
there are merits to persistent, even if inefficient, commitment as uncontrolled adaptation may cause 
greater inefficiency due to adverse incentive effects. See the discussion on the ratchet effect in 
chapter 2, section 4.2, paragraph 6 and the economic theory of culture in chapter 2, section 7, 
paragraph 4.. 
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control procedures for handling SARs specific to the given service. In most cases, 
the contracts require the supplier to introduce revised change control procedures 
for each system/service. See chapter 4, section 7, paragraphs 8-9. 
Service specification is largely subjective. It is a matter of how the users, the IT 
function and the general management want to perceive the purpose of each 
service. For example, help desks and voice telecommunications are closer and more 
visible to the users. Database support and back-ups on the other hand are more 
technically oriented services although the ultimate goal is always to satisfy end 
customer needs. Many parties within an organisation are likely to have a stake in 
the specification of each service and their interests are likely to diverge or even 
conflict. Service specifications may be stretched to cover all different perceptions. 
However, for purposes of contract clarity, efficiency and enforceability, it may be 
preferable to agree on a narrow and well-demarcated specification. Otherwise 
transaction costs will rise significantly: specifying, writing, monitoring and 
enforcing an explicit or implicit contract for broadly specified services will be very 
costly. In practice, it will be difficult for the supplier to 'serve many masters' and for 
the customer(s) to assess performance. This is not to say, of course, that important 
facets of a service should not be included in its specification. 
BP call-off contracts typically specify who the users are and who the relevant 
contacts from the supplier's side are for each system/service. This and other similar 
measures to communicate the new structures were taken to instil confidence to BP 
users as to who their IT suppliers would be. User considerations informed output 
specifications (what) whereas technical and financial considerations informed 
input specifications (how). However, a supplier site manager raised a concern that 
coordination structures created too many interfaces between BP and the supplier. 
The latter effectively had to serve too many masters with often conflicting requests 
at the same site. See chapter 4, section 7.2, last paragraph. This also points to the 
fact that contractual relationships do not rely exclusively on static documents (i. e. 
the contract) but are continuously adaptive processes through which users and 
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providers constantly 'negotiate' their exchange. This is one important aspect of 
relational contracting (see chapter 2, section 2.1, paragraph 4). 
Service specification should, finally, include several characteristics including the 
degree and desirability of existing asset specificity, the level of demand and its 
variations over time (as an indication of resource utilisation), the robustness and 
maturity of the technology (as one indication of uncertainty), the minimum 
efficient size of operations (potential scale economies) and resources shared with 
other services (potential scope economies) 8. Clearly identifying and estimating these 
characteristics is a major task and it may even be impossible or too costly in 
practice. Practical difficulties aside, it is important to generate some relevant 
indicators, either absolute (concerning individual services) or relative (comparative 
service ranking). 
BP did not consider these issues explicitly for individual systems and services. The 
general strategic mandate at BPX was, implicitly, that these parameters were such 
that total outsourcing was the preferred option. In discussions with managers, 
however, it became apparent that opinions diverged. BP Oil certainly preferred a 
more incremental approach, in recognition, again implicitly, of the varying 
constraints posed by these parameters. Having said that, they extensively referred to 
the notion of the `maturity' of a technology or service, to signify the uncertainty 
associated with it, the extent to which it is become a commodity service or not 
and/or the extent to which they felt a fairly discrete (hands-off) contract for that 
service would be efficacious. This directly related to their perception of the ease of 
specifying performance measures and of their effectiveness. See chapter 4, section 
7.1, paragraph 15. 
8 These are the basic parameters determining production and transaction costs. See also chapter 2, 
section 3.2. 
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At the first presentation I made to a group of senior IT and business managers from 
BPX and BPO, I tried to explain, among other things, the concept of asset specificity 
in fairly general and intuitive terms. Whereas most of them never quite mastered 
the pronunciation of the term, once they grasped the concept, they kept using it 
regularly even after I had completed the case study. The acceptance of specificity in 
regular discussions about organising IT (as well as other things such as oil rigs and 
convenience stores at petrol stations) testifies to the power of the concept, despite 
accusations of it being elusive and tautological (see chapter 2, section 8.1, 
paragraph 15). 
To summarise, the elements of governance highlighted in this sub-layer include the 
specification of services in terms of input or output, the interdependence and 
complementarity among IT services, the need for adaptations on contractual 
requirements and the multifaceted characteristics of services. The strategic 
direction of BPX was to concentrate on demand management, rather than supply 
management. However, managers throughout the Group were sceptical as to the 
possibility of ignoring technical issues (input specifications). The structure of 
contracts shows that this was not possible. 
The outsourcing exercise at BP also called for seamless service provision, 
emphasising the need to avoid the burden of coordinating different services and 
different suppliers. They took several measures in this directions but were not able 
to satisfy their aim completely. Of particular concern to BP management was the 
need for flexibility in IT contracts. They had already experienced difficulties in 
getting out of inflexible contracts when the technology improved or the business 
changed. BP managers were also implicitly aware of the different characteristics of 
IT systems and services that facilitate the implementation of different kinds of 
contracts. However, their only operationalisation was a poorly defined notion of 
maturity. All these issues are examined above in a systematic manner by analysing 
the contractual evidence at BP and by drawing on existing relevant theories. 
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4.1.2. Service level requirements specification 
While service specifications circumscribe the business and/or technical purposes 
served, service level requirements (SLR), the quantity and quality to be delivered, 
constitute the operationalisation of these purposes. From a contractual perspective, 
service level requirements specify the objectives that the provider (internal or 
external) is contractually (formally or informally) bound to meet. They therefore 
constitute the central component of the contract and as such have an impact on the 
costs of contracting and consequently on the form of governance. 
SLRs comprise two, often indistinguishable, components: the metric or measure and 
the respective target value. For example, a metric for PC support in one of BP's 
contracts is "response to severe problems' and the target "Only one problem can 
take longer than 30 minutes to fix or refer to the supplier in any calendar month if 
there are 20 calls or less, or two if there are more than 20 calls". See chapter 4, 
section 7.1, paragraph 2. 
SLR metrics and targets can be described in either business (e. g. percentage of 
successful video conferences) or technical (e. g. database hours or person-hours) 
terms, or both. The distinction is parallel to the aforementioned trade-off between 
specifying what a service does and how it does it and therefore SLRs partly depend 
on, as well as determine service specifications. More specifically, business oriented 
SLRs ensure that end-users receive the required service by passing the full 
responsibility of accomplishing it to the provider. The pitfall is that such metrics are 
susceptible to changes in the business and the user requirements. With technically 
oriented SLRs the customer/user needs to maintain adequate technical knowledge 
in order to set and monitor the requirement. The customer/user is also held 
responsible for the particular choice. On the positive side, technically oriented 
requirements secure the availability of certain resources and/or procedures in the 
event of contingencies or business changes. Moreover, if there are several technical 
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alternatives for a given service, technical requirements are a means of cost control. 
See footnote 4 above. 
Although BP wanted to separate IT provision as a business service from technology 
management (as mentioned in the previous section), they faced serious difficulties 
in the process of defining service level requirements. Moreover, they explicitly 
recognised the above mentioned implications of setting business oriented or 
technology oriented SLRs. See chapter 4, section 7, paragraph 10 and section 8, 
paragraph 7. 
The efficacy of service level requirements can be assessed on the basis of two 
criteria, namely, completeness and precision. Completeness characterises the extent 
to which a service level requirement covers all aspects of intended performance. 
Service level requirements for each service need to be as complete as possible 
because even minor omissions may lead to very low overall service performance. 
On this matter, managers at BP often quoted the case of voice services as example. 
Specifying that 90% of all incoming calls must be answered within 5 seconds is not 
enough if there is no provision for the remaining 10%, which may in practice 
never be answered. Precision describes the extent to which a given SLR is an 
accurate and unambiguous measure of actual performance. For instance, user 
satisfaction surveys for measuring vendor performance in desktop support, are 
highly imprecise because user satisfaction depends on many factors outside the 
vendor's control and because the process is subject to various sources of bias. In 
contrast, network downtime can be measured with perfect precision9. 
9 The role of completeness and precision in SLRs is to control uncertainty resulting from 
measurement problems (chapter 2, section 3.2, paragraph 3), to alleviate information asymmetry and 
hence, to contain opportunism (chapter 2, section 3.1, paragraph 3 and section 4, paragraph 4) and to 
support the operation of incentives by focussing the attention of the supplier to the right aspects of 
performance. 
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Discussions with managers at BP highlighted the limitations and gaps in service 
level requirements. They considered their service level agreements to be good and 
the grief point system to be important. However, they did not hesitate to emphasise 
the fact that gaps remained in the specification of metrics and in the grief point 
system and that SEMA was able to exploit such gaps by sticking to the letter of the 
contract. Near the end of the case study, BP started an effort to introduce broader 
(i. e. more complete) metrics addressing the overall quality of service (as opposed to 
measuring narrow performance indicators) to remedy the problem. See chapter 4, 
section 7.1, paragraphs 10 and 17 and section 8, paragraph 8. These observations 
lead, first, to the notions of completeness and precision as the defining qualities of 
service level requirements and, second, to the notion of the lifecycle of service level 
requirements explained below. 
Further repercussions of failing to specify complete and precise service level 
requirements accrue from service inter-dependence. Inasmuch as service level 
requirements are the basis of incentives that affect the provider's performance, 
poor performance due to poorly specified service level requirements on one service 
may have knock-on effects on other related services. For example, no matter how 
well the metrics of all services are defined, if the metrics for network operations are 
incomplete, resulting in low performance, the whole IT service provision will be ti 
affected (see footnote 6 above). Management at BP were particularly aware of this 
and made explicit contractual provisions to allocate responsibility for faults 
between different vendors (see chapter 4, section 8, paragraph 10). 
In general, IT services have various facets (functions), for each of which, a set of 
appropriate service level requirements can be devised. For example, facets of help 
desk services in one of BP's contracts include solving problems quickly, keeping the 
customer informed of the progress made, referring problems to the groups 
responsible for complementary services, etc. For each of these facets, appropriate 
SLRs must be specified as completely and as precisely as possible. Completeness is 
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therefore achieved by taking account of all facets of a service and by avoiding 
loopholes in specifying service level targets. 
Maximising the completeness and precision of service level requirements may not 
be cost effective in practice. Technical complications and measurement difficulties 
of various kinds may inhibit the achievement of perfect completeness and 
precision. User satisfaction surveys are an obviously desirable performance 
measurement instrument but it is difficult to base incentive payments on it due to 
the biases mentioned above. Air BP actually implemented such an incentive but it 
was not considered particularly effective. Other parts of BP did not attempt it (see 
chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraphs 11 and 15). In addition, the process of 
administering such surveys is too costly to be carried out on a frequent basis, since 
it requires the time and effort of many individuals. The number of successful 
videoconferences is a potentially easy to measure (and possibly to verify) metric. 
However, `success' must be defined in the contract. These examples demonstrate 
that the development of service level requirements involves costs of various kinds. 
The different kinds of costs involved can be understood on the basis of a lifecycle of 
SLR development. This lifecycle emerged during the case study as a useful tool for 
debate on devising and assessing SLRs (see ch4, section 2, paragraph 13). 
4.1.2.1. Lifecycle of service level requirements 
It is useful to conceptualise the development of service level requirements as a 
lifecycle (Figure 5.5). Each stage poses varying difficulties. For example, user 
surveys are easily identified as being useful, but are more difficult to specify in 
detail, to write a contract for and to implement. In contrast, system response times 
are relatively more easily developed throughout the lifecycle. 
The first step (identification) is the selection of desirable and feasible metrics for 
each service. This process involves either choosing among commonly used metrics 
or designing novel ones, or both. Some desirability criteria are relevance (is it 
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informative of the performance of the service or of its contribution to the business? ) 
and necessity/usefulness (does it measure an important or critical aspect of the 
service? - does it really have to be measured? ). 
IDENTIFICATION 
I SPECIFICATION 
REQUISITION 
IMPLEMENTATION 
` EVALUATION 
ADAPTATION 
------------------ 
Figure 5.5 
Lifecycle of Service Level Requirements 
The need for a service level requirement is first identified and defined (Identification). The 
associated performance targets are then specified (Specification). SLRs are then negotiated, 
included in the contract (Requisition) and implemented during contract execution 
(Implementation). At the same time they are also evaluated, whether explicitly or implicitly, so 
that weaknesses and gaps may surface (Evaluation). Appropriate measures are then taken to adapt 
existing SLR metrics and targets or to introduce new ones (Adaptation). This is an iterative 
process throughout the life of a service. 
Potential service level requirements can also be judged against their feasibility and 
cost of development through the rest of the lifecycle (ease of specification, ease of 
requisition and ease of implementation). 
In the case of desktop support in one of BP's contracts, for example, one metric 
related to service quality is the availability of adequate skills to advise users. This 
metric is certainly desirable (relevant and necessary) but it might be difficult to 
specify in advance exactly what these skills have to be and how their availability 
should be ensured, given the prospect of changing desktop applications or systems 
over time. BP implemented this metric, being aware of the fact that they would 
have to revise it regularly. 
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Having selected the metrics that are going to be used for a particular service, their 
target values have to be determined (specification stage). This may involve 
benchmarking existing service levels and specifying the required level and/or a 
plan for improving it. BP business units employed various tactics in specifying 
performance targets. See chapter 4, section 6, paragraph 3 and section 7, 
paragraph 8. The means of measuring and verifying the set target should also be 
specified. In the case of help desks, for example, response times are often specified 
contingent on ranges of demand levels. Unquantifiable metrics are verified by 
administering user surveys, whereas more tangible ones are directly measured. BP 
(see chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraphs 4 to 6) employed various combinations of 
such approaches, with a view to carrying out effective performance monitoring 
while minimising the costs of doing so. 
Setting targets for existing services is relatively easy as compared to new, especially 
innovative, services (e. g. if there is no or little relevant experience in the industry). 
This process is even more problematic with client-specific services, since by 
definition there is little or no similar experience in the market. In the absence of 
comparable measures for specifying service level targets, more emphasis might be 
placed on serving the business requirements. 
The next stage (requisition) corresponds to the actual inclusion of service level 
requirements in the contract. The contract may be formal or informal, explicit or 
implicit. In any case, the company and the service provider (whether this is an 
employee or another company) will probably have to negotiate over the terms of 
the introduction and enforcement of each metric. This is also the stage when 
contractual technicalities are resolved. 
A service provider would not be willing to contract for service level requirements 
that specify unachievable targets and would attempt to negotiate. Moreover, a 
service provider would not accept full responsibility for less tangible and 
objectively verifiable metrics such as user satisfaction, which are influenced by a 
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variety of factors, including influence activities and opportunistic manipulation of 
information. 
The first three stages (identification, specification and requisition) are often 
indistinguishable in practice, as they are resolved simultaneously through 
negotiations with the provider. Even so, this conceptual distinction helps to 
highlight important aspects of the desirability and costs of SLR development. 
During contract execution (implementation) IT services are actually being 
delivered and performance is realised, measured and verified. Service level 
requirements are implemented and simultaneously evaluated (fifth stage). While 
the service is being delivered and the metrics implemented, various pitfalls in the 
original specifications and targets may appear. Quite often unanticipated side- 
effects distort initial intentions. 
For this reason, problem monitoring and reporting procedures are established that 
extent beyond the measurement of the set performance metrics. The rationale is to 
capture aspects of service quality which were not anticipated in advance and thus 
ignored in the contract. This is often formally agreed to take place over a fixed 
initial period, during which all arrangements are being tested and fine-tuned. 
Agreeing on such a fixed period helps economise on excessive monitoring and 
bargaining costs while providing an opportunity for desirable adaptations. BP 
agreed to an initial period for evaluating and adapting service level requirements 
(chapter 4, section 6, paragraph 4 and section 7.1, paragraph 5). Furthermore, 
they agreed to the reporting of additional information, alongside the service 
metrics, in order to qualify the nature of the performance shortcomings observed in 
the primary metrics (chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraph 3). 
According to the experience gained from the implementation and evaluation of a 
set of service level requirements, the company may have to revise some or all of 
those metrics and may introduce new ones, if such adaptations are desirable (i. e. 
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they do not involve costly renegotiation or adverse incentive effects) and 
permissible (by the contract and the law). 
The process of the SLR lifecycle is iterative and ongoing throughout the life of a 
service. The governance, the contracts and the supplier associated with a given 
service may change but the SLRs for this service can survive such transitions. 
Service level requirements can, therefore, be seen as a property of the service rather 
than just a feature introduced by the contract. 
Although service level requirements need to be as efficacious as possible, the 
difficulties (costs) of developing them through their lifecycle should also be taken 
into account. In general, one should continue improving the effectiveness of service 
level requirements for each service until the incremental effort for further 
improvement at all lifecycle stages exceeds the respective increase in efficacy 
(completeness and precision). 
Of course, in practice it is almost impossible to calculate these marginal costs and 
benefits, although it should be clear when difficulties cannot be surmounted and 
when SLRs are inadequate. It may be necessary to reconsider service specifications 
(define services in a different way), or devise alternative governance mechanisms 
(such as direct supervision) that ensure effective service delivery, if either the 
effectiveness of service level requirements is judged unsatisfactory, or the cost 
(difficulty) of developing the service level requirements through their lifecycle is 
too high (i. e. the metrics are not easily specified, negotiated, measured and 
verified). 
Obviously, the costs of administering service level requirements must be kept to a 
minimum because they create no value (chapter 2, section 1, paragraph 8). Their 
purpose is to enforce the delivery of the required service levels, or in other words to 
ensure that the parties keep their promise regarding service levels and costs. If 
parties could rely on altruism and good faith, they would probably avoid using 
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service level requirements. This was explicitly stated by management at BP, with 
reference to the usefulness of performance reports vis-ä-vis the effort consumed in 
producing and reviewing them (chapter 4, section 8, paragraph 12). BP employed 
a variety of measurement and reporting methods in order to minimise the 
respective costs (chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraphs 4 and 6). Because of these costs, 
moreover, some performance requirements were not assigned rigorous targets but 
only qualitative expectations (chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraph 8). Decision 
making authority and corporate culture may be able to relieve, to a certain extent, 
these problems (see section 4.3 below and chapter 2, section 7, paragraph 2). 
Having said that, companies can also generate value from this effort by taking 
advantage of the information generated. This can be achieved by designing metrics 
that are potentially rich in informativeness and by setting up appropriate 
organisational structures and processes that will exploit this information for 
improvement, innovation and, generally, better decision making. If, for example, 
monitoring information is also used to improve a service or reorganise its 
provision, then it does have productive value. One should try to minimise the 
development cost of SLRs while maximising the potential value of the information 
collected with them. As mentioned above, this is what BP management had in mind 
when they debated the usefulness of performance reports. The productive 
utilisation of this information will in turn require appropriate organisational 
structures, which are discussed in section 4.3.3. 
To summarise, this section examines the use of service level requirements in BP 
contracts, under the light of relevant theories. In particular, four main issues are 
highlighted. First, the distinction between the metric and the target was evident in 
all BP contracts. Second, completeness and precision as key quality criteria of SLRs. 
Originally, a long list of desirable qualities for SLRs was being contemplated with 
BP management during the case study. After reviewing the concerns raised about 
the efficacy of the SLRs already in place, the list was condensed to completeness and 
precision. Third, discussions with BP managers on the difficulties and benefits of 
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developing and administering SLRs lead to the notion of the lifecycle. It was seen as 
a useful tool for contemplating the `costs' and `benefits' of SLRs. Fourth, a brief 
reference to the measurement of SLRs and the use of performance information was 
prompted by a growing interest in BP to derive value from such information. In 
addition, this section makes references to the issue of defining services in technical 
or business terms and to the issue of service interdependence. Both these issues 
featured in the previous section. 
4.1.3. Service level measurement and verification 
The process and frequency of service level reporting are an important part of SLR 
specification. Keeping track of service delivery entails a number of costs and has 
incentive implications. Therefore, it matters who will undertake it and howl0. In 
addition, ensuring that reports are truthful may prove to be a problem if customers 
and service providers have an interest in misrepresenting information. In order to 
ensure the delivery of the required service levels and to rely on metrics for 
incentive and control purposes, appropriate measurement and verification 
mechanisms need to be instituted in advance. 
Two types of information hiding or misrepresentation are possible. First, suppliers 
are often in a position to overstate their costs. Second, they may distort information 
about the difficulties encountered or the capabilities and costs of technology. Either 
problem may arise during supplier selection (adverse selection) or after the 
contract is in place (moral hazard)". Incentives, monitoring, auditing, 
10 Monitoring, as part of decision control has incentive implications for positive agency theory 
(chapter 2, section 4.2, paragraphs 2-4). In order to counter agency costs, the bearer of residual 
claims should also exercise decision control (ratification and monitoring). In IT outsourcing contracts 
matters are more complicated than the stylised case presented by the theory. See chapter 2, section 
4.2, paragraph S. 
11 Moral hazard and adverse selection are examined in chapter 2, section 3.1, paragraph 3, and in 
chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 4. 
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benchmarking and third party experts are means that can be used individually or 
in combination to address these problems. Their cost and efficacy depend on the 
circumstances. Monitoring, measurement and verification are the subject of this 
section. Incentives and other safeguards are discussed in section 4.2. 
In general, there are obvious reasons why both customers and service providers 
would have an interest in concealing or misrepresenting the truth about the 
delivery of service levels. Customers would be able to ask for more (or avoid 
payment or claim penalties) if they understated the service levels that they actually 
received. Service providers would be able to accumulate excess profits by 
overstating their achievement (hiding poor performance) or the cost of service. 
This is possible due to conditions of information asymmetry and opportunism 
(information impactedness)12. Such opportunistic tactics are not often employed in 
extreme forms which would lead to severe conflict and even contract termination, 
but rather in small incremental steps thus expropriating any information rents that 
remain beyond the efficiency of incentives and monitoring (residual loss - see 
chapter 2, section 4.2, paragraph 1). They also appear in different patterns, 
depending on the duration of the relationship and the associated uncertainty. As 
noted by Muris (1982), opportunistic behaviour is subtle because it is easily 
disguised as legitimate and its opportunistic nature can be discovered and verified 
only at a cost. 
If the service levels delivered are symmetrically observed by both parties, there is 
little space for opportunistic manipulation of information. This may be the case 
with service levels that have an immediate impact on business processes, or on 
everyday work, such as desktop support, database availability or network 
downtime. The performance of other services may not be as apparent to the 
12 When the parties do not have access to the same information (on costs, performance or other 
conditions) or when objective means of ascertaining that information are absent or too costly (such 
as a third party expert), opportunism leads to misrepresentation and haggling. This is the concept of 
information impactedness (chapter 2, section 3.1, paragraph 4). 
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customer (e. g. systems development, project management and security), or may 
become apparent after a significant time lag (e. g. when it is too late to salvage a 
project or when a security breach causes obvious damage). However, that such 
information is symmetrically observable does not necessarily mean that 
opportunistic tactics are completely avoided. Nonetheless, the availability of this 
information is necessary in order to take further action (e. g. to revise incentives or 
to introduce penalties). 
Of course the cost and effort of service provision is known only to the provider and, 
when the latter is external, various mechanisms such as audit rights and 
benchmarking can be instituted to alleviate some of the effects of information 
asymmetry. BP management were not particularly concerned with possible 
misrepresentation of information. Despite the lack of regular mechanisms for 
verifying the suppliers' performance reports, they were confident with their ability 
to detect and address misrepresentations. The framework agreement specifies an 
`open-book' policy and gives BP the rights to audit and benchmark the activities of 
their suppliers (chapter 4, section 7, paragraph 1 and section 7.1, paragraph 6). 
The costs of measurement and reporting depend on the nature of the metrics used 
and have to be kept to a minimum. Service clustering may generate scale 
economies in monitoring and measuring service levels thus affecting the total cost 
of governance. There are three main types of metrics in increasing order of 
measurement cost. (i) automated metrics measured by software or hardware 
modules built into the various systems, (ii) standardised activity logs kept by 
individuals and (iii) customer/user surveys or review meetings which may or may 
not be standardised and require the involvement of a larger number of people. BP's 
contract employ combinations of all three kinds of measures (chapter 4, section 
7.1, paragraphs 4,11 and 12). 
Service level measurement and reporting can be carried out by the user/customer, 
the service provider or a third party (e. g. auditor). The decision will depend on the 
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informational properties of the service cluster itself as well as on the procurement 
strategy being contemplated. The aim is to minimise the cost of measurement as 
well as the agency costs of moral hazard and adverse selection. If customers cannot 
observe service levels directly, they must be able either to induce providers to 
report truthfully by offering a contract that rewards honesty or penalises cheating 
by more than the latter would pay, or to rely on direct monitoring or on third party 
intervention (auditing, arbitration or the courts) for resolving disagreements13. For 
example, in an outsourcing contract, the supplier might undertake service level 
reporting because they are in a better position to observe their own performance 
(and thus economise on measurement costs). Otherwise the customer would have 
to expend resources for monitoring. Periodic verification, audit rights and 
incentives are then needed to induce truthful reporting. This is the approach 
followed by BP (chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraph 6). 
The costs of monitoring can be contained while maintaining or even improving 
incentives - by reducing the frequency of measurement or the amount of 
information collected and by simultaneously setting a large fixed reward or penalty 
(Cowen and Glazer 1996). For example, measurement at random intervals 
combined with severe penalties for underperformance create a powerful incentive 
that can be employed for non-critical metrics and/or when measurement is too 
costly. For example, BP has explicitly classified certain metrics as `mystery shopper' 
(chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraph 4). These metrics are measured at random 
intervals. For example, a `mystery shopper' metric for help desk services is "contact 
a sample of users to confirm problem handled satisfactorily'. Another example, for 
e-mail administration and support, is "requests for all mail IDs or disks to be 
13 When SLRs are not a complete and precise representation of reality or when information about 
the conditions affecting the supplier's performance is not readily available, direct monitoring of the 
supplier's effort is needed (e. g. auditing). If there is a competitive market for the given service(s), 
then market benchmarking may be a sufficient source of information. These measurement problems 
are examined in chapter 2, section 6, paragraph 3. The incentive mechanisms inducing truthful 
reporting are examined in chapter 2, section 4.2, paragraph 5. 
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actioned within two working days'. However, no penalties are attached to them. 
Clearly, the frequency of measurement and reporting will depend on the 
characteristics of each SLR, including their cost of measurement and incentive 
consequences. 
Monitoring and reporting of service delivery may include other information in 
addition to the specified service level targets (e. g. progress information, exception 
reports, persistent problems, etc. ). Clearly, keeping track of more information 
entails added costs and its necessity should therefore be scrutinised. Additional 
information monitoring is justified in three instances. First, during the early stages 
of the contract, any aspects of service performance not captured by the set metrics 
will be highlighted and taken into consideration. Second, if the parties have little 
experience with a given service, if the supply relationship is still young and 
`immature' and if the service is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, there 
may be learning benefits to be had from the exchange of additional information. 
Finally, in cases of specific services where tacit organisational or other service- 
specific knowledge constitutes an important asset, the exchange of additional 
information serves the transfer of this knowledge. BP collects and reviews such 
additional information, mainly to address persistent problems and to revise service 
level requirements (chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraph 6 and section 8, paragraph 
8). IT also appears to be the case that some BP managers felt uneasy relinquishing 
control to the supplier. This was the opinion of the SEMA Account Manager 
(chapter 4, section 7.2, paragraph 4). 
To summarise, this section addresses the measurement and reporting of vendor 
performance information. Managers at BP often gave the impression that this was 
seen as a trivial, if not burdensome, activity. However, the contracts made extensive 
provisions for ensuring that all information can be collected and distributed to all 
interested parties. Such provisions include the supplier's obligation to collect, 
distribute and review performance reports and BP's right to audit and benchmark 
the vendor's activity. BP collects additional information in order to ensure the 
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correct interpretation of recorded performance, to detect persistent problems and to 
identify opportunities for improvement. For BP, the possibility of misrepresented 
performance information was not an important issue. All the procedures mentioned 
above were perceived to address this problem satisfactorily. Vendor opportunism 
was manifested in other ways, as discussed in the following sections. 
4.2. Incentives for service level attainment 
The need for incentives arises mainly because the IT service supplier and the 
customer typically have divergent interests. The purpose of incentives is therefore 
to align these divergent goals, or in other words, to reorient the efforts of the 
supplier (agent) towards the goals and interests of the customer (principal) who 
sets the incentives. 
There are three main incentive instruments of interest to the design of IT 
governance. First, intrinsic incentives accruing to the organisational mode and the 
allocation of asset ownership. Second, formal incentives tied to various measures 
(e. g. service level or cost). Third, contractual obligations (e. g. 'open book' policies) 
and organisational safeguards (e. g. corporate culture). 
The primary source of incentives is the basic compensation scheme. Commercial 
contracts are mainly distinguished into fixed-cost and cost-plus contracts. The 
former provide greatest incentive intensity by making the supplier the residual 
claimant. The latter generate no incentive but may still be desirable in the presence 
of significant uncertainty. Mixed mode compensation schemes are also not 
uncommon, particularly in public procurement and regulation. Such contracts may 
place an upper limit to the cost component and/or include an additional 
performance-based incentive14. In internal organisation, salaries may be 
14 Chapter 2, section 4.1 examines the choice between cost-based and performance-contingent 
compensation schemes. The vendor's limited liability (risk aversion) increases the cost-based part of 
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supplemented with various types of performance-based bonuses (e. g. share 
options). The implicit promise of career rewards (which, of course, vary from one 
firm to another) is the typical incentive of the employment relation. 
Most contracts that BP entered into, define total compensation as a combination of 
a fixed element, a cost-based element and a performance contingent element. The 
relative weights of each element vary from one contract to another (chapter 4, 
section 7, paragraph 5 and section 7.1, paragraphs 15 and 20). 
Incentives are generally designed to ensure that service levels and cost targets are 
met. One of the goals of the IT function is also to pursue continuous innovation 
both in the delivery of IT services and in the contribution of IT to the business. 
Incentives that motivate improvement and innovation are certainly desirable. 
Incentives for innovation pose particular problems due to the nature of innovative 
activity. 
Innovation in IT can be of two kinds. First, general innovations, not specific to the 
users and second, innovation that generates value only within a specific user 
environment. Incentives for innovation of the first kind are more easily created in 
the case of external IT provision, if, for example, the supplier receives a share of 
any cost reductions across a number of client organisations. Streamlining of 
operations and standardisation of systems are actions often taken in this respect. 
However, replacement of a system specific to a customer for a standard alternative 
is likely to lead to loss of the value accruing to specificity and specialisation. The 
customer affected will have to assess this loss against the respective cost reductions. 
Such initiatives are subject to supplier opportunism, if the alternative technology is 
compensation and thus reduces incentive intensity (paragraph 3), despite any fixed fee proportions 
and/or rewards and penalties in the compensation structure. Uncertainty also increases the cost- 
based part of the supplier's compensation, even under asymmetric information about the extent of 
uncertainty (paragraph 7). The structure of compensation also has implications for input or output 
contracting (see section 4.1.1, paragraph 4 above). 
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specific to the supplier. Furthermore, problems in valuing the costs and benefits of 
such changes may, in turn, lead to costly negotiations and haggling. This prospect 
may deter the supplier from taking such initiatives in the first place. Auditing, 
benchmarking, escalation processes, third party experts and alternative dispute 
resolution procedures are examples of remedies to valuation problems (chapter 2, 
section 3.4, paragraphs 13-14). 
Incentives for user-specific innovation are more difficult to provide since, by 
definition, the user is the residual claimant. In the presence of unsurmountable 
valuation difficulties, the customer would have to commit to award any such 
innovations as additional business to the innovating supplier for a sufficient time 
period'5. A monopolistic situation emerges which may not be comparatively 
efficient. Moreover, the incumbent supplier is likely to innovate only within the 
bounds of his extant capabilities. Better incentives for innovation beyond these 
limits can be provided to the users themselves internallyls. Apart from the typical 
incentive problems faced by internal organisation in this respect, the acquisition 
and maintenance of the skills and expertise needed (which might be a reason for 
outsourcing in the first place) are an added difficulty. 
15 Such a commitment is a type of hostage, as explained in chapter 2, section 3.4, paragraphs 11-12. 
In order to proceed with a client-specific investment, the supplier needs an assurance that he will 
not be left stranded. Assurances (hostages) can take various forms but they often create undesirable 
incentive side-effects (windows for opportunism). Besides, such commitments may not be efficient 
later in time, if the technologies or the markets change. 
16 This is the message of the theory of property rights in chapter 2, section 5, paragraphs 5-6. 
Ownership is the ultimate form of commitment and alleviates the incentive problems mentioned in 
footnote 15 above. Moreover, client-specific expertise is native in internal organisation, whereas an 
external supplier has to invest in acquiring and maintaining this knowledge (chapter 2, section 6, 
paragraph 7). However, internal organisation faces other incentive problems and it may not be 
worth acquiring the technical expertise of the supplier. Therefore, the choice between bilateral 
commitment and internal innovation depends on the particular circumstances. 
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Innovation and continuous service improvement has been an important issue for 
BE One of the main concerns raised was that suppliers remained faithful to the 
letter of the contract and avoided introducing such innovations and improvements. 
BP wanted to introduce additional monetary incentives to this effect (chapter 4, 
section 7.1, paragraph 19). However, attempts by SEMA to standardise some 
systems and applications were resisted by BP as it was felt that significant user- 
specific value would be sacrificed (chapter 4, section 8, paragraph 15). Clearly, the 
incentives of SEMA to reduce costs by standardising are not perfectly aligned with 
BP's desire to increase value through specific improvements. 
4.2.1. Implicit incentive patterns 
A fundamental condition that determines the incentive characteristics of different 
organisational modes is the availability and sharing of information. In the case of 
internal IT provision, organisations can employ authority and fiat to observe all the 
information relevant to service delivery: the costs, the technology, the service levels 
(see chapter 2, section 2.2, paragraph 4). Despite the obligations imposed by the 
labour law, this is not to say that employees always behave in the best interest of 
their company and cannot withhold information. On the contrary, appropriate 
incentives are still required, whether formal (e. g. performance bonuses) or implicit 
(e. g. organisational culture), despite the fact that incentives within a hierarchy are 
necessarily less acute than those available in market exchanges17. 
Market transactions such as off-the-shelf hardware and software purchases, are 
characterised by a different incentive and information pattern. The incentives for 
high quality and low cost are primarily determined by the competition in the 
particular supply market. Perfectly competitive markets rely on the price system to 
17 Because of the collective nature of information in teams, team members have an incentive to shirk 
(chapter 2, section 6, paragraph 2). 
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convey all necessary information efficiently. However, such markets are rarely, if 
ever, observed in practice18. 
In supply relationships in the middle range between pure markets and hierarchies, 
the authority and discretion of each party are determined by the respective 
contract(s) and the law. Depending on how IT services are specified, it may be 
more or less costly to measure and verify the service levels delivered'9. The effort 
and generally the costs of providers are known only to them, whereas the quality of 
services may or may not be observable by either. 
For example, BP found that suppliers chose not to share information and best 
practices across sites, since they were competing for a larger share of business with 
BP. The additional quality incentives they were contemplating in early 1995 
included criteria pertaining to the collaboration and information exchange 
between BP and supplier staff in formal and informal communications (chapter 4, 
section 7.1, paragraphs 17 and 18). 
Reputation is one of the strongest implicit incentives in long term and repeated 
relationships. Opportunistic tactics sooner or later trigger a retaliatory response 
from the other party thus initiating a vicious circle of opportunistic moves. In this 
scenario, even if either party 'wins' at the end of the 'game', they both loose a 
potential, mutually beneficial trading relationship. In long term relationships, one 
or both parties will cheat only if the benefits from cheating are larger that the total 
benefits from the whole life of the relationship. This is generally unlikely and 
would only appear towards the end of the contract. This is not to say that long term 
18 Given the imperfections of markets, information acquisition is a widely accepted justification for 
vertical integration (chapter 2, section 1, paragraph 3). Private and asymmetrically available 
information creates adverse incentive effects, namely adverse selection and moral hazard (chapter 2, 
section 3.1, paragraph 4 and section 4, paragraph 4). 
19 The extent to which access to and gains from information can be contracted determines the 
governance structure (chapter 2, section 6, paragraph 4). 
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supply relationships are safe from opportunistic behaviour. Even if the two parties 
are not engaged in a long-term contract, the first-time looser will either attempt to 
retaliate in possible future exchange or avoid repeating trade altogether. Market 
reputation usually tends to be an effective deterrent of such intentions20. BP 
managers recognised that suppliers face strong incentives from the need to 
maintain good market reputation, independently of the rewards and penalties 
stipulated in the contract. Moreover, BP is a big client with significant purchasing 
power and the potential to offer more work to its suppliers over time. Having 
recognised that, they also admitted that suppliers behave opportunistically in 
incremental ways, without causing major contract breaches. See chapter 4, section 
7.1, paragraphs 20 and 21. 
Cases in which one of the parties (either the customer or the provider) has a very 
large comparative bargaining power and is in a position to negotiate and impose 
unfavourable conditions to the other, appear to be exceptions to the above 
discussion. There is a subtle difference however, in that in the latter case, the 
conditions are negotiated and voluntarily agreed upon, whereas in the first case, 
the parties attempt to take advantage of gaps in the contract after the agreement is 
concluded21. Small, incremental shirking attempts are more likely. Either party will 
20 The basic way in which reputation operates as a governance mechanism is explained in chapter 2, 
section 7, paragraph 8. Reputation is often based on personal relationships between supplier and 
customer staff but also extends beyond the bilateral relationship to the broader market or 
community (chapter 2, section 2.1, paragraph 5). The strength of reputation effects determines to 
some extent the cost (and efficacy) of hybrid governance structures (chapter 2, section 3.4, paragraph 
9). Strong reputation effects make long term (or repeated) contractual relations more sustainable. 
Otherwise vertical integration is the preferred governance structure. 
21 This is the meaning of opportunism, as defined in terms of appropriable quasi rents and in terms 
of moral hazard. Appropriable quasi rents are a measure of the unredeployable specificity of an 
investment, which creates the possibility for a hold-up after it is committed (chapter 2, section 1, 
paragraphs 10-12). Opportunism as moral hazard also arises postcontractually as a result of 
asymmetric information. Adverse selection is an instance of opportunism arising precontractually 
(chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 4). 
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try to avoid initiating a large scale dispute over small deviations. In other words, 
the short term benefits of a major confrontation are too small as compared to the 
large damage caused. However, such behaviour is expected and taken advantage 
of22. In the long run the accumulated minor damages may or may not exceed the 
costs of an early termination or renegotiation. A credible termination clause can be 
an effective deterrent of major defections or of accumulated instances of 
underperformance, depending on how it is specified. The reciprocity and specific 
investments often involved in IT provision can deter clients from instituting overly 
strict termination clauses, thus making space for opportunism. BP managers clearly 
admitted the opportunistic behaviour of their suppliers, mainly in terms of sticking 
to the letter of the contract, withholding information and disregarding `soft' 
promises (e. g. chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraphs 10,16,19 and 21 and section 8, 
paragraph 9). 
Opportunism may also be triggered by contingencies that necessarily accrue due to 
incomplete contracting. For example, unanticipated changes in demand or user 
requirements are often treated as work outside the scope of the contract and are 
charged separately (see chapter 4, section 7, paragraph 9 and section 8, 
paragraphs 14 onwards). Depending on the nature of this work and on the 
circumstances, the client may turn such situations to his or her advantage. If such 
work can be put to tender then the incumbent supplier faces an additional 
incentive to build good reputation in order to win additional business. The new 
contract would be the prize for good performance. Often, however, such work is 
required urgently, the tendering process is costly and time consuming and the 
incumbent supplier is most likely to enjoy a comparative cost advantage over 
22 This is one of the weaknesses of the reputation mechanism as explained in chapter 2, section 7, 
paragraph 11. Because it is in the interest of both parties to avoid termination, the reputation 
mechanism induces them to signal to outsiders that the supply relationship is going well, even if 
there are serious disputes. In other words, either party can behave opportunistically as long as the 
cost of opportunism is less than the cost of termination. This is more likely, the more specific 
investment are involved and, hence, the higher the cost of termination. 
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competing bidders anyway, on account of his position23. Such circumstances limit 
the incentive effect of such a tactic, which would be better suited to relatively large 
and autonomous projects. 
Powerful incentives accrue to the owner of the relevant assets. This is one of the 
reasons why physical assets are transferred in outsourcing contracts. However, if 
assets or services are highly idiosyncratic to the users, or if the users are the only 
residual claimants of operational or investment decisions, then better incentives are 
created if both asset ownership and responsibility for the relevant decisions is 
allocated to the users. This argument clarifies the commonly held opinion that 
`strategic' services (i. e. services which require significant user-specific knowledge 
and the gains from which cannot be contractually shared with an external 
provider) are better kept in-house. In practice, however, the distinction is not 
always clear. A comparative assessment of the relative importance of each party's 
decisions, of the skills and knowledge required and of the nature and contractibility 
of expected gains, is needed in order to allocate ownership and decision making 
rights24. 
For BP, asset transfers had an instrumental rather than an incentive role (chapter 4, 
section 6, paragraph 2). Moreover, BP managers preferred to avoid transfers when 
they involved additional costs either for the physical move or from the additional 
charges imposed by software vendors. They saw asset transfers as a means of 
23 This is the essence of the 'small numbers condition' as defined by Williamson (chapter 2, section 
3.2, paragraph 5). 
24 The stylised results of the relevant theories are explained in chapter 2, section 4.2, paragraphs 2-5, 
where asset ownership is defined as residual risk bearing, and in chapter 2, section 5, paragraphs 4- 
6, where asset ownership is defined as residual rights of control. In practice, complex structures, 
including limitations to liability, incentive rewards and penalties and nested or multi-tiered agency 
relationships, diffuse residual risk bearing. Accordingly, complex provisions are required for the 
allocation of control rights in order to imbue desirable incentives (see chapter 2, section 5, 
paragraphs 3 and 10). 
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increasing the bargaining power of the supplier at contract renewal or in case of 
termination. 
To summarise, this section draws on evidence of supplier opportunism that was 
observed in the BP case and explores implicit governance mechanisms for 
countering opportunism. These mechanisms include the informational properties of 
the broad organisational mode (market, hybrid and hierarchy), reputation, contract 
termination, competitive bidding and asset ownership. Of these, only information 
and reputation were found to have significant incentive consequences for BP. 
4.2.2. Contractual reward/penalty devices 
Formal incentives aim at either encouraging performance (providing positive 
reward on effort or outcome) or deterring significant deviations from the targets 
(providing negative reward, i. e. penalty, on effort or outcome). The choice will 
normally depend on the nature of the service and the way performance measures 
are defined. For example, network availability can be up to 100%. An 
encouragement-type incentive would reward the continuous achievement of this 
target whereas a deterrent incentive would penalise relatively large and/or 
frequent deviations from the target. The reward and penalty systems implemented 
in contracts of BP Oil, Air BP and BP Finance are explained in chapter 4, section 
7.1, paragraphs 7,12 and 16 and Figure 4.2. 
An encouragement-type incentive is generally preferable when the ideal target is 
known to be difficult to achieve, when the target itself (e. g. database availability) 
depends on another contingent factor (e. g. demand for database access) known to 
be highly variable or in order to foster innovation. Deterrent incentives are 
implemented to safeguard lower bounds of performance, when a service is critical 
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to the business and/or when the set target is known to be fairly easily achievablez5. 
The assessment of the incentives employed by BP Oil, Air BP and BP Finance in 
chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraphs 13,14 and 16 is made on similar terms. 
The measure of performance to which an incentive payment is tied, rarely 
represents the supplier's effort perfectly. There are two sources of imperfection. 
First, suppliers' performance is not only determined by their own effort but by 
other exogenous factors as well. Such factors include for example the co-operation 
of the customers and system breakdowns (variability in the outcome). Second, 
whether a given outcome (service level or cost) is fully determined by the supplier's 
effort or not, it may be difficult to measure and verify it accurately (error in 
measurement). 
In such cases, setting up an incentive payment tied to a measure of the achieved 
result, amounts to shifting an amount of risk to the supplier. Suppliers are willing 
to undertake risks only if they can spread them over a large number of IT services 
and/or a large number of customers and if rewards are adequate. Otherwise, it is 
in the interest of both parties to specify more detailed and accurate measures that 
eliminate some sources of risk despite the fact that more detailed measures-will 
probably increase the cost of measurement. The incentive system may also account 
for uncontrollable risk by either allowing deviations from the set target within 
limits, or by specifying target ranges rather than unitary target values. 
In order to reduce the risk that the supplier would have to bear (or alternatively to 
conserve on the premium that the supplier would charge to bear this risk) the 
customer may choose to bear some of the risk. This amounts to reducing incentive 
intensity. In other words, the incentive reward/penalty would be a relatively small 
25 In mathematical principal-agent theory, the distinction between rewards and penalties is often 
irrelevant since, analytically, they are equivalent. In practice, suppliers and clients have to make an 
informed choice between the two. Some insights are found in the literature on tournaments (chapter 
2, section 4.1, paragraph 6). 
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part of the supplier's total compensation, most of which would be based on cost. 
Reduced performance may be observed as a result of limited incentive intensity. 
If the contingent factors affecting the performance of the supplier have a 
significant weight in comparison to the supplier's own effort, it may be difficult to 
design adequate incentives, especially when the customer cannot observe those 
contingent factors directly26. For example, the quality of wide area network services 
depends on the investments and sophistication of the provider but it also depends 
on fluctuations in total demand for bandwidth. If unpredictable demand variability 
becomes a real problem and the provider has no flexibility in bandwidth allocation, 
then any incentives for speed and quality of data transfers become inoperative as 
realised performance is effectively left to chance. Fixed price contracts provide 
excellent incentive for cost reduction but service levels must be stipulated 
completely and accurately and measured effectively. 
In long term relationships, the supplier can be effectively motivated as well as 
protected from excessive risk if incentives are based on average performance over 
time, assuming services and SLRs remain unchanged. By allowing a certain number 
of deviations from the set service level target over time, the customer can forgive 
the vendor for bad performance in one instance if performance is good in the 
preceding or succeeding periods. In this way the provider is sufficiently motivated 
and protected from the effects of adverse contingencies (see chapter 2, section 4.1, 
paragraph 10). The grief point system examined in chapter 4 (Figure 4.2) operates 
on a similar basis. As mentioned in section 4.1.3, powerful incentives can also be 
created by setting a fixed reward (penalty) for performance above (below) a set 
threshold and reduce the frequency of measurement and/or the amount of 
information collected. The feasibility of such a measure depends mainly on the 
26 In the literature, suppliers (i. e. agents) are usually considered risk averse (chapter 2, section 4.1, 
paragraph 3). Accordingly, in practice, most outsourcing contracts limit the supplier's liability. The 
effect of uncertainty (variability in the outcome) and private information (measurement problems) 
on incentives is examined in chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraphs 4 and 7. 
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nature of the service and the prevailing conditions of information availability and 
verifiability. 
BP's incentive mechanisms are designed to forgive occasional failures and only 
penalise consistent under-performance. Moreover, Air BP's contract averages 
rewards and penalties across services and not just over time. (chapter 4, section 7.1, 
paragraphs 1 and 7 to 16). However, both allowances create a margin in which the 
supplier can behave opportunistically without consequences. 
Another incentive opportunity arises where two or more services are sequential or 
somehow interdependent, such as development and maintenance or desktop 
support and help desks (see chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraph 9). If greater effort in 
the first service improves the performance (or reduces the costs) of the second, then 
the contractor can be effectively motivated by undertaking both services. For 
example, greater effort and performance during the software design stage reduces 
the cost and improves the outcome of coding. On the contrary, if greater effort in 
the first service leads to more effort in the second the customer is better off 
undertaking one of the services himself or assigning it to a different provider. For 
example, an ambitious proposal during the requirements specification stage will 
complicate design and development. Alternatively, in anticipation of future work, 
the provider may specify requirements specific to his capabilities. A system provider 
performing both tasks is tempted to underperform in the first in order to reduce 
subsequent costs and complete the project quickly. For the same reason in public 
procurement, companies carrying out analysis and requirements specification are 
often excluded from the tender for implementation. 
The way service levels are specified has implications for the effectiveness of 
incentives. Basing service level targets on past performance may give rise to the 
ratchet effect. In order to avoid this adverse effect, it is recommended that 
companies commit not to alter their service level targets and incentives, even if they 
are initially set too low or too high, as long as the IT service provider, the services 
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and the technology remain the same. Alternatively, the incentive system can be 
adapted according to past performance without risking the ratchet effect, by 
simultaneously manipulating one or more of these conditions (see chapter 2, 
section 4.2, paragraph 6). BP renegotiated and amended some performance metrics 
during the early part of the contract. At the time of the case study, all metrics were 
considered stable (chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraph 5). 
If a given provider is assigned a number of services, the incentive mechanism 
should give equal weight to all of them. If some of these services cannot be 
monitored as effectively as the rest, incentive intensity should be fixed to the lower 
common denominator permitted by the measurement problems. In other words, if 
incentives do not place equal weight to all services delivered by the same provider, 
he will direct all his effort to those which yield greatest returns while maintaining 
for all the rest the minimum performance permissible by the contract. This has 
implications for service clustering: services for which incentives are desirable but 
monitoring is not equally efficacious may have to be clustered separately. 
Alternatively, additional resources may have to be committed to improving 
(equalising) the collection of performance information. 
The threat of termination can be a low cost means of deterring opportunism (see 
chapter 2, section 4.1, paragraph 11). It is invoked when significant or sustained 
defection is observed. It does not require costly third party verification, with the 
exception of cases that invoke termination on account of perfunctory fulfilment of 
the supplier's obligations according to the letter of the contract whilst a more 
positive attitude would be expected. It requires, moreover, governance checks 
against possible opportunistic use of it by the customer. These checks may entail 
significant transaction costs, if, for example, the courts or another third party has 
to ascertain if termination is invoked opportunistically (Muris 1981). BP's contracts 
make provisions for termination and management is confident that they will be 
able to manage it without serious damage to the company, if needed (chapter 4, 
section 7.1, paragraph 2). BPO's grief point system (chapter 4, Figure, 4.2) gives 
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BPO the right to contemplate termination on grounds of contract breach if SEMA 
fails consistently below a defined level. However, because of the value of the 
specific investments committed and the reciprocal dependence that arises, 
termination is undesirable and, therefore, has diminished incentive effects. 
To summarise, this section examines the operation of formal incentive schemes by 
analysing the incentives implemented in three BP contracts. The distinction 
between rewarding and penalising incentives, although it is analytically irrelevant, 
seems to have important implications for practice. The efficacy of incentives is 
affected by the uncertainty associated with the performance metrics to which the 
incentive is tied. In this respect, the `forgiveness' introduced by averaging 
performance measures for most BP contracts, is noteworthy. Other potential 
incentive opportunities and pitfalls have been drawn from the literature to 
complete the discussion in formal incentives. 
4.2.3. Other contractual and organisational safeguards 
Two more types of incentive instruments are considered here. First, general explicit 
or implicit policies and guidelines that set the character of the service provision 
relationship. Second, arrangements that deal with boundary situations and other 
contingencies. The first lind applies mainly to long term or frequently repeated 
supply relationships. In the case of internal IT service provision for example, 
corporate culture and organisational routines may prove more effective 
performance drivers or deterrents of inappropriate behaviour than formal 
incentives and penalties. Peer recognition or disapproval are powerful forces 
guiding the actions of employees. Information sharing is facilitated by formal as 
well as informal organisational structures and modes of operation. 
Framework agreements in outsourcing relationships set, among other things, the 
organisational and exchange background for service provision to take place. Such 
agreements serve as the terms of reference for the relationship. Within a 
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framework agreement, an 'open book' policy and the right to audit serve the need 
for information sharing (Friedberg and Yarberry 1994), which, in turn, reduces 
opportunistic potentials (see chapter 2, section 3.4, paragraph 13). Market 
benchmarking is another means of collecting information and thus introducing an 
element of competition in both internal organisation and long term contracts. As 
explained in chapter 2, section 3.1, paragraph 4, such exercises are costly and their 
informativeness is limited by the extent of service specificity (i. e. the availability of 
comparable services in the market). For these reasons they are undertaken 
occasionally and/or when there are other contingent reasons for seeking further 
information. BP's contracts included all these provisions but they are rarely used 
(chapter 4, section 7, paragraphs 1 and 5 and section 7.1, paragraph 6). 
The cultural match between provider and customer becomes crucial in two main 
instances. First, many IT services are provided by the contractor's staff within the 
customer's premises and in direct collaboration with the customer's personnel27. 
Second, various joint decision making structures and processes are in place as 
explained further on. In such cases the work practices of both parties need to share 
the same values and objectives. In the absence of complete contracting, corporate 
culture determines general principles according to which contingencies are dealt 
with. In long term contracts, compatible corporate cultures between the parties 
help reduce the costs of bargaining over adaptations during the course of the 
contract. Culture is, therefore, as important as formal contractual specifications28. 
27 Chapter 2, section 2.1, paragraph 5 stresses the importance of personal (social and psychological) 
relations in economic exchange. Such relations become even more important when contractor staff 
work in the client's premises and with the client's staff, although, formally, they report to separate 
hierarchies. 
28 Culture can be conceived as a set of principles that guide decision making in circumstances that 
are not sufficiently dealt with by previously agreed rules of conduct. If someone who is aware of a 
given set of such principles (culture) is able to make informed decisions independently, then culture 
helps counter contract incompleteness and economises on coordination costs (chapter 2, section 7, 
mainly paragraph 2). 
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The prospect of a convivial resolution of future contingencies creates further 
incentives for the provider to invest on existing and innovative operations. 
The relevance and interpretation of corporate culture within BP Oil is evident in at 
least three instances. First, when criticism was raised on the personal relations of 
one Partner Resource Manager and the implications this had for service 
management and user satisfaction (chapter 4, section 7.2, paragraph 4). Second, in 
the way BP management understands the notion of partnership, not as a loose, open 
ended, agreement (as it is portrayed in some parts of the literature) but as a closely 
knit exchange relationship based on sound contractual foundations (chapter 4, 
section 8, paragraph 5). Finally, the role of culture becomes evident in the 
dissatisfaction of end-users who lost the personal associations they had developed 
with the desktop support personnel (chapter 4, section 8, paragraph 9). 
In general, the effective incentive system of the governance structure of IT service 
provision must contain an efficient mix of all the previously described instruments. 
It may be desirable to introduce a general incentive mechanism that aggregates all 
service level requirements as well as other (cost related or even qualitative such as 
user surveys) performance criteria. This is how the reward and penalty 
mechanisms of BP Oil and Air BP examined in chapter 4, section 7.1 operate. Such 
a mechanism can serve at least four purposes. First, it integrates local (for 
individual services) incentives and global (company-wide) coordination. Second, it 
sets global tolerance limits of bad performance thus controlling risk allocation and 
facilitating uninterrupted service provision and clearly managed dispute resolution 
mechanisms. Third, it enables easier top level monitoring and management of the 
provision of IT, in addition to the detailed measurement of individual service level 
requirements. Finally, if measurement is not equally efficacious among services, 
aggregation may lift the problem of non-attention by the provider. 
To summarise, this section recognises that formal incentive schemes are limited to 
the performance metrics to which they are attached. Other aspects of performance 
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that cannot be measured my thus be ignored. However, a complex outsourcing 
agreement involves many more expectations that cannot be defined on paper in 
advance. Formal provisions such as audit and benchmarking rights give the 
opportunity to BP to restore information parity if the vendor is suspected of 
misrepresentation. Most of the time, however, these provisions operate as the 
client's threat position, which deters the supplier from acting opportunistically. 
Indeed, BP seldom makes use of these rights. Informal mechanisms, such as a 
climate of trust and a convivial culture between the parties also help to minimise 
influence costs (haggling) and opportunistic moves when contingencies need to be 
negotiated. Although these measures, admittedly, do not eliminate opportunism 
completely, they are important elements of a long term, relational, contract, 
complementing narrowly targeted performance incentives. 
4.3. Organisation and management of service provision 
The organisational structures, processes and managerial roles that effect 
coordination between customer and service provider are the focus of this layer. The 
managerial roles needed under different organisational structures, the mechanisms 
by which coordination is effected and the allocation of authority are the three main 
themes considered. 
In the absence of complete contracting, the resolution of contingencies is delegated 
to hierarchical authority structures. This is the essential feature of relational 
contracting. With internal organisation, there already exist decision making bodies 
(individuals or committees) and few additional rules, if any, are needed to specify 
how various categories of contingencies are to be dealt with. In simple market 
transactions, the responses to unforeseen contingencies are regulated by the law 
which specifies rights, responsibilities and appropriate action. 
In other contractual long term relations characterised by high specificity, the 
contract specifies in detail the organisational structures and decision making 
241 
Chapter Five: Service Clustering and Governance Establishment (S-CAGE) 
processes needed to resolve contingencies. Examples of such mechanisms in 
outsourcing contracts include the escalation process and the performance review 
meetings. 
Provisions are also made for dealing with boundary conditions such as contract 
termination. Equivalent arrangements (i. e. firing employees) for the case of internal 
organisation, are usually left to the discretion of management, of course within the 
bounds of the law, but the principles governing their operation are similar. 
Apart from well-defined contractual clauses, discretionary collaborative behaviours 
from both the supplier and the client appear to be significant elements of successful 
procurement relationship and customer satisfaction (Heckman and King, 1994). 
Such behaviours include various forms of discretionary assistance to the vendor (in 
the sales process, in the product development process, in the day to day problem 
solving) which go beyond the letter of the contract29. 
4.3.1. Roles and responsibilities 
The degree of managerial involvement in IT service provision varies principally 
with the type of governance structure. As explained in chapter 2, section 8.1, the 
more discrete the transaction (i. e. toward the left of the governance continuum of 
Figure 5.1) the less involved the organisational and managerial arrangements 
needed. For example, off-the-shelf purchases of hardware and software are 
handled periodically in a fairly standardised fashion by a small number of people 
in the customer organisation. Project development contracts require greater 
managerial attention and involvement to monitor progress and handle changes. 
Both users and IT staff (e. g. analysts) need to coordinate their efforts with the 
development team. With fixed term contracts (inside contracting) the contractors 
are essentially embodied in the organisational hierarchy albeit on different terms as 
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compared to company employees. Both with internal organisation and with long 
term contracts, various organisational structures and processes are set up at the 
interface between customer and provider. The following paragraphs emphasise this 
case as it is the most complicated. 
Typically, at the lower level, the vendor would have some people managing daily 
service delivery. On the customer side, there would be one or more persons acting 
as 'user representatives'. These people are assigned to individual services or groups 
of services and they act as supervisors of everyday operations. In the case of systems 
development projects, their roles may extend to participation in cooperative project 
teams. 
Above that level, are the people who manage the supply relationship. These 
managers constitute the main link between users, senior management and the 
provider. They constitute focal points in the relationship. Their role is to monitor 
the execution of the contract, and initiate corrective action whenever necessary. 
Among other responsibilities, this involves managing the incentive mechanisms, 
collecting and reviewing performance information, following up user complaints 
and negotiating with the provider(s). They are also the first level at which 
contingencies and potential disputes are dealt with, 
On top of the relationship managers, each side has a managerial hierarchy, its 
purpose being to integrate the various tasks and activities with the rest of each 
party's business and deploy the respective authority and bargaining positions when 
matters cannot be resolved at lower levels. Under normal circumstances these 
higher level managers intervene less often. Issues referred to those levels include 
the strategic and long-term evolution of the relationship, contract amendments and 
renegotiations or extensive contingencies and disputes. 
29 See the discussion on relational contracting in chapter 2, section 2.1 and the comments on the role 
of corporate culture examined in footnotes 27 and 28 above. 
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The roles outlined above mirror the common denominator of the structures 
observed at BP, as described in chapter 4, section 7.2. In general terms, these three 
levels of roles are similar in both internal IT organisation and long term relational 
contracts. In the former case, the IT supply contract is implicit and is almost 
continuously adapted and renegotiated between user and IT management. 
Another parameter affecting the degree of managerial involvement is the 
uncertainty associated with a given service or technology. A new, immature 
technology which is relied upon for significant business benefits, naturally attracts 
substantial managerial attention until it stabilises and can be reliably delegated to 
an internal or external support team. Videoconferencing was such a case for BP 
Oil for a period of time when wide area networks were used for batch data 
transfers. Internet and related technologies may also attract similar managerial 
attention in those organisations that are trying to integrate them to the mainstream 
of their activity. 
To summarise, this section reiterates the managerial roles observed in BP. An 
attempt has been made to place these observations within a broader theoretical 
context, covering a wider range on the governance continuum. 
4.3.2. Co-ordination and communication mechanisms 
Communication and coordination requirements of governance structures range 
from trivial on the left of the governance continuum (Figure 5.1) to very elaborate 
towards the right hand side. Within long term relational contracts and internal 
organisation, communication and co-ordination occurs both horizontally across 
the interface and vertically within the organisational hierarchy of each party. We 
can usefully conceptualise three broad classes of information exchanges which also 
correspond to different hierarchical levels. First, daily operational information 
about service level achievement and respective problems, second, aggregate 
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information on performance, the operation of the incentive mechanisms and 
persistent problems and third, long term and strategic considerations. 
Steering committees in internal IT organisations and joint boards in outsourcing 
contracts are equivalent structures providing top level coordination. Such bodies 
meet at regular intervals to provide top level direction and make corrective 
adjustments to the ongoing relationship. 
It is at these joint bodies and at other interaction points that the managerial style 
and organisational culture play a crucial role in facilitating the co-operation and 
resolution of decisions for which it is impossible to make contractual provisions in 
advance. These are decisions related to adaptations to changing circumstances and 
occurring contingencies that are unpredictable at the time the contract is written. 
The size and complexity of the interface between client and supplier in terms of 
number of people and contact (interaction) points affects both the organisational 
costs as well as the effectiveness of IT provision. Whilst necessary structures for the 
collection and dissemination of information and decision making, they are also 
sources of bargaining and influence costs30. The presence of high asset specificity 
and/or uncertainty generates a considerable co-ordination burden that requires 
complex structures and processes. It is expected that as a given governance 
structure evolves and matures, organisational learning, operational knowledge and 
mutual trust develop and should enable the simplification of the interface. 
30 When there are open channels of communication between decision makers and other parties, and 
the latter have private information and/or divergent interests, they will dissipate resources trying to 
influence the decision outcomes to their own private benefit. These are influence costs (chapter 2, 
section 4.2, paragraph 8). While open communication channels are necessary for informed decision 
making, appropriate governance mechanisms (including, for example, decentralisation and 
corporate culture) are needed to mitigate influence costs. 
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BP would have preferred to contract with one entity, if the European Court allowed 
it (chapter 4, section 8, paragraph 6). Instead, BP's contracts make one of the 
suppliers responsible for all problems and failures at any given site, even if they are 
due to a third party's omissions or actions. This provision is in place so that 
influence activities and coordination problems might be minimised (chapter 4, 
section 7.1, paragraph 12 and section 8, paragraph 10). Even so, because of the 
multitude of different contracts service various business units in one site, the 
communication and coordination arrangements were found to be excessively 
complicated. BP and SEMA were looking for ways to simplify the interface (chapter 
4, section 7.2, last paragraph). 
To summarise, this section addresses the interaction taking place between client 
and supplier in the course of service provision. Various review meetings and 
coordination procedures were observed, including some reflections on their 
effectiveness. An attempt is made to reconsider these issues from a more general 
perspective. Clearly, the observations made at BP and the present discussion are 
largely limited to long term service contracts, as opposed to other forms of 
governance such as requirements contracting. Having said that, long term service 
contracts provide a good demonstration of their relationality and their similarity to 
internal organisation. 
4.3.3. Locus and scope of decision making 
Decision authority in discreet transactions is well demarcated and the courts 
typically handle any exceptions. In intermediate and relational governance 
structures the allocation of decision rights to the various managers and co- 
ordination bodies will have to depend on the nature of the services in terms of asset 
specificity31, on the importance of each party's decisions and investments for 
31 Transaction cost economics relates asset specificity, as a dimension of transactions, with adaptive 
capacity, as a dimension of governance structures. Greater asset specificity requires, among others, 
governance structures with the capacity to adapt cooperatively (as opposed to autonomously). 
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service provision32 and on any benefits of specialisation in knowledge and 
information33. 
Four authority roles are identified by Galbraith (1977), in decreasing order of 
authority power, namely, responsibility, approval, consultation and informing. The 
allocation of each of these types of authority may have to be specified for every task 
or decision, depending on the complexity of the service, of the governance and of 
the supplier-customer interface. They may be allocated to the same or different 
persons or organisational bodies (e. g. committees). Purely technical decisions 
would be the responsibility of the provider. Major technological or organisational 
decisions may require the approval of the client organisation. The provider would 
also have an informational consulting role on user-specific issues. 
The juxtaposition of the four stages of decision making (Jensen and Meckling 1983, 
see also chapter 2, section 4.2), namely initiation, ratification, implementation and 
monitoring is useful in putting matters into perspective. With both internal and 
external service provision, all four stages are, in general, shared by users and the 
provider. Either users or the provider may initiate a change or a new development 
and both parties have to approve the business and technical implications 
respectively of the decision before it is implemented. Only certain supply-side 
decisions are decided upon by the provider alone. The implementation of most 
decisions has both technical and organisational aspects. Progress and performance 
Cooperative adaptation mechanisms include joint decision making structures and processes for 
private dispute resolution. See chapter 2, section 3.3, mainly paragraph 4 and section 3.4, paragraphs 
8-9. 
32 Reference is made here to positive agency theory and the theory of incomplete contracts, which 
relate asset ownership with decision rights for incentive purposes. See chapter 2, section 4.2, 
paragraph 4 and section 5, paragraph 4. 
33 As explained in chapter 2, section 6, mainly paragraphs 5-6, the collection and processing of 
information and knowledge is a costly activity. Appropriate distribution of monitoring and decision 
making authority (e. g. central or distributed control) can improve the efficiency of the process. 
247 
Chapter Five: Service Clustering and Governance Establishment (S-CAGE) 
monitoring is also a joint responsibility, depending on the respective costs. In 
general though, as noted above, more technically oriented decisions are in the area 
of responsibility of the provider while business specific decisions are handled by 
users. 
However, such distinctions are not always clear. Not only is the nature of decisions 
inherently mixed but when the IT department is a profit centre (or when there is an 
external supplier), the two parties also share residual claims (the net benefits of the 
implemented decisions). Where cost effective measures of the interface between the 
business and the technical side are available, decision authority and responsibility 
can be clearly allocated by a nearly discrete contract. The contract will stipulate 
deliverables and performance. Where such separation is not possible, the contract 
(if there is one) would have to make allowances for joint decision making. BP's 
contracts (the framework agreement) make explicit provisions for renegotiation 
and adaptation of services and service level requirements and for the resolution of 
disputes (chapter 4, section 7, paragraphs 3 and 11). These provisions are 
essentially decision making processes, involving staff from both parties. 
The decision making structures instituted as part of the governance must have clear 
objectives and authorities. The problems that BP faced with the operation of the 
Outsourcing Review Board (chapter 4, section 7.2, paragraph 6) show that all the 
elements of governance, including decision making bodies, must be justified on 
grounds of effectiveness and/or efficiency. In other words, such structures must 
either add value (e. g. by generating improvements in services and their 
management) or mitigate transaction costs (e. g. alleviate information asymmetry 
through monitoring and incentives). 
The system of service level measurement described in previous sections generates a 
large amount of information which can potentially become valuable in improving 
both the organisation and management of service provision as well as the services 
themselves. Appropriate communication channels are needed to collect and feed all 
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this information to the decision making bodies of both parties for continuous 
process and service improvement. Dedicated reviews may also be instituted. This is 
how service level requirements and performance monitoring can create value as 
discussed in section 4.1.2. BP explicitly recognised the need to improve the 
usefulness of the performance reports, beyond their instrumental role in the 
reward and penalty (grief point) mechanisms (chapter 4, section 7.1, paragraph 6 
and section 8, paragraph 12). 
To summarise, this section attempts to combine theoretical insights with case study 
evidence on the allocation of decision making authority for contract management. 
It is interesting to note that the stylised conditions studied in formal economic 
models do not apply directly in practice, where a much higher degree of 
complexity is observed. In particular, we find that in practice, residual claims do 
not rest solely with one or the other party. Inasmuch as compensation is fixed and 
supplemented with formal rewards and penalties, the supplier is the residual 
claimant. Simultaneously though, there are price adjustment mechanisms 
addressing possible changes, and there are limited liability clauses protecting the 
supplier. These provisions render the client residual claimant. As a result, the 
allocation of decision management and decision control is not straightforward, as 
suggested by the positive theory of agency. The actual allocation of decision rights 
depends on the substantive nature of the decisions themselves and on additional 
factors such as information costs, influence costs and the potential to create value- 
added from these decisions. BP shared decision management and decision control 
tasks with the suppliers in different ways for different tasks. 
5. Conclusions 
This chapter went into considerable detail to elaborate a compact idea: the 
governance of IT provision should be established by considering a number of 
contractual, organisational and other elements in conjunction with the 
characteristics of the services. Because of the variety and inter-relationships among 
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technologies, systems and services, they should be clustered in such a way that the 
different governance structures assigned to each cluster strike a balance between 
specialising the governance to the characteristics of services and taking advantage 
of synergies (minimising coordination cost). These recommendations are arrived at 
by assessing the relevance and applicability of the theories reviewed in chapter 2 to 
the contracts observed during the case study at BP (chapter 4). 
As requirements, technologies, perceptions and market conditions change over 
time, companies strive to maintain lowest costs and highest quality of services. This 
requires a degree of flexibility in governance. Flexibility in the organisation of IT 
provision can be considered at two levels. First, internal flexibility lies within a 
given governance structure. When a change or contingency occurs, the existing 
arrangements may be able to accommodate it. With a commodity product which 
has few learning or lock-in effects, the market will adjust prices and product 
specifications. Such an example might be the supply of PCs. Upgrades and price 
reductions in the market are readily transferred to the client through the same 
supply contract with limited or no negotiations (autonomous adaptation, chapter 2, 
section 3.3, paragraph 4). The same simple type of supply arrangement cannot 
provide similar flexibility when complex services are involved. Bespoke software 
development cannot be provided through a similar contract as PC supply. Changes 
in requirement or technical obstacles cannot be dealt with because there is no 
market price neither for the software itself nor for changes and obstacles. More 
involved structures are needed wherein management discretion and intervention 
are employed to reorganise and reschedule the project (cooperative adaptation, 
chapter 2, section 3.3, paragraph 4). 
Second, external flexibility lies in the ability to switch governance structure or 
supplier altogether. When internal flexibility is insufficient (i. e. when the self- 
enforcing range of the contract is exhausted, chapter 2, section 1, paragraph 13), 
companies must be able to switch to another form of governance and/or to another 
supplier. External flexibility is an inverse measure of the cost of switching. 
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Changing PC supplier is relatively easy because contracts are straightforward and 
the product is standard. Changing software developer amidst development is next 
to impossible because the product and to a lesser extent the technical knowledge 
are specific to the customer and the supplier respectively. Vertical or lateral 
integration can be a result of the adaptive failure of such a contract. 
The more long-term, complex and specific the governance of IT provision, the less 
its external flexibility. In such cases though there is usually more scope for internal 
flexibility. The two are, up to a certain extent, interchangeable. For example, it is 
very costly to terminate and replace a long term total outsourcing agreement 
because the two parties are closely tied to each other: the supplier has made specific 
investments for the particular contract and the customer essentially relies its 
business on the particular skills the incumbent supplier has developed. External 
flexibility is therefore limited. Such agreements however include (or should 
include) complex provisions for dealing with uncertainty via managerial 
intervention or third-party arbitration without reaching termination. Such 
mechanisms ensure internal flexibility. 
The application of S-CAGE (or more generally the management of the governance 
portfolio) should be seen as an ongoing process rather than a one-off exercise. The 
framework provides the means both for making continuous assessment as well as 
for achieving the flexibility required to implement adjustments. 
The S-CAGE framework provides a basis for organising the relevant economic 
literature. Table 5.1 summarises the correspondence of the theories of chapter 2 
with the three layers of governance in S-CAGE (Figure 5.4). Based on the BP 
experience, the framework also proposes a strategy for tackling the problem of IT 
governance in practice and highlights a number of particular issues that need to be 
taken into account. Further evidence of the usefulness of S-CAGE in analysing and 
understanding practical issues is presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX Outsourcing Practices 
1. Introduction 
The S-CAGE framework was introduced in the previous chapter as a normative 
framework for setting up the governance of IT service provision. As such, it can 
also be used as a means of analysing, understanding and communicating the 
governance of IT provision in a given setting with the aim of assessing and, 
possibly, adjusting some of its elements. This chapter presents a description and 
assessment of IT outsourcing practices in two companies, namely, ICI and Anglian 
Water, in order to demonstrate and evaluate the use of the framework as a 
descriptive and analytical instrument. In each company the relevant information 
has been collected by interviewing a key individual and reviewing relevant 
documents. An open-ended interview guide was prepared for use in both cases (see 
appendix). The interview guide follows the structure of the three layers and sub- 
layers of governance presented in chapter 5, section 4. The issues raised and the 
questions asked reflect the arguments that are elaborated in chapter 5, sections4.1 
to 4.3. 
Unless it is employed in a new start-up company where IT is introduced anew, any 
attempt to use S-CAGE would have to start from an assessment of the arrangements 
already in place. This is how the two cases that follow have been approached. As a 
first step, the mapping of the existing governance portfolio reveals the main policy 
followed and the implicit clustering of services that has been established. Each 
cluster (contract) can then be subject to analysis of its governance details, which, 
in turn, can subsequently provide a basis for changes. 
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The methodological basis for these case studies has been discussed in detail in 
chapter 3. Briefly, their purpose is to assess the theoretical power of the S-CAGE 
framework in alternative contexts, other than that in BP which informed its 
formation. This chapter does not constitute a formal test of the proposed 
framework in the mainstream positivist sense, for two main reasons. First, although 
the framework has been presented in a normative way, it is not tested in a complete 
reorganisation of IT provision. This would entail serious practical difficulties. 
Second, it does not cover a broad sample of organisations and contracts. Both 
contracts examined are for data centre services. Therefore, there is ample scope for 
trying out the framework in many different kinds of contracts along the 
governance continuum (including internal organisation), for different kinds of 
services. 
What these case studies achieve, is to demonstrate the S-CAGE framework in 
action, in organising, interpreting and assessing the multitude of elements 
comprising the governance of outsourcing arrangements. Outsourcing contracts 
are lengthy and complex documents where the management implications of their 
various clauses are confounded by the enormous detail and esoteric jargon of their 
style. At the very least, S-CAGE is a framework for organising and understanding 
all the elements of governance in a relevant manner, from a management 
perspective. However, the value added is in interpreting and assessing the elements 
of governance (contractual provisions and management processes) and in 
highlighting their implications (and possible alternative configurations), on the 
basis of pertinent economic theories. 
At the outset, the two companies examined here have adopted outsourcing for the 
same purpose, namely to facilitate the transition from a mainframe to a client- 
server computing environment. The case evidence corroborates several similarities 
expected in the structure of contracts. For example, the structure of compensation 
and the formal incentive systems are very similar. However, there are differences 
that merit closer examination. The most important difference is in the service 
clustering strategy adopted by each company. 
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In the following sections, the cases of ICI and Anglian Water are considered in 
turn. The presentation of each case follows the structure of the S-CAGE framework. 
Some general background information on the company and their IT outsourcing 
practices is followed by a description of the respective governance portfolio. The 
discussion of the governance portfolio reveals the implicit clustering of services 
and the reasons/causes of its pattern. One outsourcing contract is subsequently 
selected for an analysis of its governance details. The governance details are 
categorised following the three layers of governance (Figure 5.4). A critical 
commentary on the findings completes each case. Finally, the concluding section 
outlines the lessons learned and draws some implications for the usefulness of the 
framework. 
2. Corporate IT Outsourcing Practices At ICI 
Imperial Chemical Industries Plc (ICI) is one of the largest companies researching, 
manufacturing and selling paints, materials, explosives and industrial chemicals. It 
has operations in over 15 countries world-wide with a total group turnover of 
£10.5 billion in 1996. Over the past two years, the Group has been implementing 
major restructuring projects involving divestiture of certain businesses and 
acquisition of others. Broadly, their aim has been to shift the company's portfolio 
away from cyclical industrial chemicals and towards market segments with high 
growth potential, namely specialty chemicals addressing specific customer needs. 
This intense restructuring activity, which made regular headlines in the business 
press, has limited the access to IT management for the purposes of this research. 
The main contact has been made with the Group IT Manager. Consequently, the 
emphasis in this discussion is from the corporate point of view. A contract 
document for data centre services was also made available. 
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2.1. Strateg/c direction 
The strategic direction for IT in ICI stems from the business strategy, which defines 
key business processes and a set of strategic capabilities for each process. IT is 
considered almost a commodity and is expected to support and facilitate these 
capabilities. An essential skill for ICI, developed and maintained in-house, is 
Information Management. With this term ICI is referring to a small cadre of 
approximately 100 people across the Group with both technical and business 
expertise who can blend business requirements and technical opportunities. Their 
skills are critical in, among other processes, the context of writing and managing 
IT procurement contracts and particularly service level agreements. 
For different ICI businesses, there have been various imperatives for outsourcing. 
Overall, none of ICI systems or services are perceived as critical or core to the 
organisation. As a result, the directive at a strategic level is that ICI does not want 
to maintain a capability for delivering technical services and therefore all IT 
systems and services are candidates for outsourcing. It then becomes a question of 
what can the market provide and under what conditions. Indeed, for the Group IT 
Manager the primary driver for outsourcing is the marketplace, the capabilities 
offered by vendors and the conditions of competition. ICI's present IT governance 
portfolio appears to be fairly fragmented and ICI faces the burden of integrating 
and coordinating suppliers. ICI envisages the possibility of being able to procure 
whole IT `processes' from a competitive market in the future, although it is 
recognised that the idiosyncratic nature of systems and services, as well as the 
structure of the market, impedes such approaches at present. 
Outsourcing exercises at the corporate level are led by a steering group, headed by 
the Group IT Manager. The steering group directs a number of professionals who 
look after different aspects of the process. Four categories of management skills are 
important for ICI in the context of outsourcing. First, commercial purchasing and, 
second, negotiation and legal skills are typically found to be serving various 
business activities within the organisation. Third, information management skills 
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and, fourth, contract management skills are being developed among IT managers 
within the company. It is clear to ICI that the management effort involved in 
setting up and managing service contracts varies from one service to another. For 
example, wide area networks are ranked first, data centres second and new system 
developments third, in increasing order of complexity and management effort. This 
ranking can be interpreted to correspond to an increasing order of asset specificity 
involved in each case. Although this terminology is not being used at ICI and 
despite the perception of IT as commodity, the pragmatic implications of specificity 
are clearly understood and acted upon. 
Examples of other approaches to outsourcing within the ICI group include ICI 
Paints in Europe. They have contracted with CSC for consultancy, implementation 
and management services for the transition from legacy systems to a distributed 
architecture. The main focus has been on the transition process. For the purposes 
of this contract, CSC undertook the operation of existing mid-range systems and 
parts of the management of existing contracts with Origin (for access to the Data 
Centres) and other suppliers. CSC also takes full responsibility for the new systems 
and applications. 
ICI Films in North America contracted with EDS for a similar set of services 
(running existing mid-range systems, consulting and implementation of new 
developments). However, the driver in this case appears to have been a 
dissatisfaction with existing operations and the desire for fresh thinking, new skills 
and new value adding opportunities from IT. For this purpose a member of the EDS 
team sits in on the IS strategy meetings of the business. This practice comes in 
sharp contrast with the opinion held at the corporate centre in London, that 
suppliers of systems and services should not be involved in decision making. 
However, by forging such a collaboration, EDS is more likely to deliver business- 
specific, value-adding innovations from which suppliers are deterred under the 
`arms-length' relationships in more usual outsourcing contracts (see relevant 
discussion in chapter 5, section 4.2 and chapter 7, section 5). Further details on 
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this contract were not available to make possible a better assessment of the 
significance of EDS's participation in ICI North America's IT strategy meetings. 
2.2. Governance porffollo 
At the corporate level, ICI is managing several IT contracts. Their overall 
governance portfolio across the organisation appears to be fragmented, as they 
procure data centre services, wide area networks, help desks, desktops, servers, 
software and individual projects separately. One reason for not having everything 
under a single large contract is that in this way they try to maintain competitive 
procurement deals. Another stated reason is that the capabilities of suppliers to 
provide integrated services are not considered to be adequate at present. It also 
appears to be the case that as ICI is a diversified group, individual businesses have 
a fairly high degree of autonomy in selecting their own technical standards and 
procurement policies. This fragmented structure has, admittedly, been a source of 
concern. ICI is responsible for ensuring service integration and supplier 
coordination. In most cases, one supplier is `given the lead' to handle integration 
and coordination. A similar practice was also observed at BP (chapter 4) where one 
of the suppliers was being held responsible for all operations at a given site, 
although some services were provided by others. Alternatively, a third party may 
be hired with the mandate to manage the interface between ICI and the existing IT 
supply chain. Such practices are employed to economise on coordination costs, an 
issue discussed in the context of clustering in chapter 5. The main outsourcing 
contracts under the control of the corporate centre are described below. 
Wide area networks (WAN) are provided under three contracts, covering Europe, 
US and Asia/Australia respectively. Approximately 20 people world-wide are 
responsible for managing both the commercial aspects of the contracts as well as 
the integration of technical platforms and suppliers. Of particular concern to them 
is the provision of Lotus Notes operability across their global networks. WAN 
contracts have 2-3 years duration and ICI are constantly seeking competitive prices 
in the market. Appropriate pricing clauses have been included in the respective 
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contracts, which, in general, specify the right of ICI to market-test the prices 
offered by incumbent suppliers and seek adjustments. 
Desktop support and help desks are organised in a variety of ways across the 
group. Local area networks and help desks in Europe, one level below the 
corporate centre, are organised under a single contract. The next outsourcing 
project being planned at the time of the interviews would include high level 
servers, comprising software and equipment lying between WAN, data centres and 
the desktop. 
Data centre operations shared by a number of ICI businesses in Europe have been 
contracted out to the Dutch company Origin. Origin has been given the option to 
bid competitively for new developments on distributed systems and has been 
successful in winning some of them. By the time the contract expires in 2001, the 
existing mainframe operations are expected to have been phased out. This 
transition is implemented in a decentralised way, with each ICI business unit 
making its own decisions. 
The phasing out of mainframes was the main driver for outsourcing in this 
instance. Among other suppliers, origin was interested in undertaking this 
contract profitably as they were in the process of expanding their presence in the 
UK and the large data centre operations of ICI (including staff) offered a suitable 
opportunity. In contrast, other suppliers were found not to be interested in 
increasing their stock of data centre capacity and would have absorbed the costs of 
closure (redundancies etc. ) for a higher premium. ICI perceive their general policy 
to outsource in this case, as the ability to grasp a market opportunity. Having said 
that, ICI would have anyway outsourced this service on the basis of their strategic 
decision to purchase, rather than maintain internally, technical capabilities. The 
governance elements of this contract are discussed in the following section. 
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2.3. Origin contract: Governance structure 
The following analysis is based on the contract document and on related comments 
from the Group IT manager. The structure of the sections below mirrors the three 
layers of the S-CAGE framework (chapter 5, Figure 5.4) and the discussion follows 
part B of the interview guide in the appendix. The interview guide is a device for 
seeking information and subjecting it to the inspection and assessment of S-CAGE. 
As such, the interview guide was used both for conducting the interviews as well as 
for extracting relevant information out of the contract, which, like most contracts, 
is a complex and esoteric document. Following the interview guide, relevant 
information from the contract and the interviews is presented and commented 
upon, based on the respective arguments in chapter 5. 
2.3.1. Assurance of Service Delivery 
2.3.1.1. Service specification 
The contract was entered into in December 1995 for a 5-year period. This contract 
defines a number of services relating to the operation and maintenance of ICI's 
mainframes and the software running on them. It gives Origin exclusive right to 
provide these services. Although ICI asks Origin to provide a number of related and 
additional services, it reserves the right to invite tenders for such services from 
other suppliers and include Origin in the process. 
Basic services are distinguished from additional services. Basic services include 
applications maintenance and support, application enhancement, computing 
platform services (hardware, systems software etc. ) and other miscellaneous 
services. A series of detailed activities are defined under each category of basic 
services. Most of these services and activities relate to a number of software 
products, each of which supports one or more applications. Additional services 
include various development, enhancement or other change projects that were 
under way at the time of contracting, as well as similar services that ICI requests 
from time to time on an ad-hoc basis. The contract specifies that origin should 
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have available resources to support services such as systems operations (mainly 
including applications support, and facilities management), development and 
installation of new applications and IT consulting (on IT strategy, BPR etc. ), upon 
ICI's request (and according to defined contract and service change management 
procedures). 
The specificity of these services is directly manifest in the contract in two main 
ways. First, the different software owned by ICI at the time of contracting is 
classified as exclusive, restricted and unrestricted, according to the permitted 
usage, whether by licence (where the software is licensed) or otherwise. Exclusive 
software is for the exclusive use of ICI and its subsidiaries, restricted software can 
also serve other predefined companies and unrestricted software can be used to 
serve the needs of any Origin customer. 64% of the software packages listed are for 
exclusive use and 30% are unrestricted. Although the mix of human and technical 
resources required for the exclusive software may not be unique in its entirety, the 
majority percentage of such software indicates a significant degree of specificity. 
Second, the contract explicitly recognises the importance of certain key personnel 
who are essential for the proper provision of the services. Origin is asked to retain 
that staff for a period of six months into the contract to support the services. In 
particular, key personnel include 19 staff, mainly functional analysts and team 
leaders/managers. 
In addition to the above two explicit manifestations of service specificity, 
throughout the contract, four further elements implying the existence of asset 
specificity are identified among these provisions. First, controlled access to 
premises (site specificity), second, minimum threshold of payments (a form of 
`hostage"), third, intangible assets and know-how (human asset specificity) and 
1 See chapter 2, section 3.4, paragraphs 11-12 and chapter 5, section 4.2, footnote 19 and 
accompanying text. 
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finally, segregation and disentangling of networks in cases of sale of business units 
(physical asset specificity). 
A final indication of asset specificity is a provision that prohibits either party to 
employ any of the other party's staff. Anecdotal evidence suggests that as certain 
client or vendor employees accumulate knowledge of the other party's business 
during the course of service provision, they become indispensable to that other 
party (human asset specificity), which often attempts to employ them. Whereas the 
accumulation of such knowledge is desirable and important for purposes of 
effectiveness and efficiency, the prospect of such shift of employment induces the 
original employer to discourage knowledge accumulation by means of job rotation 
and other tactics. Appropriate contractual clauses such as the one reviewed here 
restore incentives and mitigate opportunism. 
In terms of uncertainty, data centre operations are generally considered fairly 
stable services. Computer processing volumes (CPU times, disk storage etc. ) for 
basic services and man-days for additional services were forecasted at the time of 
contracting for each of the five years of the duration of the contract. On the basis 
of these forecasts, ICI was bound to pay for a minimum threshold of consumption 
in each year. This demonstrates low perceived uncertainty for these services. 
Having said that, the major source of uncertainty for IT services at ICI during the 
last few years has been the intense restructuring activity at corporate level. As 
mentioned in section 2.1 above, ICI has been divesting business units and 
acquiring other businesses in an effort to reorient its portfolio. Since data centre 
operations serve many business units within the Group, such restructuring has had 
a profound effect on the nature and quantity of demand for IT services. The 
contract makes a series of provisions for managing and adjusting to such changes 
and a recent amendment to the contract (in February 1998) revised, among others, 
the forecasted quantities for each of the remaining years as a result of corporate 
restructuring. 
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A lengthy set of provisions specifies how changes of any kind (in services or in the 
terms of the contract) that are not explicitly considered in the agreement, are to be 
initiated, negotiated, agreed, documented and implemented. Of course, trivial 
changes that are part of the process of delivering defined services (such as 
variations in computer processing capacity volumes) are excluded from the 
specified procedure and the contract goes to significant lengths in defining what 
constitutes a (non-trivial) change. Changes to services are classified in three main 
categories, in increasing order of the extent of change. A fourth category concerns 
amendments to any of the other three, once the latter are under way. For each 
category, a process for authorising, managing and documenting the change is 
specified. Furthermore, a list of special cases as well as pricing guidelines are also 
supplied. These procedures are under the control of the management teams of both 
parties (see section 2.3.3) and have important incentive implications (see section 
2.3.2). 
In terms of transaction cost economics, the change management procedures serve 
as an adaptive mechanism (see chapter 2, section 3.3, paragraph 4). Other 
adaptive mechanisms in ICI's contract with Origin include provisions for 
benchmarking and indexing service charges, the dispute resolution procedure and 
numerous minor clauses which defer decisions to a later point in time, during 
contract execution. The management structure established in the contract (see 
section 2.3.3), is another important mechanism for adaptation to circumstances 
that arise during contract execution and that cannot be anticipated at the time of 
contracting. 
As discussed in section 2.1 above, an important rationale of the decision to 
outsource data centres was to take advantage of the scale economies achievable by 
IT suppliers, particularly in view of the fact that ICI had made the decision to phase 
out the mainframes gradually over the five-year period of the contract. Clearly, it 
would not be cost-effective for ICI to maintain a data centre operation for 
constantly declining volumes and then having to bear the costs of closure as well. 
Origin needed additional mainframe capacity to establish and expand its presence 
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in the UK. Scale economies and efficient resource utilisation, therefore, were 
important factors in this outsourcing decision. 
Resources shared among the services covered by this contract include the common 
hardware platforms, the software suites and the specific sites where the equipment 
is installed. Although not explicitly stated, the skills associated with the services are 
to a significant extent the same and generic (e. g. computer-platform operations 
and software enhancements) and are only specialised where particular hardware 
or software products are concerned and where ICI-specific knowledge of the 
business is required. Whereas the common generic skills mentioned above are, in 
principle, readily available in the market and divisible (e. g. a company can readily 
contract for a set amount of programming man-hours), it is the possibility of scope 
economies in terms of specialised skills (particularly ICI-specific) that matters most 
(see also chapter 2, section 3.4, paragraph 5). 
The interfaces among different software or systems constitute a significant part of 
each product's description. Apart from such descriptions the contract does not 
explicitly acknowledge any performance implications of inter-dependencies 
between systems and services. Having said that, express provisions are made with 
respect to the obligations of Origin to cooperate with any other suppliers who may 
provide IT services to ICI and where these services interface with Origin-provided 
services. In particular, Origin's cooperation is sought in three ways. First, to 
provide access to information, premises and networks as needed. Second, to ensure 
that systems and services are well integrated. Third, to secure the resolution and 
prevention of problems in service quality that may be attributed to the other 
supplier's operations. Although these obligations are restricted to Origin's side of 
the interface with any other service supplier, the contract seeks the positive 
collaboration of Origin in matters relating to interdependencies with services 
outside Origin's control. 
For most part, the specification of systems and services refers to the material 
conditions of how to deliver the services, as opposed to what must be delivered (in 
263 
Chapter Six: Using S-CAGE to Understand IT Outsourcing Practices 
terms of business processes). To begin with, services are charged on the basis of 
resource usage (in terms of CPU time, data storage volume, and man-days). The 
hardware and software to be used is also specified in detail. The measures 
employed for purposes of calculating performance incentives (penalties) are 
availability, reliability, response and serviceability. In comparative terms, these are 
the most user-oriented (non-technical) requirements set in the contract. Services 
are defined in terms of a series of activities, which, in turn, describe in fair detail 
how things should be carried out. For example, application maintenance and 
support services comprise eight activities (e. g. release management) and numerous 
sub-activities (e. g. handover acceptance is defined as "formal acceptance of 
maintenance & support responsibility concerning error modifications and/or 
enhancements by the basic Applications Maintenance and Support Services team") . 
In addition, the contract makes fairly extensive requirements for disaster recovery, 
implementation of the changeover, internal audit, project management and quality 
assurance. In all these respects, the contract is not limited to outcome 
requirements, but involves ICI extensively in the decisions as to how the respective 
processes are to be carried out. Although the respective provisions are typically 
extensive, in most cases the contract does not address the matter in its entirety but 
defers the decisions on particular plans of action to a later date. Origin is asked to 
draft the plans, subject to ICI's approval. These, among other, mechanisms clearly 
reflect the relationality of the contract (see chapter 2, section 2.1). Moreover, they 
reflect the measurement problems associated with defining requirements such as 
disaster recovery and quality assurance only in terms of outcomes and without 
reference to process. The contract repeatedly makes reference to best industry 
standards (which may be well defined) and draws on the judgement of third party 
experts in some cases of disagreement. These and other similar provisions, which 
make reference to results rather than process, do not appear to be adequate to 
cover all the requirements of ICI. Reference to process (howthings are done) seems 
to be necessary. 
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Throughout the contract ICI maintains effective discretion and control on what 
Origin should do and how. This discretion is primarily manifested in terms of 
approval of proposals, plans and reviews submitted by Origin and also in terms of 
initiating orders for additional or modified work. More explicitly, the contract 
specifies '%.. J J that ICI may from time to time issue directions [-. 1 ICI shall be 
entitled to require compliance with the directions as soon as reasonably practical" 
even if the relevant documents (orders) have not been formally agreed upon. This 
clause appears in the context of Origin's responsibilities for interfaces with other 
suppliers or with activities retained by ICI, but it is representative of the discretion 
retained by ICI. 
The performance incentive (penalty) scheme gives an indication of the criticality of 
services. For the purposes of performance measurement, each service level 
requirement for mainframe operations is assigned a weight. In aggregate, the 
response, availability, reliability and serviceability of on-line processing, batch 
processing and help desk support services are allocated the vast majority of weights 
(nearly 90%). For comparison, the rest of the weights are allocated to other related 
services including output handling, backups, disaster recovery, access control and 
contract management. In other words, the availability and response of mainframe 
applications is what matters most for ICI. 
2.3.1.2. Service level requirements specification 
As far as service level requirements for inputs are concerned, the contract does not 
specify the amount of human resources required for any service, with the 
exception of key personnel (see above), man-days or man-years for additional 
projects and implicitly by defining responsibilities for contract management. 
However, for purposes of pricing services, detailed marginal rates are defined for 
all resources, including human resources (where rates vary with rank) and 
computer processing resources (including CPU time, data storage volume etc. ). 
Detailed provisions are made for costing and payment calculations and procedures. 
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Agreed rates can, over time, be adjusted according to market indices and 
benchmarldng. 
ICI reserves the right to ratify all costs that are not anticipated by the agreement, 
before they are committed. Such costs include those arising from additional 
services and changes to services (covered by the change management procedures), 
as well as from items that may not be included in the agreed figures. 
As far as output measures and targets are concerned, the contract makes detailed 
specifications. For each computer platform, a series of service activities are defined 
and for each activity, one or more measures are to be applied to each software 
product. Where relevant, measures may include response, reliability, availability, 
serviceability and service hours. For each measure in each activity the following 
details are supplied: definition, required level (target), commitment period, 
measurement responsibility, reporting frequency, point of delivery, measurement 
method and other comments. In addition, user satisfaction surveys are carried out 
every six months. 
The service level measures that were in place while the data centre was operated in 
house and the average performance levels achieved by ICI have been incorporated 
into the contract. ICI and Origin agreed on a `service assessment period' of at least 
three months during which to evaluate and, if necessary, revise performance 
measures, targets and reporting methods. The contract directs the parties to 
establish revised service levels which bear the same relation to the service levels 
specified in the agreement "as the actual performance of that service over the 
service assessment period (as agreed between the parties) bears to the performance 
which is recorded in the reports produced [ .. J in respect of that service during the 
service assessment period'. In other words, because service levels in the original 
contract were set on the basis of reported performance, if the extant reports under- 
represented actual performance then service levels should be revised upwards and 
vice versa. This paragraph attempts to enable a fair and efficient revision of 
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performance targets without triggering adverse incentive consequences2. It is not 
clear how effective is this clause in doing so, but no significant problems have been 
reported in this respect. 
In another paragraph, the parties are directed to "seek to agree formats and 
measurement criteria for reports which clearly and objectively demonstrate for 
each of the services to which such reports relate, whether the required service 
levels have been attained in respect of such service". This paragraph attempts to 
ensure the completeness and precision of service level requirements (see chapter 5, 
section 4.1.2). In other words, the contract emphasises the need to devise measures 
of performance that are representative of actual performance and unambiguously 
measured so that any possibility for opportunistic misrepresentation of actual 
performance may be avoided. In the same clause, furthermore, the contract urges 
the parties to avoid opportunistic manipulation of actual or reported performance 
during the service assessment period and refers any disagreements to the dispute 
resolution procedure. 
The specifications of service level requirements include further evidence of 
completeness and precision. In order to cover different facets of a service, more 
than one metrics are introduced (e. g. response, availability and. reliability for on- 
line processing). In order to capture all aspects of performance for any one metric, 
more than one targets are set. For example, the response metric for on-line 
processing is associated with three interval targets (percentages of transactions to 
be completed within set time periods) and one overall average response time. 
The Group IT Manager is envisaging the possibility of linking the assessment of IT 
suppliers to overall business performance indicators but this is not considered 
attainable at present. The system of service level measurements is considered to be 
satisfactory and fairly comprehensive. 
2 See chapter 5, section 4.2.2, paragraph 10. 
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2.3.1.3. Service level measurement and reporting 
Service level requirements are measured either manually or with the use of 
measurement equipment and/or software. Service level targets apply to monthly, 
quarterly or annual periods. Most measures are reported monthly with few 
exceptions. Origin has responsibility for measuring and reporting the majority of 
service level requirements. Requirements pertaining to contract management (e. g. 
attendance to meetings, delivery of reports and invoices etc. ) are the exception and 
are monitored by ICI. 
Some measures are not constantly being monitored/measured but either failures 
are flagged by customer complaints or a customer complaint initiates a 
measurement and review period. Those service level requirements which are not 
regularly measured include either trivial requirements that are easily met or cases 
where failures are expected to be rare (e. g. security breaches). Either way, this 
practice serves to minimise the administrative burden (cost) of measuring and 
reporting. None of the metrics is measured at random. 
Some service level requirements are included in the calculations of performance 
incentives (penalties) but not all. Eleven out of 29 metrics are excluded from the 
performance index. These requirements constitute contractual obligations for 
Origin but most of them do not have any financial incentive implications. Metrics 
representing outages (service stoppages) are linked to financial penalties, which 
are, however, calculated in a different way (see section 2.3.2 below). Some metrics 
without financial implications are trivial (e. g. "business communication directory 
changes will be completed within two working days"). Others may not be trivial 
but the achievement of the target may be hampered by significant uncertainty (e. g. 
all metrics related to the response and accuracy of estimates and quotations for 
enhancements and additional projects). Such service activities and measures could 
be candidates for encouragement-type incentives (rewards for high performance 
rather than penalties for low performance) but such incentives are totally absent 
from this contract. The extent of financial implications of performance shortfalls 
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with respect to any metric is also an indication of the business criticality of that 
metric. 
The contract does not include any formal provisions for the verification of 
performance reports submitted by Origin. With very few exceptions, users observe 
the attainment of service level requirements in the course of their normal work, 
even though they do not take proper measurements. Therefore, painstaking and 
costly verification by ICI is not needed. Having said that, the contract specifies 
regular audits (at least yearly) to be carried out for the benefit of ICI. Moreover, ICI 
has the right to initiate limited audit investigations upon suspicion of contract 
breach or other problem in the delivery of services. 
2.3.2. Incentives for Service Level Attainment 
2.3.2.1. Implicit incentive patterns 
The audit procedures mentioned above, in combination with the possibility of 
benchmarking explicitly and in detail provided for in the contract, enable ICI to 
restore information parity whenever necessary and thus mitigate potential adverse 
incentives that might arise as a result of private information on the part of Origin. 
In addition, the contract requires ICI to provide Origin with assistance, access to 
information and to staff, to train its own staff to the proper use of the systems and 
to generally support Origin in fulfilling its contractual obligations. This clause 
serves as a deterrent of opportunism (moral hazard) from the part of ICI (see 
chapter 5, section 4.1.3 and chapter 2, section 4, paragraph 4). 
Origin's liability is mainly defined in terms of financial penalties payable to ICI, 
depending on the services affected and the extent of under-performance or 
stoppage. Origin's other liabilities are each limited to 20% of the total value of 
software products supported by Origin that year. 
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Most computing assets were leased by ICI and these leases have been transferred to 
Origin. In addition, 400 staff have been transferred under the TUPE (Transfer of 
Undertaking - Protection of Employment) regulations. Infrastructure assets (mainly 
buildings) have been leased to Origin for ten years. The contract includes extensive 
provision for the allocation of rights to the software. In short, the ownership of 
intellectual property rights for software (owned by either party or developed, 
bought or licensed from any third party) is not altered. Instead, licences to use and 
modify software are transferred or granted to Origin and ICI as necessary. An 
exception to this is software (or enhancements) that Origin may develop for the 
sole benefit of ICI during the course of the contract. Intellectual property rights 
(ownership) for such software are assigned to ICI and ICI, in turn, licences it to 
Origin as required for the provision of services. Upon contract termination, 
licences are recalled or adjusted as necessary and ICI seeks appropriate licences 
from Origin to use whole or parts of software that relates to ICI services. This 
software includes system and application software as well as system development 
tools and methodologies. 
In other words, the contractual provisions relating to the ownership of software do 
not seem to address any incentive implications of software ownership, other than 
practical matters pertaining to usage for service provision, while preserving the 
original property rights. To be sure, the contract refers to software or 
enhancements that Origin may implement in order to improve its management of 
services and considers the possibility of ICI investing in such software in 
anticipation of some agreed benefit to ICI. However, this is seen as an exceptional 
possibility, rather than an obligation or expectation. There are at least two 
conceivable reasons why incentive implications of asset ownership are ignored. 
First, in this case no revenue stream accrues to software ownership per se. Origin's 
income is defined separately in the contract and most incentives depend on the 
structure of compensation. Second, Origin's obligations are extensively defined 
elsewhere in the contract. Therefore, is less need to induce performance implicitly 
by means of asset ownership. 
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On contract termination, ICI retains the right to encourage those Origin employees 
engaged exclusively in services to ICI to take up employment with ICI. Moreover, 
the contract explicitly licenses Origin to use ICI-specific know-how. Such know- 
how and additional knowledge that Origin develops in the course of providing 
services to ICI reverts to ICI upon contract termination. Confidentiality clauses are 
in place to protect information, documentation and intellectual property rights on 
exclusive or restricted software from misuse by either party. 
According to the Group IT Manager, the greatest incentive faced by Origin is the 
prospect of more contracts with ICI businesses. Since the data centre contract is 
due to expire without renewal, given the opportunity to bid for new system 
developments, Origin values the future relationship with ICI and strives to build 
and maintain a good reputation. 
2.3.2.2. Contractual reward/penalty devices 
Origin's compensation is based on a fixed price with appropriate price escalators 
(market indices) to take into account changing market prices. This is a powerful 
incentive, typical for standard services, which is also combined with ICI's emphasis 
on market benchmarking aimed at ensuring competitive pricing. 
Having said that, charges are specified on a time and materials basis but for a set 
volume of computing and human resources. Moreover, payments to Origin are 
bounded, both at the top and bottom ends. In particular, the contract forecasts the 
volume of computing power for each of the five years of the contract in decreasing 
amounts (since the mainframes are being phased out). ICI is required to review 
demand forecasts on a quarterly basis for a rolling twelve-month period. A fixed 
value of total additional services (including projects that already were under way) 
was also agreed at the time of contracting, for the whole period of the contract. 
Unit prices were also agreed for adjusting payments to actual volume variations. 
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The contract guarantees a minimum threshold of payments equivalent to 90% of 
the forecasted volume of basic services for each year, as well as a minimum 
threshold of payments for the total value of additional services throughout the 
duration of the contract. This threshold for additional services can be reduced by 
one third of any excess revenues generated on basic services over the course of the 
contract. In the case of divestment of any ICI business unit the relevant thresholds 
are reduced proportionately, unless Origin does not continue to provide the 
services to the divested entity, in which case Origin is guaranteed 75% of the 
divested proportion of the value of the services. If actual demand exceeds the 
estimated volumes, any excess of up to 20% of the estimated value of basic services 
can be apportioned and deducted from the minimum threshold of subsequent 
years. In the case of excess actual demand, additional discounts are applied, on the 
basis of scaled proportions. Penalties for poor performance are excluded from all 
these calculations. 
A recent contract amendment revokes the minimum threshold for additional 
services, the discounts and deductions in cases of excess demand and the 
guaranteed revenues in case of divestment. Only the minimum thresholds for basic 
services are sustained. These amendments are associated with extensive corporate 
restructuring that has been taking place in ICI over recent years. 
Two kinds of explicit performance incentives are defined in the contract. First, a 
penalty system deters Origin from falling short on the set performance targets 
(`performance index rebates'). The mechanism specifies escalating percentage 
charges on the business value of the software, depending on the type and severity 
of the each performance shortfall. Fourteen metrics on the quality of service 
delivered, are measured with respect to each of the software products. Two 
additional metrics relate to contract management. For each metric, defined ranges 
of actual performance are classified as `marginally deficient', 'deficient' and 
`seriously deficient', depending on the respective targets. A percentage is assigned 
to each performance category, namely 3%, 7.5% and 20% respectively. Each metric 
is also assigned a relative weighting. The penalty for poor performance in any 
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metric for any software product is calculated as the product of the deemed value of 
the software product to the business for the given review month (if the metric is 
reviewed monthly), the weighting of the metric and the performance category 
percentage. 
Second, Origin is liable to pay penalties for outages (unavailability) with respect to 
any application. An outage is defined to commence when response time rises 
higher than a set level (including total unavailability). Penalties (`liquidated 
damages') are payable when an outage or a series of outages last more than a 
defined period of time, during defined working hours. Charges are defined for 
each software product in an increasing scale for each day of outage. A premium 
charge is applied with respect to some applications for outages occurring at the 
end of a month (when demand and criticality are greater). 
Performance index rebates are limited for any one month to 2.5% of the total value 
of the software products for the given year. In addition, Origin's total yearly 
liability to pay any penalties is limited to 14% of the same value. The application of 
the two kinds of penalties is exclusive (i. e. not additive) with respect to any one 
application or software product and the penalty of highest value is applicable. 
Whenever any penalty is payable, Origin has to take action to correct the problem 
and to prevent it from recurring. If penalties become payable repeatedly within 
defined rolling periods then ICI can treat this occurrence as consistent failure and 
examine the option of terminating the whole or part (i. e. certain services) of the 
contract on grounds of breach. 
All explicit incentives are deterrent (penalising), as opposed to encouraging 
(rewarding) incentives. As mentioned in section 2.3.1 above, there are some 
service level requirements involving considerable uncertainty, which would be 
suitable for encouragement-type incentives. However, if such service level 
requirements are few and exceptional the impact of the incentive on Origin's total 
compensation would be negligible. Therefore its effectiveness would be constrained 
and it may not have been worth the contracting and administrative costs. 
273 
Chapter Six: Using S-CAGE to Understand IT Outsourcing Practices 
2.3.2.3. Other contractual and organisational safeguards 
According to the Group IT Manager, ICI is satisfied both with the operation of the 
penalty mechanism and the performance of Origin, as no serious problems have 
occurred. The most important incentive for Origin is its reputation within ICI, 
which arises from the possibility of Origin bidding for and winning contracts for 
new system developments throughout the group. Both parties value and rely on the 
personal relations between contract managers for the smooth operation of services 
and the successful fulfilment of the contract. 
ICI considers the change management procedure as effective in controlling 
opportunistic charging of work as out of the scope of the contract. This is further 
evidence of the relationality of the contract, which attempts to curb opportunism 
through ex post adaptive processes rather that ex ante incentives. 
Finally, the contract defines in detail the conditions under which it can be 
terminated by either party. Extensive terms are also included for managing the 
transition to a new service provision regime, in case of termination of part or 
whole of the contract. The conditions of termination include, among others, the 
occurrence of a consistent failure. However, consistent failures are extreme 
situations. Besides, ICI has much to lose from a premature termination due to 
consistent failure. Therefore, the incentive effect of this clause is marginal. 
2.3.3. Organisation and Management of Service Provision 
2.3.3.1. Roles and responsibilities 
The contract defines in detail structures and processes for the management of the 
contract and the services. For this purpose, both parties commit a management 
team. Each team's and each individual's responsibilities are also specified. 
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ICI's management team comprises 2.5 (full-time equivalent) contract managers at 
the corporate level and another contract manager from each business unit. In 
addition, each business unit assigns a `system owner' occupied with overseeing the 
services associated with each software product used, from a user's point of view. 
Origin's management team comprises the relationship manager, the corporate 
account manager, the corporate contract manager, the contract managers assigned 
to ICI business units and the implementation manager. The relationship manager 
has overall responsibility for the relationship between the parties and the other 
members of Origin's team report to him. The corporate account manager is 
responsible for available services and for arranging proposals to meet ICI's 
additional requirements, according to the contract change management 
procedures. Corporate and business unit contract managers are responsible for 
ensuring Origin's compliance with the contract. The implementation manager was 
responsible for the necessary activities during changeover when the contract came 
into force. 
2.3.3.2. Coordination and communication mechanisms 
The contract also defines four regular meetings. A high level management meeting 
is aimed at reviewing the overall progress of the relationship on a quarterly basis. 
All members of both management teams are normally required to participate. 
Corporate and business unit service review meetings are held monthly to review 
compliance with the contract, service level requirements and plans for the next 
period. All corporate and business unit contract managers attend the corporate 
service review meetings whereas only the relevant contract managers attend 
business unit service review meetings. Product review meetings by business unit 
are held monthly or as needed to review issues specific to a particular software 
product. The relevant business unit contract managers and system owners attend 
these meetings. 
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Monthly performance is managed `by exception' to minimise the effort spent on 
monitoring. In other words, performance reviews are rather trivial processes, 
focusing on any problems that may occur, rather than painstakingly examining 
every aspect of performance. This requires, first, that service level requirements be 
fairly standardised and stable, second, that the performance measurement system is 
considered sufficiently efficacious third, that recurrent or persistent problems are 
not common and fourth, performance is not misrepresented. The inherently 
standard and predictable nature of data centre operations facilitates this 
economising approach to performance monitoring. 
2.3.3.3. Locus and scope of decision making 
Another important decision making process is the change management procedure 
which sets out in detail how changes to the contract or the services can be initiated, 
negotiated, agreed and implemented (as described in section 2.3.1 above). System 
owners can initiate some enhancements but the procedures are mainly carried out 
by business unit contract managers and controlled by Origin's corporate account 
manager and ICI's corporate contract manager. 
An appeals procedure (escalation process) has been instituted that refers serious 
problems in service levels up to the level of the ICI Group IT Manager and Origin's 
Relationship Manager, who use their authority and direction to restore service 
provision. A dispute resolution procedure is separately set up to handle 
disagreements of any kind (e. g. with respect to applicable charges or the actual 
service performance). Such disagreements are in the first instance raised at a 
regular or extraordinary 'management meeting. If no agreement is reached, the 
matter is referred to senior business managers from both parties (e. g. finance 
directors) who are asked to "cooperate in good faith to resolve the dispute as 
amicably as possible". The last resort before litigation in court is to engage third 
party mediators and/or experts, depending on the nature of the dispute. 
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Clearly, the contract makes every effort to prevent costly litigation which is also 
likely to have implications for service quality. Again, this is evidence of the 
relationality of the contract. Nevertheless, the convivial personal relations among 
the management teams of both sides are considered to be a more powerful means 
of resolving problems. This is a reference to the power of compatible corporate 
cultures (as defined in chapter 2, section 7 and included in S-CAGE in chapter 5, 
sections 4.2.1,4.2.3 and 4.3.2) to address contingencies that arise as a result of 
contractual incompleteness. 
During the first year into the contract, the focus of the contract management 
team's work at the corporate level has been to manage the transition from the in- 
house operation to the outsourced organisation and eliminate any problems. 
During the second year, emphasis shifted to sustaining competitive supply, mainly 
through market benchmarking. Half-way into the contract, a review has been 
initiated at the corporate level with a view to adjusting existing arrangements and 
strengthening the `partnership' with Origin. A shifting emphasis of management 
attention over time is, therefore, apparent. 
2.4. Comments 
The view from the top as presented by the Group IT Manager appears to lend 
credence to the neoclassical economic argument that the division of labour grows 
with the size of the market. ICI appear to be making their strategic IT procurement 
decisions on the basis of market capabilities and competitive conditions. These can 
be seen as evolving over time with the growth of the IT market and the 
standardisation of technologies and systems. 
Issues of asset specificity enter into the relevant decisions indirectly. Every 
organisation, in the process of demarcating their strategic core processes and 
capabilities implicitly define what is unique (i. e. specific) and what is not. 
Moreover, the capabilities offered by the supply market are in part (or at least at 
equilibrium) determined by the size of the respective demand. The unavailability of 
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a competitive market for a given service can be an approximation for the 
specificity of that service (assuming that the market does not face any other 
distortions). In any case, whether asset specificity and related microanalytic 
considerations have played a role in ICI's strategic decisions to pursue outsourcing 
or not (a binary decision), they have been pertinent in structuring the contracts. 
The case of ICI suggests that neoclassical economics and microanalytic institutional 
alternatives can be usefully distinguished in terms of the level of analysis to which 
they refer. Inasmuch as strategic decisions between in-house provision and 
external procurement are based on an aggregate and more long term perspective, 
neoclassical microeconomics may provide sufficient explanations. Accordingly, the 
microanalytic stance of the S-CAGE framework turns out to be more relevant to the 
exact structuring of governance, given the strategic direction. Findings presented 
here highlight the bottom-up orientation of the S-CAGE framework which makes it 
pertinent to the study of contractual provisions. However, this is not to say that the 
latter considerations do not inform and do not have an impact on the strategic 
decision. This argument makes an important qualification to the theoretical basis 
developed in the conclusion of chapter 2. In other words, whereas there may be 
microanalytic imperatives for organising IT provision in one way or another, the 
strategic decision depends on an array of other parameters as well. 
By isolating data centre operations from any other services, ICI has managed to set 
up a relatively more discrete contract as compared to total outsourcing 
arrangements. The initial competitive bidding process has led to a fixed price 
contract that maximises incentive intensity. The latter is further strengthened by 
commitment to market benchmarking. This has been possible due to the 
comparatively standard nature of data centre operations that can be matched 
against comparable operations in the market. Despite the costs of switching 
suppliers and the resultant advantage that Origin has as the incumbent supplier3, 
3 The extent of the comparative power of Origin as the incumbent supplier and the corresponding 
costs of switching to an alternative supplier is a measure of the investments involved. The 
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asset specificity is relatively low. Moreover, the structure of the penalty system and 
Origin's limited liability show that service level requirements are fairly 
straightforward, involving relatively little uncertainty. There are too few uncertain, 
company-specific or innovative requirements to justify an encouragement-type 
(reward-based) incentive (see section 4.2.2 in chapter 5). 
The opinion of the Group IT Manager also highlights the importance and operation 
of reputation effects (see chapter 2, section 7 and chapter 5, section 4.2.1). Origin 
values the future relationship with ICI as they have the opportunity to win 
additional contracts, given that current operations will be discontinued. To that 
extent, ICI can trust that Origin will continue delivering high quality of service. 
The calculative nature of trust is, therefore, manifest. The role of culture is also 
highlighted by the importance attached to the personal relations among contract 
managers of both parties in terms of resolving conflicts (see section 4.3.2 in 
chapter 5). 
Overall, it is evident that most of the questions asked in the interview guide were 
answered as expected by the S-CAGE framework. A few important unanticipated 
results are discussed in the conclusion to this chapter (section 4). The contract 
provides a wealth of information, albeit it is structured in a legalistic way that does 
not lend itself to immediate interpretation from the point of view of S-CAGE. A 
significant amount of investigation and cross-examination of the different 
schedules and clauses included in the text is required in order to arrive at informed 
answers to the questions posed in the interview guide. However, the result is 
rewarding, as it reveals mechanisms, connections and interpretations that are 
deeply hidden under the jargon and the exhaustive stipulations. 
transaction costs of negotiating another contract and installing another supplier can also be thought 
of as a consequence of the specificity of data centre operations to the respective business processes. 
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3. Total IT Outsourcing at Anglian Water 
Anglian Water Plc provides water and sewage treatment services in the UK and 
abroad. Anglian Water Services Limited is the principal subsidiary, regulated by 
the 1991 Water Industry Act. It is geographically the largest of the ten regional 
water services companies in England and Wales, serving a population of over 4 
million in the east of the country. The Group's turnover for 1997 was £837 
million, nearly £700m of which was generated by Anglian Water Services Ltd. 
Anglian Water International Limited is the other main subsidiary with operations 
predominantly in the American continent and the Far East. 
For the purposes of this research, contact has been made with the Service Manager 
of Information Services of Anglian Water Services Ltd (henceforth referred to as 
AW). This is the key person leading the management of a major IT outsourcing 
contract with CSC. 
3.1. Historical background 
Until recently, AW's IS/IT infrastructure was fragmented with many standards and 
systems for essentially the same processes across the organisation. They were 
operating a Bull mainframe for administration (payroll, accounts, billing etc. ) and 
a VAX mainframe for production operations. As a consequence, there were 
effectively two large IT departments within the business with variably overlapping 
responsibilities. 
The present IS Director arrived at AW shortly before October 1994 and made a 
substantial contribution to the direction of the IT review and to the decisions that 
ensued. AW runs a business planning process from October to February every year. 
In October 1994 they initiated a review of existing IT infrastructure and decided to 
migrate to client-server technology while also rationalising their IT operations. The 
planned changes for IT were also accompanied by a broader restructuring exercise 
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and cultural change throughout the organisation. This organisational change 
involved, among others, empowering and training programmes for all staff. 
CSC was one of the consulting firms that were invited to contribute to the business 
and IT planning processes. By February 1995, AW had decided to outsource all 
existing operations and new developments, apart from telemetry (see below), to 
CSC. They immediately entered contract negotiations. The Service Manager got 
involved in the process in August 1995, coming from Anglian Water International 
Ltd. Her main task has been to lead the development of service level agreements 
and the management of the contract. By that time, the framework agreement was 
completed, specifying a 10 year contract, the first 5 years of which would be spent 
on developing new client server applications while managing the existing legacy 
systems, as well as the transition. This is a major project for AW, involving 
complete replacement of all existing IT systems, starting from a clean slate. Over 
the second half of the contract, CSC is expected to manage the operation of the new 
systems. Contract negotiations were complete and the contract was signed on 31 
October 1995. 
3.2. Governance Portfolio 
The in-house team manages four main tasks: the contract with CSC, the telemetry 
services, IS strategy, data protection and security. They may seek the advice of CSC 
regarding some or all of these matters but it remains AW's responsibility to control 
and deliver them. 
The telemetry systems involve communication with and control of various 
automatic devices (pumps, sensors etc. ) at about 8000 unmanned sites (wells, 
reservoirs etc. ) all over the region covered by AW. The telemetry network uses 
TCP/IP over low power radio and microwave links transmitting information to and 
from a central control room. A large proportion of the 60 people running the 
telemetry services are engineers spending most of their time in the field looking 
after the equipment. There is a technical interface between the telemetry systems 
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and CSC's area of responsibility. This seems to be a well defined boundary, 
although they sometimes have to manage the organisational coordination. AW 
consider their telemetry systems as state-of-the-art and do not believe they have 
anything to gain from employing contractors to manage them. Therefore, their 
operation has been kept in-house. Moreover, such systems are highly specific to 
the fairly unique nature of AW's operations. Internal organisation is thus justified 
on transaction cost grounds, while it is also unlikely that a large, competitive and 
more efficient market can be sustained given the specific nature of these systems. 
3.3. CSC contract: Governance structure 
3.3.1. Assurance of Service Delivery 
AW's contract with CSC serves about 170 sites and covers virtually all IT services, 
including networks, mainframe operation, desktop support, help desk and new 
system development. Services and Service Level Agreements (SLA) are specified 
entirely in business terms. Achieving this had been a difficult and lengthy process. 
The management of IT prior to outsourcing was not based on any formal 
performance requirements. These were developed from scratch and particular 
effort was made to ensure early user involvement in specifying them. 
The emphasis on business-based performance measures is also suggested by the 
term `Key Business Service Components' (KBSC). There are about 120 KBSCs 
representing elements of service being measured. The derivation of the SLAs 
associated with new developments becomes part of the whole design and 
development process of each project. This approach emphasises that users 
understand what to expect from CSC and how/why they earn penalty points (see 
below) when CSC does not meet performance targets. This has also practical 
implications, as it is usually the users who first raise a complaint about a problem 
whenever they face it. They should therefore be able to understand when to flag a 
complaint. Overall, it is primarily a user-driven process and CSC's help desk plays 
282 
Chapter Six: Using S-CAGE to Understand IT Outsourcing Practices 
a central role in recording relevant information about calls and responses. This also 
means that if users are not inconvenienced CSC will not be penalised. 
CSC is responsible for measuring and reporting performance on these KBSCs, 
mainly via the help desk. They are also responsible for calculating and reporting 
penalty points. CSC also takes action to verify this information with the users 
through user surveys that the help desk administers. This user survey is not part of 
the obligations of CSC, it is above and beyond the contract. The service 
management team is responsible, among others, for policing this process. They 
hold weekly meetings with CSC account management staff to monitor performance 
issues, penalty points and persistent problems. 
3.3.2. Incentives for Service Level Attainment 
AW's legal advisers interpreted the legislation covering the licences of water 
utilities to include IT assets, namely that these assets cannot be transferred to a 
third party. Therefore, hardware was not transferred to CSC. Other reasons for not 
transferring the assets relate to accounting and financial issues, mainly that the 
fixed asset base of water utilities contributes positively to the pricing formula 
established by the regulating authority. Therefore, AW had an interest in 
maintaining ownership of these assets, although they constitute a relatively small 
percentage of their total asset base. Although residual ownership (see chapter 2, 
section 5) remains with AW, the contract attempts to restore CSC's incentives, 
which otherwise accrue naturally to ownership. 
According to the Service Manager, CSC is encouraged to manage these assets as if 
they owned them, in order to take advantage of potential efficiency gains. For 
example, AW does not in principle object to possible decisions by CSC to move or 
share the data centres, but they reserve the right to approve such plans. Sovereign 
House at Histon, Cambridgeshire, is a CSC site but also houses AW's Information 
Services team of 15. Other sites, for example a Data Centre in Lincoln is owned by 
AW but now managed by CSC, more or less with the same (transferred) staff. On 
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the whole, 200 staff were transferred to CSC, of which 120 were permanent and 
80 contract staff. Software licences were also transferred. 
CSC's compensation has a fixed cost component (subject to a cost inflation index) 
which is reduced year after year, plus a variable element associated with new 
systems development work. This compensation is subject to a profit sharing clause 
whereby any improvements that CSC achieves above a fixed percent profit margin, 
are equally shared with AW. Although this compensation arrangement is of the 
cost-plus kind, it imbues an incentive due to the fact that costs are agreed in 
advance. Because compensation for new developments is fixed in the contract 
regardless of the progress made by CSC, the sooner CSC delivers the new systems, 
the more they benefit and vice versa. 
Penalty points are awarded on an exponential scale, depending on the criticality of 
the service. Criticality appears, in general, to be a function of the effect of a 
problem to important business operations and the public image of AW (e. g. 
billing), which can be a source of significant damage. When a problem occurs, the 
prescribed penalty points are awarded. Often, the initial penalty is nil, particularly 
when users are not affected (e. g. when a fault occurs during the night). Delays in 
fixing the problem trigger exponential growth to the penalty points whereby the 
initial penalty points are multiplied by 2n, where n ranges from 0 (at first 
occurrence) to a maximum of 5. Penalty points are periodically translated to 
monetary charges. 
AW's contract provides for an open book policy and gives them audit and 
benchmarking rights. Moreover, AW wishes to encourage CSC to innovate and to 
generate improvements. Having said that, it is not entirely clear to them how to 
implement such an incentive, both in contract clauses and in the overall service 
delivery process. AW and CSC have agreed in principle on the desirability of a 
reward-based incentive system (in addition to the current penalty-based incentive). 
CSC was to bring forward a draft recommendation, but it had not been submitted 
by the time of data collection. 
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3.3.3. Organisation and Management of Service Provision 
At the time the research took place, AW's IS Services group had sixteen members. 
The IS Director reports to the Finance Director. The IS Strategy Manager is mainly 
monitoring the IT market, although it is not his responsibility to make technical 
decisions (this is CSC's task). Two members of staff provide general administrative 
support to the Information Services group. Figure 6.1 depicts an outline of the 
group's structure. 
Finance 
Director 
IS Strategy 
Manager 
Administrarive 
support 
Figure 6.1 
Service 
Management 
Team 
The Organisation of Information Services at Anglian Water Ltd. 
There are eight members of the Programme Management Team. These are the key 
people facilitating the new client server development projects, liaising with and 
intermediating between CSC and AW businesses. Their responsibility is not to 
actually manage the projects (this is the responsibility of project teams comprising 
business representatives and CSC staff). Instead, they manage and integrate the 
process, ensuring that both users and CSC commit adequate effort, time and 
resources to the development process. Part of the Programme Management Team's 
task is to ensure that CSC's proposals make a good business case, are understood by 
the users and are revised according to user feedback. Moreover, they negotiate 
IS Director 
Programme 
Management 
Team 
Information Services 
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with CSC over specifications and costs and sign invoices for payments once work 
has been delivered. 
The Service Manager is heading a team of two service analysts and administrative 
support personnel looking after and policing the implementation of the CSC 
contract. The derivation and negotiation of the KBSCs and of the penalty system 
with CSC in collaboration with users has been a major exercise for the Service 
Management Team. Once KBSCs are in place, their attention is directed towards 
benchmarking (by employing specialist consultants), testing and perhaps 
renegotiating them. They see the whole outsourcing project as a learning 
experience and they foresee that over time they will be emphasising different 
aspects of the relationship management process. The Service Management Team 
also liaises with the legal department to receive legal advice and support on issues 
pertaining to the contract. Finally, they administer the internal mechanism for 
charging AW business units for their use of CSC services. This mechanism also 
incorporates adjustments as a result of penalties incurred by CSC. 
Most members of the IS group are relatively new to AW, notably the IS Director 
and the Service Manager. Programme Managers come from diverse backgrounds 
such as engineering and finance. Only the IS Strategy Manager and two of the 
Programme Managers came from the pre-outsourcing IT organisation. 
One of the main tasks of the programme management and the service management 
teams is to ensure that proposals from CSC make business sense, represent value 
for money, are in line with the agreed IS strategy and are understandable to the 
users. In this respect they do not seem to be concerned with the fact that many of 
their technical skills have been lost to CSC, as long as they can manage the process 
in business terms. For AW, technical expertise is readily accessible to external 
sources. The new developments are process oriented and cut across the vertical 
internal boundaries between business units and functions. This has implications for 
the coordination of systems and business units. 
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It appears that AW and CSC often engage in trivial renegotiations or minor 
disputes at a micro level, while at a macro level AW wants to ensure that overall 
service levels and costs are satisfactory. However, the contract specifies an 
escalation process starting from the Service Manager, to the IS Director and up to 
the Finance Director and their CSC counterparts. While there are points of friction 
in the relationship with CSC, AW emphasises the importance of managing a 
sustainable relationship. 
3.4. Comments 
An interesting feature of the AW case is the fact that they opted for total 
outsourcing. Although total outsourcing has been common, especially during the 
early 1990s, it is worth exploring the possibility of an explanation within the S- 
CAGE framework. The reasons for total outsourcing are not readily apparent, 
although the early involvement of CSC in the strategic decision making process 
must have played a role. Other stated reasons include the lack of in-house skills 
combined with insufficient in-house credibility to deliver the massive 
redeployment of IT resources that had been decided. Moreover, they saw the 
outsourcing option as an opportunity to buy in best practice and to re-engineer the 
IS department. Although these reasons seem to justify outsourcing, they do not 
explain why AW assigned all IT activities to one supplier instead of employing 
different vendors for different services. 
What they really outsourced was not the operation of a fixed set of services but the 
replacement of practically all existing systems. The alternative to total outsourcing 
could possibly involve employing a number of contractors working on different 
development projects, another set of contractors managing existing operations and 
a third set of contractors to manage the operation of the new systems. AW would 
then have to keep all the technical decisions in house and coordinate both the 
technical as well as the commercial aspects of the work of all those third parties. 
The task of coordination could have proven to be overwhelming, with the only 
feasible alternative being total (or nearly total) insourcing of the skills required for 
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the new developments. This coordination burden combined with the perceived lack 
of skills4 and the desire to reorganise the IS department, can provide a partial 
justification for total outsourcing. 
This is an extreme case where the only feasible clustering strategy appears to be 
one cluster for all services. It seems to be a result of the heavy interdependence 
between existing operations, new developments, the transition and the new 
operations. New developments are not isolated projects as they are all based on the 
same technical platform and cut across internal organisational boundaries. 
Substantial business process redesign across the organisation is also involved. 
Because there are skills and decisions that are common to all development projects 
and specific to AW, it makes sense to assign responsibility for them to the same 
party5" 
Also, given that the quality of service in development and in 
operation/maintenance are positively correlated (the respective costs are 
negatively correlated), it is also reasonable for incentive purposes to assign both 
activities to the same vendors. In this way, the developer (CSC) is motivated to 
perform better so as to reduce the costs of operation and maintenance. Even more 
so, if the contract for operation is on a fixed price. Having said that, the Service 
Manager anticipates that perhaps halfway into the contract (when development 
projects are expected to be completed) further negotiations may be needed to 
adjust the agreement on systems operation. This also reflects an awareness of the 
need for adaptations as circumstances change over time. 
Although the above is a plausible explanation for assigning all development and 
operation to the same vendor, it is not clear why the operation of the mainframes 
being phased out should also be the responsibility of the same supplier. This 
4 See the discussion on the firm as a knowledge repository in chapter 2, section 6. 
5 See the theory of property rights in chapter 2, section 5. 
6 See chapter 2, section 4.1 paragraph 9 and chapter 5, section 3, paragraph numbered S. 
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arrangement assures CSC's revenue, despite the phasing out of legacy systems. On 
one hand, this assurance provides additional incentives to CSC to make AW- 
specific investments for the long term. On the other hand, it dampens its incentive 
to perform well in operating the mainframes. These relationships are quite subtle 
and they depend on the material conditions affecting each task and on the exact 
terms of the agreement(s). Moreover, there may be other, non-contractual, factors 
involved in these decisions, such as the strategic intent of each company, their 
relative bargaining positions and inter-firm politics. Such factors are not directly 
addressed by the S-CAGE framework. 
According to the theory of property rights, the fact that AW has continued to own 
its hardware assets may create distortions to the incentives of CSC. At least, it 
definitely creates a basis for possible haggling over decisions to move, share, alter 
or sell them as CSC's capacity requirements change over time. Incentives which 
otherwise accrue naturally to asset ownership are, in this case, restored by 
contractual agreement. Given that the source of incentives is in residual (i. e. non- 
contractible) control rights, this is achieved by specifying joint decision making 
procedures to address instances where a priori rights are insufficient to cope. In 
practice, the contract gives open-ended rights to CSC to control computing assets 
(contractual agreement), subject to AW's approval (ex post decision making 
procedure). However, the incentive implications of asset ownership were not 
explicitly recognised. 
The penalty system currently covers existing operations and its aim is to safeguard 
a minimum level of service quality and user satisfaction. The emphasis on business 
oriented service level requirements is noteworthy in this respect. Since the new 
system development projects comprise the largest part of the contract, the latter is 
of the cost-plus kind which is typical of requirements contracting for systems 
development. Similarly, the many uncertainties of these projects do not allow the 
introduction of formal incentives. Instead, the programme management team plays 
a key role in managing the process, including contingencies, in order to safeguard 
quality and cost. 
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4. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the use of the S-CAGE framework in 
analysing and understanding the governance of IT provision. The exposition of the 
two cases of ICI and AW have shown how S-CAGE can shed light on the practices 
observed in each firm and the differences between the approaches employed by 
them. Moreover, it has been shown how the main parameters of such contracts can 
be highlighted in an organised manner using the classification provided by the 
three layers of governance. 
The literature on IT outsourcing is almost unanimous on the importance of crafting 
appropriate contractual arrangements (see chapter 1, section 7). However, there is 
relatively little insight on what makes a contract appropriate. Various attempts to 
systematise a classification of sourcing alternatives have demonstrated the 
availability of many options but have not produced a comprehensive taxonomy, 
beyond `lessons learned' and `best practices'7. 
A fundamental argument made in this thesis is that the quest for such a taxonomy 
is futile on account of the multiplicity and dynamic nature of the contingencies 
determining the IT sourcing strategy. Not only are there numerous strategic, 
financial, political, economic and technical factors, but the nature and relative 
importance of these factors changes over time and across, countries, industries and 
organisations. 
Some IT sourcing possibilities are quoted in chapter 1, section 2. Some others are reviewed by 
Willcocks and Lacity (1998: 1-41): contract-out, preferred contractor, buy-in, preferred supplier, 
alliance, insourcing, offshore outsourcing, IS department as vendor, partnership, selective sourcing, 
transitional outsourcing, total outsourcing, value-added outsourcing, equity holdings, multi- 
sourcing, co-sourcing, spin-offs, creative contracting. These terms are drawn from lessons learned in 
practice and/or from what has been advocated as industry best practice. The definitions of these 
terms are not always unambiguous and, consequently, they have little discriminatory power for 
theoretical purposes. For the same reason, they give limited guidance to practitioners. 
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Instead of seeking a catalogue of sourcing alternatives, the S-CAGE framework 
presents a classification of the elements of contract. Whatever sourcing strategy an 
organisation adopts, the structure of the contract can make the difference. The 
value of the framework lies in its capacity to expose, analyse and question the 
provisions made in an IT contract, in a way that is relevant to management and not 
just to the legal professionals. 
A key feature of the S-CAGE framework is the notion of clustering. This is not a 
totally new idea. It has similarities with the notions of selective and multiple 
sourcing. Also, companies have always been bundling IT services, applications and 
projects in various ways and procuring them from different suppliers. The 
argument for service clustering presented in chapter 5 is elaborated in terms of the 
theoretical basis developed in chapter 2, section 8.1. In particular, the criteria for 
clustering or separating services draw on microanalytic economic/contractual 
issues, such as asset specificity, incentives and measurement problems. However, 
the case studies in ICI and AW have revealed some explanatory limitations of this 
approach. 
Although ICI and AW have adopted outsourcing for the transition from mainframe 
to client-server systems, they have followed a different clustering approach. The 
reason explicitly quoted by ICI is that they wanted to offer stronger incentives to 
Origin, in the form the prospect of additional contracts. AW saw the whole 
exercise as a single project from the outset. As discussed in previous sections 
(mainly 2.4 and 3.4), the role of incentives, coordination costs, skills/knowledge 
and asset specificity provide partial explanations for the clustering approach 
followed each case. 
The differences in the incentive effects of the clustering approaches adopted by AW 
and ICI are also worth exploring. By soliciting separate bids for each new project, 
ICI aimed to generate strong reputation effects as an incentive for Origin to 
perform well during the operation of the legacy systems. In contrast, AW assigned 
new developments to CSC from the outset. In comparative terms the incentives 
faced by CSC with respect to mainframe operations in the later case are weaker. 
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The case studies indicate that other factors, outside the scope of the S-CAGE 
framework, impinge on the clustering of IT services for the purposes of 
outsourcing. For example, an obvious explanation for the different clustering 
approach in ICI and AW is the size and organisational structure of each. ICI's 
contract was entered into at the corporate level and all new systems development 
projects are being undertaken independently by individual business units. AW is a 
much smaller company. The contract was entered into at the business unit level 
(Anglian Water Services Limited) and affects the whole business unit. Another 
factor is the strategic intent of senior management. For example, the Group IT 
Manager at ICI emphasised the importance of seeking market opportunities for 
good procurement agreements. Traces of political and historical antecedents to 
AW's decision can be found in the involvement of CSC since the early strategy 
review, which concluded with the decision to outsource. 
Therefore, insofar as service clustering is concerned, the S-CAGE framework 
provides relevant and valid explanations (and directions) but it does not cover all 
the determinants. Having said that about clustering, the layers of governance 
framework proved to be very effective in analysing the contractual practices in 
each case. 
The case study evidence shows that the condition of service specificity can manifest 
itself in many different guises within a contract. This testifies to the elusive nature 
of the concept and, thus, to the difficulty of measuring it in quantitative studies. 
Various approximations for asset specificity have been proposed in the literature. 
These range from multidimensional instruments asking questions on the character 
of the particular transaction to secondary sources such as the size and 
competitiveness of the supply market. It emerges from these case studies that a 
good measure (or at least indication) of specificity is the contractual provisions that 
exchange parties introduce in order to safeguard their specific investments. Part of 
the elusiveness of specificity is its subjectivity (i. e. what is specific for one 
organisation may not be specific for another). Therefore, a rational contracting 
party would make every effort to protect its specific investments. The various 
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clauses in ICI's contract reviewed in section 2.3.1.1 above are evidence to this. The 
reliability of contractual clauses as a measure of specificity is limited by the parties' 
opportunistic attempts to negotiate more in their own favour and their limitations 
to rationality. 
In both case studies, emphasis is placed on specifying appropriate performance 
measures and targets while minimising the costs of administering them 
(measurement and information costs). The effort made by AW to concentrate on 
business-oriented measures (Key Business Service Components), is worth noting. 
Their intention in doing so was twofold. First, to distance themselves from technical 
decisions as much as practically possible (see the relevant discussion in chapter 5, 
section 4.1.1). Second, to enable end-users to understand what to expect from their 
IT supplier. Apart from ensuring commitment, managing expectations and, hence, 
improving the likelyhood of perceived success, this action facilitates information 
parity, performance monitoring and contract management with minimal 
additional administrative procedures. 
Both companies employ incentive mechanisms that penalise the vendor in cases of 
performance shortfall. An implicit reward in the AW-CSC contract derives from 
the fact that costs for new systems development projects were agreed and fixed in 
advance. Therefore, an incentive is derived, as if the contract was on a fixed price. 
Inasmuch as CSC cannot extract additional compensation for cost overruns, it has 
an incentive to deliver systems faster. Acceptance procedures must then safeguard 
system quality. In the case of ICI, the opportunity for rewarding incentives was 
identified with certain service level requirements related to the accuracy of 
estimates and plans for new projects. These requirements are a contractual 
obligation but no financial penalty is attached, in recognition of the uncertainty 
that characterises them. An incentive providing additional compensation when 
Origin overcomes the uncertainties, would be suitable in this case. However, these 
requirements are a very small part of expected performance (although potentially 
significant in terms of value) and any related incentive would not make a big 
enough impact on Origin's total compensation to justify its introduction. 
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Although in both cases appropriate provisions are made specifying the conditions 
under which contract termination can be invoked, the threat of termination is not 
seen as an important incentive. The conditions for termination specify a very low 
performance threshold and both ICI and AW prefer not to get close to that level, 
since it would involve significant damage to their businesses. Actually invoking 
termination on grounds of poor performance would be even more damaging to 
both vendors and clients. The fact that both parties prefer to avoid termination, 
dampens the client's resolve to enforce it and consequently reduces the incentive 
effect of the termination clause. This suggests that the more specific investments 
are involved and the more relational the contract is, the less powerful is 
termination as an incentive (and vice versa). 
Similarly, the incentive importance of asset ownership was disregarded both by the 
interviewees and by the contracts in both case studies. Any transfers of property 
rights seem to have purposes not related to incentives. As it turns out, companies 
give priority to two other issues over incentives. First, the contracts protect the 
intellectual property rights on software. Second, any asset transfers are made to 
protect the continuity and operation of services. Once these two purposes are taken 
care of first, there remains very little scope for reassigning ownership rights for 
incentive purposes. It appears that although the theorys provides an elegant and 
credible proposition, in practice other factors seem to take precedence. Of course, 
this observation is drawn from the particular kinds of contracts studied here. The 
incentive significance of asset ownership in IT contracts warrants further empirical 
investigation. 
Finally, the relational character of these contracts is manifest in the numerous 
clauses that defer decisions, plans and actions to joint decision making procedures 
during contract execution. Often the contracts call on `all reasonable endeavours' 
of the parties to take into consideration each other's interests and to resolve 
8 See chapter 2, section 4.2, paragraphs 2-5 and section 5, paragraphs 4-6. See also the relevant 
discussion in chapter 5, section 4.2.1. 
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disagreements in an `amicable' way (see the the discussion on discretionary 
collaborative behaviours in chapter 5, section 4.3, paragraph 5). Moreover, the 
formal incentive mechanisms would not be efficacious without supplementary 
administrative procedures to control aspects of performance that cannot be 
contracted in advance. Such procedures are the change management and approval 
provisions found in both cases. These and other similar provisions are akin (even if 
qualitatively different) to the open-ended rights and duties afforded by the 
fiduciary regime of internal organisation (see chapter 2, section 2.2). In this way, 
markets replicate many of the adaptive advantages of in-house service provision, 
alongside penalty clauses and other incentive instruments (typical advantages of 
market structures). 
The variations in the adaptive, incentive and other mechanisms instituted by the 
two contracts, which otherwise correspond to very similar services, provide 
empirical support for the concept of governance continuum developed in the end 
of chapter 2. In other words, two contracts that can, in general, be classified as 
being the same, may contain differences that have important managerial and 
economic implications. This is the essence of the microanalytic approach advocated 
in this thesis, namely to examine governance mechanisms in their details and to 
study how they may combine in various configurations yielding different 
governance structures along the governance continuum. 
The two cases presented here demonstrate, albeit in a limited way, the capability of 
the framework to describe, analyse and interpret the governance of IT provision. As 
such, S-CAGE is also useful in understanding different practices between 
organisations. The implication for the relevance and applicability of S-CAGE is that 
it is relevant to a bottom-up analysis of the clustering approach and the details of 
governance from an economic/contractual point of view. Further research 
strategies for testing and enhancing the S-CAGE framework are explored among 
other conclusions in the following final chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN and The Way Ahead 
1. Introduction 
The widespread adoption of IT outsourcing since the late 1980s suddenly turned 
the spotlight on an aspect of IT management that had previously received little 
attention in both the academic and practitioner communities. Organisations have 
always been using contracts, of one kind or another, for systems and services but 
the issue was assumed to be somehow peripheral to the organisation and 
management of IT or to consist of more simple make or buy decisions. Given the 
unquestioned assumption that IT provision is the responsibility of large in-house 
departments or divisions, attention was centred around issues of centralisation 
versus decentralisation, end-user computing, and charge-back systems, to name a 
few. When some large corporations in the US started replacing all their IT 
operations with single contracts, many academics and managers were caught off- 
guard. 
After consideration, some observers noted that this phenomenon was not so much a 
revolutionary change but rather an evolutionary step. Under the light of the theory 
developed in this thesis, the issues of centralisation versus decentralisation, end user 
computing and charge-back are simply elements of the governance of internal IT 
provision. They are about measuring performance, providing appropriate 
incentives and allocating decision authority and control. In other words, they are 
about adjusting arrangements in the three layers of governance, respectively, of the 
S-CAGE framework (Figure 5.4), within the general governance category of 
internal organisation. Therefore, the move from internal organisation to contracts 
of the total outsourcing kind is, analytically, a small shift on the governance 
continuum (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
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This is not to say, however, that the above is a complete account of the 
phenomenon on the whole or of individual decisions made by organisations. On 
the contrary, as chapter 6 concluded, the broader historical, technological, 
economic, strategic and political explanations and interpretations reviewed in 
chapter 1 are important complements to a comprehensive understanding of what 
has been going on. Similarly, various abstract or empirical exercises in the context 
of economic theories illuminate the potential workings of parts of the relevant 
economic and organisational system. 
These inroads motivated the desire to fill a small gap in the middle ground between 
partial, restricted economic models and unifying, all-encompassing accounts. The 
focus is the governance structure. The perspective is provided by economics. The 
task is both abstractive and synthetic. The governance structure is abstracted from 
other co-determinants of the organisation of IT provision, in order to define its 
nature and examine the structure and workings of its constituent parts. In doing so, 
several relevant strands of economic theory are synthesised into an integrative 
whole, the governance structure. It was the task of chapter 2 to review the relevant 
strands of economic theory, to assess their implications for governance and to 
combine their often disparate means and ends into a concept of governance 
structure. Transaction cost economics, agency theory, the theory of property rights, 
theories of information, knowledge and measurement and economic treatments of 
culture, trust and reputation effects provided the raw material for this task. 
The governance continuum, established at the end of chapter 2, is one of the two 
pillars on which subsequent theoretical propositions rest (the other being the 
clustering continuum). To be sure, both the selection of relevant theories and the 
notion of a continuum of governance emerged out of the action research at British 
Petroleum. However, it is felt that this separation and linear exposition aids a better 
understanding of the concepts involved and the arguments made. The argument 
made at the end of chapter 2 entails a definition of governance as a system of 
organisational and contractual arrangements, including performance 
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measurement, incentives and decision making and control. The composition and 
characteristics of the services being governed is singled out as the main 
determinant of the exact configuration of such a system, which, in turn, may lie 
anywhere between two fictional opposite extremes, the pure market and the pure 
hierarchy. 
Chapter 3 stands as a pause in the flow of the thesis for self-reflection. It identifies 
the philosophical underpinnings of the research project in the realist philosophy of 
science and draws implications for the nature of the proposed theory and the 
methods employed. The upshot is that governance structure and its mechanisms are 
real entities existing independently of our knowledge of them and of their 
manifestation in the events that we observe. As such they possess causal powers 
that may lead to particular (observable) organisational and contractual 
arrangements, contingent on the actualisation of various unpredictable conditions 
under different circumstances. 
For example, formal incentive mechanisms can take several forms: they may be 
rewarding or penalising, they may be based on nominal or aggregate performance 
and they may have lighter or heavier financial consequences, to name a few 
parameters. Their feasibility and effectiveness is conditioned by, among others, the 
nature of the respective services, other incentives facing the supplier and the 
willingness of each party to enforce the mechanism and bear the consequences. 
Therefore, whilst such mechanisms are potentially very powerful in inducing high 
quality and low cost of service, their exact role and configuration is indeterminate 
outside an actual context. 
What is called for, therefore, is a comprehensive account of the potential capacities 
and ways of acting of the elements of IT governance which can take different forms 
under various conditions, leading to particular consequences. Such an account 
constitutes both a basis for explaining observed governance structures for IT as well 
as a guide for decision making in practice. 
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The exploratory study of the outsourcing practices and opinions at British 
Petroleum (chapter 4) is the means by which economic theory is reconsidered in 
the light of the concerns facing practitioners in order to produce the theory sought. 
In the process, it has been possible to draw on economic theories in an attempt to 
understand and explain the different contractual arrangements observed. The same 
theoretical framework, presented in a more lay language, served the interest of BP 
management in gaining a deeper and more general understanding of what is 
involved in setting up the governance of IT provision. 
The multitude of IT services served by various contracts at BP, in conjunction with 
appropriate theoretical arguments, inspired the notion of service clustering. The 
characteristics and interrelationships among IT services provide opportunities and 
restrictions for clustering services under the same governance structure. The main 
benefit of having large clusters with many services is that problems of technical 
and managerial coordination are minimised. On the other hand, smaller clusters of 
homogenous services afford more specialised governance arrangements. In 
addition, although all contracts studied at BP were `outsourcing' contracts, they 
differed in many significant ways. The relevant observations also corroborated the 
notion of the governance continuum. 
The S-CAGE framework (chapter 5) brings together the clustering and the 
governance continuum and elaborates on their determination and inter- 
dependence. For example, when many diverse services are clustered together, the 
governance mechanisms are analytically similar to those found in internal IT 
departments. The composition of governance is presented in terms of three layers. 
This classification is derived from the study of contractual practices at BP and 
serves to facilitate understanding of the many issues involved and to direct 
attention to all aspects and implications of governance in practical circumstances. 
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While chapter 5 presents S-CAGE with reference to BP and the theory, chapter 6 
attempts to re-address its relevance in alternative empirical contexts. It is shown 
that the framework is not just a convenient classification of practices at BP nor 
simply an exercise in rearranging economic theories. The contracting practices at 
ICI and Anglian Water have been made intelligible using this framework. More 
importantly, by using S-CAGE it is possible to explain differences in the governance 
structure between different companies or contracts. These two cases also showed 
that S-CAGE is most applicable at that management level where the organisational 
and contractual details are being set up. 
Having recapitulated the emphasis in each previous chapter, the next section 
pinpoints the achievement of this thesis and its limitations, including a brief 
assessment of its validity. Some directions for further abstract and empirical 
research are discussed in section 3. Section 4 explores the question of whether S- 
CAGE is applicable to business activities other than IT. The chapter, indeed the 
thesis, concludes with a final brief illustration of the usefulness of S-CAGE. 
2. Contribution and limitations 
The main deliverable of this thesis is the S-CAGE framework. As discussed in 
chapters 3 and 5, it is submitted both as a theoretical basis for explaining the 
occurrence of various contractual and organisational configurations in the 
provision of IT systems and services, as well as a practical means for assessing and 
changing the governance of IT in actual commercial situations. 
S-CAGE addresses many of the gaps identified in the IS literature. Specifically, the 
main criticism raised in chapter 1 is that some extant theories are too narrow either 
in the dimensions of governance and/or in the alternative outcomes. For example, 
attempts have been made to combine transaction and agency cost considerations or 
to introduce elements of risk or strategy. Outcomes are also restricted to either 
discrete forms of governance (e. g. market versus hierarchy or classical versus 
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relational contracting) or to variations in the variables (i. e. dimensions of 
governance) they study. These attempts are limited by the analytical or empirical 
methods they employ, or by the desire to produce a simple framework for decision 
making. The S-CAGE framework draws on a much broader theoretical canvas and 
attempts to synthesise the various insights available under a unifying framework. 
As a result the dimensions of governance are classified in three generic layers, each 
of which is analysed into much finer detail. In terms of outcomes, common 
categories of governance, such as systems development contracts or total 
outsourcing, are shown to be useful abstractions but nonetheless inadequate in 
characterising and analysing actual practices. An important theoretical 
contribution of S-CAGE is the argument that actual governance structures are 
theoretically infinite on a continuum between ideal pure markets and hierarchies 
and are determined by the exact configuration of the various elements of 
governance. 
The S-CAGE framework is also consistent with the ontological and epistemological 
foundations laid down in chapter 3. The elements of governance, including, for 
example, performance measurement processes, explicit incentive schemes and 
decision making authority, are postulated as mechanisms that are expected to be in 
play but may not always be directly observable or some of them may dominate 
others in producing the observed effects. In any case, S-CAGE can be seen as a 
sourcebook of explanatory mechanisms from which the exact interactions and 
contingencies can be drawn in order to understand a given governance structure. 
The incorporation of the realist ontology and epistemology in information systems 
research is another, secondary, contribution of the thesis. 
Seen as such a sourcebook, S-CAGE can be used not only for explanatory but also 
for normative purposes. Specifically, S-CAGE can be used to assess and to make 
adjustments on an existing governance structure or to set up the governance on a 
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zero basis. Given a particular set of IT systems and services and a business context, 
the relevant elements of governance can be identified and configured accordingly. 
The empirical work presented in chapters 4 and 6 has been instrumental in 
achieving the explanatory and normative goals of the proposed framework. Having 
said that, they are also a source of limitations. First, the organisations studied are 
large private companies in the UK' in the 1990s. Small and medium sized 
enterprises or public organisations are likely to face different constraints and 
opportunities and to be subject to different market forces, beyond the reach of the 
analysis in this thesis. Similarly, economic, legal and business systems significantly 
different to that found in the UK (e. g. in developing economies) may impinge 
differently on the capabilities and possibilities available to firms. Moreover, as 
social structures and business environments evolve over time, the validity and 
relevance of S-CAGE may be questionable in historical contexts or in the future. 
Second, the empirical basis of the present work is relatively narrow. Although this 
does not necessarily compromise the validity of the substantive claims (see below), 
further refinements can be sought by using and assessing S-CAGE in more 
organisations. The two case studies in chapter 6 demonstrate that there is ample 
scope for refining and sharpening the framework by studying ' more contracts of 
different kinds. 
Third, S-CAGE is not the ultimate, unifying theory of IT governance. It excludes 
important facets, most notably strategic considerations, supplier selection and 
negotiations. Although such issues do emerge in various parts of the analysis of 
governance elements and although S-CAGE can inform the relevant processes, they 
are not directly addressed. 
1 The fact that Anglian Water is a regulated utility was not found to have any repercussions beyond 
their retention of IT assets, as noted in chapter 6. 
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Fourth, S-CAGE is limited by the scope of the theories it encompasses and by the 
degree to which they are elaborated. The abstract theoretical process of extending 
the scope and refining the detail of the framework cannot be separated from 
further empirical investigation. 
Finally, the whole thesis and the S-CAGE framework adopt the point of view of the 
buyer and user of IT services. The behaviour of suppliers and the dynamics of the 
supply market are assumed to be given. Among the antecedents of the choice of IT 
governance that have been omitted from the S-CAGE framework (but have been 
considered in chapter 1) is the political and commercial pressure that suppliers 
exert upon IT directors and CEOs in order to win a contract. With few exceptions 
(e. g. IDC and WBS, 1994) this is the perspective taken by the majority of the 
literature on the topic. The evolution of the supply side and the dynamics of its 
interaction with buyers (users) is worth significantly greater research attention. 
The importance placed by the Group IT Manager of ICI on the role of the IT 
industry (see chapter 6) is another hint that more work is needed in this direction. 
A preliminary idea in this respect is considered in section 3.1 further below. 
2.1. A note on valldiy 
Some further qualifications on the validity of the S-CAGE framework are 
worthwhile at this point. Having developed the framework, how can it be evaluated 
and on what criteria? The epistemological position adopted in this thesis is outlined 
in chapter 3. Briefly, the proposed theory is acceptable as long as it provides 
satisfactory explanations and guidance and until it is superseded by another theory 
(new or extant). Acid tests of predictive power and falsifiability have been 
dismissed on the basis of their principle. 
Chapter 5 may have not satisfied those readers expecting to find a contingency 
framework. A pure contingency approach could provide a basis for (positivist) 
validation and an easier guide for practical decision making. As explained in 
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chapter 3, section 6.2, the temptation to create a contingency framework has been 
resisted. The configuration of governance is seen as complex and context-specific 
so that it cannot (and should not) be foreclosed by a small number of "if .. then" 
clauses. Instead, it is argued, what is needed is an understanding of the operation 
and interaction of the various (structure and process) components of governance. 
This understanding is sufficient for both explanation and actual decision making. 
At this point, it is worth reviewing how the perspective in this thesis responds to the 
widely held positivist criteria of validity (Yin 1989, Cavaye 1996). Internal validity 
is concerned with eliminating alternative and competing explanations for the same 
evidence. The realist epistemology accepts the possibility of sustaining 
complementary, even if conflicting, explanations for the same phenomenon. 
Examples include Newtonian physics, quantum mechanics and relativity theory in 
physics. All three theories coexist, although the last two are still incommensurable. 
In the social sciences there are several well-documented paradoxes, such as the 
paradox between social structure and human agency. Of course, all theories are 
subject to criticism and replacement by superior theories. In this thesis it is 
recognised that the S-CAGE framework excludes several important factors that 
determine the clustering of services and the choice of general organisational mode. 
By being inclusive in terms of the economic theories adopted, the possibility of 
competing explanations has been reduced. However the possibility that such 
theories may exist, does not invalidate the theoretical framework presented here, 
unless the alternative theories encompass the explanations provided within S- 
CAGE. 
Construct or convergent validity ensures that the theoretical instrument reflects the 
concept being studied and not something else. No measurement instrument is being 
developed here. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasising once more that the thesis 
focuses on the elements of contracts and not on other facets of IT outsourcing 
relationships. 
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External validity refers to the generalisability of the framework. Clearly, the small 
number of empirical cases places a limit to the generality that can be claimed for S- 
CAGE. Having said that, there are three reasons supporting its general applicability. 
First, epistemologically, generalisation resides in real mechanisms and not in 
empirical regularities (chapter 3, section 6.1, paragraph 2). Second, the case study 
at BP offered evidence from at least three different contracts and a multitude of 
diverse opinions on outsourcing. Therefore, it is not a unitary datum of evidence. 
Third, the S-CAGE framework inherits the generality of the economic theories 
reviewed in chapter 2. 
The criteria of reliability and replicability require that if the same project were to be 
repeated the conclusions would be the same. It is worth reiterating here that this 
criterion can be rejected in the social sciences due to the reflexive nature of human 
agents, who use their knowledge (including scientific theories) to reconstruct their 
reality (see chapter 3, section 3 and Numagami, 1998). In other words, theories 
can be self-fulfilling or self-negating. Having said that, the consistent application of 
the S-CAGE framework to the three companies is some evidence of reliability. 
Finally, the acceptance of the framework by management at BP contributes not only 
to its practical value, but to its theoretical `quality' as well. 
3. Further research directions 
Further development of the S-CAGE framework can be sought in three directions. 
First, in extending its empirical grounding, second, in extending its scope and third, 
in refining its analytical components. 
In terms of empirical work, more intensive research in the form of case studies and 
action research is warranted. Additional observations from IT contracts can be a 
valuable source of further refinements. Further research should start by 
approaching major IT vendors and seeking access to their contracts. 
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A more profitable and exciting endeavour would be to use S-CAGE in changing the 
governance of IT in actual circumstances, especially in conjunction with alternative 
frameworks. Such work will clearly provide a better (comparative) assessment of 
the normative power of S-CAGE and will produce valuable lessons for practice. 
However, such a project would encounter serious problems of access to 
organisations. 
The empirical work presented in previous chapters is limited to contracts of the 
commonly understood outsourcing kind. As a result, the S-CAGE framework has a 
certain degree of bias towards such contracts. Although these kinds of contracts 
constitute a rich array of interesting phenomena that are of contemporary interest 
to practitioners, further empirical work should place a more balanced emphasis on 
alternative types of governance, such as internal IT departments, and more discrete 
contracts. It is anticipated that internal departments will yield mechanisms 
equivalent to those currently prevailing in S-CAGE, whereas more discrete 
contracts will encompass small subsets of the governance mechanisms considered 
here. 
The scope of S-CAGE can be extended in two ways. One possibility is to broaden the 
number of explanatory mechanisms by either incorporating other extant theories 
or by devising new. Another possibility is to broaden the range of related issues 
addressed by the framework, particularly strategic considerations, supplier 
selection and negotiations. Conceivably, the S-CAGE framework as it stands may 
not be able to sustain such an expansion without compromising its coherence or its 
explanatory and normative power. If this turns out to be the case, it will either have 
to be supplanted with a superior alternative or, at least, be linked to complementary 
theories of such issues in a consistent manner. In any case, the limited attention to 
such matters at present is a significant limitation that needs to be corrected. An 
appropriate combination of abstract and empirical research will have to be 
designed. 
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Another issue that needs to be addressed, is the nature of the role of internal IT 
organisation given the many governance possibilities for organising IT provision. 
This issue is not within the scope of S-CAGE but a consequence of it. A possible 
implication of adopting a framework such as S-CAGE within an organisation is that 
the residual IT staff are administrators of IT governance rather than providers of 
systems. There is some early work being done on the residual IS department 
(Willcocks and Fitzgerald 1994d, Venkatraman and Loh 1994, Markus and 
Benjamin 1996) but the issue of what is the core value-added of the internal IT 
organisation warrants further investigation. An interesting strand of research can 
grow in this direction. 
Two opportunities for refining the analytical components of the framework, are 
identified here. The first relates to the method of clustering services in practice. A 
rather simple approach is presented in chapter 5, according to which it is assumed 
that it is a priori desirable to have all services clustered together in order to 
minimise the costs of technical and organisational coordination. Then individual 
services are separated if there are reasons to do so. This method may be sufficient in 
some cases but not necessarily always. It gives priority to the benefits of 
coordination while temporarily ignoring that governance structures for small 
service clusters are better matched to the characteristics of services and therefore 
more efficient and effective. Alternative, more sophisticated, clustering methods 
could take into account both criteria simultaneously, with the aim of minimising 
the number of service clusters while maximising each cluster's homogeneity. Such 
a method would probably require a detailed model of the criteria to be used as well 
as an elaborate optimisation technique. An even more advanced possibility would 
be a method of hierarchical clustering which would assign sets of services to 
hierarchically related suppliers (and respective governance structures). 
These ideas point to the direction of a variety of possible approaches and 
techniques, including, for example, multi-criteria decision analysis. However, the 
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feasibility of developing formal quantitative models is questionable, on three 
accounts. First, the problem is quite complex, entailing many different 
technological and organisational parameters. Second, there are already significant 
difficulties in measuring empirically all the relevant parameters, such as asset 
specificity and uncertainty (see also chapter 2, section 8, paragraph 7). Third, the 
difficulties are compounded by the changing characteristics of the technologies, the 
user organisations and the IT vendors, over time. For these reasons, it is probably 
more worthwhile pursuing an incremental decomposition of the clustering 
decision, with a view to devising a practical problem-solving methodology rather 
than a formal algorithm. The purpose of this methodology would be to guide 
decision makers in clustering IT services and assigning them to internal or external 
IT providers. It would be a methodology that raises awareness of the issues among 
decision makers, rather than a technique that prescribes answers. The answers 
would be produced by informed decision makers, given the organisational context, 
rather than by an 'objective' algorithm. 
The second opportunity for refining the analytical components of S-CAGE 
envisaged here entails the notion of governance feasibility, which is explored in 
some detail in the following section. 
3.1. Governance feaslb1111y frontiers 
This section explores a series of conceptual ideas, based on the interaction between 
the governance continuum and the clustering continuum. These are abstract 
theoretical propositions, akin to much of the abstract theoretical development in 
economics, particularly the theories reviewed in chapter 2. However, appropriate 
research designs to develop and test these ideas encounter serious practical 
difficulties. Section 3.1.1 below, examines the feasibility of such research designs 
and methods. 
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We could postulate a surrogate measure for the governance continuum, ranging 
from 0, corresponding to the ideal market, to 1, corresponding to the ideal 
hierarchy. Williamson regularly uses asset specificity as such a surrogate (1996), 
although this is not necessarily the only determinant of governance, as discussed in 
chapter 2. The extent of contract discreteness and relationality (chapter 2, section 
2.1) could be another surrogate for this purpose. If we were to survey the 
governance structure of given IT services among a large number of organisations, 
we could possibly derive the frequency distribution of governance structures for a 
given service. Williamson has also pondered on this issue (see chapter 2, section 
8.1, paragraphs 7-8). Figure 7.1 shows three hypothetical examples of normal 
distributions. 
The variance of the distribution would be a function of the heterogeneity of services 
and of other contingent factors determining the governance in each case. For 
example, the more standard and homogenous the service across organisations, the 
smaller the variance (i. e. narrower) of the frequency distribution (e. g. hardware 
procurement represented by distribution i in Figure 7.1). Other services such as 
software development (distribution il) and desktop support (distribution iii) may 
differ significantly from case to case and, therefore, the respective governance 
structures would differ and the variance of the distribution would be larger. 
The clustering continuum (Figure 5.2) can be redefined in terms of relative cluster 
size. If S is the total number of services and Si the number of services in cluster i 
then relative cluster size is defined as S. IS. This ratio takes the same values as the 
clustering ratio CIS (where Cis the number of clusters), namely (1/S, 1). However 
they have inverse meaning in that I/S represents one cluster for all services in 
terms of the clustering ratio but only one service in cluster i in terms of relative 
cluster size. Accordingly, 1 represents one separate cluster for each service in terms 
of the clustering ratio but one cluster for all services in terms of relative cluster size. 
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Figure 7.1 
Frequency distributions of governance structures for individual services 
These are hypothetical distributions. For example, they could correspond to hardware 
procurement (d), software development (ii) and desktop support (iii). 
Assuming that an appropriate surrogate measure of the governance continuum can 
be devised, clusters could be plotted on a graph where the governance continuum 
is on the horizontal axis and the clustering continuum in terms of relative cluster 
size on the vertical. Figure 7.2 shows the example of total outsourcing towards the 
top of the clustering continuum (denoting a large cluster) and towards the right of 
the governance continuum (denoting a strongly relational long term contract) and 
the example of a software development contract denoting a small cluster under a 
more discrete contract. 
On the same graph we can plot the whole governance portfolio allocation of an 
organisation at a given moment in time. Table 7.1 provides a hypothetical example 
of a portfolio of governance structures. This table lists six service clusters in terms 
of separate contracts. For each cluster, the allocation of services, budget, human 
resources (from the client's side), management support and customer/supplier 
involvement is then listed. The rightmost column shows graphically the extent of 
managerial involvement that each service cluster (contract) requires from the 
customer and the provider. The extent of this involvement is not necessarily 
commensurate to the amount of human resources allocated. Rather, it is a measure 
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of the extent to and proximity with which the two parties have to work together in 
managing service provision. 
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Figure 7.2 
Examples of service clusters 
Two hypothetical examples. A total outsourcing contract (i) and a software development 
contract (ii). The position on the vertical axis denotes the size of the cluster. The positioning 
on the governance continuum denotes the extent of discreteness or relationality of the 
governance structure. 
The hypothetical example of Table 7.1 is plotted in Figure 7.3. The internal IT 
department (rightmost point) corresponds to a fairly small cluster of services as it 
only includes strategy, planning, security and contract management. Outsourcing 
contract I includes fairly standardised services and can, therefore, afford a more 
market-like governance. Outsourcing contract II includes more company-specific 
services and thus requires more sophisticated governance with hierarchical 
elements. Project contracts A and B are typical systems development contracts. The 
hardware lease contract is the most discrete of all (leftmost point). This graph is 
another useful means of depicting governance portfolios2. 
2 The graph is not drawn to exact scale. The total height of all points in the same governance 
portfolio must equal 1(1: 
S, 
S =1). 
8-1 
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Allocation 
Governance Human Management Management Involvement 
Portfolio Services Budget Resources support Customer --4 F_ Provider 
i Internal Strategy, 5% 1 Senior Steering 
Department Planning. Mgr committee ----- ------- --- ----- _-ý 
Security 1 Mid. Mgr 
1 
Technician 
ii Outsourcing WAN 15% 1 Contract Service level 
contract I Telecoms manager monitoring - ----SIE- 
Contract 
management 
iii Outsourcing Data 45% 1 contract Service level 
contract 11 Centres, manager monitoring ---- --- 4Ie-- 
LAN, Help Contract 
desk management 
iv Project System A 15% 1 Analyst Monitoring 
contract A 1/3 Contract and testing 
manager 
v Project System B 10% 1 Analyst Monitoring 
contract B 1/3 Contract and testing --------------ýiF-------__.... __ _.. _. ____.. _. _... _. __. ý 
manager 
vi base contract Hardware 10% 1/3 Contract Contract -+I¬---- _---- 
manager management 
Table 7.1 
Governance Portfolio Allocation (hypothetical example) 
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Figure 7.3 
Governance Portfolio Allocation 
This graph maps the hypothetical clustering of Table 7.1 
It is also possible to demonstrate on this graph the theoretical argument that larger 
(and hence more heterogeneous) service clusters require more sophisticated 
governance structures, of the kinds located towards the right of the governance 
continuum. Relatively more discrete (market-like) transactions can handle the 
procurement of services that are relatively more standard with little or no asset 
specificity, uncertainty and measurement problems. As clusters grow in size, such 
sources of transaction costs are likely to compound thus making discrete 
transactions infeasible. All this means that clusters on the left of the governance 
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continuum are necessarily more limited in size as compared to clusters organised 
under governance structures towards the right of the governance continuum. 
At the extreme, it can be shown that it is impossible to procure all IT services that 
an organisation makes use of, under a single discrete contract (such as off-the-shelf 
purchasing). It is similarly impossible for any company to produce all services, 
including all hardware and software, in-house. Thus, clusters on the right cannot 
include all services (i. e. their maximum relative cluster size is necessarily less than 
1). Figure 7.4 postulates a convex governance feasibility frontier which represents 
this limit to the maximum feasible size of clusters over the range of the governance 
continuum. 
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Figure 7.4 
Governance Feasibility Frontier 
The governance feasibility frontier represents the extent to which more or fewer IT 
services (larger or smaller clusters) can be organised under a single governance for 
each type of governance. It can also be thought of as an efficient frontier. Given a 
cluster of services, if their governance requirements can be measured using the 
hypothetical surrogate mentioned above, they should be organised under the 
leftmost feasible governance structure3. The efficient governance thus obtained 
mitigates market transaction costs while eschewing unnecessary bureaucratic slack. 
The implicit assumption here is that the respective markets exist and that the law sustains the 
desired governance structures. 
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The shape and the location of the governance frontier are currently unknown and 
possibly indeterminate. The shape in Figure 7.4 is indicative. The governance 
feasibility frontier may vary with time, industry and firm and its shape and location 
are expected to be affected by the nature of IT systems and services and by market 
conditions. 
New technologies and innovative systems are likely to be associated with significant 
uncertainty, specificity and performance measurement problems. Therefore, under 
such conditions the frontier is expected to shift towards the bottom right of the 
diagram. In contrast, as technologies and services mature over time, such as data 
centres and help desks, they are less subject to such conditions. As a result, the 
governance frontier is expected to shift towards the upper left corner of the 
diagram, as technologies become more stable and standardised. The mixture of 
standard and specific services within an organisation will therefore determine, to 
an extent, the governance feasibility frontier. This also supports the argument that 
companies may decide to standardise their systems in order to adopt more market- 
oriented governance structures. See BP's initial reluctance to standardise certain 
information systems as SEMA had suggested, in chapter 4, section 8, last 
paragraph. 
The growth of the market for different systems and services is also another 
determinant of governance feasibility. The governance possibilities faced by 
companies in a remote region or in developing economies are expected to be fewer 
(and perhaps even qualitatively different) to those available in large developed 
markets. Market growth is expected to shift the governance frontier towards the 
upper left corner of the diagram. 
This reference to the IT supply market points to the fact that the preceding 
discussion is made from the point of view of an individual user organisation (i. e. 
the demand side). Indeed, this is the perspective taken by the whole thesis. 
However, a symmetric argument can be articulated for the supply side. The IT 
services market is expected to offer smaller and homogenous clusters of services 
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under relatively more discrete contracts and larger, heterogeneous service clusters 
under more relational governance structures. Clearly, internal organisation 
(hierarchy) amounts to vertical integration, which for the purposes of this 
argument must be seen as a discrete (as opposed to continuous - see end of chapter 
2) change in governance structure. 
A possible supply-side governance frontier is depicted in Figure 7.5 alongside a 
demand-side governance frontier. The former demarcates the minimum cluster 
size sustainable by a given governance structure and/or the maximum governance 
requirements for an IT service cluster of given size. Accordingly, the latter 
demarcates the maximum cluster size for a given governance structure and/or the 
minimum governance requirements for a cluster of given size. The area between 
the two curves can be seen as the range of feasible governance structures for IT 
service clusters that should be expected to be found in practice. 
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Demand and supply side governance feasibility frontiers 
The area between the two curves can be seen as the range of feasible governance structures 
for IT service clusters. The demand side frontier determines the minimum governance 
requirements (leftmost governance structure) for a given service cluster, whereas the supply 
side frontier determines the maximum governance requirements (rightmost governance 
structure) for the same service cluster. 
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3.1.1. Research designs for governance feasibility 
Earlier suggestions to extend the empirical grounding and theoretical scope of the 
S-CAGE framework have an immediate practical benefit in terms of strengthening 
the theory and enhancing its usefulness. In contrast, the notion of governance 
feasibility frontiers is an abstract, conceptual extension of the notions of the 
clustering continuum and the governance continuum. As it stands, it is more of a 
definitional proposition than a testable hypothesis. This approach is common in 
both traditional as well as recent institutional4 economic theories5 (Jensen, 1983). 
For example, in a similar vein, Riordan and Williamson (1985) and Williamson 
(1996: 108-109) draw governance cost curves. 
As Jensen (1983) argues extensively, the potential value of such abstract, 
definitional, propositions is that they can stimulate debate, enhance our 
understanding of the issues and, eventually, lead to the development of partial, 
incremental, testable hypotheses. In this sense, the empirical estimation of the 
governance feasibility frontier for any industry, organisation or technology is not 
the point. Besides, it would be very difficult, if not impossible to do in practice. On 
the other hand, understanding what makes one or more IT services more or less 
amenable to contracting under different governance structures, is both more 
attainable (if carried out incrementally) and more valuable for practitioners. 
Empirically deriving the determinants of governance feasibility for a given set of IT 
services within a given organisational context, could be a fruitful research 
direction. The literature on IT outsourcing and the empirical work carried out for 
this thesis, show that one issue practitioners are deliberating is whether IT is, or 
will ever be, suitable for `simple' purchasing. For example, a senior BP manager 
raised this possibility (see chapter 4, section 4, paragraph 6). Moreover, common 
' Williamson (1985) coins the term 'new institutional economics' to refer collectively to transaction 
cost and related theories. See chapter 2, Figure 2.1 and related text. 
5 See also Figure 3.1 and related text in chapter 3. 
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understanding suggests that industry maturity with a technology can be an enabler 
of more hands-off contracting practices. Clearly, understanding the determinants 
of governance feasibility has both theoretical and practical value. 
Both intensive and contextual, as well as extensive and statistical research 
approaches are suitable for this purpose. As mentioned in chapter 2, section 8, the 
study of governance structure entails significant measurement problems. The 
theoretical constructs with which we are dealing in these theories are not directly 
observable in practice in the way that quantities and prices are. However, it is still 
worthwhile to try to develop appropriate measurement instruments based on 
indirect manifestations of the mechanisms of interest. Such endeavours have been 
met with some success in other areas of information systems, such as service quality 
(e. g. Pitt et al 1995) and information privacy (Smith et al 1996). Empirical 
research of the transaction and agency determinants of organisational form, 
abound in economics, marketing and organisational studies. Quantitative research 
on this subject aims at developing suitable measurement instruments that 
approximate the constructs of interest (such as asset specificity and risk aversion) 
satisfactorily. 
In contrast, qualitative research relies on interpretive evidence of the presence and 
magnitude of such constructs. As suggested in chapters 4,5 and 6, the presence 
and magnitude of asset specificity or uncertainty, is not always objectively 
understood. It often depends on the perceived value of IT assets and on subjective 
expectations about the future of the technology and of the organisation. Therefore, 
further research on the determinants of governance feasibility ought to combine 
both quantitative and qualitative sources of evidence, in both intensive and 
extensive research designs (see footnote 5 above). 
A final epistemological note is warranted at this stage. On the whole, the proposals 
advanced in this subsection appear to linger towards the empiricist research 
tradition that has been rejected earlier in chapter 3. Transcendental realism does 
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not make any a priori judgements for or against particular techniques for empirical 
research. It does, however, restrict the types of theoretical claims that they sustain. 
For example, there is nothing inherently wrong in developing an empirical 
instrument for measuring the idiosyncrasy of governance structures, as long as we 
qualify the result as representative of experiences and not of real structures and 
mechanisms. Such measures of experience are still important elements of realist 
research. The epistemological assessment of the above proposals should become an 
integral part of their substantive development. 
4. Information technology and other business activities 
A question that naturally arises is to what extent the S-CAGE framework is specific 
to the procurement of IT or of general applicability to any business activity. The 
straightforward answer is that it has been developed in the context of and for the 
purposes of IT procurement and therefore, any claims of broader generality cannot 
be sustained by this research. Surely though, there are good reasons to expect that 
this framework should be valid outside IT. 
The question asked can be restated as to what extent IT is similar or different to 
other business activities. The argument made here is that the provision of IT 
services presents certain distinct differences. In particular, IT permeates all parts of 
the organisation, or, in other words, it is not organisationally contained. Not only is 
IT found in every part of the business but it is also intrinsically linked with it. While 
computers, software and communications are typically standard products, the 
services they perform are typically inseparable from the business activity they 
serve. Every change in organisation and management has to be followed by 
appropriate adaptations in the respective information systems and vice versah 
6 One implication of this argument is that inasmuch as information systems are inseparable from the 
business itself, the expectation that IT suppliers should recommend innovative uses of IT, amounts 
to expecting innovations to the core business from an IT supplier. This is a particularly problematic 
issue, as discussed in chapter 5, section 4.2, paragraphs 5-8 and in the next section in this chapter. 
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This is not the case with other business activities. For example, the procurement of 
manufacturing designs and components is a complex process, often involving a 
large number of services and (sub)systems and significant asset specificity. 
However, it is organisationally isolated and requirements can be specified with 
engineering precision. Warehousing and distribution is a function that may involve 
significant uncertainty but, again, it is organisationally separated and well defined. 
Similar arguments can be made for most business activities that are candidates for 
contracting out, from accounting/finance and advertising to catering and mail 
facilities. 
Further implications are manifested when trying to specify contractual 
requirements. Requirements are ill-defined and subject to frequent change. The 
same is true for support services. User organisations often wish to specify 
requirements in business terms in order to distance themselves from technological 
issues. Sometimes, though, contracts of useful duration are not sustainable if 
business requirements change regularly and are not measurable. Faced with this 
problem, companies have to resort to specifying requirements for technical 
resources (inputs). But then, in the face of technological innovation and changing 
market prices, they risk being locked into obsolete or too expensive systems and/or 
skills. 
To address these difficulties, the S-CAGE framework places particular attention in 
the problems related to service definition and requirements specification under the 
first layer of governance (assurance of service delivery). In addition, innovation is 
facilitated with appropriate incentives (elaborated under the second layer of 
governance) and, more importantly, through coordination processes that 
communicate relevant information to the appropriate persons in the organisation 
(discussed under the third layer of governance). 
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To be sure, not all IT systems and services are subject to such problems to the same 
degree. This, in turn, points to another distinct feature of IT, namely, the 
multiplicity, heterogeneity and interconnectedness of systems and services. The 
notion of clustering aims at providing a basis for balancing the benefits of 
specialisation that accrue to separated organisation of services and the 
requirements for coordination. 
The only other business activity that has to coordinate a diverse range of 
interrelated components is production, for instance in the clothing and car 
industries. In these industries, however, the division of clusters is given by the 
designs, the technology and the structure of the market. IT services are not 
separable with the same ease and their interfaces are less well defined. Meanwhile, 
the market is not segmented into specialist suppliers, with few exceptions such as 
telecommunications. 
To summarise, the S-CAGE framework is geared towards IT procurement. As such, 
it emphasises certain distinct features of IT. However, all its theoretical claims must 
have broader applicability since they are based on general economic theories. 
Therefore, S-CAGE must be relevant to other business activities, even if it may not 
give a balanced emphasis on the issues that are important in every such case. 
5. A final illustration 
IT outsourcing is still a topical issue today, even though it ranked last (20th) in the 
1994 survey of IS management issues in the US (Brancheau et al 1996). Figure 7.6 
shows the number of articles (academic as well as professional) related to IT 
outsourcing that have been recorded in the ABI/INFORM bibliographic database 
over the period 1988-'96. Even if these figures represent a lot of industry 
hyperbole, they are an indication of an increasing interest in the topic. 
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Some of this interest may be a result of the continuous growth of the industry (see 
the introduction of chapter 1) or from concerns that arise as experience 
accumulates from earlier contracts. Such is a recent article7 reporting on the 
initiatives of the International Information Technology Users Group, an exclusive 
group of the 20 largest IT outsourcing users in the world. The aim of this group is 
to find solutions to a range of problems that arise in outsourcing relationships, 
mainly due to contractual incompleteness. Of course, this is not the term used in 
the article. Instead, the article refers to `soft promises' which include, among others, 
"prompt responses to letters and telephone calls, critical technological failures 
beyond the contracted targets, unexpected changes in staff or failure to meet 
unexpected changes in demand". There is also reference to minor opportunistic 
tactics by both customers and suppliers and to trust which is defined as `no 
unpleasant surprises'. Finally, the largest outsourcing users stress their expectation 
that suppliers deliver "value added service which should be a new, specific and 
innovative IT-led creation that increases profits'". 
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Figure 7.6 
Number of articles on `information technology outsourcing' in the ABI/INFORM 
bibliographic database, over the period 1988-1996 
If this report summarises the main problems that arise in big outsourcing deals, the 
S-CAGE framework can help separate the issues in order to understand them from 
a clearer perspective. Breaches of the so called soft promises can be limited by 
By Tony Collins, Computer Weekly, Thursday 31 July 1997, pp. 1,16-17. 
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introducing more detailed requirements and measures of performance in the 
contract. Indeed, the above mentioned user group tries to devise scorecards for use 
by both client and supplier staff with a view to recording such breaches from both 
sides. However, such breaches are ultimately unavoidable on account of the 
necessary incompleteness of contracts. Moreover, the difficulty (cost) of devising 
and administering additional metrics may not be worth the marginal improvement 
in the relationship (see the SLR lifecycle in chapter 5, section 4.1.2.1), although, 
admittedly, it may be worth doing so collectively within a consortium of clients and 
suppliers such as the above mentioned group. 
The treatment of trust in S-CAGE suggests that unless there are severe sanctions 
against minor opportunistic tactics, their short term benefits will always exceed the 
respective `costs' in terms of unpleasant friction (since they never threaten the 
continuation of the contract). Moreover, trust has to be calculative and rigorously 
supported by appropriate governance mechanisms. The terms trust and partnership 
should not be synonyms for lousy contracting. The notion of trust as `no unpleasant 
surprises' points directly to the importance of a common culture for addressing 
contingencies in a way that satisfies the expectations of both parties. 
Finally, the expectation of business-specific innovations of the kind mentioned in 
the article is unrealistic unless strong incentives and safeguards are offered. In 
particular, clients will have to be prepared to pay a premium and guarantee a long 
term contract, if the supplier is to be induced to commit the unique, specific 
investment required for such innovations. Suppliers are furthermore deterred from 
such activity because the client cannot commit not to hire key supplier personnel 
when the latter acquire business-specific expertise. As it turns out, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that vendors purposefully rotate key staff in order to pre-empt 
this possibility. If client organisations are not prepared to (or cannot) offer the 
necessary incentives and safeguards, they will have to develop and maintain 
appropriate skills and organisational structures to produce such innovations 
internally. As mentioned in the previous section, this specificity of innovations in IT 
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to the core of the business is a characteristic that distinguishes IT from other 
business activities. 
The purpose of the S-CAGE framework is to provide a theoretically grounded basis 
for illuminating practical problems, such as this brief exposition, with a view to 
supporting further decision making. There remains ample scope for broadening 
and strengthening our understanding of the effective and efficient governance of IT 
service provision. It is hoped that further research activity will take on this 
challenge. 
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APPENDIX 1 Interview Guide 
The following was used as a guide to the interviews carried out at ICI andAnglian 
Water. It has been derived from the S-CAGE framework as presented in chapter 5. 
Plan 
" Interview Part A: Discussing the overall organisation of IT and the allocation of 
services to contracts. Likely contact: IT director. 
" Interview Part B: Discussing the governance details of selected contracts. While 
specific services are the focal points, the whole corresponding contract will be 
examined. Likely contact: Contract manager or equivalent; someone who knows 
the contract well. 
Interviewe 
(The corresponding elements of S-CAGE are indicated in curly brackets) 
Part A 
(Service clustering) 
" Obtain a comprehensive list and/or statistics of the kinds of contracts (services, 
duration, value, compensation, management involvement) should be recorded. 
" Discuss why have they grouped/split services in the way they have and not in 
some other way. Discuss any plans for changes. 
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Part B 
{General} 
" Start date and duration of the contract 
" Brief history of the outsourcing decision and process 
" Discuss success/satisfaction with the contract. 
(1. Assurance of service delivery) 
{ 1.1. Service specification) 
" List the services and activities identified in the contract. 
" Discuss why they were put under the same contract. What do they have in 
common? What are the most profound differences? 
" Discuss the degree of specificity of assets or investments included in the contract 
(physical (h/w, s/w, data), human, site and dedicated). How important are 
specific assets in comparison to the total value of the contract? 
" Discuss the extent of uncertainty involved with each of the services of the 
contract. Uncertainty can be defined in three main ways: (I) Changing user 
needs and requirements, (ii) changes in the technology and (iii) Unpredictable 
factors affecting performance. 
" Is the service or its requirements expected to change over time? How would the 
contract cope with any changes? 
" Discuss the size of operations required and potential economies of scale. 
" Discuss possible resources shared among the services within the contract or with 
other contracts (H/W, S/W, physical space, skills). 
" Is the performance of the focal service related to the performance of other 
services? 
" Are any other inter-dependencies and complementarities among services within 
the same contract or between contracts perceived significant? 
" Discuss variations in demand for the service and resource utilisation over time. 
Appendix: Interview Guide 
" To what extent does the contract specify what (the user's view of the service) 
must be delivered and how (e. g. resources, people, skills, methods etc. ) it must be 
done? Why? 
" How much discretion and control does the contract give the client to tell the 
provider howto provide the service? Why? 
" How critical is this service to the company? What are its most critical 
performance aspects? 
{ 1.2. Service level requirements specification} 
" Discuss how rigorously performance metrics and targets are specified. Both for 
inputs (costs and perhaps human resources) and for outputs (service levels). 
" To what extend are they expressed in business or technical terms. 
" Discuss the completeness of SLRs, i. e. the extent to which they cover all aspects of 
intended performance. 
" Discuss the precision of SLRs, i. e. the extent to which they are accurate and 
unambiguous measures of actual performance. 
" Discuss problems that have been observed with respect to the efficacy of SLRs 
and the actions taken to alleviate them. 
" What, if any, different categories of SLRs are there (e. g. critical, non-critical, 
random)? 
(1.3. Service level measurement and verification) 
" What monitoring, measurement and reporting mechanisms are specified in the 
contract, i. e. how are SLRs measured and reported? 
" Who is responsible for measurement and reporting? 
" Any verification processes regularly carried out or exceptionally provided for by 
the contract? 
" Is there any additional information over and above the SLRs being measured, e. g. 
persistent problems or exceptions. 
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" Is the administrative cost of measurement and verification considered to be a 
problem? Are the measurement/monitoring processes considered to be effective? 
" What is the frequency of performance measurement and reporting? 
" Have they observed problems with the provider(s) taking advantage of either 
gaps in monitoring or over-monitoring? 
" Have there been disagreements between client and provider as to the true 
performance delivered? 
(2. Incentives for service level attainment) 
(2.1. Implicit incentive patterns) 
" How difficult is it to obtain information about the costs, capabilities and 
performance of the supplier? 
" Does the contract include the right to audit and/or to benchmark the supplier's 
activity? Do they make use of this right? 
" Have they observed opportunistic behaviour from the provider's part? Does this 
opportunistic behaviour consist of major failures to meet agreed targets or does 
it consist of taking advantage of minor gaps in the contract or in the monitoring 
process? 
" How do they react to such behaviour? 
" What is the provider's liability in case of failure? 
" Who has ownership and who has control rights over hardware and software? 
" Who keeps the hardware and software after the end of the contract? 
" Are there equivalent provisions for staff to return to the company? 
" Are there any exclusivity or confidentiality clauses as to the use of specialised 
systems or equipment? 
" How important is the supplier's reputation, within the particular contract and 
within the whole market? 
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{2.2. Contractual reward/penalty devices} 
" What proportion of the supplier's total compensation is fixed, what proportion is 
cost-based and what proportion is based on performance incentives? 
" Discuss any explicit incentives stipulated in the contract. 
" Does the incentive system encourage by rewarding or does it deter by penalising, 
or both? Why? 
" How does the incentive mechanism work? Is the reward/penalty fixed in 
advance or is it variable depending on the extent of good/bad performance? 
" Does it cover all services under the contract? Does it place more weight on some 
services than on others? 
" Are incentives based on the outcome of the provider's work (i. e. service levels) or 
on their effort (i. e. cost)? 
" Are the incentive targets specified in terms of values, intervals or thresholds? 
" Are incentives based on average performance over time or not? 
" Are uncontrollable factors affecting the performance of the supplier taken into 
account? 
" Does the incentive system forgive some deviations from the targets or not and 
how? 
" Are incentive targets subject to renegotiation? Have they been revised at all? Are 
they considered sufficient? 
" Are they satisfied with the operation of the incentive system? Have there been 
any problems? 
2.3. Other contractual and organisational safeguards) 
" What, in their opinion, is the strongest incentive for the supplier? 
" How important is trust and organisational culture? 
" What types of disagreements/problems/disputes are most common? How severe 
are they perceived to be? How are they dealt with? 
" Is there a termination clause and how can it be invoked? 
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(S. Organisation and management of service provision} 
{3.1. Roles and responsibilities} 
" What managerial roles does the company and the provider put in place to 
oversee service delivery and contract execution? 
" Discuss the extent and the tasks of the managerial involvement of the company 
in overseeing the contract. 
" How are renegotiations dealt with? 
{3.2. Coordination and communication mechanisms} 
" Discuss the communication channels that exist between client and provider 
regarding contract execution and service delivery. Are they formally stipulated 
in the contract or not? 
" How are contingencies dealt with? 
" Is there an escalation process? How is it invoked? 
(3.3. Locus and scope of decision making} 
" Discuss which managers or committees have decision authority over the contract 
and the relations with the vendor. 
" Discuss how disputes are being handled. 
" Discuss how renegotiations can be initiated and who participates. 
356 
APPENDIX 2 Research Participants 
This appendix lists the managers who were involved in interviews and other 
meetings during the case studies. 
BP 
The primary contact throughout the case study was David Beaney, then Global 
Head of IT, BP Oil. Extensive and repeated interaction took place with his associates 
in Oil's global IS group, Brian Ralphs and Stephen Cotten, during most of the case 
study (both moved from that office before the end of the case study). Paul Stone, 
who was initially coordinating IT operations at the Corporate Centre, was involved 
in the case study from the first presentation. He became much more actively 
involved in the case study after the departure of Stephen Cotten, when his 
responsibilities were also augmented. The other attendants at the first presentation 
were John Cross, im Hood (both from BPX) and Graham Williams (BPCC). Most of 
them were individually interviewed in subsequent meetings. More brief discussions 
took place with John Cross and Stephen Giles (Oil Europe). During another visit, 
Tom Gallen (BPCC) offered more extensive information about the IT contracting 
practices across the Group. Brian Hitch (VP Operations, BP America) offered his 
view during a long meeting. George Fish (BPX) extensively explained the BPX 
approach. John Maher (PRM at Oil's HQ at Hemel) clarified the SLAs and grief 
point systems. Barry Poulten (Air BP at Hemel) explained his role as part time PRM 
and Air's contract. Robert Booth (SEMA Site Manager at Hemel) and David Tait 
(SEMA Account Manager, based at Birmingham) offered the supplier's view. 
ICI 
One interview at the London Headquarters and several telephone interviews were 
conducted with Dr. Richard Sykes, Group IS Manager. 
Anglian Water 
Mrs. Diane Rafter, Service Manager, offered a face-to-face and a telephone 
interview, and a review of the case write up. 
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